GENWiki

Premier IT Outsourcing and Support Services within the UK

User Tools

Site Tools


rfc:rfc8280

Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) N. ten Oever Request for Comments: 8280 ARTICLE 19 Category: Informational C. Cath ISSN: 2070-1721 Oxford Internet Institute

                                                          October 2017
         Research into Human Rights Protocol Considerations

Abstract

 This document aims to propose guidelines for human rights
 considerations, similar to the work done on the guidelines for
 privacy considerations (RFC 6973).  The other parts of this document
 explain the background of the guidelines and how they were developed.
 This document is the first milestone in a longer-term research
 effort.  It has been reviewed by the Human Rights Protocol
 Considerations (HRPC) Research Group and also by individuals from
 outside the research group.

Status of This Memo

 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
 published for informational purposes.
 This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force
 (IRTF).  The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research
 and development activities.  These results might not be suitable for
 deployment.  This RFC represents the consensus of the Human Rights
 Protocol Considerations Research Group of the Internet Research Task
 Force (IRTF).  Documents approved for publication by the IRSG are not
 a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of
 RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8280.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 1] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 2] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................4
 2. Vocabulary Used .................................................6
 3. Research Questions .............................................12
 4. Literature and Discussion Review ...............................12
 5. Methodology ....................................................15
    5.1. Data Sources ..............................................17
         5.1.1. Discourse Analysis of RFCs .........................17
         5.1.2. Interviews with Members of the IETF Community ......17
         5.1.3. Participant Observation in Working Groups ..........17
    5.2. Data Analysis Strategies ..................................18
         5.2.1. Identifying Qualities of Technical Concepts
                That Relate to Human Rights ........................18
         5.2.2. Relating Human Rights to Technical Concepts ........20
         5.2.3. Mapping Cases of Protocols, Implementations, and
                Networking Paradigms That Adversely Impact Human
                Rights or Are Enablers Thereof .....................21
 6. Model for Developing Human Rights Protocol Considerations ......40
    6.1. Human Rights Threats ......................................40
    6.2. Guidelines for Human Rights Considerations ................42
         6.2.1. Connectivity .......................................43
         6.2.2. Privacy ............................................43
         6.2.3. Content Agnosticism ................................44
         6.2.4. Security ...........................................45
         6.2.5. Internationalization ...............................46
         6.2.6. Censorship Resistance ..............................47
         6.2.7. Open Standards .....................................48
         6.2.8. Heterogeneity Support ..............................50
         6.2.9. Anonymity ..........................................51
         6.2.10. Pseudonymity ......................................51
         6.2.11. Accessibility .....................................53
         6.2.12. Localization ......................................53
         6.2.13. Decentralization ..................................54
         6.2.14. Reliability .......................................55
         6.2.15. Confidentiality ...................................56
         6.2.16. Integrity .........................................58
         6.2.17. Authenticity ......................................59
         6.2.18. Adaptability ......................................60
         6.2.19. Outcome Transparency ..............................61
 7. Security Considerations ........................................61
 8. IANA Considerations ............................................61
 9. Research Group Information .....................................62
 10. Informative References ........................................62
 Acknowledgements ..................................................80
 Authors' Addresses ................................................81

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 3] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

1. Introduction

 "There's a freedom about the Internet: As long as we accept the rules
 of sending packets around, we can send packets containing anything to
 anywhere."  [Berners-Lee]
 "The Internet isn't value-neutral, and neither is the IETF."
 [RFC3935]
 The ever-growing interconnectedness of the Internet and society
 increases the impact of the Internet on the lives of individuals.
 Because of this, the design and development of the Internet
 infrastructure also have a growing impact on society.  This has led
 to a broad recognition that human rights [UDHR] [ICCPR] [ICESCR] have
 a role in the development and management of the Internet [UNGA2013]
 [NETmundial].  It has also been argued that the Internet should be
 strengthened as an enabling environment for human rights [Brown].
 This document aims to (1) expose the relationship between protocols
 and human rights, (2) propose possible guidelines to protect the
 Internet as an enabling environment for human rights in future
 protocol development, in a manner similar to the work done for
 privacy considerations [RFC6973], and (3) increase the awareness, in
 both the human rights community and the technical community, of the
 importance of the technical workings of the Internet and its impact
 on human rights.
 Document authors who want to apply this work to their own can go
 directly to Section 6 of this document.
 Open, secure, and reliable connectivity is necessary (although not
 sufficient) to exercise human rights such as freedom of expression
 and freedom of association [FOC], as defined in the Universal
 Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR].  The purpose of the Internet is
 to be a global network of networks that provides unfettered
 connectivity to all users, and for any content [RFC1958].  This
 objective of stimulating global connectivity contributes to the
 Internet's role as an enabler of human rights.  The Internet has
 given people a platform to exchange opinions and gather information;
 it has enabled people of different backgrounds and genders to
 participate in the public debate; it has also allowed people to
 congregate and organize.  Next to that, the strong commitment to
 security [RFC1984] [RFC3365] and privacy [RFC6973] [RFC7258] in the
 Internet's architectural design contributes to the strengthening of
 the Internet as an enabling environment for human rights.  One could
 even argue that the Internet is not only an enabler of human rights
 but that human rights lie at the base of, and are ingrained in, the
 architecture of the networks that make up the Internet.  Internet

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 4] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 connectivity increases the capacity for individuals to exercise their
 rights; the core of the Internet -- its architectural design -- is
 therefore closely intertwined with the human rights framework
 [CathFloridi].  The quintessential link between the Internet's
 infrastructure and human rights has been argued by many.  [Bless1],
 for instance, argues that "to a certain extent, the Internet and its
 protocols have already facilitated the realization of human rights,
 e.g., the freedom of assembly and expression.  In contrast, measures
 of censorship and pervasive surveillance violate fundamental human
 rights."  [DeNardis15] argues that "Since the first hints of Internet
 commercialization and internationalization, the IETF has supported
 strong security in protocol design and has sometimes served as a
 force resisting protocol-enabled surveillance features."  By doing
 so, the IETF enabled the manifestation of the right to privacy,
 through the Internet's infrastructure.  Additionally, access to
 freely available information gives people access to knowledge that
 enables them to help satisfy other human rights; as such, the
 Internet increasingly becomes a precondition for human rights rather
 than a supplement.
 Human rights can be in conflict with each other, such as the right to
 freedom of expression and the right to privacy.  In such cases, the
 different affected rights need to be balanced.  To do this, it is
 crucial that the impacts on rights are clearly documented in order to
 mitigate potential harm.  This research aims to ultimately contribute
 to making that process tangible and practical for protocol
 developers.  Technology can never be fully equated with a human
 right.  Whereas a specific technology might be a strong enabler of a
 specific human right, it might have an adverse impact on another
 human right.  In this case, decisions on design and deployment need
 to take this into account.
 The open nature of the initial technical design and its open
 standards, as well as developments like open source, fostered freedom
 of communication.  What emerged was a network of networks that could
 enable everyone to connect and to exchange data, information, and
 code.  For many, enabling such connections became a core value.
 However, as the scale and the commercialization of the Internet grew,
 topics like access, rights, and connectivity have been forced to
 compete with other values.  Therefore, important characteristics of
 the Internet that enable human rights might be degraded if they're
 not properly defined, described, and protected as such.  Conversely,
 not protecting characteristics that enable human rights could also
 result in (partial) loss of functionality and connectivity, along
 with other inherent parts of the Internet's architecture of networks.
 New protocols, particularly those that upgrade the core
 infrastructure of the network, should be designed to continue to
 enable fundamental human rights.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 5] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 The IETF has produced guidelines and procedures to ensure and
 galvanize the privacy of individuals and security of the network in
 protocol development.  This document aims to explore the possibility
 of developing similar procedures for guidelines for human rights
 considerations to ensure that protocols developed in the IETF do not
 have an adverse impact on the realization of human rights on the
 Internet.  By carefully considering the answers to the questions
 posed in Section 6 of this document, document authors should be
 (1) able to produce a comprehensive analysis that can serve as the
 basis for discussion on whether the protocol adequately protects
 against specific human rights threats and (2) potentially stimulated
 to think about alternative design choices.
 This document was developed within the framework of the Human Rights
 Protocol Considerations (HRPC) Research Group, based on discussions
 on the HRPC mailing list (Section 9); this document was also
 extensively discussed during HRPC sessions.  This document has
 received eleven in-depth reviews on the mailing list, and it received
 many comments from inside and outside the IRTF and IETF communities.

2. Vocabulary Used

 In the discussion of human rights and Internet architecture, concepts
 developed in computer science, networking, law, policy-making, and
 advocacy are coming together [Dutton] [Kaye] [Franklin] [RFC1958].
 The same concepts might have a very different meaning and
 implications in other areas of expertise.  In order to foster a
 constructive interdisciplinary debate and minimize differences in
 interpretation, the following glossary is provided.  It builds as
 much as possible on existing definitions; when definitions were not
 available in IETF documents, definitions were taken from other
 Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) or academic literature.
 Accessibility:  "Full Internet Connectivity", as described in
    [RFC4084], to provide unfettered access to the Internet.
    The design of protocols, services, or implementations that provide
    an enabling environment for people with disabilities.
    The ability to receive information available on the Internet.
 Anonymity:  The condition of an identity being unknown or concealed
    [RFC4949].
 Anonymous:  A state of an individual in which an observer or attacker
    cannot identify the individual within a set of other individuals
    (the anonymity set) [RFC6973].

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 6] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Authenticity:  The property of being genuine and able to be verified
    and be trusted [RFC4949].
 Blocking:  The practice of preventing access to resources in the
    aggregate [RFC7754].  Both blocking and filtering can be
    implemented at the level of "services" (web hosting or video
    streaming, for example) or at the level of particular "content"
    [RFC7754].
 Censorship:  Technical mechanisms, including both blocking and
    filtering, that certain political or private actors around the
    world use to block or degrade Internet traffic.  For further
    details on the various elements of Internet censorship, see
    [Hall].
 Censorship resistance:  Methods and measures to mitigate Internet
    censorship.
 Confidentiality:  The property that data is not disclosed to system
    entities unless they have been authorized to know the data
    [RFC4949].
 Connectivity:  The extent to which a device or network is able to
    reach other devices or networks to exchange data.  The Internet is
    the tool for providing global connectivity [RFC1958].  Different
    types of connectivity are further specified in [RFC4084].
    The end-to-end principle, interoperability, distributed
    architecture, resilience, reliability, and robustness in
    combination constitute the enabling factors that result in
    connectivity to, and on, the Internet.
 Content agnosticism:  Treating network traffic identically regardless
    of content.
 Decentralized:  Implementation or deployment of standards, protocols,
    or systems without one single point of control.
 End-to-end principle:  The principle that application-specific
    functions should not be embedded into the network and thus stay at
    the endpoints.  In many cases, especially when dealing with
    failures, the right decisions can only be made with the
    corresponding application-specific knowledge, which is available
    at endpoints not in the network.
    The end-to-end principle is one of the key architectural
    guidelines of the Internet.  The argument in favor of the
    end-to-end approach to system design is laid out in the

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 7] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    fundamental papers by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark [Saltzer] [Clark].
    In these papers, the authors argue in favor of radical
    simplification: system designers should only build the essential
    and shared functions into the network, as most functions can only
    be implemented at network endpoints.  Building features into the
    network for the benefit of certain applications will come at the
    expense of others.  As such, in general system designers should
    attempt to steer clear of building anything into the network that
    is not a bare necessity for its functioning.  Following the
    end-to-end principle is crucial for innovation, as it makes
    innovation at the edges possible without having to make changes to
    the network, and it protects the robustness of the network.
    [RFC2775] further elaborates on various aspects of end-to-end
    connectivity.
 Federation:  The possibility of connecting autonomous and possibly
    centralized systems into a single system without a central
    authority.
 Filtering:  The practice of preventing access to specific resources
    within an aggregate [RFC7754].
 Heterogeneity:  "The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on
    many levels: devices and nodes, router scheduling algorithms and
    queue management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of
    multiplexing, protocol versions and implementations, underlying
    link layers (e.g., point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless,
    FDDI, etc.), in the traffic mix and in the levels of congestion at
    different times and places.  Moreover, as the Internet is composed
    of autonomous organizations and internet service providers, each
    with their own separate policy concerns, there is a large
    heterogeneity of administrative domains and pricing structures."
    [FIArch]
    As a result, per [FIArch], the heterogeneity principle proposed in
    [RFC1958] needs to be supported by design.
 Human rights:  Principles and norms that are indivisible,
    interrelated, unalienable, universal, and mutually reinforcing.
    Human rights have been codified in national and international
    bodies of law.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]
    is the most well-known document in the history of human rights.
    The aspirations from [UDHR] were later codified into treaties such
    as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
    [ICCPR] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
    Cultural Rights [ICESCR], after which signatory countries were

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 8] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    obliged to reflect them in their national bodies of law.  There is
    also a broad recognition that not only states have obligations
    vis-a-vis human rights, but non-state actors do as well.
 Integrity:  The property that data has not been changed, destroyed,
    or lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner [RFC4949].
 Internationalization (i18n):  The practice of making protocols,
    standards, and implementations usable in different languages and
    scripts (see Section 6.2.12 ("Localization")).
    "In the IETF, 'internationalization' means to add or improve the
    handling of non-ASCII text in a protocol" [RFC6365].
    A different perspective, more appropriate to protocols that are
    designed for global use from the beginning, is the definition used
    by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [W3Ci18nDef]:
    "Internationalization is the design and development of a product,
    application or document content that enables easy localization for
    target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language."
    Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset
    (US-ASCII), or they leave the question of encoding up to local
    guesswork (which leads, of course, to interoperability problems)
    [RFC3536].  If multiple charsets are permitted, they must be
    explicitly identified [RFC2277].  Adding non-ASCII text to a
    protocol allows the protocol to handle more scripts, hopefully all
    scripts in use in the world.  In today's world, that is normally
    best accomplished by allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only,
    thereby shifting conversion issues away from ad hoc choices.
 Interoperable:  A property of a documented standard or protocol that
    allows different independent implementations to work with each
    other without any restriction on functionality.
 Localization (l10n):  The practice of translating an implementation
    to make it functional in a specific language or for users in a
    specific locale (see Section 6.2.5 ("Internationalization")).
    (cf. [RFC6365]): The process of adapting an internationalized
    application platform or application to a specific cultural
    environment.  In localization, the same semantics are preserved
    while the syntax may be changed [FRAMEWORK].
    Localization is the act of tailoring an application for a
    different language, script, or culture.  Some internationalized
    applications can handle a wide variety of languages.  Typical
    users only understand a small number of languages, so the program

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 9] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    must be tailored to interact with users in just the languages they
    know.  The major work of localization is translating the user
    interface and documentation.  Localization involves not only
    changing the language interaction but also other relevant changes,
    such as display of numbers, dates, currency, and so on.  The
    better internationalized an application is, the easier it is to
    localize it for a particular language and character-encoding
    scheme.
 Open standards:  Conform with [RFC2026], which states the following:
    "Various national and international standards bodies, such as
    ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU-T, develop a variety of protocol and
    service specifications that are similar to Technical
    Specifications defined here.  National and international groups
    also publish 'implementors' agreements' that are analogous to
    Applicability Statements, capturing a body of implementation-
    specific detail concerned with the practical application of their
    standards.  All of these are considered to be 'open external
    standards' for the purposes of the Internet Standards Process."
 Openness:  Absence of centralized points of control -- "a feature
    that is assumed to make it easy for new users to join and new uses
    to unfold" [Brown].
 Permissionless innovation:  The freedom and ability to freely create
    and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs
    that currently exist.
 Privacy:  The right of an entity (normally a person), acting on its
    own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with
    its environment, including the degree to which the entity is
    willing to share its personal information with others [RFC4949].
    The right of individuals to control or influence what information
    related to them may be collected and stored, and by whom and to
    whom that information may be disclosed.
    Privacy is a broad concept relating to the protection of
    individual or group autonomy and the relationship between an
    individual or group and society, including government, companies,
    and private individuals.  It is often summarized as "the right to
    be left alone", but it encompasses a wide range of rights,
    including protections from intrusions into family and home life,
    control of sexual and reproductive rights, and communications
    secrecy.  It is commonly recognized as a core right that underpins
    human dignity and other values such as freedom of association and
    freedom of speech.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 10] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    The right to privacy is also recognized in nearly every national
    constitution and in most international human rights treaties.  It
    has been adjudicated upon by both international and regional
    bodies.  The right to privacy is also legally protected at the
    national level through provisions in civil and/or criminal codes.
 Reliability:  Ensures that a protocol will execute its function
    consistently as described and function without unexpected results.
    A system that is reliable degenerates gracefully and will have a
    documented way to announce degradation.  It also has mechanisms to
    recover from failure gracefully and, if applicable, allow for
    partial healing [dict].
 Resilience:  The maintaining of dependability and performance in the
    face of unanticipated changes and circumstances [Meyer].
 Robustness:  The resistance of protocols and their implementations to
    errors, and resistance to involuntary, legal, or malicious
    attempts to disrupt their modes of operation [RFC760] [RFC791]
    [RFC793] [RFC1122].  Or, framed more positively, a system can
    provide functionality consistently and without errors despite
    involuntary, legal, or malicious attempts to disrupt its mode of
    operation.
 Scalability:  The ability to handle increased or decreased system
    parameters (number of end systems, users, data flows, routing
    entries, etc.) predictably within defined expectations.  There
    should be a clear definition of its scope and applicability.  The
    limits of a system's scalability should be defined.  Growth or
    shrinkage of these parameters is typically considered by orders of
    magnitude.
 Strong encryption / cryptography:  Used to describe a cryptographic
    algorithm that would require a large amount of computational power
    to defeat it [RFC4949].  In the modern usage of the definition of
    "strong encryption", this refers to an amount of computing power
    currently not available, not even to major state-level actors.
 Transparency:  In this context, linked to the comprehensibility of a
    protocol in relation to the choices it makes for users, protocol
    developers, and implementers, and to its outcome.
    Outcome transparency is linked to the comprehensibility of the
    effects of a protocol in relation to the choices it makes for
    users, protocol developers, and implementers, including the
    comprehensibility of possible unintended consequences of protocol
    choices (e.g., lack of authenticity may lead to lack of integrity
    and negative externalities).

