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rfc:rfc9322



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Mizrahi Request for Comments: 9322 Huawei Category: Standards Track F. Brockners ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco

                                                           S. Bhandari
                                                           Thoughtspot
                                                              B. Gafni
                                                                Nvidia
                                                            M. Spiegel
                                                     Barefoot Networks
                                                         November 2022

In Situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) Loopback and

                            Active Flags

Abstract

 In situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) collects
 operational and telemetry information in packets while they traverse
 a path between two points in the network.  This document defines two
 new flags in the IOAM Trace Option headers, specifically the Loopback
 and Active flags.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9322.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
 Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
 in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction
 2.  Conventions
   2.1.  Requirements Language
   2.2.  Terminology
 3.  New IOAM Trace Option Flags
 4.  Loopback in IOAM
   4.1.  Loopback: Encapsulating Node Functionality
     4.1.1.  Loopback Packet Selection
   4.2.  Receiving and Processing Loopback
   4.3.  Loopback on the Return Path
   4.4.  Terminating a Looped-Back Packet
 5.  Active Measurement with IOAM
 6.  IANA Considerations
 7.  Performance Considerations
 8.  Security Considerations
 9.  References
   9.1.  Normative References
   9.2.  Informative References
 Acknowledgments
 Contributors
 Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

 IOAM [RFC9197] is used for monitoring traffic in the network by
 incorporating IOAM data fields into in-flight data packets.
 IOAM data may be represented in one of four possible IOAM options:
 Pre-allocated Trace, Incremental Trace, Proof of Transit (POT), and
 Edge-to-Edge.  This document defines two new flags in the Pre-
 allocated and Incremental Trace options: the Loopback and Active
 flags.
 The Loopback flag is used to request that each transit device along
 the path loops back a truncated copy of the data packet to the
 sender.  The Active flag indicates that a packet is used for active
 measurement.  The term "active measurement" in the context of this
 document is as defined in [RFC7799].

2. Conventions

2.1. Requirements Language

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
 capitals, as shown here.

2.2. Terminology

 Abbreviations used in this document:
 IOAM:   In situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
 OAM:    Operations, Administration, and Maintenance [RFC6291]

3. New IOAM Trace Option Flags

 This document defines two new flags in the Pre-allocated and
 Incremental Trace options:
 Bit 1 "Loopback" (L-bit):  When set, the Loopback flag triggers the
    sending of a copy of a packet back towards the source, as further
    described in Section 4.
 Bit 2 "Active" (A-bit):  When set, the Active flag indicates that a
    packet is an active measurement packet rather than a data packet,
    where "active" is used in the sense defined in [RFC7799].  The
    packet may be an IOAM probe packet or a replicated data packet
    (the second and third use cases of Section 5).

4. Loopback in IOAM

 The Loopback flag is used to request that each transit device along
 the path loops back a truncated copy of the data packet to the
 sender.  Loopback allows an IOAM encapsulating node to trace the path
 to a given destination and to receive per-hop data about both the
 forward and return paths.  Loopback is intended to provide an
 accelerated alternative to Traceroute that allows the encapsulating
 node to receive responses from multiple transit nodes along the path
 in less than one round-trip time (RTT) and by sending a single
 packet.
 As illustrated in Figure 1, an IOAM encapsulating node can push an
 IOAM encapsulation that includes the Loopback flag onto some or all
 of the packets it forwards using one of the IOAM encapsulation types,
 e.g., [IOAM-NSH] or [IOAM-IPV6-OPTIONS].  The IOAM transit node and
 the decapsulating node both create copies of the packet and loop them
 back to the encapsulating node.  The decapsulating node also
 terminates the IOAM encapsulation and then forwards the packet
 towards the destination.  The two IOAM looped-back copies are
 terminated by the encapsulating node.

