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rfc:rfc8209

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Reynolds Request for Comments: 8209 IPSw Updates: 6487 S. Turner Category: Standards Track sn3rd ISSN: 2070-1721 S. Kent

                                                                   BBN
                                                        September 2017
             A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates,
      Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests

Abstract

 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used
 to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border
 Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol
 known as BGPsec.  BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the
 Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together.  BGPsec
 is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the
 requirement to provide security for BGP.  The goal of BGPsec is to
 provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong
 cryptographic primitives.  The end entity (EE) certificates specified
 by this profile are issued to routers within an AS.  Each of these
 certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key Infrastructure
 (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate.  These CA
 certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS Resource
 extension.  An EE certificate of this type asserts that the router or
 routers holding the corresponding private key are authorized to emit
 secure route advertisements on behalf of the AS(es) specified in the
 certificate.  This document also profiles the format of certification
 requests and specifies Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation
 procedures for these EE certificates.  This document extends the
 RPKI; therefore, this document updates the RPKI Resource Certificates
 Profile (RFC 6487).

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................3
    1.1. Terminology ................................................4
 2. Describing Resources in Certificates ............................4
 3. Updates to RFC 6487 .............................................6
    3.1. BGPsec Router Certificate Fields ...........................6
         3.1.1. Subject .............................................6
         3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info .............................6
         3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3
                Extension Fields ....................................6
                3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints ..........................6
                3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage .........................6
                3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access .................7
                3.1.3.4. IP Resources ...............................7
                3.1.3.5. AS Resources ...............................7
    3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile ..................7
    3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation .......................8
    3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI ......8
 4. Design Notes ....................................................9
 5. Implementation Considerations ...................................9
 6. Security Considerations ........................................10
 7. IANA Considerations ............................................10
 8. References .....................................................11
    8.1. Normative References ......................................11
    8.2. Informative References ....................................12
 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module ..........................................14
 Acknowledgements ..................................................15
 Authors' Addresses ................................................15

1. Introduction

 This document defines a profile for X.509 end entity (EE)
 certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of
 Autonomous System (AS) paths in the BGPsec protocol.  Such
 certificates are termed "BGPsec Router Certificates".  The holder of
 the private key associated with a BGPsec Router Certificate is
 authorized to send secure route advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on
 behalf of the AS(es) named in the certificate.  A router holding the
 private key is authorized to send route advertisements (to its peers)
 identifying the router's AS number (ASN) as the source of the
 advertisements.  A key property provided by BGPsec is that every AS
 along the AS path can verify that the other ASes along the path have
 authorized the advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along
 the AS path).

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

 This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of
 [RFC5280]; thus, this document updates [RFC6487].  It establishes
 requirements imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a
 BGPsec Router Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for
 certificate fields and extensions for the certificate to be valid in
 this context.  This document also profiles the certification requests
 used to acquire BGPsec Router Certificates.  Finally, this document
 specifies the Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation
 procedures for these certificates.

1.1. Terminology

 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
 described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates"
 [RFC6487], "BGPsec Protocol Specification" [RFC8205], "A Border
 Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security Vulnerabilities
 Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating the Path in BGP"
 [RFC5123], and "Capabilities Advertisement with BGP-4" [RFC5492].
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
 capitals, as shown here.

2. Describing Resources in Certificates

 Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the Resource Public Key
 Infrastructure (RPKI) and some of the products generated by RPKI
 entities.  IANA issues a Certification Authority (CA) certificate to
 each Regional Internet Registry (RIR).  The RIR in turn issues a
 CA certificate to an Internet Service Provider (ISP).  The ISP
 in turn issues EE certificates to itself to enable verification of
 signatures on RPKI signed objects.  The CA also generates Certificate
 Revocation Lists (CRLs).  These CA and EE certificates are referred
 to as "Resource Certificates" and are profiled in [RFC6487].
 [RFC6480] envisioned using Resource Certificates to enable
 verification of manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations
 (ROAs) [RFC6482].  ROAs and manifests include the Resource
 Certificates used to verify them.

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

              +---------+   +------+
              | CA Cert |---| IANA |
              +---------+   +------+
                       \
                    +---------+   +-----+
                    | CA Cert |---| RIR |
                    +---------+   +-----+
                            \
                           +---------+   +-----+
                           | CA Cert |---| ISP |
                           +---------+   +-----+
                            / |            | |
                 +-----+   /  |            | |   +-----+
                 | CRL |--+   |            | +---| ROA |
                 +-----+      |            |     +-----+
                              |            |   +----------+
                     +----+   |            +---| Manifest |
                   +-| EE |---+                +----------+
                   | +----+
                   +-----+
                               Figure 1
 This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is
 referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate".  The purpose of this
 certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of
 appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484].  The issuance of BGPsec
 Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI
 CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as
 specified in [RFC6487]).  Further, the algorithms used to generate
 RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and
 the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router
 Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in
 [RFC7935]).  The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to be able to
 process a profiled certificate request (see Section 3.2) signed with
 algorithms found in [RFC8208].  BGPsec Router Certificates are used
 only to verify the signature on the BGPsec certificate request (only
 CAs process these) and the signature on a BGPsec UPDATE message
 [RFC8205] (only BGPsec routers process these); BGPsec Router
 Certificates are not used to process manifests and ROAs or verify
 signatures on Certificates or CRLs.
 This document enumerates only the differences between this profile
 and the profile in [RFC6487].  Note that BGPsec Router Certificates
 are EE certificates, and as such there is no impact on the algorithm
 agility procedure described in [RFC6916].

