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rfc:rfc8386

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Winter Request for Comments: 8386 University of Applied Sciences Augsburg Category: Informational M. Faath ISSN: 2070-1721 Conntac GmbH

                                                          F. Weisshaar
                               University of Applied Sciences Augsburg
                                                              May 2018
                     Privacy Considerations for
           Protocols Relying on IP Broadcast or Multicast

Abstract

 A number of application-layer protocols make use of IP broadcast or
 multicast messages for functions such as local service discovery or
 name resolution.  Some of these functions can only be implemented
 efficiently using such mechanisms.  When using broadcast or multicast
 messages, a passive observer in the same broadcast or multicast
 domain can trivially record these messages and analyze their content.
 Therefore, designers of protocols that make use of broadcast or
 multicast messages need to take special care when designing their
 protocols.

Status of This Memo

 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
 published for informational purposes.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
 approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
 Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8386.

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 1] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................2
    1.1. Types and Usage of Broadcast and Multicast .................4
    1.2. Requirements Language ......................................5
 2. Privacy Considerations ..........................................5
    2.1. Message Frequency ..........................................5
    2.2. Persistent Identifiers .....................................6
    2.3. Anticipate User Behavior ...................................6
    2.4. Consider Potential Correlation .............................7
    2.5. Configurability ............................................7
 3. Operational Considerations ......................................8
 4. Summary .........................................................8
 5. Other Considerations ............................................9
 6. IANA Considerations ............................................10
 7. Security Considerations ........................................10
 8. References .....................................................10
    8.1. Normative References ......................................10
    8.2. Informative References ....................................10
 Acknowledgments ...................................................13
 Authors' Addresses ................................................13

1. Introduction

 Broadcast and multicast messages have a large (and, to the sender,
 unknown) receiver group by design.  Because of that, these two
 mechanisms are vital for a number of basic network functions such as
 autoconfiguration and link-layer address lookup.  Also, application
 developers use broadcast/multicast messages to implement things such
 as local service or peer discovery.  It appears that an increasing
 number of applications make use of it as suggested by experimental
 results obtained on campus networks, including the IETF meeting
 network [TRAC2016].  This trend is not entirely surprising.  As

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 2] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 [RFC919] puts it, "The use of broadcasts [...] is a good base for
 many applications".  Broadcast and multicast functionality in a
 subnetwork is therefore important because a lack thereof renders the
 protocols relying on these mechanisms inoperable [RFC3819].
 Using broadcast/multicast can become problematic if the information
 that is being distributed can be regarded as sensitive or if the
 information that is distributed by multiple protocols can be
 correlated in a way that sensitive data can be derived.  This is
 clearly true for any protocol, but broadcast/multicast is special in
 at least two respects:
 (a)  The aforementioned large receiver group consists of receivers
      unknown to the sender.  This makes eavesdropping without special
      privileges or a special location in the network trivial for
      anybody in the same broadcast/multicast domain.
 (b)  Encryption is difficult when broadcast/multicast messages are
      used, because, for instance, a non-trivial key management
      protocol might be required.  When encryption is not used, the
      content of these messages is easily accessible, making it easy
      to spoof and replay them.
 Given the above, privacy protection for protocols based on broadcast
 or multicast communication is significantly more difficult compared
 to unicast communication, and at the same time, invasion of privacy
 is much easier.
 Privacy considerations for IETF-specified protocols have received
 some attention in the recent past (e.g., [RFC7721] and [RFC7819]).
 There is also general guidance available for document authors on when
 and how to include a privacy considerations section in their
 documents and on how to evaluate the privacy implications of Internet
 protocols [RFC6973].  RFC 6973 also describes potential threats to
 privacy in great detail and lists terminology that is also used in
 this document.  In contrast to RFC 6973, this document contains a
 number of privacy considerations, especially for protocols that rely
 on broadcast/multicast, that are intended to reduce the likelihood
 that a broadcast- or multicast-based protocol can be misused to
 collect sensitive data about devices, users, and groups of users in a
 broadcast/multicast domain.
 The above-mentioned considerations particularly apply to protocols
 designed outside the IETF for two reasons.  First, non-standard
 protocols will likely not receive operational attention and support
 in making them more secure, e.g., what DHCP snooping does for DHCP.
 Because these protocols are typically not documented, network
 equipment does not provide similar features for them.  Second, these

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 3] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 protocols have been designed in isolation, where a set of
 considerations to follow is useful in the absence of a larger
 community providing feedback and expertise to improve the protocol.
 In particular, carelessly designed protocols that use broadcast/
 multicast can break privacy efforts at different layers of the
 protocol stack such as Media Access Control (MAC) address or IP
 address randomization [RFC4941].