+——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ | | | IOAM |…..| IOAM |…..| IOAM | | | +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ | L2/L3 |⇐=⇒| L2/L3 |⇐=⇒| L2/L3 |⇐=⇒| L2/L3 |⇐=⇒| L2/L3 | +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+

 Source      Encapsulating    Transit      Decapsulating   Destination
                  Node           Node           Node
              <------------  IOAM-Domain  ----------->
                   IOAM encap. with Loopback flag

Data packet ——→===========================⇒———–>

                                 |             |
                IOAM looped back |             |
                   <=============+             |
                               IOAM looped back|
                   <===========================+
                     Figure 1: Loopback in IOAM
 Loopback can be used only if a return path from transit nodes and
 destination nodes towards the source (encapsulating node) exists.
 Specifically, loopback is only applicable in encapsulations in which
 the identity of the encapsulating node is available in the
 encapsulation header.  If an encapsulating node receives a looped-
 back packet that was not originated from the current encapsulating
 node, the packet is dropped.

4.1. Loopback: Encapsulating Node Functionality

 The encapsulating node either generates synthetic packets with an
 IOAM trace option that has the Loopback flag set or sets the Loopback
 flag in a subset of the in-transit data packets.  Loopback is used
 either proactively or on-demand, i.e., when a failure is detected.
 The encapsulating node also needs to ensure that sufficient space is
 available in the IOAM header for loopback operation, which includes
 transit nodes adding trace data on the original path and again on the
 return path.
 An IOAM trace option that has the Loopback flag set MUST have the
 value '1' in the most significant bit of IOAM-Trace-Type and '0' in
 the rest of the bits of IOAM-Trace-Type.  Thus, every transit node
 that processes this trace option only adds a single data field, which
 is the Hop_Lim and node_id data field.  A transit node that receives
 a packet with an IOAM trace option that has the Loopback flag set and
 the IOAM-Trace-Type is not equal to '1' in the most significant bit
 and '0' in the rest of the bits MUST NOT loop back a copy of the
 packet.  The reason for allowing only a single data field per hop is
 to minimize the impact of amplification attacks.
 IOAM encapsulating nodes MUST NOT push an IOAM encapsulation with the
 Loopback flag onto data packets that already include an IOAM
 encapsulation.  This requirement is intended to prevent IOAM Loopback
 nesting where looped-back packets may be subject to loopback in a
 nested IOAM-Domain.

4.1.1. Loopback Packet Selection

 If an IOAM encapsulating node incorporates the Loopback flag into all
 the traffic it forwards, it may lead to an excessive amount of looped
 back packets, which may overload the network and the encapsulating
 node.  Therefore, an IOAM encapsulating node that supports the
 Loopback flag MUST support the ability to incorporate the Loopback
 flag selectively into a subset of the packets that are forwarded by
 it.
 Various methods of packet selection and sampling have been previously
 defined, such as [RFC7014] and [RFC5475].  Similar techniques can be
 applied by an IOAM encapsulating node to apply loopback to a subset
 of the forwarded traffic.
 The subset of traffic that is forwarded or transmitted with a
 Loopback flag SHOULD NOT exceed 1/N of the interface capacity on any
 of the IOAM encapsulating node's interfaces.  This requirement
 applies to the total traffic that incorporates a Loopback flag,
 including traffic that is forwarded by the IOAM encapsulating node
 and probe packets that are generated by the IOAM encapsulating node.
 In this context, N is a parameter that can be configurable by network
 operators.  If there is an upper bound, M, on the number of IOAM
 transit nodes in any path in the network, then configuring N such
 that N >> M (i.e., N is much greater than M) is RECOMMENDED.  The
 rationale is that a packet that includes the Loopback flag triggers a
 looped-back packet from each IOAM transit node along the path for a
 total of M looped-back packets.  Thus, if N >> M, then the number of
 looped-back packets is significantly lower than the number of data
 packets forwarded by the IOAM encapsulating node.  It is RECOMMENDED
 that the default value of N satisfies N>100 to be used in the absence
 of explicit operator configuration or if there is no prior knowledge
 about the network topology or size.
 An IOAM-Domain in which the Loopback flag is used MUST be configured
 such that there is expected to be a return path from each of the IOAM
 transit and IOAM decapsulating nodes; if this expectation does not
 apply, or if the encapsulating node's identity is not available in
 the encapsulation header, then configuration MUST NOT enable the
 Loopback flag to be set.

