GENWiki

Premier IT Outsourcing and Support Services within the UK

User Tools

Site Tools


rfc:rfc8071

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Watsen Request for Comments: 8071 Juniper Networks Category: Standards Track February 2017 ISSN: 2070-1721

              NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home

Abstract

 This RFC presents NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home, which
 enable a NETCONF or RESTCONF server to initiate a secure connection
 to a NETCONF or RESTCONF client, respectively.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8071.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   1.2.  Requirements Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   1.3.  Applicability Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   1.4.  Relation to RFC 4253  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   1.5.  The NETCONF/RESTCONF Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
 2.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
 3.  The NETCONF or RESTCONF Client  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.1.  Client Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.2.  Client Configuration Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
 4.  The NETCONF or RESTCONF Server  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.1.  Server Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.2.  Server Configuration Data Model . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
 5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
 6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
 7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
 Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
 Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1. Introduction

 This RFC presents NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home, which
 enable a NETCONF or RESTCONF server to initiate a secure connection
 to a NETCONF or RESTCONF client, respectively.
 NETCONF Call Home supports both of the secure transports used by the
 Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241], Secure Shell
 (SSH), and Transport Layer Security (TLS).  The NETCONF protocol's
 binding to SSH is defined in [RFC6242].  The NETCONF protocol's
 binding to TLS is defined in [RFC7589].
 RESTCONF Call Home only supports TLS, the same as the RESTCONF
 protocol [RFC8040].  The RESTCONF protocol's binding to TLS is
 defined in [RFC8040].
 The SSH protocol is defined in [RFC4253].  The TLS protocol is
 defined in [RFC5246].  Both the SSH and TLS protocols are layered on
 top of the TCP protocol, which is defined in [RFC793].
 Both NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home preserve all but one of
 the client/server roles in their respective protocol stacks, as
 compared to client-initiated NETCONF and RESTCONF connections.  The
 one and only role reversal that occurs is at the TCP layer; that is,
 which peer is the TCP client and which is the TCP server.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

 For example, a network element is traditionally the TCP server.
 However, when calling home, the network element initially assumes the
 role of the TCP client.  The network element's secure transport-layer
 roles (SSH server, TLS server) and its application-layer roles
 (NETCONF server, RESTCONF server) all remain the same.
 Having consistency in both the secure transport-layer (SSH, TLS) and
 application-layer (NETCONF, RESTCONF) roles conveniently enables
 deployed network management infrastructure to support call home also.
 For instance, existing certificate chains and user authentication
 mechanisms are unaffected by call home.

1.1. Motivation

 Call home is generally useful for both the initial deployment and
 ongoing management of networking elements.  Here are some scenarios
 enabled by call home:
 o  The network element may proactively "call home" after being
    powered on for the first time in order to register itself with its
    management system.
 o  The network element may access the network in a way that
    dynamically assigns it an IP address, but does not register its
    assigned IP address to a mapping service (e.g., dynamic DNS).
 o  The network element may be deployed behind a firewall that
    implements Network Address Translation (NAT) for all internal
    network IP addresses.
 o  The network element may be deployed behind a firewall that does
    not allow any management access to the internal network.
 o  The network element may be configured in "stealth mode", and thus
    does not have any open ports for the management system to connect
    to.
 o  The operator may prefer to have network elements initiate
    management connections, believing it is easier to secure one open
    port in the data center than to have an open port on each network
    element in the network.

1.2. Requirements Terminology

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Watsen Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

1.3. Applicability Statement

 The techniques described in this document are suitable for network
 management scenarios such as the ones described in Section 1.1.
 However, these techniques are only defined for NETCONF Call Home and
 RESTCONF Call Home, as described in this document.
 The reason for this restriction is that different protocols have
 different security assumptions.  The NETCONF and RESTCONF protocols
 require clients and servers to verify the identity of the other
 party.  This requirement is specified for the NETCONF protocol in
 Section 2.2 of [RFC6241], and is specified for the RESTCONF protocol
 in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of [RFC8040].
 This contrasts with the base SSH and TLS protocols, which do not
 require programmatic verification of the other party (Section 9.3.4
 of [RFC4251], Section 4 of [RFC4252], and Section 7.3 of [RFC5246]).
 In such circumstances, allowing the SSH/TLS server to contact the
 SSH/TLS client would open new vulnerabilities.  Any use of call home
 with SSH/TLS for purposes other than NETCONF or RESTCONF will need a
 thorough contextual risk assessment.  A risk assessment for this RFC
 is in the Security Considerations section (Section 5).