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 11] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

3. Research Questions

 The Human Rights Protocol Considerations (HRPC) Research Group in the
 Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) embarked on its mission to answer
 the following two questions, which are also the main two questions
 that this document seeks to answer:
 1.  How can Internet protocols and standards impact human rights, by
     either enabling them or creating a restrictive environment?
 2.  Can guidelines be developed to improve informed and transparent
     decision-making about the potential impact of protocols on human
     rights?

4. Literature and Discussion Review

 Protocols and standards are regularly seen as merely performing
 technical functions.  However, these protocols and standards do not
 exist outside of their technical context, nor do they exist outside
 of their political, historical, economic, legal, or cultural context.
 This is best exemplified by the way in which some Internet processes
 and protocols have become part and parcel of political processes and
 public policies: one only has to look at the IANA transition,
 [RFC7258] ("Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack"), or global innovation
 policy, for concrete examples [DeNardis15].  According to [Abbate],
 "protocols are politics by other means."  This statement would
 probably not garner IETF consensus, but it nonetheless reveals that
 protocols are based on decision-making, most often by humans.  In
 this process, the values and ideas about the role that a particular
 technology should perform in society are embedded into the design.
 Often, these design decisions are partly "purely technical" and
 partly inspired by a certain world view of how technology should
 function that is inspired by personal, corporate, and political
 views.  Within the community of IETF participants, there is a strong
 desire to solve technical problems and to minimize engagement with
 political processes and non-protocol-related political issues.
 Since the late 1990s, a burgeoning group of academics and
 practitioners researched questions surrounding the societal impact of
 protocols, as well as the politics of protocols.  These studies vary
 in focus and scope: some focus on specific standards [Davidson-etal]
 [Musiani]; others look into the political, legal, commercial, or
 social impact of protocols [BrownMarsden] [Lessig] [Mueller]; and yet
 others look at how the engineers' personal set of values get
 translated into technology [Abbate] [CathFloridi] [DeNardis15]
 [WynsbergheMoura].

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 12] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Commercial and political influences on the management of the
 Internet's infrastructure are well documented in the academic
 literature and will thus not be discussed here; see [Benkler],
 [Brown-etal], [DeNardis15], [Lessig], [Mueller], and [Zittrain].  It
 is sufficient to say that the IETF community consistently tries to
 push back against the standardization of surveillance and certain
 other issues that negatively influence an end user's experience of,
 and trust in, the Internet [DeNardis14].  The role that human rights
 play in engineering, infrastructure maintenance, and protocol design
 is much less clear.
 It is very important to understand how protocols and standards impact
 human rights, in particular because SDOs are increasingly becoming
 venues where social values (like human rights) are discussed,
 although often from a technological point of view.  These SDOs are
 becoming a new focal point for discussions about "values by design"
 and the role of technical engineers in protecting or enabling human
 rights [Brown-etal] [Clark-etal] [DeNardis14] [CathFloridi] [Lessig]
 [Rachovitsa].
 In the academic literature, five clear positions can be discerned in
 relation to the role of human rights in protocol design and how to
 account for these human rights in protocol development: Clark
 et al. [Clark-etal] argue that there is a need to design "for
 variation in outcome -- so that the outcome can be different in
 different places, and the tussle takes place within the design (...)"
 [as] "Rigid designs will be broken; designs that permit variation
 will flex under pressure and survive."  They hold that human rights
 should not be hard-coded into protocols for three reasons: First, the
 rights in the UDHR are not absolute.  Second, technology is not the
 only tool in the tussle over human rights.  And last but not least,
 it is dangerous to make promises that can't be kept.  The open nature
 of the Internet will never, they argue, be enough to fully protect
 individuals' human rights.
 Conversely, Brown et al. [Brown-etal] state that "some key, universal
 values -- of which the UDHR is the most legitimate expression --
 should be baked into the architecture at design time."  They argue
 that design choices have offline consequences and are able to shape
 the power positions of groups or individuals in society.  As such,
 the individuals making these technical decisions have a moral
 obligation to take into account the impact of their decisions on
 society and, by extension, human rights.  Brown et al. recognize that
 values and the implementation of human rights vary across the globe.
 Yet they argue that all members of the United Nations have found
 "common agreement on the values proclaimed in the Universal
 Declaration of Human Rights.  In looking for the most legitimate set

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 13] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 of global values to embed in the future Internet architectures, the
 UDHR has the democratic assent of a significant fraction of the
 planet's population, through their elected representatives."
 The main disagreement between these two academic positions lies
 mostly in the question of whether (1) a particular value system
 should be embedded into the Internet's architectures or (2) the
 architectures need to account for a varying set of values.
 A third position, which is similar to that of Brown et al., is taken
 by [Broeders], in which Broeders argues that "we must find ways to
 continue guaranteeing the overall integrity and functionality of the
 public core of the Internet."  He argues that the best way to do this
 is by declaring the backbone of the Internet -- which includes the
 TCP/IP protocol suite, numerous standards, the Domain Name System
 (DNS), and routing protocols -- a common public good.  This is a
 different approach than those of [Clark-etal] and [Brown-etal]
 because Broeders does not suggest that social values should (or
 should not) be explicitly coded into the Internet, but rather that
 the existing infrastructure should be seen as an entity of public
 value.
 Bless and Orwat [Bless2] represent a fourth position.  They argue
 that it is too early to make any definitive claims but that there is
 a need for more careful analysis of the impact of protocol design
 choices on human rights.  They also argue that it is important to
 search for solutions that "create awareness in the technical
 community about impact of design choices on social values" and "work
 towards a methodology for co-design of technical and institutional
 systems."
 Berners-Lee and Halpin [BernersLeeHalpin] represent a fifth position.
 They argue that the Internet could lead to even newer capacities, and
 these capacities may over time be viewed as new kinds of rights.  For
 example, Internet access may be viewed as a human right in and of
 itself if it is taken to be a precondition for other rights, even if
 it could not have been predicted at the time that the UDHR was
 written (after the end of World War II).
 It is important to contextualize the technical discussion with the
 academic discussions on this issue.  The academic discussions are
 also important to document, as they inform the position of the
 authors of this document.  The research group's position is that
 hard-coding human rights into protocols is complicated and changes
 with the context.  At this point, it is difficult to say whether or
 not hard-coding human rights into protocols is wise or feasible.
 Additionally, there are many human rights, but not all are relevant
 for information and communications technologies (ICTs).  A partial

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 14] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 catalog (with references to sources) of human rights related to ICTs
 can be found in [Hill2014].  It is, however, important to make
 conscious and explicit design decisions that take into account the
 human rights protocol considerations guidelines developed below.
 This will contribute to the understanding of the impact that
 protocols can have on human rights, for both developers and users.
 In addition, it contributes to (1) the careful consideration of the
 impact that a specific protocol might have on human rights and
 (2) the dissemination of the practice of documenting protocol design
 decisions related to human rights.
 Pursuant to the principle of constant change, because the function
 and scope of the Internet evolve, so does the role of the IETF in
 developing standards.  Internet Standards are adopted based on a
 series of criteria, including high technical quality, support by
 community consensus, and their overall benefit to the Internet.  The
 latter calls for an assessment of the interests of all affected
 parties and the specifications' impact on the Internet's users.  In
 this respect, the effective exercise of the human rights of the
 Internet users is a relevant consideration that needs to be
 appreciated in the standardization process insofar as it is directly
 linked to the reliability and core values of the Internet [RFC1958]
 [RFC2775] [RFC3439] [RFC3724].
 This document details the steps taken in the research into human
 rights protocol considerations by the HRPC Research Group to clarify
 the relationship between technical concepts used in the IETF and
 human rights.  This document sets out some preliminary steps and
 considerations for engineers to take into account when developing
 standards and protocols.

5. Methodology

 Mapping the relationship between human rights, protocols, and
 architectures is a new research challenge that requires a good amount
 of interdisciplinary and cross-organizational cooperation to develop
 a consistent methodology.
 The methodological choices made in this document are based on the
 political-science-based method of discourse analysis and ethnographic
 research methods [Cath].  This work departs from the assumption that
 language reflects the understanding of concepts.  Or, as [Jabri]
 holds, policy documents are "social relations represented in texts
 where the language contained within these texts is used to construct
 meaning and representation."  This process happens in society
 [Denzin] and manifests itself in institutions and organizations
 [King], exposed using the ethnographic methods of semi-structured
 interviews and participant observation.  Or, in non-academic

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 15] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 language, the way the language in IETF/IRTF documents describes and
 approaches the issues they are trying to address is an indication of
 the underlying social assumptions and relationships of the engineers
 to their engineering.  By reading and analyzing these documents, as
 well as interviewing engineers and participating in the IETF/IRTF
 working groups, it is possible to distill the relationship between
 human rights, protocols, and the Internet's infrastructure as it
 pertains to the work of the IETF.
 The discourse analysis was operationalized using qualitative and
 quantitative means.  The first step taken by the authors and
 contributors was reading RFCs and other official IETF documents.  The
 second step was the use of a Python-based analyzer, using the
 "Bigbang" tool, adapted by Nick Doty [Doty], to scan for the concepts
 that were identified as important architectural principles (distilled
 on the initial reading and supplemented by the interviews and
 participant observation).  Such a quantitative method is very precise
 and speeds up the research process [Ritchie].  But this tool is
 unable to understand "latent meaning" [Denzin].  In order to mitigate
 these issues of automated word-frequency-based approaches and to get
 a sense of the "thick meaning" [Geertz] of the data, a second
 qualitative analysis of the data set was performed.  These various
 rounds of discourse analysis were used to inform the interviews and
 further data analysis.  As such, the initial rounds of quantitative
 discourse analysis were used to inform the second rounds of
 qualitative analysis.  The results from the qualitative interviews
 were again used to feed new concepts into the quantitative discourse
 analysis.  As such, the two methods continued to support and enrich
 each other.
 The ethnographic methods of the data collection and processing
 allowed the research group to acquire the data necessary to "provide
 a holistic understanding of research participants' views and actions"
 [Denzin] that highlighted ongoing issues and case studies where
 protocols impact human rights.  The interview participants were
 selected through purposive sampling [Babbie], as the research group
 was interested in getting a wide variety of opinions on the role of
 human rights in guiding protocol development.  This sampling method
 also ensured that individuals with extensive experience working at
 the IETF in various roles were targeted.  The interviewees included
 individuals in leadership positions (Working Group (WG) chairs, Area
 Directors (ADs)), "regular participants", and individuals working for
 specific entities (corporate, civil society, political, academic) and
 represented various backgrounds, nationalities, and genders.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 16] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.1. Data Sources

 In order to map the potential relationship between human rights and
 protocols, the HRPC Research Group gathered data from three specific
 sources:

5.1.1. Discourse Analysis of RFCs

 To start addressing the issue, a mapping exercise analyzing Internet
 infrastructure and protocol features vis-a-vis their possible impact
 on human rights was undertaken.  Therefore, research on (1) the
 language used in current and historic RFCs and (2) information
 gathered from mailing-list discussions was undertaken to expose core
 architectural principles, language, and deliberations on the human
 rights of those affected by the network.

5.1.2. Interviews with Members of the IETF Community

 Over 30 interviews with the current and past members of the Internet
 Architecture Board (IAB), current and past members of the Internet
 Engineering Steering Group (IESG), chairs of selected working groups,
 and RFC authors were done at the IETF 92 meeting in Dallas in
 March 2015 to get an insider's understanding of how they view the
 relationship (if any) between human rights and protocols, and how
 this relationship plays out in their work.  Several of the
 participants opted to remain anonymous.  If you are interested in
 this data set, please contact the authors of this document.

5.1.3. Participant Observation in Working Groups

 By participating in various working groups, in person at IETF
 meetings, and on mailing lists, information about the IETF's
 day-to-day workings was gathered, from which general themes,
 technical concepts, and use cases about human rights and protocols
 were extracted.  This process started at the IETF 91 meeting in
 Honolulu and continues today.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 17] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.2. Data Analysis Strategies

 The data above was processed using three consecutive strategies:
 mapping protocols related to human rights, extracting concepts from
 these protocols, and creation of a common glossary (detailed under
 Section 2).  Before going over these strategies, some elaboration on
 the process of identifying technical concepts as they relate to human
 rights is needed:

5.2.1. Identifying Qualities of Technical Concepts That Relate to Human

      Rights

5.2.1.1. Mapping Protocols and Standards to Human Rights

 By combining data from the three data sources named above, an
 extensive list of protocols and standards that potentially enable the
 Internet as a tool for freedom of expression and association was
 created.  In order to determine the enabling (or inhibiting)
 features, we relied on direct references in the RFCs as related to
 such impacts, as well as input from the community.  Based on this
 analysis, a list of RFCs that describe standards and protocols that
 are potentially closely related to human rights was compiled.

5.2.1.2. Extracting Concepts from Selected RFCs

 The first step was to identify the protocols and standards that are
 related to human rights and to create an environment that enables
 human rights.  For that, we needed to focus on specific technical
 concepts that underlie these protocols and standards.  Based on this
 list, a number of technical concepts that appeared frequently were
 extracted and used to create a second list of technical terms that,
 when combined and applied in different circumstances, create an
 enabling environment for exercising human rights on the Internet.

5.2.1.3. Building a Common Vocabulary of Technical Concepts That Impact

        Human Rights
 While interviewing experts, investigating RFCs, and compiling
 technical definitions, several concepts of convergence and divergence
 were identified.  To ensure that the discussion was based on a common
 understanding of terms and vocabulary, a list of definitions was
 created.  The definitions are based on the wording found in various
 IETF documents; if the definitions were not available therein,
 definitions were taken from other SDOs or academic literature, as
 indicated in Section 2.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 18] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.2.1.4. Translating Human Rights Concepts into Technical Definitions

 The previous steps allowed for the clarification of relationships
 between human rights and technical concepts.  The steps taken show
 how the research process "zoomed in", from compiling a broad list of
 protocols and standards that relate to human rights to extracting the
 precise technical concepts that make up these protocols and
 standards, in order to understand the relationship between the two.
 This subsection presents the next step: translating human rights to
 technical concepts by matching the individual components of the
 rights to the accompanying technical concepts, allowing for the
 creation of a list of technical concepts that, when partially
 combined, can create an enabling environment for human rights.

