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rfc:rfc8942



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) I. Grigorik Request for Comments: 8942 Y. Weiss Category: Experimental Google ISSN: 2070-1721 February 2021

                         HTTP Client Hints

Abstract

 HTTP defines proactive content negotiation to allow servers to select
 the appropriate response for a given request, based upon the user
 agent's characteristics, as expressed in request headers.  In
 practice, user agents are often unwilling to send those request
 headers, because it is not clear whether they will be used, and
 sending them impacts both performance and privacy.
 This document defines an Accept-CH response header that servers can
 use to advertise their use of request headers for proactive content
 negotiation, along with a set of guidelines for the creation of such
 headers, colloquially known as "Client Hints."

Status of This Memo

 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
 published for examination, experimental implementation, and
 evaluation.
 This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
 community.  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
 Task Force (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF
 community.  It has received public review and has been approved for
 publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not
 all documents approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of
 Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8942.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction
   1.1.  Notational Conventions
 2.  Client Hints Request Header Fields
   2.1.  Sending Client Hints
   2.2.  Server Processing of Client Hints
 3.  Advertising Server Support
   3.1.  The Accept-CH Response Header Field
   3.2.  Interaction with Caches
 4.  Security Considerations
   4.1.  Information Exposure
   4.2.  Deployment and Security Risks
   4.3.  Abuse Detection
 5.  Cost of Sending Hints
 6.  IANA Considerations
   6.1.  Accept-CH
 7.  References
   7.1.  Normative References
   7.2.  Informative References
 Acknowledgements
 Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

 There are thousands of different devices accessing the web, each with
 different device capabilities and preference information.  These
 device capabilities include hardware and software characteristics, as
 well as dynamic user and user agent preferences.  Historically,
 applications that wanted the server to optimize content delivery and
 user experience based on such capabilities had to rely on passive
 identification (e.g., by matching the User-Agent header field
 (Section 5.5.3 of [RFC7231]) against an established database of user
 agent signatures), use HTTP cookies [RFC6265] and URL parameters, or
 use some combination of these and similar mechanisms to enable ad hoc
 content negotiation.
 Such techniques are expensive to set up and maintain and are not
 portable across both applications and servers.  They also make it
 hard for both user agent and server to understand which data are
 required and are in use during the negotiation:
  • User agent detection cannot reliably identify all static

variables, cannot infer dynamic user agent preferences, requires

    an external device database, is not cache friendly, and is reliant
    on a passive fingerprinting surface.
 *  Cookie-based approaches are not portable across applications and
    servers, impose additional client-side latency by requiring
    JavaScript execution, and are not cache friendly.
 *  URL parameters, similar to cookie-based approaches, suffer from
    lack of portability and are hard to deploy due to a requirement to
    encode content negotiation data inside of the URL of each
    resource.
 Proactive content negotiation (Section 3.4.1 of [RFC7231]) offers an
 alternative approach; user agents use specified, well-defined request
 headers to advertise their capabilities and characteristics, so that
 servers can select (or formulate) an appropriate response based on
 those request headers (or on other, implicit characteristics).
 However, traditional proactive content negotiation techniques often
 mean that user agents send these request headers prolifically.  This
 causes performance concerns (because it creates "bloat" in requests),
 as well as privacy issues; passively providing such information
 allows servers to silently fingerprint the user.
 This document defines Client Hints, a framework that enables servers
 to opt-in to specific proactive content negotiation features,
 adapting their content accordingly, as well as guidelines for content
 negotiation mechanisms that use the framework.  This document also
 defines a new response header, Accept-CH, that allows an origin
 server to explicitly ask that user agents send these headers in
 requests.
 Client Hints mitigate performance concerns by assuring that user
 agents will only send the request headers when they're actually going
 to be used, and they mitigate privacy concerns of passive
 fingerprinting by requiring explicit opt-in and disclosure of
 required headers by the server through the use of the Accept-CH
 response header, turning passive fingerprinting vectors into active
 ones.
 The document does not define specific usages of Client Hints.  Such
 usages need to be defined in their respective specifications.
 One example of such usage is the User-Agent Client Hints [UA-CH].