1.1. Types and Usage of Broadcast and Multicast

 In IPv4, two major types of broadcast addresses exist: limited
 broadcast and directed broadcast.  Section 5.3.5 of [RFC1812] defines
 limited broadcast as all-ones (255.255.255.255) and defines directed
 broadcast as the given network prefix of an IP address and the local
 part of all-ones.  Broadcast packets are received by all nodes in a
 subnetwork.  Limited broadcasts never transit a router.  The same is
 true for directed broadcasts by default, but routers may provide an
 option to do this [RFC2644].  IPv6, on the other hand, does not
 provide broadcast addresses but relies solely on multicast [RFC4291].
 In contrast to broadcast addresses, multicast addresses represent an
 identifier for a set of interfaces that can be a set different from
 all nodes in the subnetwork.  All interfaces that are identified by a
 given multicast address receive packets destined towards that address
 and are called a "multicast group".  In both IPv4 and IPv6, multiple
 pre-defined multicast addresses exist.  The ones most relevant for
 this document are the ones with subnet scope.  For IPv4, an IP prefix
 called the "Local Network Control Block" (224.0.0.0/24, defined in
 Section 4 of [RFC5771]) is reserved for this purpose.  For IPv6, the
 relevant multicast addresses are the two All Nodes Addresses, which
 every IPv6-capable host is required to recognize as identifying
 itself (see Section 2.7.1 of [RFC4291]).
 Typical usage of these addresses includes local service discovery
 (e.g., Multicast DNS (mDNS) [RFC6762] and Link-Local Multicast Name
 Resolution (LLMNR) [RFC4795] make use of multicast),
 autoconfiguration (e.g., DHCPv4 [RFC2131] uses broadcasts, and DHCPv6
 [RFC3315] uses multicast addresses), and other vital network services
 such as address resolution or duplicate address detection.  Aside
 from these core network functions, applications also make use of
 broadcast and multicast functionality, often implementing proprietary
 protocols.  In sum, these protocols distribute a diverse set of
 potentially privacy-sensitive information to a large receiver group,
 and the only requirement to be part of this receiver group is to be
 on the same subnetwork.

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 4] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

1.2. Requirements Language

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
 capitals, as shown here.

2. Privacy Considerations

 There are a few obvious and a few not necessarily obvious things that
 designers of protocols utilizing broadcast/multicast should consider
 in respect to the privacy implications for their protocol.  Most of
 these items are based on protocol behavior observed as part of
 experiments on operational networks [TRAC2016].

2.1. Message Frequency

 Frequent broadcast/multicast traffic caused by an application can
 give away user behavior and online connection times.  This allows a
 passive observer to potentially deduce a user's current activity
 (e.g., a game) and to create an online profile (i.e., times the user
 is on the network).  This profile becomes more accurate as the
 frequency of messages and the time duration over which they are sent
 increases.  Given that broadcast/multicast messages are only visible
 in the same broadcast/multicast domain, these messages also give away
 the rough location of the user (e.g., a campus or building).
 This behavior has, for example, been observed by a synchronization
 mechanism of a popular application, where multiple messages have been
 sent per minute via broadcast.  Given this behavior, it is possible
 to record a device's time on the network with a sub-minute accuracy
 given only the traffic of this single application installed on the
 device.  Also, services used for local name resolution in modern
 operating systems utilize broadcast- or multicast-based protocols
 (e.g., mDNS, LLMNR, or NetBIOS) to announce, for example, resources
 on a regular basis.  This also allows tracking of the online times of
 a device.
 If a protocol relies on frequent or periodic broadcast/multicast
 messages, the frequency SHOULD be chosen conservatively, in
 particular if the messages contain persistent identifiers (see
 Section 2.2).  Also, intelligent message suppression mechanisms such
 as the ones employed in mDNS [RFC6762] SHOULD be implemented.  The
 lower the frequency of broadcast messages, the harder passive traffic
 analysis and surveillance becomes.