5.2.1.5. List of Technical Terms That, When Partially Combined, Can

        Create an Enabling Environment for Human Rights
 Based on the prior steps, the following list of technical terms was
 drafted.  When partially combined, this list can create an enabling
 environment for human rights, such as freedom of expression and
 freedom of association.
   Architectural principles                    Enabling features
     and system properties                        for user rights
                    /------------------------------------------------\
                    |                                                |
  +=================|=============================+                  |
  =                 |                             =                  |
  =                 |           End-to-end        =                  |
  =                 |          Reliability        =                  |
  =                 |           Resilience        =  Access as       |
  =                 |        Interoperability     =   human right    |
  =    Good enough  |          Transparency       =                  |
  =     principle   |       Data minimization     =                  |
  =                 |  Permissionless innovation  =                  |
  =    Simplicity   |     Graceful degradation    =                  |
  =                 |          Connectivity       =                  |
  =                 |      Heterogeneity support  =                  |
  =                 |                             =                  |
  =                 |                             =                  |
  =                 \------------------------------------------------/
  =                                               =
  +===============================================+
 Figure 1: Relationship between Architectural Principles and Enabling
                       Features for User Rights

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 19] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.2.2. Relating Human Rights to Technical Concepts

 The technical concepts listed in the steps above have been grouped
 according to their impact on specific rights, as mentioned in the
 interviews done at IETF 92 as well as the study of literature (see
 Section 4 ("Literature and Discussion Review") above).
 This analysis aims to assist protocol developers in better
 understanding the roles that specific technical concepts have with
 regard to their contribution to an enabling environment for people to
 exercise their human rights.
 This analysis does not claim to be a complete or exhaustive mapping
 of all possible ways in which protocols could potentially impact
 human rights, but it presents a mapping of initial concepts based on
 interviews and on discussion and review of the literature.
 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
 | Technical Concepts    | Rights Potentially Impacted             |
 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
 | Connectivity          |                                         |
 | Privacy               |                                         |
 | Security              |                                         |
 | Content agnosticism   | Right to freedom of expression          |
 | Internationalization  |                                         |
 | Censorship resistance |                                         |
 | Open standards        |                                         |
 | Heterogeneity support |                                         |
 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
 | Anonymity             |                                         |
 | Privacy               |                                         |
 | Pseudonymity          | Right to non-discrimination             |
 | Accessibility         |                                         |
 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
 | Content agnosticism   |                                         |
 | Security              | Right to equal protection               |
 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
 | Accessibility         |                                         |
 | Internationalization  | Right to political participation        |
 | Censorship resistance |                                         |
 | Connectivity          |                                         |
 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
 | Open standards        |                                         |
 | Localization          | Right to participate in cultural life,  |
 | Internationalization  |    arts, and science, and               |
 | Censorship resistance | Right to education                      |
 | Accessibility         |                                         |

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 20] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
 | Connectivity          |                                         |
 | Decentralization      |                                         |
 | Censorship resistance | Right to freedom of assembly            |
 | Pseudonymity          |    and association                      |
 | Anonymity             |                                         |
 | Security              |                                         |
 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
 | Reliability           |                                         |
 | Confidentiality       |                                         |
 | Integrity             | Right to security                       |
 | Authenticity          |                                         |
 | Anonymity             |                                         |
 |                       |                                         |
 +-----------------------+-----------------------------------------+
      Figure 2: Relationship between Specific Technical Concepts
     with Regard to Their Contribution to an Enabling Environment
               for People to Exercise Their Human Rights

5.2.3. Mapping Cases of Protocols, Implementations, and Networking

      Paradigms That Adversely Impact Human Rights or Are Enablers
      Thereof
 Given the information above, the following list of cases of
 protocols, implementations, and networking paradigms that either
 adversely impact or enable human rights was formed.
 It is important to note that the assessment here is not a general
 judgment on these protocols, nor is it an exhaustive listing of all
 the potential negative or positive impacts on human rights that these
 protocols might have.  When these protocols were conceived, there
 were many criteria to take into account.  For instance, relying on a
 centralized service can be bad for freedom of speech (it creates one
 more control point, where censorship could be applied), but it may be
 a necessity if the endpoints are not connected and reachable
 permanently.  So, when we say "protocol X has feature Y, which may
 endanger freedom of speech," it does not mean that protocol X is bad,
 much less that its authors were evil.  The goal here is to show, with
 actual examples, that the design of protocols has practical
 consequences for some human rights and that these consequences have
 to be considered in the design phase.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 21] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.2.3.1. IPv4

 The Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), also known as "Layer 3" of
 the Internet and specified with a common encapsulation and protocol
 header, is defined in [RFC791].  The evolution of Internet
 communications led to continued development in this area,
 "encapsulated" in the development of version 6 (IPv6) of the protocol
 [RFC8200].  In spite of this updated protocol, we find that 23 years
 after the specification of IPv6 the older IPv4 standard continues to
 account for a sizable majority of Internet traffic.  Most of the
 issues discussed here (Network Address Translators (NATs) are a major
 exception; see Section 5.2.3.1.2 ("Address Translation and
 Mobility")) are valid for IPv4 as well as IPv6.
 The Internet was designed as a platform for free and open
 communication, most notably encoded in the end-to-end principle, and
 that philosophy is also present in the technical implementation of IP
 [RFC3724].  While the protocol was designed to exist in an
 environment where intelligence is at the end hosts, it has proven to
 provide sufficient information that a more intelligent network core
 can make policy decisions and enforce policy-based traffic shaping,
 thereby restricting the communications of end hosts.  These
 capabilities for network control and for limitations on freedom of
 expression by end hosts can be traced back to the design of IPv4,
 helping us to understand which technical protocol decisions have led
 to harm to this human right.  A feature that can harm freedom of
 expression as well as the right to privacy through misuse of IP is
 the exploitation of the public visibility of the host pairs for all
 communications and the corresponding ability to differentiate and
 block traffic as a result of that metadata.

5.2.3.1.1. Network Visibility of Source and Destination

 The IPv4 protocol header contains fixed location fields for both the
 source IP address and destination IP address [RFC791].  These
 addresses identify both the host sending and the host receiving each
 message; they also allow the core network to understand who is
 talking to whom and to practically limit communication selectively
 between pairs of hosts.  Blocking of communication based on the pair
 of source and destination is one of the most common limitations on
 the ability for people to communicate today [CAIDA] and can be seen
 as a restriction of the ability for people to assemble or to
 consensually express themselves.
 Inclusion of an Internet-wide identified source in the IP header
 is not the only possible design, especially since the protocol is
 most commonly implemented over Ethernet networks exposing only
 link-local identifiers [RFC894].

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 22] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 A variety of alternative designs do exist, such as the Accountable
 and Private Internet Protocol [APIP] and High-speed Onion Routing at
 the Network Layer (HORNET) [HORNET] as well as source routing.  The
 latter would allow the sender to choose a predefined (safe) route and
 spoofing of the source IP address, which are technically supported by
 IPv4, but neither are considered good practice on the Internet
 [Farrow].  While projects like [TorProject] provide an alternative
 implementation of anonymity in connections, they have been developed
 in spite of the IPv4 protocol design.

5.2.3.1.2. Address Translation and Mobility

 A major structural shift in the Internet that undermined the protocol
 design of IPv4, and significantly reduced the freedom of end users to
 communicate and assemble, was the introduction of network address
 translation [RFC3022].  Network address translation is a process
 whereby organizations and autonomous systems connect two networks by
 translating the IPv4 source and destination addresses between them.
 This process puts the router performing the translation in a
 privileged position, where it is predetermined which subset of
 communications will be translated.
 This process of translation has widespread adoption despite promoting
 a process that goes against the stated end-to-end process of the
 underlying protocol [NATusage].  In contrast, the proposed mechanism
 to provide support for mobility and forwarding to clients that may
 move -- encoded instead as an option in IP [RFC5944] -- has failed to
 gain traction.  In this situation, the compromise made in the design
 of the protocol resulted in a technology that is not coherent with
 the end-to-end principles and thus creates an extra possible hurdle
 for freedom of expression in its design, even though a viable
 alternative exists.  There is a particular problem surrounding NATs
 and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) (as well as other connections
 used for privacy purposes), as NATs sometimes cause VPNs not to work.

5.2.3.2. DNS

 The Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1035] provides service discovery
 capabilities and provides a mechanism to associate human-readable
 names with services.  The DNS is organized around a set of
 independently operated "root servers" run by organizations that
 function in line with ICANN's policy by answering queries for which
 organizations have been delegated to manage registration under each
 Top-Level Domain (TLD).  The DNS is organized as a rooted tree, and
 this brings up political and social concerns over control.  TLDs are
 maintained and determined by ICANN.  These namespaces encompass
 several classes of services.  The initial namespaces, including
 ".com" and ".net", provide common spaces for expression of ideas,

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 23] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 though their policies are enacted through US-based companies.  Other
 namespaces are delegated to specific nationalities and may impose
 limits designed to focus speech in those forums, to both (1) promote
 speech from that nationality and (2) comply with local limits on
 expression and social norms.  Finally, the system has recently been
 expanded with additional generic and sponsored namespaces -- for
 instance, ".travel" and ".ninja" -- that are operated by a range of
 organizations that may independently determine their registration
 policies.  This new development has both positive and negative
 implications in terms of enabling human rights.  Some individuals
 argue that it undermines the right to freedom of expression because
 some of these new generic TLDs have restricted policies on
 registration and particular rules on hate speech content.  Others
 argue that precisely these properties are positive because they
 enable certain (mostly minority) communities to build safer spaces
 for association, thereby enabling their right to freedom of
 association.  An often-mentioned example is an application like
 .gay [CoE].
 As discussed in [RFC7626], DNS has significant privacy issues.  Most
 notable is the lack of encryption to limit the visibility of requests
 for domain resolution from intermediary parties, and a limited
 deployment of DNSSEC to provide authentication, allowing the client
 to know that they received a correct, "authoritative" answer to a
 query.  In response to the privacy issues, the IETF DNS Private
 Exchange (DPRIVE) Working Group is developing mechanisms to provide
 confidentiality to DNS transactions, to address concerns surrounding
 pervasive monitoring [RFC7258].
 Authentication through DNSSEC creates a validation path for records.
 This authentication protects against forged or manipulated DNS data.
 As such, DNSSEC protects directory lookups and makes it harder to
 hijack a session.  This is important because interference with the
 operation of the DNS is currently becoming one of the central
 mechanisms used to block access to websites.  This interference
 limits both the freedom of expression of the publisher to offer their
 content and the freedom of assembly for clients to congregate in a
 shared virtual space.  Even though DNSSEC doesn't prevent censorship,
 it makes it clear that the returned information is not the
 information that was requested; this contributes to the right to
 security and increases trust in the network.  It is, however,
 important to note that DNSSEC is currently not widely supported or
 deployed by domain name registrars, making it difficult to
 authenticate and use correctly.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 24] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.2.3.2.1. Removal of Records

 There have been a number of cases where the records for a domain are
 removed from the name system due to political events.  Examples of
 this removal include the "seizure" of wikileaks [BBC-wikileaks] and
 the names of illegally operating gambling operations by the United
 States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) unit.  In the first
 case, a US court ordered the registrar to take down the domain.  In
 the second, ICE compelled the US-based registry in charge of the .com
 TLD to hand ownership of those domains over to the US government.
 The same technique has been used in Libya to remove sites in
 violation of "our Country's Law and Morality (which) do not allow any
 kind of pornography or its promotion."  [techyum]
 At a protocol level, there is no technical auditing for name
 ownership, as in alternate systems like Namecoin [Namecoin].  As a
 result, there is no ability for users to differentiate seizure from
 the legitimate transfer of name ownership, which is purely a policy
 decision made by registrars.  While DNSSEC addresses the network
 distortion events described below, it does not tackle this problem.
 (Although we mention alternative techniques, this is not a comparison
 of DNS with Namecoin: the latter has its own problems and
 limitations.  The idea here is to show that there are several
 possible choices, and they have consequences for human rights.)

5.2.3.2.2. Distortion of Records

 The most common mechanism by which the DNS is abused to limit freedom
 of expression is through manipulation of protocol messages by the
 network.  One form occurs at an organizational level, where client
 computers are instructed to use a local DNS resolver controlled by
 the organization.  The DNS resolver will then selectively distort
 responses rather than request the authoritative lookup from the
 upstream system.  The second form occurs through the use of Deep
 Packet Inspection (DPI), where all DNS protocol messages are
 inspected by the network and objectionable content is distorted, as
 can be observed in Chinese networks.
 A notable instance of distortion occurred in Greece [Ververis], where
 a study found evidence of both (1) DPI to distort DNS replies and
 (2) more excessive blocking of content than was legally required or
 requested (also known as "overblocking").  Internet Service Providers
 (ISPs), obeying a governmental order, prevented clients from
 resolving the names of domains, thereby prompting this particular
 blocking of systems there.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 25] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 At a protocol level, the effectiveness of these attacks is made
 possible by a lack of authentication in the DNS protocol.  DNSSEC
 provides the ability to determine the authenticity of responses when
 used, but it is not regularly checked by resolvers.  DNSSEC is not
 effective when the local resolver for a network is complicit in the
 distortion -- for instance, when the resolver assigned for use by an
 ISP is the source of injection.  Selective distortion of records is
 also made possible by the predictable structure of DNS messages,
 which makes it computationally easy for a network device to watch all
 passing messages even at high speeds, and the lack of encryption,
 which allows the network to distort only an objectionable subset of
 protocol messages.  Specific distortion mechanisms are discussed
 further in [Hall].
 Users can switch to another resolver -- for instance, a public
 resolver.  The distorter can then try to block or hijack the
 connection to this resolver.  This may start an arms race, with the
 user switching to secured connections to this alternative resolver
 [RFC7858] and the distorter then trying to find more sophisticated
 ways to block or hijack the connection.  In some cases, this search
 for an alternative, non-disrupting resolver may lead to more
 centralization because many people are switching to a few big
 commercial public resolvers.

5.2.3.2.3. Injection of Records

 Responding incorrectly to requests for name lookups is the most
 common mechanism that in-network devices use to limit the ability of
 end users to discover services.  A deviation that accomplishes a
 similar objective and may be seen as different from a "freedom of
 expression" perspective is the injection of incorrect responses to
 queries.  The most prominent example of this behavior occurs in
 China, where requests for lookups of sites deemed inappropriate will
 trigger the network to return a false response, causing the client to
 ignore the real response when it subsequently arrives
 [greatfirewall].  Unlike the other network paradigms discussed above,
 injection does not stifle the ability of a server to announce its
 name; it instead provides another voice that answers sooner.  This is
 effective because without DNSSEC, the protocol will respond to
 whichever answer is received first, without listening for subsequent
 answers.

5.2.3.3. HTTP

 The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) version 1.1 [RFC7230]
 [RFC7231] [RFC7232] [RFC7233] [RFC7234] [RFC7235] [RFC7236] [RFC7237]
 is a request-response application protocol developed throughout the
 1990s.  HTTP factually contributed to the exponential growth of the

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 26] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Internet and the interconnection of populations around the world.
 Its simple design strongly contributed to the fact that HTTP has
 become the foundation of most modern Internet platforms and
 communication systems, from websites to chat systems and computer-to-
 computer applications.  In its manifestation in the World Wide Web,
 HTTP radically revolutionized the course of technological development
 and the ways people interact with online content and with each other.
 However, HTTP is also a fundamentally insecure protocol that doesn't
 natively provide encryption properties.  While the definition of the
 Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [RFC6101], and later of Transport Layer
 Security (TLS) [RFC5246], also happened during the 1990s, the fact
 that HTTP doesn't mandate the use of such encryption layers by
 developers and service providers was one of the reasons for a very
 late adoption of encryption.  Only in the middle of the 2000s did we
 observe big ISPs, such as Google, starting to provide encrypted
 access to their web services.
 The lack of sensitivity and understanding of the critical importance
 of securing web traffic incentivized certain (offensive) actors to
 develop, deploy, and utilize interception systems at large and to
 later launch active injection attacks, in order to swipe large
 amounts of data and compromise Internet-enabled devices.  The
 commercial availability of systems and tools to perform these types
 of attacks also led to a number of human rights abuses that have been
 discovered and reported over the years.
 Generally, we can identify traffic interception (Section 5.2.3.3.1)
 and traffic manipulation (Section 5.2.3.3.2) as the two most
 problematic attacks that can be performed against applications
 employing a cleartext HTTP transport layer.  That being said, the
 IETF is taking steady steps to move to the encrypted version of HTTP,
 HTTP Secure (HTTPS).
 While this is commendable, we must not lose track of the fact that
 different protocols, implementations, configurations, and networking
 paradigms can intersect such that they (can be used to) adversely
 impact human rights.  For instance, to facilitate surveillance,
 certain countries will throttle HTTPS connections, forcing users to
 switch to (unthrottled) HTTP [Aryan-etal].

5.2.3.3.1. Traffic Interception

 While we are seeing an increasing trend in the last couple of years
 to employ SSL/TLS as a secure traffic layer for HTTP-based
 applications, we are still far from seeing a ubiquitous use of
 encryption on the World Wide Web.  It is important to consider that
 the adoption of SSL/TLS is also a relatively recent phenomenon.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 27] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Email providers such as riseup.net were the first to enable SSL by
 default.  Google did not introduce an option for its Gmail users to
 navigate with SSL until 2008 [Rideout] and turned TLS on by default
 later, in 2010 [Schillace].  It took an increasing amount of security
 breaches and revelations on global surveillance from Edward Snowden
 before other mail service providers followed suit.  For example,
 Yahoo did not enable SSL/TLS by default on its webmail services until
 early 2014 [Peterson].
 TLS itself has been subject to many attacks and bugs; this situation
 can be attributed to some fundamental design weaknesses, such as lack
 of a state machine (which opens a vulnerability for triple handshake
 attacks) and flaws caused by early US government restrictions on
 cryptography, leading to cipher-suite downgrade attacks (Logjam
 attacks).  These vulnerabilities are being corrected in TLS 1.3
 [Bhargavan] [Adrian].
 HTTP upgrading to HTTPS is also vulnerable to having an attacker
 remove the "s" in any links to HTTPS URIs from a web page transferred
 in cleartext over HTTP -- an attack called "SSL Stripping"
 [sslstrip].  Thus, for high-security use of HTTPS, IETF standards
 such as HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [RFC6797], certificate
 pinning [RFC7469], and/or DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
 (DANE) [RFC6698] should be used.
 As we learned through Snowden's revelations, intelligence agencies
 have been intercepting and collecting unencrypted traffic at large
 for many years.  There are documented examples of such
 mass-surveillance programs with the Government Communications
 Headquarters's (GCHQ's) Tempora [WP-Tempora] and the National
 Security Agency's (NSA's) XKeyscore [Greenwald].  Through these
 programs, the NSA and the GCHQ have been able to swipe large amounts
 of data, including email and instant messaging communications that
 have been transported in the clear for years by providers
 unsuspecting of the pervasiveness and scale of governments' efforts
 and investment in global mass-surveillance capabilities.
 However, similar mass interception of unencrypted HTTP communications
 is also often employed at the national level by some democratic
 countries, by exercising control over state-owned ISPs and through
 the use of commercially available monitoring, collection, and
 censorship equipment.  Over the last few years, a lot of information
 has come to public attention on the role and scale of a surveillance
 industry dedicated to developing different types of interception
 gear, making use of known and unknown weaknesses in existing
 protocols [RFC7258].  We have several records of such equipment being
 sold and utilized by some regimes in order to monitor entire segments
 of a population, especially at times of social and political

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 28] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 distress, uncovering massive human rights abuses.  For example, in
 2013, the group Telecomix revealed that the Syrian regime was making
 use of Blue Coat products in order to intercept cleartext traffic as
 well as to enforce censorship of unwanted content [RSF].  Similarly,
 in 2011, it was found that the French technology firm Amesys provided
 the Gadhafi government with equipment able to intercept emails,
 Facebook traffic, and chat messages at a country-wide level [WSJ].
 The use of such systems, especially in the context of the Arab Spring
 and of civil uprisings against the dictatorships, has caused serious
 concerns regarding significant human rights abuses in Libya.