4.2. Receiving and Processing Loopback

 A Loopback flag that is set indicates to the transit nodes processing
 this option that they are to create a copy of the received packet and
 send the copy back to the source of the packet.  In this context, the
 source is the IOAM encapsulating node and it is assumed that the
 source address is available in the encapsulation header.  Thus, the
 source address of the original packet is used as the destination
 address in the copied packet.  If IOAM is used over an encapsulation
 that does not include the address of the encapsulating node, then the
 transit/decapsulating node does not loop back a copy of the original
 packet.  The address of the node performing the copy operation is
 used as the source address; the specific method of source address
 assignment is encapsulation specific, e.g., if an IPv6 encapsulation
 is used, then the source address can be assigned as specified in
 [RFC6724].  The copy is also truncated, i.e., any payload that
 resides after the IOAM option(s) is removed before transmitting the
 looped-back packet back towards the encapsulating node.  Creating the
 copy that is looped back, and specifically the truncation, may
 require some encapsulation-specific updates in the encapsulation
 header.  The original packet continues towards its destination.  The
 L-bit MUST be cleared in the copy of the packet that a node sends
 back towards the source.
 An IOAM node that supports the reception and processing of the
 Loopback flag MUST support the ability to limit the rate of the
 looped-back packets.  The rate of looped-back packets SHOULD be
 limited so that the number of looped-back packets is significantly
 lower than the number of packets that are forwarded by the device.
 The looped-back data rate SHOULD NOT exceed 1/N of the interface
 capacity on any of the IOAM node's interfaces.  Using N>100 is
 RECOMMENDED.  Depending on the IOAM node's architecture
 considerations, the loopback response rate may be limited to a lower
 number in order to avoid overloading the IOAM node.

4.3. Loopback on the Return Path

 On its way back towards the source, the copied packet is processed
 like any other packet with IOAM information, including adding
 requested data at each transit node (assuming there is sufficient
 space).

4.4. Terminating a Looped-Back Packet

 Once the return packet reaches the IOAM-Domain boundary, IOAM
 decapsulation occurs as with any other packet containing IOAM
 information.  Note that the looped-back packet does not have the
 L-bit set.  The IOAM encapsulating node that initiated the original
 loopback packet recognizes a received packet as an IOAM looped-back
 packet by checking the Node ID in the Hop_Lim/node_id field that
 corresponds to the first hop.  If the Node ID and IOAM-Namespace
 match the current IOAM node, it indicates that this is a looped-back
 packet that was initiated by the current IOAM node and processed
 accordingly.  If there is no match in the Node ID, the packet is
 processed like a conventional IOAM-encapsulated packet.
 Note that an IOAM encapsulating node may be either an endpoint (such
 as an IPv6 host) or a switch/router that pushes a tunnel
 encapsulation onto data packets.  In both cases, the functionality
 that was described above avoids IOAM data leaks from the IOAM-Domain.
 Specifically, if an IOAM looped-back packet reaches an IOAM boundary
 node that is not the IOAM node that initiated the loopback, the node
 does not process the packet as a loopback; the IOAM encapsulation is
 removed, preventing IOAM information from leaking out from the IOAM-
 Domain.  Since the packet does not have any payload, it is
 terminated.