1.1. Notational Conventions

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
 capitals, as shown here.
 This document uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of
 [RFC5234].

2. Client Hints Request Header Fields

 A Client Hints request header field is an HTTP header field that is
 used by HTTP user agents to indicate data that can be used by the
 server to select an appropriate response.  Each one conveys user-
 agent preferences that the server can use to adapt and optimize the
 response.

2.1. Sending Client Hints

 User agents choose what Client Hints to send in a request based on
 their default settings, user configuration, and server preferences
 expressed in "Accept-CH".  The user agent and server can use an opt-
 in mechanism outlined below to negotiate which header fields need to
 be sent to allow for efficient content adaption, and they can
 optionally use additional mechanisms (e.g., as outlined in
 [CLIENT-HINTS-INFRASTRUCTURE]) to negotiate delegation policies that
 control access of third parties to those same header fields.  User
 agents SHOULD require an opt-in to send any hints that are not
 considered low-entropy.  See the low-entropy hint table at
 [CLIENT-HINTS-INFRASTRUCTURE] for examples of hints that expose low
 amounts of entropy.
 Implementers need to be aware of the fingerprinting implications when
 implementing support for Client Hints and follow the considerations
 outlined in the Security Considerations section of this document (see
 Section 4).

2.2. Server Processing of Client Hints

 When presented with a request that contains one or more Client Hints
 header fields, servers can optimize the response based upon the
 information in them.  When doing so, and if the resource is
 cacheable, the server MUST also generate a Vary response header field
 (Section 7.1.4 of [RFC7231]) to indicate which hints can affect the
 selected response and whether the selected response is appropriate
 for a later request.
 Servers MUST ignore hints they do not understand nor support.  There
 is no mechanism for servers to indicate to user agents that hints
 were ignored.
 Furthermore, the server can generate additional response header
 fields (as specified by the hint or hints in use) that convey related
 values to aid client processing.

3. Advertising Server Support

 Servers can advertise support for Client Hints using the mechanism
 described below.

3.1. The Accept-CH Response Header Field

 The Accept-CH response header field indicates server support for the
 hints indicated in its value.  Servers wishing to receive user agent
 information through Client Hints SHOULD add the Accept-CH response
 header to their responses as early as possible.
 Accept-CH is a Structured Header [RFC8941].  Its value MUST be an sf-
 list (Section 3.1 of [RFC8941]) whose members are Tokens
 (Section 3.3.4 of [RFC8941]).  Its ABNF is:
   Accept-CH = sf-list
 For example:
 Accept-CH: Sec-CH-Example, Sec-CH-Example-2
 When a user agent receives an HTTP response containing "Accept-CH",
 it indicates that the origin opts-in to receive the indicated request
 header fields for subsequent same-origin requests.  The opt-in MUST
 be ignored if delivered over non-secure transport (using a scheme
 different from HTTPS).  It SHOULD be persisted and bound to the
 origin to enable delivery of Client Hints on subsequent requests to
 the server's origin, for the duration of the user's session (as
 defined by the user agent).  An opt-in overrides previous persisted
 opt-in values and SHOULD be persisted in its stead.
 Based on the Accept-CH example above, which is received in response
 to a user agent navigating to "https://site.example", and delivered
 over a secure transport, persisted Accept-CH preferences will be
 bound to "https://site.example".  It will then use it for navigations
 to for example, "https://site.example/foobar.html", but not to, for
 example, "https://foobar.site.example/".  It will similarly use the
 preference for any same-origin resource requests (e.g., to
 "https://site.example/image.jpg") initiated by the page constructed
 from the navigation's response, but not to cross-origin resource
 requests (e.g., "https://thirdparty.example/resource.js").  This
 preference will not extend to resource requests initiated to
 "https://site.example" from other origins (e.g., from navigations to
 "https://other.example/").