1.4. Relation to RFC 4253

 This document uses the SSH Transport Layer Protocol [RFC4253] with
 the exception that the statement "The client initiates the
 connection" made in Section 4 of RFC 4253 does not apply.  Assuming
 the reference to the client means "SSH client" and the reference to
 the connection means "TCP connection", this statement doesn't hold
 true in call home, where the network element is the SSH server and
 yet still initiates the TCP connection.  Security implications
 related to this change are discussed in Section 5.

1.5. The NETCONF/RESTCONF Convention

 Throughout the remainder of this document, the term "NETCONF/
 RESTCONF" is used as an abbreviation in place of the text "the
 NETCONF or the RESTCONF".  The NETCONF/RESTCONF abbreviation is not
 intended to require or to imply that a client or server must
 implement both the NETCONF standard and the RESTCONF standard.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

2. Solution Overview

 The diagram below illustrates call home from a protocol-layering
 perspective:
        NETCONF/RESTCONF                    NETCONF/RESTCONF
             Server                              Client
               |                                    |
               |         1. TCP                     |
               |----------------------------------->|
               |                                    |
               |                                    |
               |         2. SSH/TLS                 |
               |<-----------------------------------|
               |                                    |
               |                                    |
               |         3. NETCONF/RESTCONF        |
               |<-----------------------------------|
               |                                    |
              Note: Arrows point from the "client" to
                the "server" at each protocol layer.
                 Figure 1: Call Home Sequence Diagram
 This diagram makes the following points:
 1.  The NETCONF/RESTCONF server begins by initiating a TCP connection
     to the NETCONF/RESTCONF client.
 2.  Using this TCP connection, the NETCONF/RESTCONF client initiates
     an SSH/TLS session to the NETCONF/RESTCONF server.
 3.  Using this SSH/TLS session, the NETCONF/RESTCONF client initiates
     a NETCONF/RESTCONF session to the NETCONF/RESTCONF server.

3. The NETCONF or RESTCONF Client

 The term "client" is defined in [RFC6241], Section 1.1.  In the
 context of network management, the NETCONF/RESTCONF client might be a
 network management system.

3.1. Client Protocol Operation

 C1  The NETCONF/RESTCONF client listens for TCP connection requests
     from NETCONF/RESTCONF servers.  The client MUST support accepting
     TCP connections on the IANA-assigned ports defined in Section 6,
     but MAY be configured to listen to a different port.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

 C2  The NETCONF/RESTCONF client accepts an incoming TCP connection
     request and a TCP connection is established.
 C3  Using this TCP connection, the NETCONF/RESTCONF client starts
     either the SSH client [RFC4253] or the TLS client [RFC5246]
     protocol.  For example, assuming the use of the IANA-assigned
     ports, the SSH client protocol is started when the connection is
     accepted on port 4334 and the TLS client protocol is started when
     the connection is accepted on either port 4335 or port 4336.
 C4  When using TLS, the NETCONF/RESTCONF client MUST advertise
     "peer_allowed_to_send", as defined by [RFC6520].  This is
     required so that NETCONF/RESTCONF servers can depend on it being
     there for call home connections, when keep-alives are needed the
     most.
 C5  As part of establishing an SSH or TLS connection, the NETCONF/
     RESTCONF client MUST validate the server's presented host key or
     certificate.  This validation MAY be accomplished by certificate
     path validation or by comparing the host key or certificate to a
     previously trusted or "pinned" value.  If a certificate is
     presented and it contains revocation-checking information, the
     NETCONF/RESTCONF client SHOULD check the revocation status of the
     certificate.  If it is determined that a certificate has been
     revoked, the client MUST immediately close the connection.
 C6  If certificate path validation is used, the NETCONF/RESTCONF
     client MUST ensure that the presented certificate has a valid
     chain of trust to a preconfigured issuer certificate, and that
     the presented certificate encodes an "identifier" [RFC6125] that
     the client was aware of before the connection attempt.  How
     identifiers are encoded in certificates MAY be determined by a
     policy associated with the certificate's issuer.  For instance, a
     given issuer may be known to only sign IDevID certificates
     [Std-802.1AR-2009] having a unique identifier (e.g., a serial
     number) in the X.509 certificate's "CommonName" field.
 C7  After the server's host key or certificate is validated, the SSH
     or TLS protocol proceeds as normal to establish an SSH or TLS
     connection.  When performing client authentication with the
     NETCONF/RESTCONF server, the NETCONF/RESTCONF client MUST only
     use credentials that it had previously associated for the
     NETCONF/RESTCONF server's presented host key or server
     certificate.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