5. Active Measurement with IOAM

 Active measurement methods [RFC7799] make use of synthetically
 generated packets in order to facilitate measurement.  This section
 presents use cases of active measurement using the IOAM Active flag.
 The Active flag indicates that a packet is used for active
 measurement.  An IOAM decapsulating node that receives a packet with
 the Active flag set in one of its Trace options must terminate the
 packet.  The Active flag is intended to simplify the implementation
 of decapsulating nodes by indicating that the packet should not be
 forwarded further.  It is not intended as a replacement for existing
 active OAM protocols, which may run in higher layers and make use of
 the Active flag.
 An example of an IOAM deployment scenario is illustrated in Figure 2.
 The figure depicts two endpoints: a source and a destination.  The
 data traffic from the source to the destination is forwarded through
 a set of network devices, including an IOAM encapsulating node (which
 incorporates one or more IOAM options), a decapsulating node (which
 removes the IOAM options), and optionally one or more transit nodes.
 The IOAM options are encapsulated in one of the IOAM encapsulation
 types, e.g., [IOAM-NSH] or [IOAM-IPV6-OPTIONS].

+——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ | | | IOAM |…..| IOAM |…..| IOAM | | | +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ | L2/L3 |⇐=⇒| L2/L3 |⇐=⇒| L2/L3 |⇐=⇒| L2/L3 |⇐=⇒| L2/L3 | +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+ +——–+

 Source      Encapsulating    Transit      Decapsulating   Destination
                 Node           Node           Node
              <------------  IOAM-Domain  ----------->
                    Figure 2: Network Using IOAM
 This document focuses on three possible use cases of active
 measurement using IOAM.  These use cases are described using the
 example of Figure 2.
 Endpoint active measurement:
    synthetic probe packets are sent between the source and
    destination, traversing the IOAM-Domain.  Since the probe packets
    are sent between the endpoints, these packets are treated as data
    packets by the IOAM-Domain and do not require special treatment at
    the IOAM layer.  Specifically, the Active flag is not used in this
    case and the IOAM layer does not need to be aware that an active
    measurement mechanism is used at a higher layer.
 IOAM active measurement using probe packets within the IOAM-
 Domain:
    probe packets are generated and transmitted by the IOAM
    encapsulating node and are expected to be terminated by the
    decapsulating node.  IOAM data related to probe packets may be
    exported by one or more nodes along its path by an exporting
    protocol that is outside the scope of this document (e.g.,
    [IOAM-RAWEXPORT]).  Probe packets include a Trace Option that has
    its Active flag set, indicating that the decapsulating node must
    terminate them.  The specification of these probe packets and the
    processing of these packets by the encapsulating and decapsulating
    nodes is outside the scope of this document.
 IOAM active measurement using replicated data packets:
    probe packets are created by the encapsulating node by selecting
    some or all of the en route data packets and replicating them.  A
    selected data packet and its (possibly truncated) copy is
    forwarded with one or more IOAM options while the original packet
    is forwarded normally without IOAM options.  To the extent
    possible, the original data packet and its replica are forwarded
    through the same path.  The replica includes a Trace Option that
    has its Active flag set, indicating that the decapsulating node
    should terminate it.  The current document defines the role of the
    Active flag in allowing the decapsulating node to terminate the
    packet, but the replication functionality and the functionality of
    the decapsulating node in this context is outside the scope of
    this document.
 If the volume of traffic that incorporates the Active flag is large,
 it may overload the network and the IOAM node(s) that process the
 active measurement packet.  Thus, the rate of the traffic that
 includes the Active flag SHOULD NOT exceed 1/N of the interface
 capacity on any of the IOAM node's interfaces.  Using N>100 is
 RECOMMENDED.  Depending on the IOAM node's architecture
 considerations, the rate of Active-enabled IOAM packets may be
 limited to a lower number in order to avoid overloading the IOAM
 node.

6. IANA Considerations

 IANA has allocated the following bits in the "IOAM Trace-Flags"
 registry as follows:
 Bit 1  "Loopback" (L-bit)
 Bit 2  "Active" (A-bit)
 This document is specified as the "Reference" in the registry for
 both bits.
 Note that bit 0 is the most significant bit in the "IOAM Trace-Flags"
 registry.  This bit was allocated by [RFC9197] as the 'Overflow' bit.