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

3. Updates to RFC 6487

3.1. BGPsec Router Certificate Fields

 A BGPsec Router Certificate is consistent with the profile in
 [RFC6487] as modified by the specifications in this section.  As
 such, it is a valid X.509 public key certificate and consistent with
 the PKIX profile [RFC5280].  The differences between this profile and
 the profile in [RFC6487] are specified in this section.

3.1.1. Subject

 Encoding options for the common name that are supported are
 printableString and UTF8String.  For BGPsec Router Certificates, it
 is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal
 string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit ASN [RFC3779] encoded as
 eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute contain
 the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) encoded as
 eight hexadecimal digits.  If there is more than one ASN, the choice
 of which to include in the common name is at the discretion of the
 Issuer.  If the same certificate is issued to more than one router
 (and hence the private key is shared among these routers), the choice
 of the router ID used in this name is at the discretion of the
 Issuer.

3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info

 Refer to Section 3.1 of [RFC8208].

3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields

3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints

 BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension
 must not be present, as per [RFC6487].

3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage

 BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU)
 extension.  As specified in [RFC6487], this extension must not be
 marked critical.  This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router
 Certificates:
   id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
   id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

 A BGPsec router MUST require the EKU extension be present in a BGPsec
 Router Certificate it receives.  If multiple KeyPurposeId values are
 included, the BGPsec routers need not recognize all of them, as long
 as the required KeyPurposeId value is present.  BGPsec routers MUST
 reject certificates that do not contain the BGPsec Router EKU even if
 they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in [RFC5280].

3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access

 This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates.  It MUST be
 omitted.

3.1.3.4. IP Resources

 This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates.  It MUST be
 omitted.

3.1.3.5. AS Resources

 Each BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resources
 extension, as specified in Section 4.8.11 of [RFC6487].  The
 AS Resources extension MUST include one or more ASNs, and the
 "inherit" element MUST NOT be specified.

3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile

 Refer to Section 6 of [RFC6487].  The only differences between this
 profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are as follows:
 o  The Basic Constraints extension:
    If included, the CA MUST NOT honor the cA boolean if set to TRUE.
 o  The EKU extension:
    If included, id-kp-bgpsec-router MUST be present (see
    Section 3.1.3.2).  If included, the CA MUST honor the request for
    id-kp-bgpsec-router.
 o  The Subject Information Access (SIA) extension:
    If included, the CA MUST NOT honor the request to include the
    extension.
 o  The SubjectPublicKeyInfo field is specified in [RFC8208].
 o  The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [RFC8208].

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation

 The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is
 identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of
 [RFC6487] (and any RFC that updates that procedure), as modified
 below.  For example, in step 3 (of the criteria listed in Section 7.2
 of [RFC6487]), "The certificate contains all fields that MUST be
 present" refers to the fields that are required by this
 specification.
 The differences are as follows:
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec Router EKU
    defined in Section 3.1.3.2.
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension.
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resources
    extension.
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resources
    extension.
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the subjectPublicKeyInfo
    field described in [RFC8208].
 NOTE: BGPsec RPs will need to support the algorithms in [RFC8208],
 which are used to validate BGPsec signatures, as well as the
 algorithms in [RFC7935], which are needed to validate signatures on
 BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI CRLs.

3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI

 As described in Section 1, the primary function of BGPsec Router
 Certificates in the RPKI is for use in the context of certification
 of AS paths in the BGPsec protocol.
 The private key associated with a router EE certificate may be used
 multiple times in generating signatures in multiple instances of the
 BGPsec_PATH attribute Signature Segments [RFC8205].  That is, the
 BGPsec Router Certificate is used to validate multiple signatures.
 BGPsec Router Certificates are stored in the issuing CA's repository,
 where a repository following [RFC6481] MUST use a .cer filename
 extension for the certificate file.