 C8  Once the SSH or TLS connection is established, the NETCONF/
     RESTCONF client starts either the NETCONF client [RFC6241] or
     RESTCONF client [RFC8040] protocol.  Assuming the use of the
     IANA-assigned ports, the NETCONF client protocol is started when
     the connection is accepted on either port 4334 or port 4335 and
     the RESTCONF client protocol is started when the connection is
     accepted on port 4336.

3.2. Client Configuration Data Model

 How a NETCONF or RESTCONF client is configured is outside the scope
 of this document.  For instance, such a configuration might be used
 to enable listening for call home connections, configuring trusted
 certificate issuers, or configuring identifiers for expected
 connections.  That said, YANG [RFC7950] data modules for configuring
 NETCONF and RESTCONF clients, including call home, are provided in
 [NETCONF-MODELS] and [RESTCONF-MODELS].

4. The NETCONF or RESTCONF Server

 The term "server" is defined in [RFC6241], Section 1.1.  In the
 context of network management, the NETCONF/RESTCONF server might be a
 network element or a device.

4.1. Server Protocol Operation

 S1  The NETCONF/RESTCONF server initiates a TCP connection request to
     the NETCONF/RESTCONF client.  The source port may be per local
     policy or randomly assigned by the operating system.  The server
     MUST support connecting to one of the IANA-assigned ports defined
     in Section 6, but MAY be configured to connect to a different
     port.  Using the IANA-assigned ports, the server connects to port
     4334 for NETCONF over SSH, port 4335 for NETCONF over TLS, and
     port 4336 for RESTCONF over TLS.
 S2  The TCP connection request is accepted and a TCP connection is
     established.
 S3  Using this TCP connection, the NETCONF/RESTCONF server starts
     either the SSH server [RFC4253] or the TLS server [RFC5246]
     protocol, depending on how it is configured.  For example,
     assuming the use of the IANA-assigned ports, the SSH server
     protocol is used after connecting to the remote port 4334 and the
     TLS server protocol is used after connecting to either remote
     port 4335 or remote port 4336.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

 S4  As part of establishing the SSH or TLS connection, the NETCONF/
     RESTCONF server will send its host key or certificate to the
     client.  If a certificate is sent, the server MUST also send all
     intermediate certificates leading up to a well-known and trusted
     issuer.  How to send a list of certificates is defined for SSH in
     [RFC6187], Section 2.1, and for TLS in [RFC5246], Section 7.4.2.
 S5  Establishing an SSH or TLS session requires server authentication
     of client credentials in all cases except with RESTCONF, where
     some client authentication schemes occur after the secure
     transport connection (TLS) has been established.  If transport-
     level (SSH or TLS) client authentication is required, and the
     client is unable to successfully authenticate itself to the
     server in an amount of time defined by local policy, the server
     MUST close the connection.
 S6  Once the SSH or TLS connection is established, the NETCONF/
     RESTCONF server starts either the NETCONF server [RFC6241] or
     RESTCONF server [RFC8040] protocol, depending on how it is
     configured.  Assuming the use of the IANA-assigned ports, the
     NETCONF server protocol is used after connecting to remote port
     4334 or remote port 4335, and the RESTCONF server protocol is
     used after connecting to remote port 4336.
 S7  If a persistent connection is desired, the NETCONF/RESTCONF
     server, as the connection initiator, SHOULD actively test the
     aliveness of the connection using a keep-alive mechanism.  For
     TLS-based connections, the NETCONF/RESTCONF server SHOULD send
     HeartbeatRequest messages, as defined by [RFC6520].  For SSH-
     based connections, per Section 4 of [RFC4254], the server SHOULD
     send an SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST message with a purposely
     nonexistent "request name" value (e.g., keepalive@ietf.org) and
     the "want reply" value set to '1'.