5.2.3.3.2. Traffic Manipulation

 The lack of a secure transport layer under HTTP connections not only
 exposes users to interception of the content of their communications
 but is more and more commonly abused as a vehicle for actively
 compromising computers and mobile devices.  If an HTTP session
 travels in the clear over the network, any node positioned at any
 point in the network is able to perform man-in-the-middle attacks;
 the node can observe, manipulate, and hijack the session and can
 modify the content of the communication in order to trigger
 unexpected behavior by the application generating the traffic.  For
 example, in the case of a browser, the attacker would be able to
 inject malicious code in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the
 browser or any of its plugins.  Similarly, the attacker would be able
 to intercept, add malware to, and repackage binary software updates
 that are very commonly downloaded in the clear by applications such
 as word processors and media players.  If the HTTP session were
 encrypted, the tampering of the content would not be possible, and
 these network injection attacks would not be successful.
 While traffic manipulation attacks have long been known, documented,
 and prototyped, especially in the context of Wi-Fi and LAN networks,
 in the last few years we have observed an increasing investment in
 the production and sale of network injection equipment that is both
 commercially available and deployed at scale by intelligence
 agencies.
 For example, we learned from some of the documents provided by Edward
 Snowden to the press that the NSA has constructed a global network
 injection infrastructure, called "QUANTUM", able to leverage mass
 surveillance in order to identify targets of interest and
 subsequently task man-on-the-side attacks to ultimately compromise a
 selected device.  Among other attacks, the NSA makes use of an attack
 called "QUANTUMINSERT" [Haagsma], which intercepts and hijacks an
 unencrypted HTTP communication and forces the requesting browser to
 redirect to a host controlled by the NSA instead of the intended
 website.  Normally, the new destination would be an exploitation

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 29] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 service, referred to in Snowden documents as "FOXACID", which would
 attempt to execute malicious code in the context of the target's
 browser.  The Guardian reported in 2013 that the NSA has, for
 example, been using these techniques to target users of the popular
 anonymity service Tor [Schneier].  The German Norddeutscher Rundfunk
 (NDR) reported in 2014 that the NSA has also been using its
 mass-surveillance capabilities to identify Tor users at large
 [Appelbaum].
 Recently, similar capabilities used by Chinese authorities have been
 reported as well in what has been informally called the "Great
 Cannon" [Marcak], which raised numerous concerns on the potential
 curb on human rights and freedom of speech due to the increasingly
 tighter control of Chinese Internet communications and access to
 information.
 Network injection attacks are also made widely available to state
 actors around the world through the commercialization of similar,
 smaller-scale equipment that can be easily acquired and deployed at a
 country-wide level.  Certain companies are known to have network
 injection gear within their products portfolio [Marquis-Boire].  The
 technology devised and produced by some of them to perform network
 traffic manipulation attacks on HTTP communications is even the
 subject of a patent application in the United States [Googlepatent].
 Access to offensive technologies available on the commercial lawful
 interception market has led to human rights abuses and illegitimate
 surveillance of journalists, human rights defenders, and political
 activists in many countries around the world [Collins].  While
 network injection attacks haven't been the subject of much attention,
 they do enable even unskilled attackers to perform silent and very
 resilient compromises, and unencrypted HTTP remains one of the main
 vehicles.
 There is a new version of HTTP, called "HTTP/2" [RFC7540], which aims
 to be largely backwards compatible while also offering new options
 such as data compression of HTTP headers, pipelining of requests, and
 multiplexing multiple requests over a single TCP connection.  In
 addition to decreasing latency to improve page-loading speeds, it
 also facilitates more efficient use of connectivity in low-bandwidth
 environments, which in turn enables freedom of expression; the right
 to assembly; the right to political participation; and the right to
 participate in cultural life, arts, and science.  [RFC7540] does not
 mandate TLS or any other form of encryption, nor does it support
 opportunistic encryption even though opportunistic encryption is now
 addressed in [RFC8164].

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 30] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.2.3.4. XMPP

 The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), specified in
 [RFC6120], provides a standard for interactive chat messaging and has
 evolved to encompass interoperable text, voice, and video chat.  The
 protocol is structured as a federated network of servers, similar to
 email, where users register with a local server that acts on their
 behalf to cache and relay messages.  This protocol design has many
 advantages, allowing servers to shield clients from denial of service
 and other forms of retribution for their expression; it is also
 designed to avoid central entities that could control the ability to
 communicate or assemble using the protocol.
 Nonetheless, there are plenty of aspects of the protocol design of
 XMPP that shape the ability for users to communicate freely and to
 assemble via the protocol.

5.2.3.4.1. User Identification

 The XMPP specification [RFC6120] dictates that clients are identified
 with a resource (<node@domain/home> / <node@domain/work>) to
 distinguish the conversations to specific devices.  While the
 protocol does not specify that the resource must be exposed by the
 client's server to remote users, in practice this has become the
 default behavior.  In doing so, users can be tracked by remote
 friends and their servers, who are able to monitor the presence of
 not just the user but of each individual device the user logs in
 with.  This has proven to be misleading to many users [Pidgin], since
 many clients only expose user-level rather than device-level
 presence.  Likewise, user invisibility so that communication can
 occur while users don't notify all buddies and other servers of their
 availability is not part of the formal protocol and has only been
 added as an extension within the XML stream rather than enforced by
 the protocol.

5.2.3.4.2. Surveillance of Communication

 XMPP specifies the standard by which communications channels may be
 encrypted, but it does not provide visibility to clients regarding
 whether their communications are encrypted on each link.  In
 particular, even when both clients ensure that they have an encrypted
 connection to their XMPP server to ensure that their local network is
 unable to read or disrupt the messages they send, the protocol does
 not provide visibility into the encryption status between the two
 servers.  As such, clients may be subject to selective disruption of
 communications by an intermediate network that disrupts
 communications based on keywords found through DPI.  While many
 operators have committed to only establishing encrypted links from

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 31] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 their servers in recognition of this vulnerability, it remains
 impossible for users to audit this behavior, and encrypted
 connections are not required by the protocol itself [XMPP-Manifesto].
 In particular, Section 13.14 of the XMPP specification [RFC6120]
 explicitly acknowledges the existence of a downgrade attack where an
 adversary controlling an intermediate network can force the
 inter-domain federation between servers to revert to a non-encrypted
 protocol where selective messages can then be disrupted.

5.2.3.4.3. Group Chat Limitations

 Group chat in XMPP is defined as an extension within the XML
 specification of XMPP (https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0045.html).
 However, it is not encoded or required at a protocol level and is not
 uniformly implemented by clients.
 The design of multi-user chat in XMPP suffers from extending a
 protocol that was not designed with assembly of many users in mind.
 In particular, in the federated protocol provided by XMPP, multi-user
 communities are implemented with a distinguished "owner" who is
 granted control over the participants and structure of the
 conversation.
 Multi-user chat rooms are identified by a name specified on a
 specific server, so that while the overall protocol may be federated,
 the ability for users to assemble in a given community is moderated
 by a single server.  That server may block the room and prevent
 assembly unilaterally, even between two users, neither of whom trust
 or use that server directly.

5.2.3.5. Peer-to-Peer

 Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is a distributed network architecture [RFC5694] in
 which all the participant nodes can be responsible for the storage
 and dissemination of information from any other node (see [RFC7574],
 an IETF standard that discusses a P2P architecture called the
 "Peer-to-Peer Streaming Peer Protocol" (PPSPP)).  A P2P network is a
 logical overlay that lives on top of the physical network and allows
 nodes (or "peers") participating in it to establish contact and
 exchange information directly with each other.  The implementation of
 a P2P network may vary widely: it may be structured or unstructured,
 and it may implement stronger or weaker cryptographic and anonymity
 properties.  While its most common application has traditionally been
 file-sharing (and other types of content delivery systems), P2P is a
 popular architecture for networks and applications that require (or
 encourage) decentralization.  Prime examples include Bitcoin and
 other proprietary multimedia applications.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 32] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 In a time of heavily centralized online services, P2P is regularly
 described as an alternative, more democratic, and resistant option
 that displaces structures of control over data and communications and
 delegates all peers to be equally responsible for the functioning,
 integrity, and security of the data.  While in principle P2P remains
 important to the design and development of future content
 distribution, messaging, and publishing systems, it poses numerous
 security and privacy challenges that are mostly delegated to
 individual developers to recognize, analyze, and solve in each
 implementation of a given P2P network.

5.2.3.5.1. Network Poisoning

 Since content, and sometimes peer lists, are safeguarded and
 distributed by their members, P2P networks are prone to what are
 generally defined as "poisoning attacks".  Poisoning attacks might be
 aimed directly at the data that is being distributed, for example,
 (1) by intentionally corrupting the data, (2) at the index tables
 used to instruct the peers where to fetch the data, or (3) at routing
 tables, with an attempt to provide connecting peers with lists of
 rogue or nonexistent peers, with the intention to effectively cause a
 denial of service on the network.

5.2.3.5.2. Throttling

 P2P traffic (and BitTorrent in particular) represents a significant
 percentage of global Internet traffic [Sandvine], and it has become
 increasingly popular for ISPs to perform throttling of customers'
 lines in order to limit bandwidth usage [torrentfreak1] and,
 sometimes, probably as an effect of the ongoing conflict between
 copyright holders and file-sharing communities [wikileaks].  Such
 throttling undermines the end-to-end principle.
 Throttling the P2P traffic makes some uses of P2P networks
 ineffective; this throttling might be coupled with stricter
 inspection of users' Internet traffic through DPI techniques,
 possibly posing additional security and privacy risks.

5.2.3.5.3. Tracking and Identification

 One of the fundamental and most problematic issues with traditional
 P2P networks is a complete lack of anonymization of their users.  For
 example, in the case of BitTorrent, all peers' IP addresses are
 openly available to the other peers.  This has led to ever-increasing
 tracking of P2P and file-sharing users [ars].  As the geographical
 location of the user is directly exposed, as could also be his
 identity, the user might become a target of additional harassment and
 attacks of a physical or legal nature.  For example, it is known that

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 33] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 in Germany law firms have made extensive use of P2P and file-sharing
 tracking systems in order to identify downloaders and initiate legal
 actions looking for compensations [torrentfreak2].
 It is worth noting that there are some varieties of P2P networks that
 implement cryptographic practices and that introduce anonymization of
 their users.  Such implementations may be proved to be successful in
 resisting censorship of content and tracking of network peers.  A
 prime example is Freenet [freenet1], a free software application that
 is (1) designed to make it significantly more difficult to identify
 users and content and (2) dedicated to fostering freedom of speech
 online [freenet2].

5.2.3.5.4. Sybil Attacks

 In open-membership P2P networks, a single attacker can pretend to be
 many participants, typically by creating multiple fake identities of
 whatever kind the P2P network uses [Douceur].  Attackers can use
 Sybil attacks to bias choices that the P2P network makes collectively
 to the attacker's advantage, e.g., by making it more likely that a
 particular data item (or some threshold of the replicas or shares of
 a data item) is assigned to attacker-controlled participants.  If the
 P2P network implements any voting, moderation, or peer-review-like
 functionality, Sybil attacks may be used to "stuff the ballots" to
 benefit the attacker.  Companies and governments can use Sybil
 attacks on discussion-oriented P2P systems for "astroturfing" or
 creating the appearance of mass grassroots support for some position
 where in reality there is none.  It is important to know that there
 are no known complete, environmentally sustainable, and fully
 distributed solutions to Sybil attacks, and routing via "friends"
 allows users to be de-anonymized via their social graph.  It is
 important to note that Sybil attacks in this context (e.g.,
 astroturfing) are relevant to more than P2P protocols; they are also
 common on web-based systems, and they are exploited by governments
 and commercial entities.
 Encrypted P2P and anonymous P2P networks have already emerged.  They
 provide viable platforms for sharing material [Tribler], publishing
 content anonymously, and communicating securely [Bitmessage].  These
 platforms are not perfect, and more research needs to be done.  If
 adopted at large, well-designed and resistant P2P networks might
 represent a critical component of a future secure and distributed
 Internet, enabling freedom of speech and freedom of information
 at scale.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 34] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.2.3.6. Virtual Private Networks

 The VPNs discussed here are point-to-point connections that enable
 two computers to communicate over an encrypted tunnel.  There are
 multiple implementations and protocols used in the deployment of
 VPNs, and they generally diversify by encryption protocol or
 particular requirements, most commonly in proprietary and enterprise
 solutions.  VPNs are commonly used to (1) enable some devices to
 communicate through peculiar network configurations, (2) use some
 privacy and security properties in order to protect the traffic
 generated by the end user, or both.  VPNs have also become a very
 popular technology among human rights defenders, dissidents, and
 journalists worldwide to avoid local monitoring and eventually also
 to circumvent censorship.  VPNs are often debated among human rights
 defenders as a potential alternative to Tor or other anonymous
 networks.  Such comparisons are misleading, as some of the privacy
 and security properties of VPNs are often misunderstood by less
 tech-savvy users and could ultimately lead to unintended problems.
 As VPNs have increased in popularity, commercial VPN providers have
 started growing as businesses and are very commonly picked by human
 rights defenders and people at risk, as they are normally provided
 with an easy-to-use service and, sometimes, even custom applications
 to establish the VPN tunnel.  Not being able to control the
 configuration of the network, let alone the security of the
 application, assessing the general privacy and security state of
 common VPNs is very hard.  Such services have often been discovered
 to be leaking information, and their custom applications have been
 found to be flawed.  While Tor and similar networks receive a lot of
 scrutiny from the public and the academic community, commercial or
 non-commercial VPNs are far less analyzed and understood [Insinuator]
 [Alshalan-etal], and it might be valuable to establish some standards
 to guarantee a minimal level of privacy and security to those who
 need them the most.

5.2.3.6.1. No Anonymity against VPN Providers

 One of the common misconceptions among users of VPNs is the level of
 anonymity that VPNs can provide.  This sense of anonymity can be
 betrayed by a number of attacks or misconfigurations of the VPN
 provider.  It is important to remember that, in contrast to Tor and
 similar systems, VPNs were not designed to provide anonymity
 properties.  From a technical point of view, a VPN might leak
 identifiable information or might be the subject of correlation
 attacks that could expose the originating address of a connecting
 user.  Most importantly, it is vital to understand that commercial
 and non-commercial VPN providers are bound by the law of the
 jurisdiction in which they reside or in which their infrastructure is

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 35] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 located, and they might be legally forced to turn over data of
 specific users if legal investigations or intelligence requirements
 dictate so.  In such cases, if the VPN providers retain logs, it is
 possible that a user's information could be provided to the user's
 adversary and lead to his or her identification.

5.2.3.6.2. Logging

 Because VPNs are point-to-point connections, the service providers
 are in fact able to observe the original location of connecting
 users, and they are able to track at what time they started their
 session and, eventually, also to which destinations they're trying to
 connect.  If the VPN providers retain logs for a long enough time,
 they might be forced to turn over the relevant data or they might be
 otherwise compromised, leading to the same data getting exposed.  A
 clear log-retention policy could be enforced, but considering that
 countries enforce different levels of data-retention policies, VPN
 providers should at least be transparent regarding what information
 they store and for how long it is being kept.

5.2.3.6.3. Third-Party Hosting

 VPN providers very commonly rely on third parties to provision the
 infrastructure that is later going to be used to run VPN endpoints.
 For example, they might rely on external dedicated server providers
 or on uplink providers.  In those cases, even if the VPN provider
 itself isn't retaining any significant logs, the information on
 connecting users might be retained by those third parties instead,
 introducing an additional collection point for the adversary.