3.2. Interaction with Caches

 When selecting a response based on one or more Client Hints, and if
 the resource is cacheable, the server needs to generate a Vary
 response header field [RFC7234] to indicate which hints can affect
 the selected response and whether the selected response is
 appropriate for a later request.
 Vary: Sec-CH-Example
 The above example indicates that the cache key needs to include the
 Sec-CH-Example header field.
 Vary: Sec-CH-Example, Sec-CH-Example-2
 The above example indicates that the cache key needs to include the
 Sec-CH-Example and Sec-CH-Example-2 header fields.

4. Security Considerations

4.1. Information Exposure

 Request header fields used in features relying on this document
 expose information about the user's environment to enable privacy-
 preserving proactive content negotiation and avoid exposing passive
 fingerprinting vectors.  However, implementers need to bear in mind
 that in the worst case, uncontrolled and unmonitored active
 fingerprinting is not better than passive fingerprinting.  In order
 to provide user privacy benefits, user agents need to apply further
 policies that prevent abuse of the information exposed by features
 using Client Hints.
 The information exposed by features might reveal new information
 about the user, and implementers ought to consider the following
 considerations, recommendations, and best practices.
 The underlying assumption is that exposing information about the user
 as a request header is equivalent (from a security perspective) to
 exposing this information by other means.  (For example, if the
 request's origin can access that information using JavaScript APIs
 and transmit it to its servers.)
 Because Client Hints is an explicit opt-in mechanism, it means that
 servers wanting access to information about the user's environment
 need to actively ask for it, enabling clients and privacy researchers
 to keep track of which origins collect that data, and potentially act
 upon it.  The header-based opt-in means that removal of passive
 fingerprinting vectors is possible.  As an example, the user agent
 can reduce the information exposed by the User-Agent string, while
 enabling active access to that information through User-Agent Client
 Hints [UA-CH].  Otherwise, the user agent can expose information
 already available through script (e.g., the Save-Data Client Hints
 <https://wicg.github.io/savedata/#save-data-request-header-field>),
 without increasing the passive fingerprinting surface.  User agents
 supporting Client Hints features which send certain information to
 opted-in servers SHOULD avoid sending the equivalent information
 passively.
 Therefore, features relying on this document to define Client Hint
 headers MUST NOT provide new information that is otherwise not made
 available to the application by the user agent, such as existing
 request headers, HTML, CSS, or JavaScript.
 Such features need to take into account the following aspects of the
 exposed information:
 Entropy:  Exposing highly granular data can be used to help identify
    users across multiple requests to different origins.  Reducing the
    set of header field values that can be expressed, or restricting
    them to an enumerated range where the advertised value is close to
    but is not an exact representation of the current value, can
    improve privacy and reduce risk of linkability by ensuring that
    the same value is sent by multiple users.
 Sensitivity:  The feature SHOULD NOT expose user-sensitive
    information.  To that end, information available to the
    application, but gated behind specific user actions (e.g., a
    permission prompt or user activation), SHOULD NOT be exposed as a
    Client Hint.
 Change over time:  The feature SHOULD NOT expose user information
    that changes over time, unless the state change itself is also
    exposed (e.g., through JavaScript callbacks).
 Different features will be positioned in different points in the
 space between low-entropy, non-sensitive, and static information
 (e.g., user agent information) and high-entropy, sensitive, and
 dynamic information (e.g., geolocation).  User agents need to
 consider the value provided by a particular feature vs. these
 considerations and may wish to have different policies regarding that
 tradeoff on a per-feature or other fine-grained basis.
 Implementers ought to consider both user- and server-controlled
 mechanisms and policies to control which Client Hints header fields
 are advertised:
  • Implementers SHOULD restrict delivery of some or all Client Hints

header fields to the opt-in origin only, unless the opt-in origin

    has explicitly delegated permission to another origin to request
    Client Hints header fields.
  • Implementers that consider providing user-choice mechanisms that

allow users to balance privacy concerns against bandwidth

    limitations need to also consider that explaining the privacy
    implications involved to users, such as the risks of passive
    fingerprinting, may be challenging or even impractical.
  • Implementations specific to certain use cases or threat models MAY

avoid transmitting some or all of the Client Hints header fields.

    For example, avoid transmission of header fields that can carry
    higher risks of linkability.
 User agents MUST clear persisted opt-in preferences when any one of
 site data, browsing cache, cookies, or similar are cleared.