7. Performance Considerations

 Each of the flags that are defined in this document may have
 performance implications.  When using the loopback mechanism, a copy
 of the data packet is sent back to the sender (thus, generating more
 traffic than originally sent by the endpoints).  Using active
 measurement with the Active flag requires the use of synthetic
 (overhead) traffic.
 Each of the mechanisms that use the flags above has a cost in terms
 of the network bandwidth and may potentially load the node that
 analyzes the data.  Therefore, it MUST be possible to use each of the
 mechanisms on a subset of the data traffic; an encapsulating node
 needs to be able to set the Loopback and Active flags selectively in
 a way that considers the effect on the network performance, as
 further discussed in Sections 4.1.1 and 5.
 Transit and decapsulating nodes that support loopback need to be able
 to limit the looped-back packets (as discussed in Section 4.2) so as
 to ensure that the mechanisms are used at a rate that does not
 significantly affect the network bandwidth and does not overload the
 source node in the case of loopback.

8. Security Considerations

 The security considerations of IOAM in general are discussed in
 [RFC9197].  Specifically, an attacker may try to use the
 functionality that is defined in this document to attack the network.
 IOAM is assumed to be deployed in a restricted administrative domain,
 thus limiting the scope of the threats above and their effect.  This
 is a fundamental assumption with respect to the security aspects of
 IOAM as further discussed in [RFC9197].  However, even given this
 limited scope, security threats should still be considered and
 mitigated.  Specifically, an attacker may attempt to overload network
 devices by injecting synthetic packets that include an IOAM Trace
 Option with one or more of the flags defined in this document.
 Similarly, an on-path attacker may maliciously set one or more of the
 flags of transit packets.
 Loopback flag:
    an attacker that sets this flag, either in synthetic packets or
    transit packets, can potentially cause an amplification since each
    device along the path creates a copy of the data packet and sends
    it back to the source.  The attacker can potentially leverage the
    Loopback flag for a DDoS attack as multiple devices send looped-
    back copies of a packet to a single victim.
 Active flag:
    the impact of synthetic packets with the Active flag is no worse
    than synthetic data packets in which the Active flag is not set.
    By setting the Active flag in en route packets, an attacker can
    prevent these packets from reaching their destination since the
    packet is terminated by the decapsulating device.  However, note
    that an on-path attacker may achieve the same goal by changing the
    destination address of a packet.  Another potential threat is
    amplification; if an attacker causes transit switches to replicate
    more packets than they are intended to replicate (either by
    setting the Active flag or by sending synthetic packets), then
    traffic is amplified, causing bandwidth degradation.  As mentioned
    in Section 5, the specification of the replication mechanism is
    not within the scope of this document.  A specification that
    defines the replication functionality should also address the
    security aspects of this mechanism.
 Some of the security threats that were discussed in this document may
 be worse in a wide area network in which there are nested IOAM-
 Domains.  For example, if there are two nested IOAM-Domains that use
 loopback, then a looped-back copy in the outer IOAM-Domain may be
 forwarded through another (inner) IOAM-Domain and may be subject to
 loopback in that (inner) IOAM-Domain, causing the amplification to be
 worse than in the conventional case.
 In order to mitigate the performance-related attacks described in
 Section 7, it should be possible for IOAM-enabled devices to
 selectively apply the mechanisms that use the flags defined in this
 document to a subset of the traffic and to limit the performance of
 synthetically generated packets to a configurable rate.
 Specifically, IOAM nodes should be able to:
  • Limit the rate of IOAM packets with the Loopback flag (IOAM

encapsulating nodes) as discussed in Section 4.1.1.

  • Limit the rate of looped back packets (IOAM transit and

decapsulating nodes) as discussed in Section 4.2.

  • Limit the rate of IOAM packets with the Active flag (IOAM

encapsulating nodes) as discussed in Section 5.