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 5] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

2.2. Persistent Identifiers

 A few protocols that make use of broadcast/multicast messages
 observed in the wild also make use of persistent identifiers.  This
 includes the use of host names or more abstract persistent
 identifiers such as a Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) or
 similar.  These IDs, which, for example, identify the installation of
 a certain application, might not change across updates of the
 software and can therefore be extremely long lived.  This allows a
 passive observer to track a user precisely if broadcast/multicast
 messages are frequent.  This is even true if the IP and/or MAC
 address changes.  Such identifiers also allow two different
 interfaces (e.g., Wi-Fi and Ethernet) to be correlated to the same
 device.  If the application makes use of persistent identifiers for
 multiple installations of the same application for the same user,
 this even allows a passive observer to infer that different devices
 belong to the same user.
 The aforementioned broadcast messages from a synchronization
 mechanism of a popular application also included a persistent
 identifier in every broadcast.  This identifier never changed after
 the application was installed, which allowed for the tracking of a
 device even when it changed its network interface or when it
 connected to a different network.
 In general, persistent IDs are considered bad practice for broadcast
 and multicast communication, as persistent application-layer IDs will
 make efforts to randomize identifiers (e.g., [RANDOM-ADDR]) on lower
 layers useless.  When protocols that make use of broadcast/multicast
 need to make use of IDs, these IDs SHOULD be rotated frequently to
 make user tracking more difficult.

2.3. Anticipate User Behavior

 A large number of users name their device after themselves, either
 using their first name, last name, or both.  Often, a host name
 includes the type, model, or maker of a device, its function, or
 language-specific information.  Based on data gathered during
 experiments performed at IETF meetings and at a large campus network,
 this appears to be the currently prevalent user behavior [TRAC2016].
 For protocols using the host name as part of the messages, this
 clearly will reveal personally identifiable information to everyone
 on the local network.  This information can also be used to mount
 more sophisticated attacks, e.g., when the owner of a device is
 identified (as an interesting target) or properties of the device are
 known (e.g., known vulnerabilities).  Host names are also a type of
 persistent identifier; therefore, the considerations in Section 2.2
 apply.

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 6] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 Some of the most commonly used operating systems include the name the
 user chooses for the user account during the installation process as
 part of the host name of the device.  The name of the operating
 system can also be included, therefore revealing two pieces of
 information that can be regarded as private information if the host
 name is used in broadcast/multicast messages.
 Where possible, the use of host names and other user-provided
 information in protocols making use of broadcast/multicast SHOULD be
 avoided.  An application might want to display the information it
 will broadcast on the LAN at install/config time, so that the user is
 at least aware of the application's behavior.  More host name
 considerations can be found in [RFC8117].  More information on user
 participation can be found in [RFC6973].

2.4. Consider Potential Correlation

 A large number of services and applications make use of the
 broadcast/multicast mechanism.  That means there are various sources
 of information that are easily accessible by a passive observer.  In
 isolation, the information these protocols reveal might seem
 harmless, but given multiple such protocols, it might be possible to
 correlate this information.  For example, a protocol that uses
 frequent messages including a UUID to identify the particular
 installation does not give away the identity of the user.  However, a
 single message including the user's host name might do that, and it
 can be correlated using, for example, the MAC address of the device's
 interface.
 In the experiments described in [TRAC2016], it was possible to
 correlate frequently sent broadcast messages that included a unique
 identifier with other broadcast/multicast messages containing
 usernames (e.g. mDNS, LLMNR, or NetBIOS); this revealed relationships
 among users.  This allowed the real identity of the users of many
 devices to be revealed, and it also gave away some information about
 their social environment.
 A designer of a protocol that makes use of broadcast/multicast needs
 to be aware of the fact that even if the information a protocol leaks
 seems harmless in isolation, there might be ways to correlate that
 information with information from other protocols to reveal sensitive
 information about a user.

2.5. Configurability

 A lot of applications and services relying on broadcast- or
 multicast-based protocols do not include the means to declare "safe"
 environments (e.g., based on the Service Set Identifier (SSID) of a

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 7] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 Wi-Fi network and the MAC addresses of the access points).  For
 example, a device connected to a public Wi-Fi network will likely
 broadcast the same information as when connected to the home network.
 It would be beneficial if certain behaviors could be restricted to
 "safe" environments.
 For example, a popular operating system allows the user to specify
 the trust level of the network the device connects to, which, for
 example, restricts specific system services (using broadcast/
 multicast messages for their normal operation) to be used in trusted
 networks only.  Such functionality could be implemented as part of an
 application.
 An application developer making use of broadcast/multicast messages
 as part of the application SHOULD, if possible, make the broadcast
 feature configurable so that potentially sensitive information does
 not leak on public networks where the threat to privacy is much
 larger.