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

4. Design Notes

 The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource
 Certificate profile as specified in [RFC6487].  As a result, many of
 the design choices herein are a reflection of the design choices that
 were taken in that prior work.  The reader is referred to [RFC6484]
 for a fuller discussion of those choices.
 CAs are required by the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] to issue
 properly formed BGPsec Router Certificates regardless of what is
 present in the certificate request, so there is some flexibility
 permitted in the certificate requests:
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore,
    requests to issue a CA certificate result in EE certificates;
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore,
    requests for Key Usage extension values keyCertSign and cRLSign
    result in certificates with neither of these values;
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates always include the BGPsec Router EKU
    value; therefore, requests without the value result in
    certificates with the value; and,
 o  BGPsec Router Certificates never include the SIA extension;
    therefore, requests with this extension result in certificates
    without the extension.
 Note that this behavior is similar to the CA including the
 AS Resources extension in issued BGPsec Router Certificates, despite
 the fact that it is not present in the request.

5. Implementation Considerations

 This document permits the operator to include a list of ASNs in a
 BGPsec Router Certificate.  In that case, the router certificate
 would become invalid if any one of the ASNs is removed from any
 superior CA certificate along the path to a trust anchor.  Operators
 could choose to avoid this possibility by issuing a separate BGPsec
 Router Certificate for each distinct ASN, so that the router
 certificates for ASNs that are retained in the superior CA
 certificate would remain valid.

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

6. Security Considerations

 The security considerations of [RFC6487] apply.
 A BGPsec Router Certificate will fail RPKI validation as defined in
 [RFC6487] because the cryptographic algorithms used are different.
 Consequently, an RP needs to identify the EKU to determine the
 appropriate Validation constraint.
 A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to
 encompass routers.  It is a building block of BGPsec and is used to
 validate signatures on BGPsec Signature Segment origination of
 signed path segments [RFC8205].  Thus, its essential security
 function is the secure binding of one or more ASNs to a public key,
 consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment hierarchy.
 Hash functions [RFC8208] are used when generating the two key
 identifier extensions (i.e., Subject Key Identifier and Issuer Key
 Identifier) included in BGPsec certificates.  However, as noted in
 [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required property of one-way
 hash functions when used to generate key identifiers.  Regardless,
 hash collisions are unlikely, but they are possible, and if detected
 an operator should be alerted.  A Subject Key Identifier collision
 might cause the incorrect certificate to be selected from the cache,
 resulting in a failed signature validation.

7. IANA Considerations

 This document makes use of two OIDs in the SMI registry for PKIX.
 One is for the ASN.1 module [X680] [X690] in Appendix A, and it comes
 from the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" IANA registry
 (id-mod-bgpsec-eku).  The other is for the BGPsec Router EKU defined
 in Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A, and it comes from the "SMI
 Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" IANA registry
 (id-kp-bgpsec-router).  These OIDs were assigned before management of
 the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA.  The references in those registries
 have been updated to point to this document.

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

8. References

8.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for
            IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
 [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
            Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
 [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
            Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
            Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
            (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
 [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
            Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
 [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
            "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
            (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
 [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
            X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
 [RFC7935]  Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
            Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
            Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
            August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

 [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
            RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
 [RFC8205]  Lepinski, M., Ed., and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
            Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205,
            September 2017,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
 [RFC8208]  Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats,
            and Signature Formats", RFC 8208, DOI 10.17487/RFC8208,
            September 2017,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.
 [X680]     ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax
            Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
            ITU-T Recommendation X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1, August 2015,
            <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680/en>.
 [X690]     ITU-T, "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
            Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
            (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1,
            August 2015, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/en>.

8.2. Informative References

 [RFC4272]  Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
            RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.
 [RFC5123]  White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the
            Path in BGP", RFC 5123, DOI 10.17487/RFC5123,
            February 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5123>.
 [RFC5492]  Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement
            with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492,
            February 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5492>.
 [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
            Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
            February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
 [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
            Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

 [RFC6484]  Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
            Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
            (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, DOI 10.17487/RFC6484,
            February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.
 [RFC6818]  Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key
            Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
            (CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, DOI 10.17487/RFC6818,
            January 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6818>.
 [RFC6916]  Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
            Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
            (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916,
            April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

Appendix A. ASN.1 Module

 BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
   security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-bgpsec-eku(84) }
   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN
  1. - EXPORTS ALL –
  1. - IMPORTS NOTHING –
  1. - OID Arc –
   id-kp  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
     security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }
  1. - BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage –
   id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 }
   END

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 8209 BGPsec Router PKI Profile September 2017

Acknowledgements

 We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert
 Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on.  In
 addition, the efforts of Matt Lepinski were instrumental in preparing
 this work.  Additionally, we'd like to thank Rob Austein, Roque
 Gagliano, Richard Hansen, Geoff Huston, David Mandelberg, Sandra
 Murphy, and Sam Weiler for their reviews and comments.

Authors' Addresses

 Mark Reynolds
 Island Peak Software
 328 Virginia Road
 Concord, MA  01742
 United States of America
 Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com
 Sean Turner
 sn3rd
 Email: sean@sn3rd.com
 Stephen Kent
 Raytheon BBN Technologies
 10 Moulton St.
 Cambridge, MA  02138
 United States of America
 Email: kent@alum.mit.edu

Reynolds, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]

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