4.2. Deployment and Security Risks

 Deployment of new request headers requires several considerations:
  • Potential conflicts due to existing use of a header field name
  • Properties of the data communicated in a header field value
 Authors of new Client Hints are advised to carefully consider whether
 they need to be able to be added by client-side content (e.g.,
 scripts) or whether the Client Hints need to be exclusively set by
 the user agent.  In the latter case, the Sec- prefix on the header
 field name has the effect of preventing scripts and other application
 content from setting them in user agents.  Using the "Sec-" prefix
 signals to servers that the user agent -- and not application content
 -- generated the values.  See [FETCH] for more information.
 By convention, request headers that are Client Hints are encouraged
 to use a CH- prefix, to make them easier to identify as using this
 framework; for example, CH-Foo or, with a "Sec-" prefix, Sec-CH-Foo.
 Doing so makes them easier to identify programmatically (e.g., for
 stripping unrecognized hints from requests by privacy filters).
 A Client Hints request header negotiated using the Accept-CH opt-in
 mechanism MUST have a field name that matches sf-token (Section 3.3.4
 of [RFC8941]).

4.3. Abuse Detection

 A user agent that tracks access to active fingerprinting information
 SHOULD consider emission of Client Hints headers similar to the way
 it would consider access to the equivalent API.
 Research into abuse of Client Hints might look at how HTTP responses
 to requests that contain Client Hints differ from those with
 different values and from those without values.  This might be used
 to reveal which Client Hints are in use, allowing researchers to
 further analyze that use.

5. Cost of Sending Hints

 Sending Client Hints to the server incurs an increase in request byte
 size.  Some of this increase can be mitigated by HTTP header
 compression schemes, but each new hint sent will still lead to some
 increased bandwidth usage.  Servers SHOULD take that into account
 when opting in to receive Client Hints and SHOULD NOT opt-in to
 receive hints unless they are to be used for content adaptation
 purposes.
 Due to request byte size increase, features relying on this document
 to define Client Hints MAY consider restricting sending those hints
 to certain request destinations [FETCH], where they are more likely
 to be useful.

6. IANA Considerations

 Features relying on this document are expected to register added
 request header fields in the "Permanent Message Header Field Names"
 registry [RFC3864].
 This document defines the "Accept-CH" HTTP response header field;
 IANA has registered it in the same registry.

6.1. Accept-CH

 Header field name:  Accept-CH
 Applicable protocol:  HTTP
 Status:  experimental
 Author/Change controller:  IETF
 Specification document(s):  Section 3.1 of this RFC
 Related information:  for Client Hints

7. References

7.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC3864]  Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
            Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>.
 [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
            Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
 [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
            Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
 [RFC7234]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
            Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
            RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.
 [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
            2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
            May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
 [RFC8941]  Nottingham, M. and P-H. Kamp, "Structured Field Values for
            HTTP", RFC 8941, DOI 10.17487/RFC8941, February 2021,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8941>.

7.2. Informative References

 [CLIENT-HINTS-INFRASTRUCTURE]
            Weiss, Y., "Client Hints Infrastructure", July 2020,
            <https://wicg.github.io/client-hints-infrastructure/>.
 [FETCH]    WHATWG, "Fetch - Living Standard",
            <https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/>.
 [RFC6265]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
 [UA-CH]    West, M. and Y. Weiss, "User-Agent Client Hints", August
            2020, <https://wicg.github.io/ua-client-hints/>.

Acknowledgements

 Thanks to Mark Nottingham, Julian Reschke, Chris Bentzel, Ben
 Greenstein, Tarun Bansal, Roy Fielding, Vasiliy Faronov, Ted Hardie,
 Jonas Sicking, Martin Thomson, and numerous other members of the IETF
 HTTP Working Group for invaluable help and feedback.

Authors' Addresses

 Ilya Grigorik
 Google
 Email: ilya@igvita.com
 URI:   https://www.igvita.com/
 Yoav Weiss
 Google
 Email: yoav@yoav.ws
 URI:   https://blog.yoav.ws/
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