3. Operational Considerations

 Besides changing end-user behavior, choosing sensible defaults as an
 operating system vendor (e.g., for suggesting host names), and
 following the considerations for protocol designers mentioned in this
 document, there is something that the network administrators/
 operators can do to limit the above-mentioned problems.
 A feature commonly found on access points is the ability to manage/
 filter broadcast and multicast traffic.  This will potentially break
 certain applications or some of their functionality but will also
 protect the users from potentially leaking sensitive information.
 Wireless access points often provide finer-grained control beyond a
 simple on/off switch for well-known protocols or provide mechanisms
 to manage broadcast/multicast traffic intelligently using, for
 example, proxies (see [MCAST-CONS]).  However, these mechanisms only
 work on standardized protocols.

4. Summary

 Increasingly, applications rely on protocols that send and receive
 broadcast and multicast messages.  For some, broadcast/multicast
 messages are the basis of their application logic; others use
 broadcast/multicast messages to improve certain aspects of the
 application but are fully functional in case broadcast/multicast
 messages fail.  Irrespective of the role of broadcast and multicast
 messages for the application, the designers of protocols that make
 use of them should be very careful in their protocol design because
 of the special nature of broadcast and multicast.

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 8] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 It is not always possible to implement certain functionality via
 unicast, but if a protocol designer chooses to rely on broadcast/
 multicast, the following should be carefully considered:
 o  IETF-specified protocols, such as mDNS [RFC6762], SHOULD be used
    if possible as operational support might exist to protect against
    the leakage of private information.  Also, for some protocols,
    privacy extensions are being specified; these can be used if
    implemented.  For example, for DNS-SD, privacy extensions are
    documented in [DNSSD-PRIV].
 o  Using user-specified information inside broadcast/multicast
    messages SHOULD be avoided, as users will often use personal
    information or other information that aids attackers, in
    particular if the user is unaware about how that information is
    being used.
 o  The use of persistent IDs in messages SHOULD be avoided, as this
    allows user tracking and correlation, and it potentially has a
    devastating effect on other privacy-protection mechanisms.
 o  If one must design a new protocol relying on broadcast/multicast
    and cannot use an IETF-specified protocol, then:
  • the protocol SHOULD be very conservative in how frequently it

sends messages as an effort in data minimization,

  • it SHOULD make use of mechanisms implemented in IETF-specified

protocols that can be helpful in privacy protection, such as

       message suppression in mDNS,
  • it SHOULD be designed in such a way that information sent in

broadcast/multicast messages cannot be correlated with

       information from other protocols using broadcast/multicast, and
  • it SHOULD be possible to let the user configure "safe"

environments if possible (e.g., based on the SSID) to minimize

       the risk of information leakage (e.g., a home network as
       opposed to a public Wi-Fi network).

5. Other Considerations

 Besides privacy implications, frequent broadcasting also represents a
 performance problem.  In particular, in certain wireless technologies
 such as 802.11, broadcast and multicast are transmitted at a much
 lower rate (the lowest common denominator rate) compared to unicast
 and therefore have a much bigger impact on the overall available
 airtime [MCAST-CONS].  Further, it will limit the ability for devices

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 9] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 to go to sleep if frequent broadcasts are being sent.  A similar
 problem in respect to Router Advertisements is addressed in
 [RFC7772].  In that respect, broadcast/multicast can be used for
 another class of attacks that is not related to privacy.  The
 potential impact on network performance should nevertheless be
 considered when designing a protocol that makes use of broadcast/
 multicast.

6. IANA Considerations

 This document has no IANA actions.

7. Security Considerations

 This document deals with privacy-related considerations for
 broadcast- and multicast-based protocols.  It contains advice for
 designers of such protocols to minimize the leakage of privacy-
 sensitive information.  The intent of the advice is to make sure that
 identities will remain anonymous and user tracking will be made
 difficult.
 To protect multicast traffic, certain applications can make use of
 existing mechanisms, such as the ones defined in [RFC5374].  Examples
 of such applications can be found in Appendix A of [RFC5374].
 However, given the assumptions about these applications and the
 required security infrastructure, many applications will not be able
 to make use of such mechanisms.