5.2.3.6.4. IPv6 Leakage

 Some studies proved that several commercial VPN providers and
 applications suffer from critical leakage of information through IPv6
 due to improper support and configuration [PETS2015VPN].  This is
 generally caused by a lack of proper configuration of the client's
 IPv6 routing tables.  Considering that most popular browsers and
 similar applications have been supporting IPv6 by default, if the
 host is provided with a functional IPv6 configuration, the traffic
 that is generated might be leaked if the VPN application isn't
 designed to manipulate such traffic properly.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 36] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

5.2.3.6.5. DNS Leakage

 Similarly, VPN services that aren't handling DNS requests and aren't
 running DNS servers of their own might be prone to DNS leaking that
 might not only expose sensitive information on the activity of a user
 but could also potentially lead to DNS hijacking attacks and
 subsequent compromises.

5.2.3.6.6. Traffic Correlation

 Some VPN implementations appear to be particularly vulnerable to
 identification and collection of key exchanges that, some Snowden
 documents revealed, are systematically collected and stored for
 future reference.  The ability of an adversary to monitor network
 connections at many different points over the Internet can allow them
 to perform traffic correlation attacks and identify the origin of
 certain VPN traffic by cross-referencing the connection time of the
 user to the endpoint and the connection time of the endpoint to the
 final destination.  These types of attacks, although very expensive
 and normally only performed by very resourceful adversaries, have
 been documented [SPIEGEL] to be already in practice, and they could
 completely nullify the use of a VPN and ultimately expose the
 activity and the identity of a user at risk.

5.2.3.7. HTTP Status Code 451

 "Every Internet user has run into the '404 Not Found' Hypertext
 Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to
 access a particular website" [Cath].  It is a response status that
 the server sends to the browser when the server cannot locate the
 URL. "403 Forbidden" is another example of this class of code signals
 that gives users information about what is going on.  In the "403"
 case, the server can be reached but is blocking the request because
 the user is trying to access content forbidden to them, typically
 because some content is only for identified users, based on a payment
 or on special status in the organization.  Most of the time, 403 is
 sent by the origin server, not by an intermediary.  If a firewall
 prevents a government employee from accessing pornography on a work
 computer, it does not use 403.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 37] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 As surveillance and censorship of the Internet are becoming more
 commonplace, voices were raised at the IETF to introduce a new status
 code that indicates when something is not available for "legal
 reasons" (like censorship):
 The 451 status code would allow server operators to operate with
 greater transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public
 policy affect their operation.  This transparency may be beneficial
 to both (1) these operators and (2) end users [RFC7725].
 The status code is named "451" in reference to both Bradbury's famous
 novel "Fahrenheit 451" and to 451 degrees Fahrenheit (the temperature
 at which some claim book paper autoignites).
 During the IETF 92 meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the
 usefulness of 451.  The main tension revolved around the lack of an
 apparent machine-readable technical use of the information.  The
 extent to which 451 is just "political theatre" or whether it has a
 concrete technical use was heatedly debated.  Some argued that "the
 451 status code is just a status code with a response body"; others
 said it was problematic because "it brings law into the picture."
 Still others argued that it would be useful for individuals or for
 organizations like the "Chilling Effects" project that are crawling
 the Web to get an indication of censorship (IETF discussion on 451 --
 author's field notes, March 2015).  There was no outright objection
 during the Dallas meeting against moving forward on status code 451,
 and on December 18, 2015, the IESG approved "An HTTP Status Code to
 Report Legal Obstacles" (now [RFC7725]) for publication.  HTTP status
 code 451 is now an IETF-approved HTTP status code that signals when
 resource access is denied as a consequence of legal demands.
 What is interesting about this particular case is that not only
 technical arguments but also the status code's outright potential
 political use for civil society played a substantial role in shaping
 the discussion and the decision to move forward with this technology.
 It is nonetheless important to note that HTTP status code 451 is not
 a solution to detect all occasions of censorship.  A large swath of
 Internet filtering occurs in the network, at a lower level than HTTP,
 rather than at the server itself.  For these forms of censorship, 451
 plays a limited role, as typical censoring intermediaries won't
 generate it.  Besides technical reasons, such filtering regimes are
 unlikely to voluntarily inject a 451 status code.  The use of 451 is
 most likely to apply in the case of cooperative, legal versions of
 content removal resulting from requests to providers.  One can think
 of content that is removed or blocked for legal reasons, like
 copyright infringement, gambling laws, child abuse, etc.  Large

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 38] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Internet companies and search engines are constantly asked to censor
 content in various jurisdictions.  451 allows this to be easily
 discovered -- for instance, by initiatives like the Lumen Database.
 Overall, the strength of 451 lies in its ability to provide
 transparency by giving the reason for blocking and giving the
 end user the ability to file a complaint.  It allows organizations to
 easily measure censorship in an automated way and prompts the user to
 access the content via another path (e.g., Tor, VPNs) when (s)he
 encounters the 451 status code.
 Status code 451 impacts human rights by making censorship more
 transparent and measurable.  It increases transparency by signaling
 the existence of censorship (instead of a much broader HTTP error
 message such as HTTP status code 404) as well as providing details of
 the legal restriction, which legal authority is imposing it, and to
 what class of resources it applies.  This empowers the user to seek
 redress.

5.2.3.8. DDoS Attacks

 Many individuals, including IETF engineers, have argued that DDoS
 attacks are fundamentally against freedom of expression.
 Technically, DDoS attacks are attacks where one host or multiple
 hosts overload the bandwidth or resources of another host by flooding
 it with traffic or making resource-intensive requests, causing it to
 temporarily stop being available to users.  One can roughly
 differentiate three types of DDoS attacks:
 1.  volume-based attacks (which aim to make the host unreachable by
     using up all its bandwidth; often-used techniques are UDP floods
     and ICMP floods)
 2.  protocol attacks (which aim to use up actual server resources;
     often-used techniques are SYN floods, fragmented packet attacks,
     and "ping of death" [RFC4949])
 3.  application-layer attacks (which aim to bring down a server, such
     as a web server)
 DDoS attacks can thus stifle freedom of expression and complicate the
 ability of independent media and human rights organizations to
 exercise their right to (online) freedom of association, while
 facilitating the ability of governments to censor dissent.  When it
 comes to comparing DDoS attacks to protests in offline life, it is
 important to remember that only a limited number of DDoS attacks
 solely involved willing participants.  In the overwhelming majority
 of cases, the clients are hacked hosts of unrelated parties that

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 39] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 have not consented to being part of a DDoS (for exceptions, see
 Operation Ababil [Ababil] or the Iranian Green Movement's DDoS
 campaign at election time [GreenMovement]).  In addition,
 DDoS attacks are increasingly used as an extortion tactic.
 All of these issues seem to suggest that the IETF should try to
 ensure that their protocols cannot be used for DDoS attacks; this is
 consistent with the long-standing IETF consensus that DDoS is an
 attack that protocols should mitigate to the extent they can [BCP72].
 Decreasing the number of vulnerabilities in protocols and (outside of
 the IETF) the number of bugs in the network stacks of routers or
 computers could address this issue.  The IETF can clearly play a role
 in bringing about some of these changes, but the IETF cannot be
 expected to take a positive stance on (specific) DDoS attacks or to
 create protocols that enable some attacks and inhibit others.  What
 the IETF can do is critically reflect on its role in the development
 of the Internet and how this impacts the ability of people to
 exercise their human rights, such as freedom of expression.

6. Model for Developing Human Rights Protocol Considerations

 This section outlines a set of human rights protocol considerations
 for protocol developers.  It provides questions that engineers should
 ask themselves when developing or improving protocols if they want to
 understand their impact on human rights.  It should, however, be
 noted that the impact of a protocol cannot be solely deduced from its
 design; its usage and implementation should also be studied to form a
 full assessment of the impact of the protocol on human rights.
 The questions are based on the research performed by the HRPC
 Research Group.  This research was documented prior to the writing of
 these considerations.  The research establishes that human rights
 relate to standards and protocols; it also offers a common vocabulary
 of technical concepts that impact human rights and how these
 technical concepts can be combined to ensure that the Internet
 remains an enabling environment for human rights.  With this, a model
 for developing human rights protocol considerations has taken shape.

6.1. Human Rights Threats

 Human rights threats on the Internet come in a myriad of forms.
 Protocols and standards can either harm or enable the right to
 freedom of expression; the right to non-discrimination; the right to
 equal protection; the right to participate in cultural life, arts,
 and science; the right to freedom of assembly and association; and
 the right to security.  An end user who is denied access to certain
 services, data, or websites may be unable to disclose vital
 information about malpractice on the part of a government or other

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 40] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 authority.  A person whose communications are monitored may be
 prevented from exercising their right to freedom of association or
 participation in political processes [Penney].  In a worst-case
 scenario, protocols that leak information can lead to physical
 danger.  A realistic example to consider is when, based on
 information gathered by state agencies through information leakage in
 protocols, individuals perceived as threats to the state are
 subjected to torture, extrajudicial killings, or detention.
 This section details several "common" threats to human rights,
 indicating how each of these can lead to harm to, or violations of,
 human rights.  It also presents several examples of how these threats
 to human rights materialize on the Internet.  This threat modeling is
 inspired by [RFC6973] ("Privacy Considerations for Internet
 Protocols"), which is based on security threat analysis.  This method
 is by no means a perfect solution for assessing human rights risks in
 Internet protocols and systems; it is, however, the best approach
 currently available.  Certain specific human rights threats are
 indirectly considered in Internet protocols as part of their security
 considerations [BCP72], but privacy guidelines [RFC6973] or reviews,
 let alone the assessments of the impact of protocols on human rights,
 are not standardized or implemented.
 Many threats, enablers, and risks are linked to different rights.
 This is not surprising if one takes into account that human rights
 are interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible.  Here, however,
 we're not discussing all human rights, because not all human rights
 are relevant to ICTs in general and to protocols and standards in
 particular [Bless1]:
    The main source of the values of human rights is the International
    Bill of Human Rights that is composed of the Universal Declaration
    of Human Rights [UDHR] along with the International Covenant on
    Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International Covenant
    on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR].  In the light of
    several cases of Internet censorship, the Human Rights Council
    Resolution 20/8 was adopted in 2012 [UNHRC2016], affirming "...
    that the same rights that people have offline must also be
    protected online ..."  In 2015, the Charter of Human Rights and
    Principles for the Internet [IRP] was developed and released.
    According to these documents, some examples of human rights
    relevant for ICT systems are human dignity (Art. 1 UDHR),
    non-discrimination (Art. 2), rights to life, liberty and security
    (Art. 3), freedom of opinion and expression (Art. 19), freedom of
    assembly and association (Art. 20), rights to equal protection,
    legal remedy, fair trial, due process, presumed innocent
    (Art. 7-11), appropriate social and international order (Art. 28),

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 41] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    participation in public affairs (Art. 21), participation in
    cultural life, protection of intellectual property (Art. 27), and
    privacy (Art. 12).
 A partial catalog of human rights related to ICTs, including economic
 rights, can be found in [Hill2014].
 This is by no means an attempt to exclude specific rights or
 prioritize some rights over others.  If other rights seem relevant,
 please contact the authors of this document.

6.2. Guidelines for Human Rights Considerations

 This section provides guidance for document authors in the form of a
 questionnaire about protocols and their (potential) impact.  The
 questionnaire may be useful at any point in the design process,
 particularly after document authors have developed a high-level
 protocol model as described in [RFC4101].  These guidelines do not
 seek to replace any existing referenced specifications; rather, they
 contribute to them and look at the design process from a human rights
 perspective.
 Protocols and Internet Standards might benefit from a documented
 discussion of potential human rights risks arising from potential
 misapplications of the protocol or technology described in the RFC in
 question.  This might be coupled with an Applicability Statement for
 that RFC.
 Note that the guidance provided in this section does not recommend
 specific practices.  The range of protocols developed in the IETF is
 too broad to make recommendations about particular uses of data or
 how human rights might be balanced against other design goals.
 However, by carefully considering the answers to the following
 questions, document authors should be able to produce a comprehensive
 analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion on whether the
 protocol adequately takes specific human rights threats into account.
 This guidance is meant to help the thought process of a human rights
 analysis; it does not provide specific directions for how to write a
 human rights protocol considerations section (following the example
 set in [RFC6973]), and the addition of a human rights protocol
 considerations section has also not yet been proposed.  In
 considering these questions, authors will need to be aware of the
 potential of technical advances or the passage of time to undermine
 protections.  In general, considerations of rights are likely to be
 more effective if they are considered given a purpose and specific
 use cases, rather than as abstract absolute goals.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 42] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

6.2.1. Connectivity

 Questions:
  1. Does your protocol add application-specific functions to

intermediary nodes?

  1. Could this functionality be added to end nodes instead of

intermediary nodes?

  1. Is your protocol optimized for low bandwidth and high-latency

connections?

  1. Could your protocol also be developed in a stateless manner?
 Explanation:  The end-to-end principle [Saltzer] holds that "the
    intelligence is end to end rather than hidden in the network"
    [RFC1958].  The end-to-end principle is important for the
    robustness of the network and innovation.  Such robustness of the
    network is crucial to enabling human rights like freedom of
    expression.
 Example:  Middleboxes (which can be content delivery networks,
    firewalls, NATs, or other intermediary nodes that provide
    "services" other than routing) serve many legitimate purposes.
    But the protocols guiding them can influence individuals' ability
    to communicate online freely and privately.  The potential for
    abuse, intentional and unintentional censoring, and limiting
    permissionless innovation -- and thus, ultimately, the impact of
    middleboxes on the Internet as a place of unfiltered, unmonitored
    freedom of speech -- is real.
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association

6.2.2. Privacy

 Questions:
  1. Did you have a look at the guidelines in Section 7 of [RFC6973]

("Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols")?

  1. Could your protocol in any way impact the confidentiality of

protocol metadata?

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 43] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

  1. Could your protocol counter traffic analysis?
  1. Could your protocol improve data minimization?
  1. Does your document identify potentially sensitive data logged by

your protocol and/or for how long that data needs to be retained

    for technical reasons?
 Explanation:  "Privacy" refers to the right of an entity (normally a
    person), acting on its own behalf, to determine the degree to
    which it will interact with its environment, including the degree
    to which the entity is willing to share its personal information
    with others [RFC4949].  If a protocol provides insufficient
    privacy protection, it may have a negative impact on freedom of
    expression as users self-censor for fear of surveillance or find
    themselves unable to express themselves freely.
 Example:  See [RFC6973].
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to non-discrimination

6.2.3. Content Agnosticism

 Questions:
  1. If your protocol impacts packet handling, does it use user data

(packet data that is not included in the header)?

  1. Does your protocol make decisions based on the payload of the

packet?

  1. Does your protocol prioritize certain content or services over

others in the routing process?

  1. Is the protocol transparent about the prioritization that is made

(if any)?

 Explanation:  "Content agnosticism" refers to the notion that network
    traffic is treated identically regardless of payload, with some
    exceptions when it comes to effective traffic handling -- for
    instance, delay-tolerant or delay-sensitive packets based on the
    header.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 44] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Example:  Content agnosticism prevents payload-based discrimination
    against packets.  This is important because changes to this
    principle can lead to a two-tiered Internet, where certain packets
    are prioritized over others based on their content.  Effectively,
    this would mean that although all users are entitled to receive
    their packets at a certain speed, some users become more equal
    than others.
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to non-discrimination
  1. Right to equal protection

6.2.4. Security

 Questions:
  1. Did you have a look at [BCP72] ("Guidelines for Writing RFC Text

on Security Considerations")?

  1. Have you found any attacks that are somewhat related to your

protocol yet considered out of scope for your document?

  1. Would these attacks be pertinent to the features of the Internet

that enable human rights (as described throughout this document)?

 Explanation:  Most people speak of security as if it were a single
    monolithic property of a protocol or system; however, upon
    reflection one realizes that it is clearly not true.  Rather,
    security is a series of related but somewhat independent
    properties.  Not all of these properties are required for every
    application.  Since communications are carried out by systems and
    access to systems is through communications channels, these goals
    obviously interlock, but they can also be independently provided
    [BCP72].
 Example:  See [BCP72].

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 45] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association
  1. Right to non-discrimination
  1. Right to security

6.2.5. Internationalization

 Questions:
  1. Does your protocol have text strings that have to be understood or

entered by humans?

  1. Does your protocol allow Unicode? If so, do you accept texts in

one charset (which must be UTF-8) or several (which is dangerous

    for interoperability)?
  1. If character sets or encodings other than UTF-8 are allowed, does

your protocol mandate proper tagging of the charset?