 As defined in Section 4, transit nodes that process a packet with the
 Loopback flag only add a single data field and truncate any payload
 that follows the IOAM option(s), thus significantly limiting the
 possible impact of an amplification attack.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
            2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
            May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
 [RFC9197]  Brockners, F., Ed., Bhandari, S., Ed., and T. Mizrahi,
            Ed., "Data Fields for In Situ Operations, Administration,
            and Maintenance (IOAM)", RFC 9197, DOI 10.17487/RFC9197,
            May 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9197>.

9.2. Informative References

 [IOAM-IPV6-OPTIONS]
            Bhandari, S., Ed. and F. Brockners, Ed., "In-situ OAM IPv6
            Options", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
            ippm-ioam-ipv6-options-09, 11 October 2022,
            <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ippm-
            ioam-ipv6-options-09>.
 [IOAM-NSH] Brockners, F., Ed. and S. Bhandari, Ed., "Network Service
            Header (NSH) Encapsulation for In-situ OAM (IOAM) Data",
            Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sfc-ioam-nsh-
            11, 30 September 2022,
            <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sfc-
            ioam-nsh-11>.
 [IOAM-RAWEXPORT]
            Spiegel, M., Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., and R.
            Sivakolundu, "In-situ OAM raw data export with IPFIX",
            Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-spiegel-ippm-ioam-
            rawexport-06, 21 February 2022,
            <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spiegel-ippm-
            ioam-rawexport-06>.
 [RFC5475]  Zseby, T., Molina, M., Duffield, N., Niccolini, S., and F.
            Raspall, "Sampling and Filtering Techniques for IP Packet
            Selection", RFC 5475, DOI 10.17487/RFC5475, March 2009,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5475>.
 [RFC6291]  Andersson, L., van Helvoort, H., Bonica, R., Romascanu,
            D., and S. Mansfield, "Guidelines for the Use of the "OAM"
            Acronym in the IETF", BCP 161, RFC 6291,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6291, June 2011,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6291>.
 [RFC6724]  Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
            "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
            (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.
 [RFC7014]  D'Antonio, S., Zseby, T., Henke, C., and L. Peluso, "Flow
            Selection Techniques", RFC 7014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7014,
            September 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7014>.
 [RFC7799]  Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
            Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
            May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.

Acknowledgments

 The authors thank Martin Duke, Tommy Pauly, Donald Eastlake, Paul
 Kyzivat, Bernard Aboba, Greg Mirsky, and other members of the IPPM
 working group for many helpful comments.

Contributors

 The Editors would like to recognize the contributions of the
 following individuals to this document.
 Ramesh Sivakolundu
 Cisco Systems, Inc.
 170 West Tasman Dr.
 San Jose, CA 95134
 United States of America
 Email: sramesh@cisco.com
 Carlos Pignataro
 Cisco Systems, Inc.
 7200-11 Kit Creek Road
 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
 United States of America
 Email: cpignata@cisco.com
 Aviv Kfir
 Nvidia
 Email: avivk@nvidia.com
 Jennifer Lemon
 Broadcom
 270 Innovation Drive
 San Jose, CA 95134
 United States of America
 Email: jennifer.lemon@broadcom.com

Authors' Addresses

 Tal Mizrahi
 Huawei
 Israel
 Email: tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com
 Frank Brockners
 Cisco Systems, Inc.
 3rd Floor
 Hansaallee 249
 40549 Duesseldorf
 Germany
 Email: fbrockne@cisco.com
 Shwetha Bhandari
 Thoughtspot
 3rd Floor
 Indiqube Orion
 Garden Layout
 HSR Layout
 24th Main Rd
 Bangalore 560 102
 Karnataka
 India
 Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
 Barak Gafni
 Nvidia
 Suite 100
 350 Oakmead Parkway
 Sunnyvale, CA 94085
 United States of America
 Email: gbarak@nvidia.com
 Mickey Spiegel
 Barefoot Networks, an Intel company
 4750 Patrick Henry Drive
 Santa Clara, CA 95054
 United States of America
 Email: mickey.spiegel@intel.com
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