8. References

8.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
            2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
            May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

8.2. Informative References

 [DNSSD-PRIV]
            Huitema, C. and D. Kaiser, "Privacy Extensions for DNS-
            SD", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-dnssd-privacy-04, April
            2018.

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 10] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 [MCAST-CONS]
            Perkins, C., McBride, M., Stanley, D., Kumari, W., and J.
            Zuniga, "Multicast Considerations over IEEE 802 Wireless
            Media", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-mboned-ieee802-mcast-
            problems-01, February 2018.
 [RANDOM-ADDR]
            Huitema, C., "Implications of Randomized Link Layers
            Addresses for IPv6 Address Assignment", Work in Progress,
            draft-huitema-6man-random-addresses-03, March 2016.
 [RFC919]   Mogul, J., "Broadcasting Internet Datagrams", STD 5,
            RFC 919, DOI 10.17487/RFC0919, October 1984,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc919>.
 [RFC1812]  Baker, F., Ed., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
            RFC 1812, DOI 10.17487/RFC1812, June 1995,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1812>.
 [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
            RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.
 [RFC2644]  Senie, D., "Changing the Default for Directed Broadcasts
            in Routers", BCP 34, RFC 2644, DOI 10.17487/RFC2644,
            August 1999, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2644>.
 [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
            C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
            for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
            2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.
 [RFC3819]  Karn, P., Ed., Bormann, C., Fairhurst, G., Grossman, D.,
            Ludwig, R., Mahdavi, J., Montenegro, G., Touch, J., and L.
            Wood, "Advice for Internet Subnetwork Designers", BCP 89,
            RFC 3819, DOI 10.17487/RFC3819, July 2004,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3819>.
 [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
            Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
            2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
 [RFC4795]  Aboba, B., Thaler, D., and L. Esibov, "Link-local
            Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR)", RFC 4795,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC4795, January 2007,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4795>.

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 11] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
            Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
            IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
 [RFC5374]  Weis, B., Gross, G., and D. Ignjatic, "Multicast
            Extensions to the Security Architecture for the Internet
            Protocol", RFC 5374, DOI 10.17487/RFC5374, November 2008,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5374>.
 [RFC5771]  Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., and D. Meyer, "IANA Guidelines for
            IPv4 Multicast Address Assignments", BCP 51, RFC 5771,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5771, March 2010,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5771>.
 [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6762>.
 [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
            Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
            Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
 [RFC7721]  Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
            Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
            RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.
 [RFC7772]  Yourtchenko, A. and L. Colitti, "Reducing Energy
            Consumption of Router Advertisements", BCP 202, RFC 7772,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7772, February 2016,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7772>.
 [RFC7819]  Jiang, S., Krishnan, S., and T. Mrugalski, "Privacy
            Considerations for DHCP", RFC 7819, DOI 10.17487/RFC7819,
            April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7819>.
 [RFC8117]  Huitema, C., Thaler, D., and R. Winter, "Current Hostname
            Practice Considered Harmful", RFC 8117,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC8117, March 2017,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8117>.

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 12] RFC 8386 Broadcast/Multicast Privacy Considerations May 2018

 [TRAC2016] Faath, M., Weisshaar, F., and R. Winter, "How Broadcast
            Data Reveals Your Identity and Social Graph", Wireless
            Communications and Mobile Computing Conference
            (IWCMC), International Workshop on TRaffic Analysis and
            Characterization (TRAC), DOI 10.1109/IWCMC.2016.7577084,
            September 2016.

Acknowledgments

 We would like to thank Eliot Lear, Joe Touch, and Stephane Bortzmeyer
 for their valuable input to this document.
 This work was partly supported by the European Commission under grant
 agreement FP7-318627 mPlane.  Support does not imply endorsement.

Authors' Addresses

 Rolf Winter
 University of Applied Sciences Augsburg
 Augsburg
 Germany
 Email: rolf.winter@hs-augsburg.de
 Michael Faath
 Conntac GmbH
 Augsburg
 Germany
 Email: faath@conntac.net
 Fabian Weisshaar
 University of Applied Sciences Augsburg
 Augsburg
 Germany
 Email: fabian.weisshaar@hs-augsburg.de

Winter, et al. Informational [Page 13]

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