  1. Did you have a look at [RFC6365]?
 Explanation:  "Internationalization" refers to the practice of making
    protocols, standards, and implementations usable in different
    languages and scripts (see Section 6.2.12 ("Localization")).  "In
    the IETF, 'internationalization' means to add or improve the
    handling of non-ASCII text in a protocol" [RFC6365].
    A different perspective, more appropriate to protocols that are
    designed for global use from the beginning, is the definition used
    by the W3C [W3Ci18nDef]: "Internationalization is the design and
    development of a product, application or document content that
    enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in
    culture, region, or language."
    Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset
    (US-ASCII), or they leave the question of what coded character set
    (CCS) and encoding are used up to local guesswork (which leads, of
    course, to interoperability problems) [RFC3536].  If multiple
    charsets are permitted, they must be explicitly identified
    [RFC2277].  Adding non-ASCII text to a protocol allows the
    protocol to handle more scripts, hopefully all scripts in use in
    the world.  In today's world, that is normally best accomplished
    by allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 46] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    In the current IETF policy [RFC2277], internationalization is
    aimed at user-facing strings, not protocol elements, such as the
    verbs used by some text-based protocols.  (Do note that some
    strings, such as identifiers, are both content and protocol
    elements.)  If the Internet wants to be a global network of
    networks, the protocols should work with languages other than
    English and character sets other than Latin characters.  It is
    therefore crucial that at least the content carried by the
    protocol can be in any script and that all scripts are treated
    equally.
 Example:  See Section 6.2.12 ("Localization").
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to political participation
  1. Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

6.2.6. Censorship Resistance

 Questions:
  1. Does this protocol introduce new identifiers or reuse existing

identifiers (e.g., Media Access Control (MAC) addresses) that

    might be associated with persons or content?
  1. Does your protocol make it apparent or transparent when access to

a resource is restricted?

  1. Can your protocol contribute to filtering in such a way that it

could be implemented to censor data or services? If so, could

    your protocol be designed to ensure that this doesn't happen?
 Explanation:  "Censorship resistance" refers to the methods and
    measures to prevent Internet censorship.
 Example:  When IPv6 was developed, embedding a MAC address into
    unique IP addresses was discussed.  This makes it possible, per
    [RFC4941], for "eavesdroppers and other information collectors to
    identify when different addresses used in different transactions
    actually correspond to the same node."  This is why privacy
    extensions for stateless address autoconfiguration in IPv6
    [RFC4941] have been introduced.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 47] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    Identifiers of content exposed within a protocol might be used to
    facilitate censorship, as in the case of application-layer-based
    censorship, which affects protocols like HTTP.  Denial or
    restriction of access can be made apparent by the use of status
    code 451, thereby allowing server operators to operate with
    greater transparency in circumstances where issues of law or
    public policy affect their operation [RFC7725].
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to political participation
  1. Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association

6.2.7. Open Standards

 Questions:
  1. Is your protocol fully documented in such a way that it could be

easily implemented, improved, built upon, and/or further

    developed?
  1. Do you depend on proprietary code for the implementation, running,

or further development of your protocol?

  1. Does your protocol favor a particular proprietary specification

over technically equivalent and competing specification(s) – for

    instance, by making any incorporated vendor specification
    "required" or "recommended" [RFC2026]?
  1. Do you normatively reference another standard that is not

available without cost (and could you possibly do without it)?

  1. Are you aware of any patents that would prevent your standard from

being fully implemented [RFC6701] [RFC8179]?

 Explanation:  The Internet was able to be developed into the global
    network of networks because of the existence of open,
    non-proprietary standards [Zittrain].  They are crucial for
    enabling interoperability.  Yet, open standards are not explicitly
    defined within the IETF.  On the subject, [RFC2026] states the
    following: "Various national and international standards bodies,
    such as ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU-T, develop a variety of protocol
    and service specifications that are similar to Technical

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 48] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    Specifications defined" at the IETF.  "National and international
    groups also publish 'implementors' agreements' that are analogous
    to Applicability Statements, capturing a body of implementation-
    specific detail concerned with the practical application of their
    standards.  All of these are considered to be 'open external
    standards' for the purposes of the Internet Standards Process."
    Similarly, [RFC3935] does not define open standards but does
    emphasize the importance of "open process": any interested person
    can participate in the work, know what is being decided, and make
    his or her voice heard on the issue.  Part of this principle is
    the IETF's commitment to making its documents, WG mailing lists,
    attendance lists, and meeting minutes publicly available on the
    Internet.
    Open standards are important, as they allow for permissionless
    innovation, which in turn is important for maintaining the freedom
    and ability to freely create and deploy new protocols on top of
    the communications constructs that currently exist.  It is at the
    heart of the Internet as we know it, and to maintain its
    fundamentally open nature, we need to be mindful of the need for
    developing open standards.
    All standards that need to be normatively implemented should be
    freely available and should provide reasonable protection against
    patent infringement claims, so that it can also be implemented in
    open-source or free software.  Patents have often held back open
    standardization or have been used against those deploying open
    standards, particularly in the domain of cryptography [Newegg].
    An exemption is sometimes made when a protocol that normatively
    relies on specifications produced by other SDOs that are not
    freely available is standardized.  Patents in open standards or in
    normative references to other standards should have a patent
    disclosure [notewell], royalty-free licensing [patentpolicy], or
    some other form of reasonable protection.  Reasonable patent
    protection should include, but is not limited to, cryptographic
    primitives.
 Example:  [RFC6108] describes a system deployed by Comcast, an ISP,
    for providing critical end-user notifications to web browsers.
    Such a notification system is being used to provide
    almost-immediate notifications to customers, such as warning them
    that their traffic exhibits patterns that are indicative of
    malware or virus infection.  There are other proprietary systems
    that can perform such notifications, but those systems utilize
    Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology.  In contrast to DPI,
    [RFC6108] describes a system that does not rely upon DPI and is
    instead based on open IETF standards and open-source applications.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 49] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

6.2.8. Heterogeneity Support

 Questions:
  1. Does your protocol support heterogeneity by design?
  1. Does your protocol allow for multiple types of hardware?
  1. Does your protocol allow for multiple types of application

protocols?

  1. Is your protocol liberal in what it receives and handles?
  1. Will your protocol remain usable and open if the context changes?
  1. Does your protocol allow well-defined extension points? If so, do

these extension points allow for open innovation?

 Explanation:  [FIArch] notes the following: "The Internet is
    characterized by heterogeneity on many levels: devices and nodes,
    router scheduling algorithms and queue management mechanisms,
    routing protocols, levels of multiplexing, protocol versions and
    implementations, underlying link layers (e.g., point-to-point,
    multi-access links, wireless, FDDI, etc.), in the traffic mix and
    in the levels of congestion at different times and places.
    Moreover, as the Internet is composed of autonomous organizations
    and internet service providers, each with their own separate
    policy concerns, there is a large heterogeneity of administrative
    domains and pricing structures."  As a result, as also noted in
    [FIArch], the heterogeneity principle proposed in [RFC1958] needs
    to be supported by design.
 Example:  Heterogeneity is inevitable and needs to be supported by
    design.  For example, multiple types of hardware must be allowed
    for transmission speeds differing by at least seven orders of
    magnitude, various computer word lengths, and hosts ranging from
    memory-starved microprocessors up to massively parallel
    supercomputers.  As noted in [RFC1958], "Multiple types of
    application protocol must be allowed for, ranging from the
    simplest such as remote login up to the most complex such as
    distributed databases."

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 50] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to political participation

6.2.9. Anonymity

 Question:
  1. Did you have a look at [RFC6973] ("Privacy Considerations for

Internet Protocols"), especially Section 6.1.1 of that document?

 Explanation:  "Anonymity" refers to the condition of an identity
    being unknown or concealed [RFC4949].  Even though full anonymity
    is hard to achieve, it is a non-binary concept.  Making pervasive
    monitoring and tracking harder is important for many users as well
    as for the IETF [RFC7258].  Achieving a higher level of anonymity
    is an important feature for many end users, as it allows them
    different degrees of privacy online.
 Example:  Protocols often expose personal data; it is therefore
    important to consider ways to mitigate the obvious impacts on
    privacy.  A protocol that uses data that could help identify a
    sender (items of interest) should be protected from third parties.
    For instance, if one wants to hide the source/destination IP
    addresses of a packet, the use of IPsec in tunneling mode (e.g.,
    inside a VPN) can help protect against third parties likely to
    eavesdrop packets exchanged between the tunnel endpoints.
 Impacts:
  1. Right to non-discrimination
  1. Right to political participation
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association
  1. Right to security

6.2.10. Pseudonymity

 Questions:
  1. Have you considered [RFC6973] ("Privacy Considerations for

Internet Protocols"), especially Section 6.1.2 of that document?

  1. Does the protocol collect personally derived data?

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 51] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

  1. Does the protocol generate or process anything that can be, or

that can be tightly correlated with, personally identifiable

    information?
  1. Does the protocol utilize data that is personally derived, i.e.,

derived from the interaction of a single person or from their

    device or address?
  1. Does this protocol generate personally derived data? If so, how

will that data be handled?

 Explanation:  Pseudonymity -- the ability to use a persistent
    identifier that is not immediately linked to one's offline
    identity -- is an important feature for many end users, as it
    allows them different degrees of disguised identity and privacy
    online.
 Example:  When designing a standard that exposes personal data, it is
    important to consider ways to mitigate the obvious impacts.  While
    pseudonyms cannot easily be reverse-engineered -- for example,
    some early approaches used such techniques as simple hashing of IP
    addresses that could in turn be easily reversed by generating a
    hash for each potential IP address and comparing it to the
    pseudonym -- limiting the exposure of personal data remains
    important.
    "Pseudonymity" means using a pseudonym instead of one's "real"
    name.  There are many reasons for users to use pseudonyms -- for
    instance, to hide their gender; protect themselves against
    harassment; protect their families' privacy; frankly discuss
    sexuality; or develop an artistic or journalistic persona without
    retribution from an employer, (potential) customers, or social
    surroundings [geekfeminism].  The difference between anonymity and
    pseudonymity is that a pseudonym is often persistent.
    "Pseudonymity is strengthened when less personal data can be
    linked to the pseudonym; when the same pseudonym is used less
    often and across fewer contexts; and when independently chosen
    pseudonyms are more frequently used for new actions (making them,
    from an observer's or attacker's perspective, unlinkable)."
    [RFC6973]
 Impacts:
  1. Right to non-discrimination
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 52] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

6.2.11. Accessibility

 Questions:
  1. Is your protocol designed to provide an enabling environment for

people who are not able-bodied?

  1. Have you looked at the W3C Web Accessibility Initiative

[W3CAccessibility] for examples and guidance?

 Explanation:  The Internet is fundamentally designed to work for all
    people, whatever their hardware, software, language, culture,
    location, or physical or mental ability.  When the Internet meets
    this goal, it is accessible to people with a diverse range of
    hearing, movement, sight, and cognitive abilities
    [W3CAccessibility].  Sometimes, in the design of protocols,
    websites, web technologies, or web tools, barriers that exclude
    people from using the Web are created.
 Example:  The HTML protocol as defined in [HTML5] specifically
    requires that (with a few exceptions) every image must have an
    "alt" attribute to ensure that images are accessible for people
    that cannot themselves decipher non-text content in web pages.
 Impacts:
  1. Right to non-discrimination
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association
  1. Right to education
  1. Right to political participation

6.2.12. Localization

 Questions:
  1. Does your protocol uphold the standards of internationalization?
  1. Have you taken any concrete steps towards localizing your protocol

for relevant audiences?

 Explanation:  Per [W3Ci18nDef], "Localization refers to the
    adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet
    the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target
    market (a 'locale')."  It is also described as the practice of

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 53] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    translating an implementation to make it functional in a specific
    language or for users in a specific locale (see Section 6.2.5
    ("Internationalization")).
 Example:  The Internet is a global medium, but many of its protocols
    and products are developed with a certain audience in mind; this
    audience often shares particular characteristics like knowing how
    to read and write in ASCII and knowing English.  This limits the
    ability of a large part of the world's online population to use
    the Internet in a way that is culturally and linguistically
    accessible.  An example of a protocol that has taken into account
    the view that individuals like to have access to data in their
    native language can be found in [RFC5646]; such a protocol would
    label the information content with an identifier for the language
    in which it is written and would allow information to be presented
    in more than one language.
 Impacts:
  1. Right to non-discrimination
  1. Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science
  1. Right to freedom of expression

6.2.13. Decentralization

 Questions:
  1. Can your protocol be implemented without one single point of

control?

  1. If applicable, can your protocol be deployed in a federated

manner?

  1. What is the potential for discrimination against users of your

protocol?

  1. Can your protocol be used to negatively implicate users (e.g.,

incrimination, accusation)?

  1. Does your protocol create additional centralized points of

control?

 Explanation:  Decentralization is one of the central technical
    concepts of the architecture of networks and is embraced as such
    by the IETF [RFC3935].  It refers to the absence or minimization
    of centralized points of control -- "a feature that is assumed to

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 54] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    make it easy for new users to join and new uses to unfold"
    [Brown].  It also reduces issues surrounding single points of
    failure and distributes the network such that it continues to
    function if one or several nodes are disabled.  With the
    commercialization of the Internet in the early 1990s, there has
    been a slow trend toward moving away from decentralization, to the
    detriment of any technical benefits that having a decentralized
    Internet otherwise provides.
 Example:  The bits traveling the Internet are increasingly
    susceptible to monitoring and censorship, from both governments
    and ISPs, as well as third (malicious) parties.  The ability to
    monitor and censor is further enabled by increased centralization
    of the network, creating central infrastructure points that can be
    tapped into.  The creation of P2P networks and the development of
    voice-over-IP protocols using P2P technology in combination with a
    distributed hash table (DHT) for scalability are examples of how
    protocols can preserve decentralization [Pouwelse].
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association

6.2.14. Reliability

 Questions:
  1. Is your protocol fault tolerant?
  1. Does your protocol degrade gracefully?
  1. Can your protocol resist malicious degradation attempts?
  1. Do you have a documented way to announce degradation?
  1. Do you have measures in place for recovery or partial healing from

failure?

  1. Can your protocol maintain dependability and performance in the

face of unanticipated changes or circumstances?

 Explanation:  Reliability ensures that a protocol will execute its
    function consistently, be error resistant as described, and
    function without unexpected results.  A system that is reliable
    degenerates gracefully and will have a documented way to announce
    degradation.  It also has mechanisms to recover from failure

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 55] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

    gracefully and, if applicable, to allow for partial healing.  It
    is important here to draw a distinction between random degradation
    and malicious degradation.  Many current attacks against TLS, for
    example, exploit TLS's ability to gracefully degrade to older
    cipher suites; from a functional perspective, this ability is
    good, but from a security perspective, it can be very bad.  As
    with confidentiality, the growth of the Internet and fostering
    innovation in services depend on users having confidence and trust
    [RFC3724] in the network.  For reliability, it is necessary that
    services notify users if packet delivery fails.  In the case of
    real-time systems, the protocol needs to safeguard timeliness in
    addition to providing reliable delivery.
 Example:  In the modern IP stack structure, a reliable transport
    layer requires an indication that transport processing has
    successfully completed, such as the indication given by TCP's ACK
    message [RFC793] and not simply an indication from the IP layer
    that the packet arrived.  Similarly, an application-layer protocol
    may require an application-specific acknowledgement that contains,
    among other things, a status code indicating the disposition of
    the request (see [RFC3724]).
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to security

6.2.15. Confidentiality

 Questions:
  1. Does this protocol expose information related to identifiers or

data? If so, does it do so to each of the other protocol entities

    (i.e., recipients, intermediaries, and enablers) [RFC6973]?
  1. What options exist for protocol implementers to choose to limit

the information shared with each entity?

  1. What operational controls are available to limit the information

shared with each entity?

  1. What controls or consent mechanisms does the protocol define or

require before personal data or identifiers are shared or exposed

    via the protocol?  If no such mechanisms or controls are
    specified, is it expected that control and consent will be handled
    outside of the protocol?

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 56] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

  1. Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to share different

pieces of information with different recipients? If not, are

    there mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide
    initiators with such control?
  1. Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to limit which

information is shared with intermediaries? If not, are there

    mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide users
    with such control?
  1. Is it expected that users will have relationships that govern the

use of the information (contractual or otherwise) with those who

    operate these intermediaries?
  1. Does the protocol prefer encryption over cleartext operation?
  1. Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to express

individuals' preferences to recipients or intermediaries with

    regard to the collection, use, or disclosure of their personal
    data?
 Explanation:  "Confidentiality" refers to keeping a user's data
    secret from unintended listeners [BCP72].  The growth of the
    Internet depends on users having confidence that the network
    protects their personal data [RFC1984].
 Example:  Protocols that do not encrypt their payload make the entire
    content of the communication available to the idealized attacker
    along their path [RFC7624].  Following the advice in [RFC3365],
    most such protocols have a secure variant that encrypts the
    payload for confidentiality, and these secure variants are seeing
    ever-wider deployment.  A noteworthy exception is DNS [RFC1035],
    as DNSSEC [RFC4033] does not have confidentiality as a
    requirement.  This implies that, in the absence of changes to the
    protocol as presently under development in the IETF's DNS Private
    Exchange (DPRIVE) Working Group, all DNS queries and answers
    generated by the activities of any protocol are available to the
    attacker.  When store-and-forward protocols are used (e.g., SMTP
    [RFC5321]), intermediaries leave this data subject to observation
    by an attacker that has compromised these intermediaries, unless
    the data is encrypted end to end by the application-layer protocol
    or the implementation uses an encrypted store for this data
    [RFC7624].

