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rfc:rfc8097

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Mohapatra Request for Comments: 8097 Sproute Networks Category: Standards Track K. Patel ISSN: 2070-1721 Arrcus, Inc.

                                                            J. Scudder
                                                      Juniper Networks
                                                               D. Ward
                                                                 Cisco
                                                               R. Bush
                                       Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
                                                            March 2017
       BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community

Abstract

 This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
 the origination Autonomous System (AS) validation state inside an
 autonomous system.  Internal BGP (IBGP) speakers that receive this
 validation state can configure local policies that allow it to
 influence their decision process.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097.

Mohapatra, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8097 Prefix Origin Validation State Ext. Comm. March 2017

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
 2.  Origin Validation State Extended Community  . . . . . . . . .   3
 3.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
 4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
 5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
 6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
 Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
 Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

Mohapatra, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 8097 Prefix Origin Validation State Ext. Comm. March 2017

1. Introduction

 This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
 the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
 IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
 policies that allow it to influence their decision process.

1.1. Requirements Language

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Origin Validation State Extended Community

 The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended
 community [RFC4360] with the following encoding:
      0                   1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |       0x43    |      0x00     |             Reserved          |
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     |                    Reserved                   |validationstate|
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type field is 0x43,
 which indicates it is non-transitive.  The value of the low-order
 octet of the extended Type field as assigned by IANA is 0x00.  The
 Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of this
 community.  The last octet of the extended community is an unsigned
 integer that gives the route's validation state [RFC6811].  It can
 assume the following values:
                   +-------+-----------------------------+
                   | Value | Meaning                     |
                   +-------+-----------------------------+
                   |   0   | Lookup result = "valid"     |
                   |   1   | Lookup result = "not found" |
                   |   2   | Lookup result = "invalid"   |
                   +-------+-----------------------------+
 If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
 document, it SHOULD attach the origin validation state extended
 community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the
 computed validation state in the last octet of the extended

Mohapatra, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 8097 Prefix Origin Validation State Ext. Comm. March 2017

 community.  Similarly, a receiving BGP speaker, in the absence of
 validation state set based on local data, SHOULD derive a validation
 state from the last octet of the extended community, if present.
 An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the
 origin validation state extended community.  However, if more than
 one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
 instances other than the one with the numerically greatest validation
 state value.  If the value received is greater than the largest
 specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar
 to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community
 and logging the error for further analysis.
 By default, implementations MUST drop the origin validation state
 extended community if received from an External BGP (EBGP) peer,
 without processing it further.  Similarly, by default, an
 implementation SHOULD NOT send the community to EBGP peers.  However,
 it SHOULD be possible to configure an implementation to send or
 accept the community when warranted.  An example of a case where the
 community would reasonably be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer
 is when two adjacent ASes are under control of the same
 administration.  A second example is documented in [SIDR-RPKI].

3. Deployment Considerations

 In deployment scenarios in which not all the speakers in an
 autonomous system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in
 this document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the
 origin validation extended community and set another BGP attribute
 [RFC6811] that influences selection of the best path in the same way
 that an implementation of this extension would.

4. IANA Considerations

 IANA has registered the value 0x00, with the name "BGP Origin
 Validation State Extended Community", in the "Non-Transitive Opaque
 Extended Community Sub-Types" registry.

5. Security Considerations

 Security considerations such as those described in [RFC4272] continue
 to apply.  Because this document introduces an extended community
 that will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis
 in Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant.  These
 issues are neither new nor unique to the origin validation extended
 community.

Mohapatra, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 8097 Prefix Origin Validation State Ext. Comm. March 2017

 The security considerations provided in [RFC6811] apply equally to
 this application of origin validation.  In addition, this document
 describes a scheme where router A outsources validation to some
 router B.  If this scheme is used, the participating routers should
 have the appropriate trust relationship -- B should trust A either
 because they are under the same administrative control or for some
 other reason (for example, consider [SIDR-RPKI]).  The security
 properties of the TCP connection between the two routers should also
 be considered.  See Section 5.1 of [RFC7454] for advice regarding
 protection of the TCP connection.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC4360]   Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
             Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
             February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
 [RFC6811]   Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
             Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.

6.2. Informative References

 [RFC4272]   Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
             RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.
 [RFC4593]   Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
             Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593,
             October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>.
 [RFC7454]   Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP
             Operations and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC7454, February 2015,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.
 [RFC7606]   Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
             Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
             RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
             <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.

Mohapatra, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 8097 Prefix Origin Validation State Ext. Comm. March 2017

 [SIDR-RPKI] King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux,
             "Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
             Server to Peers", Work in Progress,
             draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01, January
             2017.

Acknowledgements

 The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and
 suggestions from Wesley George, Roque Gagliano, and Bruno Decraene on
 this document.

Authors' Addresses

 Pradosh Mohapatra
 Sproute Networks
 Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com
 Keyur Patel
 Arrcus, Inc.
 Email: keyur@arrcus.com
 John Scudder
 Juniper Networks
 1194 N. Mathilda Ave
 Sunnyvale, CA  94089
 United States of America
 Email: jgs@juniper.net
 Dave Ward
 Cisco
 170 W. Tasman Drive
 San Jose, CA  95124
 United States of America
 Email: dward@cisco.com
 Randy Bush
 Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
 5147 Crystal Springs
 Bainbridge Island, WA  98110
 United States of America
 Email: randy@psg.com

Mohapatra, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]

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