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 57] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Impacts:
  1. Right to privacy
  1. Right to security

6.2.16. Integrity

 Questions:
  1. Does your protocol maintain, assure, and/or verify the accuracy of

payload data?

  1. Does your protocol maintain and assure the consistency of data?
  1. Does your protocol in any way allow the data to be (intentionally

or unintentionally) altered?

 Explanation:  "Integrity" refers to the maintenance and assurance of
    the accuracy and consistency of data to ensure that it has not
    been (intentionally or unintentionally) altered.
 Example:  Integrity verification of data is important for preventing
    vulnerabilities and attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks.
    These attacks happen when a third party (often for malicious
    reasons) intercepts a communication between two parties, inserting
    themselves in the middle and changing the content of the data.  In
    practice, this looks as follows:
    Alice wants to communicate with Bob.
    Corinne forges and sends a message to Bob, impersonating Alice.
    Bob cannot see that the data from Alice was altered by Corinne.
    Corinne intercepts and alters the communication as it is sent
    between Alice and Bob.
    Corinne is able to control the communication content.
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to security

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 58] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

6.2.17. Authenticity

 Questions:
  1. Do you have sufficient measures in place to confirm the truth of

an attribute of an entity or of a single piece of data?

  1. Can attributes get garbled along the way (see Section 6.2.4

("Security"))?

  1. If relevant, have you implemented IPsec, DNSSEC, HTTPS, and other

standard security best practices?

 Explanation:  Authenticity ensures that data does indeed come from
    the source it claims to come from.  This is important for
    preventing (1) certain attacks or (2) unauthorized access to, and
    use of, data.
 Example:  Authentication of data is important for preventing
    vulnerabilities and attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks.
    These attacks happen when a third party (often for malicious
    reasons) intercepts a communication between two parties, inserting
    themselves in the middle and posing as both parties.  In practice,
    this looks as follows:
    Alice wants to communicate with Bob.
    Alice sends data to Bob.
    Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob.
    Corinne reads and alters the message to Bob.
    Bob cannot see that the data did not come from Alice but instead
    came from Corinne.
    When there is proper authentication, the scenario would be as
    follows:
    Alice wants to communicate with Bob.
    Alice sends data to Bob.
    Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob.
    Corinne reads and alters the message to Bob.
    Bob can see that the data did not come from Alice but instead came
    from Corinne.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 59] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 Impacts:
  1. Right to privacy
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to security

6.2.18. Adaptability

 Questions:
  1. Is your protocol written in such a way that it would be easy for

other protocols to be developed on top of it or to interact

    with it?
  1. Does your protocol impact permissionless innovation (see

Section 6.2.1 ("Connectivity") above)?

 Explanation:  Adaptability is closely interrelated with
    permissionless innovation; both maintain the freedom and ability
    to freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the
    communications constructs that currently exist.  Permissionless
    innovation is at the heart of the Internet as we know it.  To
    maintain the Internet's fundamentally open nature and ensure that
    it can continue to develop, we need to be mindful of the impact of
    protocols on maintaining or reducing permissionless innovation.
 Example:  WebRTC generates audio and/or video data.  In order to
    ensure that WebRTC can be used in different locations by different
    parties, it is important that standard JavaScript APIs be
    developed to support applications from different voice service
    providers.  Multiple parties will have similar capabilities; in
    order to ensure that all parties can build upon existing
    standards, these standards need to be adaptable and allow for
    permissionless innovation.
 Impacts:
  1. Right to education
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 60] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

6.2.19. Outcome Transparency

 Question:
  1. Are the effects of your protocol fully and easily comprehensible,

including with respect to unintended consequences of protocol

    choices?
 Explanation:  Certain technical choices may have unintended
    consequences.
 Example:  Lack of authenticity may lead to lack of integrity and
    negative externalities; spam is an example.  Lack of data that
    could be used for billing and accounting can lead to so-called
    "free" arrangements that obscure the actual costs and distribution
    of the costs -- for example, (1) the barter arrangements that are
    commonly used for Internet interconnection and (2) the commercial
    exploitation of personal data for targeted advertising, which is
    the most common funding model for the so-called "free" services
    such as search engines and social networks.
 Impacts:
  1. Right to freedom of expression
  1. Right to privacy
  1. Right to freedom of assembly and association
  1. Right to access to information

7. Security Considerations

 As this document discusses research, there are no security
 considerations.

8. IANA Considerations

 This document does not require any IANA actions.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 61] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

9. Research Group Information

 The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations
 Research Group is located at the email address <hrpc@ietf.org>.
 Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the
 list are provided at <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>.
 Archives of the list can be found at
 <https://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html>.

10. Informative References

 [Ababil]   Danchev, D., "Dissecting 'Operation Ababil' - an OSINT
            Analysis", September 2012, <http://ddanchev.blogspot.be/
            2012/09/dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.html>.
 [Abbate]   Abbate, J., "Inventing the Internet", MIT Press, 2000,
            <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inventing-internet>.
 [Adrian]   Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
            Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
            Thome, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
            Zanella-Beguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Imperfect
            Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice",
            Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
            and Communications Security, pp. 5-17,
            DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707, October 2015.
 [Alshalan-etal]
            Alshalan, A., Pisharody, S., and D. Huang, "A Survey of
            Mobile VPN Technologies", IEEE Communications Surveys &
            Tutorials, Volume 18, Issue 2, pp. 1177-1196,
            DOI 10.1109/COMST.2015.2496624, 2016,
            <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
            document/7314859/?arnumber=7314859>.
 [APIP]     Naylor, D., Mukerjee, M., and P. Steenkiste, "Balancing
            accountability and privacy in the network", SIGCOMM '14,
            Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Conference on
            SIGCOMM, pp. 75-86, DOI 10.1145/2740070.2626306,
            October 2014,
            <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2626306>.
 [Appelbaum]
            Appelbaum, J., Gibson, A., Goetz, J., Kabisch, V., Kampf,
            L., and L. Ryge, "NSA targets the privacy-conscious",
            2014, <http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/
            nsa230_page-1.html>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 62] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [ars]      Anderson, N., "P2P researchers: use a blocklist or you
            will be tracked... 100% of the time", October 2007,
            <http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/10/
            p2p-researchers-use-a-blocklist-or-you-will-be-tracked-
            100-of-the-time/>.
 [Aryan-etal]
            Aryan, S., Aryan, H., and J. Alex Halderman, "Internet
            Censorship in Iran: A First Look", 2013,
            <https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/iran-foci13.pdf>.
 [Babbie]   Babbie, E., "The Basics of Social Research",
            Cengage, Belmont, CA, 2017.
 [BBC-wikileaks]
            BBC, "Whistle-blower site taken offline", February 2008,
            <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7250916.stm>.
 [BCP72]    Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
            Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
            July 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp72>.
 [Benkler]  Benkler, Y., "The Wealth of Networks - How Social
            Production Transforms Markets and Freedom", Yale
            University Press, New Haven and London, 2006,
            <http://is.gd/rxUpTQ>.
 [Berners-Lee]
            Berners-Lee, T. and M. Fischetti, "Weaving the Web: The
            Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide
            Web", HarperCollins, p. 208, 1999.
 [BernersLeeHalpin]
            Berners-Lee, T. and H. Halpin, "Internet Access is a Human
            Right", 2012, <http://www.ibiblio.org/hhalpin/homepage/
            publications/def-timbl-halpin.pdf>.
 [Bhargavan]
            Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
            A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:
            Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS", 2014 IEEE
            Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 98-113,
            DOI 10.1109/SP.2014.14, May 2014.
 [Bitmessage]
            Bitmessage, "Bitmessage Wiki", March 2017,
            <https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 63] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [Bless1]   Orwat, C. and R. Bless, "Values and Networks - Steps
            Toward Exploring their Relationships", ACM SIGCOMM
            Computer Communication Review, Volume 46, Number 2,
            pp. 25-31, DOI 10.1145/2935634.2935640, April 2016,
            <http://www.sigcomm.org/sites/default/files/ccr/
            papers/2016/April/0000000-0000003.pdf>.
 [Bless2]   Bless, R. and C. Orwat, "Values and Networks", July 2015,
            <https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/93/slides/
            slides-93-hrpc-2.pdf>.
 [Broeders] Broeders, D., "The public core of the Internet.  An
            international agenda for Internet governance", The
            Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)
            Report No. 94 (under "Reports to the government"), 2015,
            <https://english.wrr.nl/publications/reports/2015/10/01/
            the-public-core-of-the-internet>
 [Brown]    Ziewitz, M. and I. Brown, Ed., "A Prehistory of Internet
            Governance", Research Handbook on Governance of the
            Internet, Part 1, Chapter 1 (pp. 3-26), Edward Elgar
            Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham, DOI 10.4337/9781849805049,
            2013.
 [Brown-etal]
            Brown, I., Clark, D., and D. Trossen, "Should Specific
            Values Be Embedded In The Internet Architecture?",
            ReARCH '10, Proceedings of the Re-Architecting the
            Internet Workshop, Article No. 10,
            DOI 10.1145/1921233.1921246, November 2010,
            <http://conferences.sigcomm.org/co-next/2010/Workshops/
            REARCH/ReArch_papers/10-Brown.pdf>.
 [BrownMarsden]
            Brown, I. and C. Marsden, "Regulating Code: Good
            Governance and Better Regulation in the Information Age",
            MIT Press, 2013,
            <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/regulating-code>.
 [CAIDA]    Dainotti, A., Squarcella, C., Aben, E., Claffy, K.,
            Chiesa, M., Russo, M., and A. Pescape, "Analysis of
            Country-wide Internet Outages Caused by Censorship",
            DOI 10.1109/TNET.2013.2291244, December 2013,
            <http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2014/
            outages_censorship/outages_censorship.pdf>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 64] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [Cath]     Cath, C., "A Case Study of Coding Rights: Should Freedom
            of Speech Be Instantiated in the Protocols and Standards
            Designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force?",
            August 2015, <https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/
            hrpc/current/pdf36GrmRM84S.pdf>.
 [CathFloridi]
            Cath, C. and L. Floridi, "The Design of the Internet's
            Architecture by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
            and Human Rights", April 2017.
 [Clark]    Clark, D., "The Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet
            Protocols", SIGCOMM '88, Proceedings of the ACM CCR,
            Volume 18, Number 4, pp. 106-114, DOI 10.1145/52324.52336,
            August 1988.
 [Clark-etal]
            Clark, D., Wroclawski, J., Sollins, K., and R. Braden,
            "Tussle in cyberspace: defining tomorrow's Internet",
            IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON) archive,
            Volume 13, Issue 3, pp. 462-475,
            DOI 10.1109/TNET.2005.850224, June 2005,
            <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1074049>.
 [CoE]      Council of Europe, "Applications to ICANN for Community-
            based New Generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs): Opportunities
            and challenges from a human rights perspective", 2016,
            <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/
            DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806b5a14>.
 [Collins]  Collins, K., "Hacking Team's oppressive regimes customer
            list revealed in hack", July 2015,
            <http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2015-07/06/
            hacking-team-spyware-company-hacked>.
 [Davidson-etal]
            Davidson, A., Morris, J., and R. Courtney, "Strangers in a
            Strange Land: Public Interest Advocacy and Internet
            Standards", Telecommunications Policy Research
            Conference, Alexandria, VA, September 2002,
            <https://www.cdt.org/files/publications/piais.pdf>.
 [DeNardis14]
            DeNardis, L., "The Global War for Internet Governance",
            Yale University Press, 2014,
            <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vkz4n>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 65] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [DeNardis15]
            DeNardis, L., "The Internet Design Tension between
            Surveillance and Security", IEEE Annals of the History of
            Computing, Volume 37, Issue 2, DOI 10.1109/MAHC.2015.29,
            2015, <http://is.gd/7GAnFy>.
 [Denzin]   Denzin, N., Ed., and Y. Lincoln, Ed., "The SAGE Handbook
            of Qualitative Research", SAGE Handbooks, Thousand Oaks,
            CA, 2011, <http://www.amazon.com/
            SAGE-Handbook-Qualitative-Research-Handbooks/
            dp/1412974178>.
 [dict]     BusinessDictionary.com, "Reliability (dictionary entry)",
            WebFinance, Inc., 2017,
            <http://www.businessdictionary.com/
            definition/reliability.html>.
 [Doty]     Doty, N., "Automated text analysis of Requests for Comment
            (RFCs)", 2014, <https://github.com/npdoty/rfc-analysis>.
 [Douceur]  Douceur, J., "The Sybil Attack", 2002,
            <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/
            uploads/2002/01/IPTPS2002.pdf>.
 [Dutton]   Dutton, W., Dopatka, A., Law, G., and V. Nash, "Freedom of
            Connection, Freedom of Expression: The Changing Legal and
            Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet", 2011,
            <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-
            information/resources/publications-and-communication-
            materials/publications/full-list/freedom-of-connection-
            freedom-of-expression-the-changing-legal-and-regulatory-
            ecology-shaping-the-internet/>.
 [Farrow]   Farrow, R., "Source Address Spoofing", 2016,
            <https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc723706.aspx>.
 [FIArch]   "Future Internet Design Principles", January 2012,
            <http://www.future-internet.eu/uploads/media/
            FIArch_Design_Principles_V1.0.pdf>.
 [FOC]      Ministers of the Freedom Online Coalition, "The Tallinn
            Agenda - Recommendations for Freedom Online", 2014,
            <https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/
            uploads/2014/04/FOC-recommendations-consensus.pdf>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 66] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [FRAMEWORK]
            ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Framework for
            internationalization", prepared by ISO/IEC
            JTC 1/SC 22/WG 20 ISO/IEC TR 11017, 1998.
 [Franklin] Franklin, U., "The Real World of Technology", June 1999,
            <http://houseofanansi.com/products/
            the-real-world-of-technology-digital>.
 [freenet1] Freenet, "What is Freenet?", n.d.,
            <https://freenetproject.org/whatis.html>.
 [freenet2] Clarke, I., "The Philosophy behind Freenet", n.d.,
            <https://freenetproject.org/pages/about.html>.
 [geekfeminism]
            Geek Feminism Wiki, "Pseudonymity", 2015,
            <http://geekfeminism.wikia.com/wiki/Pseudonymity>.
 [Geertz]   Geertz, H. and C. Geertz, "Kinship in Bali", University of
            Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975,
            <http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/K/
            bo25832222.html>.
 [Googlepatent]
            Google, "Method and device for network traffic
            manipulation", 2012,
            <https://www.google.com/patents/EP2601774A1?cl=en>.
 [greatfirewall]
            Anonymous, "Towards a Comprehensive Picture of the Great
            Firewall's DNS Censorship", 4th USENIX Workshop on Free
            and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI) '14,
            August 2014, <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/
            conference/foci14/foci14-anonymous.pdf>.
 [GreenMovement]
            Villeneuve, N., "Iran DDoS", 2009,
            <https://www.nartv.org/2009/06/16/iran-ddos/>.
 [Greenwald]
            Greenwald, G., "XKeyscore: NSA tool collects 'nearly
            everything a user does on the internet'", July 2013,
            <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/
            nsa-top-secret-program-online-data>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 67] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [Haagsma]  Haagsma, L., "Deep dive into QUANTUM INSERT", April 2015,
            <http://blog.fox-it.com/2015/04/20/
            deep-dive-into-quantum-insert/>.
 [Hall]     Hall, J., Aaron, M., Jones, B., and N. Feamster, "A Survey
            of Worldwide Censorship Techniques", Work in Progress,
            draft-hall-censorship-tech-04, July 2016.
 [Hill2014] Hill, R., "Partial Catalog of Human Rights Related to ICT
            Activities", May 2014,
            <http://www.apig.ch/UNIGE%20Catalog.pdf>.
 [HORNET]   Chen, C., Asoni, D., Barrera, D., Danezis, G., and A.
            Perrig, "HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network
            Layer", CCS '15, Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC
            Conference on Computer and Communications
            Security, pp. 1441-1454, DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813628,
            October 2015,
            <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2813628>.
 [HTML5]    Hickson, I., Ed., Berjon, R., Ed., Faulkner, S., Ed.,
            Leithead, T., Ed., Navara, E., Ed., O'Connor, E., Ed., and
            S. Pfeiffer, Ed., "HTML5", W3C Recommendation,
            October 2014, <https://www.w3.org/TR/html5/>.
 [ICCPR]    United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
            on Civil and Political Rights", 1966,
            <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
            CCPR.aspx>.
 [ICESCR]   United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
            on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 1966,
            <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
            CESCR.aspx>.
 [Insinuator]
            Schiess, N., "Vulnerabilities & attack vectors of VPNs
            (Pt 1)", August 2013, <https://www.insinuator.net/2013/08/
            vulnerabilities-attack-vectors-of-vpns-pt-1/>.
 [IRP]      Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition,
            "10 Internet Rights & Principles", 2017,
            <http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/campaign/>.
 [Jabri]    Jabri, V., "Discourses on violence: conflict analysis
            reconsidered", Manchester University Press, 1996.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 68] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [Kaye]     Kaye, D., "Freedom of expression and the private sector in
            the digital age", 2016, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/
            FreedomOpinion/Pages/Privatesectorinthedigitalage.aspx>.
 [King]     King, C., "Power, Social Violence and Civil Wars",
            Chapter 8 of "Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict
            Management in a Divided World", United States Institute of
            Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 2007.
 [Lessig]   Lessig, L., "Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace,
            Version 2.0 ('Codev2')", Basic Books, New York, 2006,
            <http://codev2.cc/>.
 [Marcak]   Marcak, B., Weaver, N., Dalek, J., Ensafi, R., Fifield,
            D., McKune, S., Rey, A., Scott-Railton, J., Deibert, R.,
            and V. Paxson, "China's Great Cannon", April 2015,
            <https://citizenlab.org/2015/04/chinas-great-cannon/>.
 [Marquis-Boire]
            Marquis-Boire, M., "Schrodinger's Cat Video and the Death
            of Clear-Text", August 2014, <https://citizenlab.org/
            2014/08/cat-video-and-the-death-of-clear-text/>.
 [Meyer]    Meyer, J., "Defining and Evaluating Resilience: A
            Performability Perspective", presentation at International
            Workshop on Performability Modeling of Computer and
            Communication Systems, September 2009.
 [Mueller]  Mueller, M., "Networks and States: The Global Politics of
            Internet Governance", MIT Press,
            DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014595.001.0001, 2010,
            <https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/networks-and-states>.
 [Musiani]  Musiani, F., "Giants, Dwarfs and Decentralized
            Alternatives to Internet-based Services: An Issue of
            Internet Governance", Westminster Papers in Communication
            and Culture, 10(1), pp. 81-94, DOI 10.16997/wpcc.214,
            2015, <https://www.westminsterpapers.org/
            articles/10.16997/wpcc.214/>.
 [Namecoin] Namecoin, "Namecoin", 2015, <https://namecoin.info/>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 69] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [NATusage] Maier, G., Schneider, F., and A. Feldmann, "NAT usage in
            Residential Broadband networks", PAM: International
            Conference on Passive and Active Network
            Measurement Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
            Volume 6579, Springer, Berlin and Heidelberg,
            DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19260-9_4, 2011,
            <http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/pubs/networking/
            NATusage11.pdf>.
 [NETmundial]
            NETmundial, "NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement",
            April 2014, <http://netmundial.br/wp-content/
            uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>.
 [Newegg]   Mullin, J., "Newegg on trial: Mystery company TQP rewrites
            the history of encryption", November 2013,
            <http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/11/newegg-on-
            trial-mystery-company-tqp-re-writes-the-history-of-
            encryption/>.
 [notewell] IETF, "Note Well", 2015,
            <https://www.ietf.org/about/note-well.html>.
 [patentpolicy]
            Weitzner, D., Ed., "W3C Patent Policy", World Wide
            Web Consortium, February 2004,
            <https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/>.
 [Penney]   Penney, J., "Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and
            Wikipedia Use", 2016, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
            papers.cfm?abstract_id=2769645>.
 [Peterson] Peterson, A., Gellman, B., and A. Soltani, "Yahoo to make
            SSL encryption the default for Webmail users.  Finally.",
            October 2013, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/
            news/the-switch/wp/2013/10/14/
            yahoo-to-make-ssl-encryption-the-default-
            for-webmail-users-finally/?utm_term=.a17eca45ddfe>.
 [PETS2015VPN]
            Perta, V., Barbera, M., Tyson, G., Haddadi, H., and A.
            Mei, "A Glance through the VPN Looking Glass: IPv6 Leakage
            and DNS Hijacking in Commercial VPN clients",
            DOI 10.1515/popets-2015-0006, 2015,
            <http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/~hamed/papers/
            PETS2015VPN.pdf>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 70] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [Pidgin]   js and Pidgin Developers, "[XMPP] Invisible mode violating
            standard", 2007,
            <https://developer.pidgin.im/ticket/4322>.
 [Pouwelse] Pouwelse, J., Ed., "Media without censorship (CensorFree)
            scenarios", Work in Progress, draft-pouwelse-censorfree-
            scenarios-02, October 2012.
 [Rachovitsa]
            Rachovitsa, A., "Engineering and lawyering privacy by
            design: understanding online privacy both as a technical
            and an international human rights issue", International
            Journal of Law and Information Technology, Volume 24,
            Issue 4, pp. 374-399, DOI 10.1093/ijlit/eaw012,
            December 2016, <https://academic.oup.com/ijlit/
            article/24/4/374/2566975/
            Engineering-and-lawyering-privacy-by-design>.
 [RFC760]   Postel, J., "DoD standard Internet Protocol", RFC 760,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC0760, January 1980,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc760>.
 [RFC791]   Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
 [RFC793]   Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
            RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
 [RFC894]   Hornig, C., "A Standard for the Transmission of IP
            Datagrams over Ethernet Networks", STD 41, RFC 894,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC0894, April 1984,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc894>.
 [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
            specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
            November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
 [RFC1122]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
            Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.
 [RFC1958]  Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
            Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 71] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [RFC1984]  IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
            Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1984>.
 [RFC2026]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process --
            Revision 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026,
            October 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2026>.
 [RFC2277]  Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
            Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, DOI 10.17487/RFC2277,
            January 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2277>.
 [RFC2775]  Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2775>.
 [RFC3022]  Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
            Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC3022, January 2001,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3022>.
 [RFC3365]  Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet
            Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", BCP 61,
            RFC 3365, DOI 10.17487/RFC3365, August 2002,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3365>.
 [RFC3439]  Bush, R. and D. Meyer, "Some Internet Architectural
            Guidelines and Philosophy", RFC 3439,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC3439, December 2002,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3439>.
 [RFC3536]  Hoffman, P., "Terminology Used in Internationalization in
            the IETF", RFC 3536, DOI 10.17487/RFC3536, May 2003,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3536>.
 [RFC3724]  Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, "The Rise of
            the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on
            the Evolution of the Internet Architecture", RFC 3724,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3724>.
 [RFC3935]  Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF",
            BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3935>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 72] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
            Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
            RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
 [RFC4084]  Klensin, J., "Terminology for Describing Internet
            Connectivity", BCP 104, RFC 4084, DOI 10.17487/RFC4084,
            May 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4084>.
 [RFC4101]  Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4101>.
 [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
            Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
            IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
 [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
            FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
 [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
            (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
 [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.
 [RFC5646]  Phillips, A., Ed., and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for
            Identifying Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, September 2009,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
 [RFC5694]  Camarillo, G., Ed., and IAB, "Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
            Architecture: Definition, Taxonomies, Examples, and
            Applicability", RFC 5694, DOI 10.17487/RFC5694,
            November 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5694>.
 [RFC5944]  Perkins, C., Ed., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised",
            RFC 5944, DOI 10.17487/RFC5944, November 2010,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5944>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 73] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [RFC6101]  Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The Secure
            Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0", RFC 6101,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6101, August 2011,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6101>.
 [RFC6108]  Chung, C., Kasyanov, A., Livingood, J., Mody, N., and B.
            Van Lieu, "Comcast's Web Notification System Design",
            RFC 6108, DOI 10.17487/RFC6108, February 2011,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6108>.
 [RFC6120]  Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
            Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
            March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120>.
 [RFC6365]  Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in
            Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.
 [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
            of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
            Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698,
            August 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
 [RFC6701]  Farrel, A. and P. Resnick, "Sanctions Available for
            Application to Violators of IETF IPR Policy", RFC 6701,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6701, August 2012,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6701>.
 [RFC6797]  Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
            Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6797>.
 [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
            Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
            Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
 [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
            Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
            RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 74] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
            Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content",
            RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
 [RFC7232]  Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
            Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Conditional Requests",
            RFC 7232, DOI 10.17487/RFC7232, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7232>.
 [RFC7233]  Fielding, R., Ed., Lafon, Y., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed.,
            "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Range Requests",
            RFC 7233, DOI 10.17487/RFC7233, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7233>.
 [RFC7234]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
            Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
            RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.
 [RFC7235]  Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
            Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
 [RFC7236]  Reschke, J., "Initial Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
            Authentication Scheme Registrations", RFC 7236,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7236, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7236>.
 [RFC7237]  Reschke, J., "Initial Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
            Method Registrations", RFC 7237, DOI 10.17487/RFC7237,
            June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7237>.
 [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
            Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258,
            May 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
 [RFC7469]  Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
            Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469,
            April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.
 [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
            Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 75] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [RFC7574]  Bakker, A., Petrocco, R., and V. Grishchenko, "Peer-to-
            Peer Streaming Peer Protocol (PPSPP)", RFC 7574,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7574, July 2015,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7574>.
 [RFC7624]  Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
            Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
            "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
            Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624>.
 [RFC7626]  Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 7626,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7626, August 2015,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7626>.
 [RFC7725]  Bray, T., "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles",
            RFC 7725, DOI 10.17487/RFC7725, February 2016,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7725>.
 [RFC7754]  Barnes, R., Cooper, A., Kolkman, O., Thaler, D., and E.
            Nordmark, "Technical Considerations for Internet Service
            Blocking and Filtering", RFC 7754, DOI 10.17487/RFC7754,
            March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7754>.
 [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
            and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
            Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858,
            May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.
 [RFC8164]  Nottingham, M. and M. Thomson, "Opportunistic Security for
            HTTP/2", RFC 8164, DOI 10.17487/RFC8164, May 2017,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8164>.
 [RFC8179]  Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property
            Rights in IETF Technology", BCP 79, RFC 8179,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC8179, May 2017,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8179>.
 [RFC8200]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
            (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
 [Rideout]  Rideout, A., "Making security easier", July 2008,
            <http://gmailblog.blogspot.de/2008/07/
            making-security-easier.html>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 76] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [Ritchie]  Ritchie, J. and J. Lewis, "Qualitative Research Practice:
            A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers", SAGE
            Publishing, London, 2003, <http://www.amazon.co.uk/
            Qualitative-Research-Practice-Students-Researchers/
            dp/0761971106>.
 [RSF]      Reporters Without Borders (RSF), "Syria using 34 Blue Coat
            servers to spy on Internet users", January 2016,
            <https://rsf.org/en/news/
            syria-using-34-blue-coat-servers-spy-internet-users>.
 [Saltzer]  Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-to-End Arguments
            in System Design", ACM Transactions on Computer Systems
            (TOCS), Volume 2, Number 4, pp. 277-288,
            DOI 10.1145/357401.357402, November 1984.
 [Sandvine] Sandvine, "Sandvine: Over 70% Of North American Traffic Is
            Now Streaming Video And Audio", December 2015,
            <https://www.sandvine.com/pr/2015/12/7/sandvine-over-70-
            of-north-american-traffic-is-now-streaming-video-and-
            audio.html>.
 [Schillace] Schillace, S., "Default https access for Gmail",
            January 2010, <http://gmailblog.blogspot.de/2010/01/
            default-https-access-for-gmail.html>.
 [Schneier] Schneier, B., "Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users'
            online anonymity", October 2013,
            <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/
            tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity>.
 [SPIEGEL]  SPIEGEL, "Prying Eyes - Inside the NSA's War on Internet
            Security", December 2014,
            <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/
            inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html>.
 [sslstrip] Marlinspike, M., "Software >> sslstrip", 2011,
            <https://moxie.org/software/sslstrip/>.
 [techyum]  Violet, "Official - vb.ly Link Shortener Seized by Libyan
            Government", October 2010, <http://techyum.com/2010/10/
            official-vb-ly-link-shortener-seized-by-libyan-
            government/>.
 [TorProject]
            The Tor Project, "Anonymity Online", 2006,
            <https://www.torproject.org/>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 77] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [torrentfreak1]
            Van der Sar, E., "Is Your ISP Messing With BitTorrent
            Traffic?  Find Out", January 2014,
            <https://torrentfreak.com/is-your-isp-messing-with-
            bittorrent-traffic-find-out-140123/>.
 [torrentfreak2]
            Andy, "Lawyers Sent 109,000 Piracy Threats in Germany
            During 2013", March 2014, <https://torrentfreak.com/
            lawyers-sent-109000-piracy-threats-in-germany-during-
            2013-140304/>.
 [Tribler]  Delft University of Technology, Department EWI/PDS/
            Tribler, "About Tribler", 2013,
            <https://www.tribler.org/about.html>.
 [UDHR]     United Nations General Assembly, "The Universal
            Declaration of Human Rights", 1948, <http://www.un.org/en/
            universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html>.
 [UNGA2013] United Nations General Assembly, "UN General Assembly
            Resolution "The right to privacy in the digital age"
            (A/C.3/68/L.45)", 2013,
            <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N13/
            576/77/PDF/N1357677.pdf?OpenElement>.
 [UNHRC2016]
            United Nations Human Rights Council, "The promotion,
            protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet",
            Resolution A/HRC/32/L.20, 2016,
            <http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=20340>.
 [Ververis] Ververis, V., Kargiotakis, G., Filasto, A., Fabian, B.,
            and A. Alexandros, "Understanding Internet Censorship
            Policy: The Case of Greece", 5th USENIX Workshop on Free
            and Open Communications on the Internet (FOCI) '15,
            August 2015, <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/
            conference/foci15/foci15-paper-ververis-update.pdf>.
 [W3CAccessibility]
            World Wide Web Consortium, "Accessibility", 2016,
            <https://www.w3.org/standards/webdesign/accessibility>.
 [W3Ci18nDef]
            Ishida, R. and S. Miller, "Localization vs.
            Internationalization", World Wide Web Consortium,
            April 2015, <http://www.w3.org/International/
            questions/qa-i18n.en>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 78] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

 [wikileaks]
            Sladek, T. and E. Broese, "Market Survey: Detection &
            Filtering Solutions to Identify File Transfer of Copyright
            Protected Content for Warner Bros. and movielabs", 2011,
            <https://wikileaks.org/sony/docs/05/docs/Anti-Piracy/CDSA/
            EANTC-Survey-1.5-unsecured.pdf>.
 [WP-Tempora]
            Wikipedia, "Tempora", September 2017,
            <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempora>.
 [WSJ]      Sonne, P. and M. Coker, "Firms Aided Libyan Spies", The
            Wall Street Journal, August 2011,
            <http://www.wsj.com/articles/
            SB10001424053111904199404576538721260166388>.
 [WynsbergheMoura]
            Nguyen, B., Ed., van Wynsberghe, A., van Wynsberghe, A.,
            and G. Moreira Moura, "The concept of embedded values and
            the example of internet security", June 2013,
            <http://doc.utwente.nl/87095/>.
 [XMPP-Manifesto]
            Saint-Andre, P. and XMPP Operators, "A Public Statement
            Regarding Ubiquitous Encryption on the XMPP Network",
            March 2014, <https://raw.githubusercontent.com/
            stpeter/manifesto/master/manifesto.txt>.
 [Zittrain] Zittrain, J., "The Future of the Internet - And How to
            Stop It", Yale University Press & Penguin UK, 2008,
            <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4455262/
            Zittrain_Future%20of%20the%20Internet.pdf?sequence=1>.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 79] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

Acknowledgements

 A special thanks to all members of the HRPC Research Group who
 contributed to this document.  The following deserve a special
 mention:
  1. Joana Varon for helping draft the first iteration of the

methodology and previous drafts, and for directing the film "Net

    of Rights" and working on the interviews at IETF 92 in Dallas.
  1. Daniel Kahn Gillmor (dkg) for helping with the first iteration of

the glossary (Section 2) as well as a lot of technical guidance,

    support, and language suggestions.
  1. Claudio Guarnieri for writing the first iterations of the case

studies on VPNs, HTTP, and P2P.

  1. Will Scott for writing the first iterations of the case studies on

DNS, IP, and XMPP.

  1. Avri Doria for proposing writing a glossary in the first place,

help with writing the initial proposals and Internet-Drafts, her

    reviews, and her contributions to the glossary.
 Thanks also to Stephane Bortzmeyer, John Curran, Barry Shein, Joe
 Hall, Joss Wright, Harry Halpin, and Tim Sammut, who made a lot of
 excellent suggestions, many of which found their way directly into
 the text.  We want to thank Amelia Andersdotter, Stephen Farrell,
 Stephane Bortzmeyer, Shane Kerr, Giovane Moura, James Gannon, Alissa
 Cooper, Andrew Sullivan, S. Moonesamy, Roland Bless, and Scott Craig
 for their reviews and for testing the HRPC guidelines in the wild.
 We would also like to thank Molly Sauter, Arturo Filasto, Nathalie
 Marechal, Eleanor Saitta, Richard Hill, and all others who provided
 input on this document or the conceptualization of the idea.  Thanks
 to Edward Snowden for his comments at IETF 93 in Prague regarding the
 impact of protocols on the rights of users.

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 80] RFC 8280 Human Rights Protocol Considerations October 2017

Authors' Addresses

 Niels ten Oever
 ARTICLE 19
 Email: mail@nielstenoever.net
 Corinne Cath
 Oxford Internet Institute
 Email: corinnecath@gmail.com

Ten Oever & Cath Informational [Page 81]

/data/webs/external/dokuwiki/data/pages/rfc/rfc8280.txt · Last modified: 2017/11/01 04:50 by 127.0.0.1

Donate Powered by PHP Valid HTML5 Valid CSS Driven by DokuWiki