4.2. Server Configuration Data Model

 How a NETCONF or RESTCONF server is configured is outside the scope
 of this document.  This includes configuration that might be used to
 specify hostnames, IP addresses, ports, algorithms, or other relevant
 parameters.  That said, YANG [RFC7950] data modules for configuring
 NETCONF and RESTCONF servers, including call home, are provided in
 [NETCONF-MODELS] and [RESTCONF-MODELS].

Watsen Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

5. Security Considerations

 The security considerations described in [RFC6242] and [RFC7589], and
 by extension [RFC4253], [RFC5246], and [RFC8040] apply here as well.
 This RFC deviates from standard SSH and TLS usage by having the SSH/
 TLS server initiate the underlying TCP connection.  This reversal is
 incongruous with [RFC4253], which says "the client initiates the
 connection" and also [RFC6125], which says "the client MUST construct
 a list of acceptable reference identifiers, and MUST do so
 independently of the identifiers presented by the service."
 Risks associated with these variances are centered around server
 authentication and the inability for clients to compare an
 independently constructed reference identifier to one presented by
 the server.  To mitigate against these risks, this RFC requires that
 the NETCONF/RESTCONF client validate the server's SSH host key or
 certificate, by certificate path validation to a preconfigured issuer
 certificate, or by comparing the host key or certificate to a
 previously trusted or "pinned" value.  Furthermore, when a
 certificate is used, this RFC requires that the client be able to
 match an identifier encoded in the presented certificate with an
 identifier the client was preconfigured to expect (e.g., a serial
 number).
 For cases when the NETCONF/RESTCONF server presents an X.509
 certificate, NETCONF/RESTCONF clients should ensure that the
 preconfigured issuer certificate used for certificate path validation
 is unique to the manufacturer of the server.  That is, the
 certificate should not belong to a third-party certificate authority
 that might issue certificates for more than one manufacturer.  This
 is especially important when a client authentication mechanism
 passing a shared secret (e.g., a password) to the server is used.
 Not doing so could otherwise lead to a case where the client sends
 the shared secret to another server that happens to have the same
 identity (e.g., a serial number) as the server the client was
 configured to expect.
 Considerations not associated with server authentication follow next.
 Internet-facing hosts running NETCONF Call Home or RESTCONF Call Home
 will be fingerprinted via scanning tools such as "zmap" [zmap].  Both
 SSH and TLS provide many ways in which a host can be fingerprinted.
 SSH and TLS servers are fairly mature and able to withstand attacks,
 but SSH and TLS clients may not be as robust.  Implementers and
 deployments need to ensure that software update mechanisms are
 provided so that vulnerabilities can be fixed in a timely fashion.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

 An attacker could launch a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the
 NETCONF/RESTCONF client by having it perform computationally
 expensive operations, before deducing that the attacker doesn't
 possess a valid key.  For instance, in TLS 1.3 [TLS1.3], the
 ClientHello message contains a Key Share value based on an expensive
 asymmetric key operation.  Common precautions mitigating DoS attacks
 are recommended, such as temporarily blacklisting the source address
 after a set number of unsuccessful login attempts.
 When using call home with the RESTCONF protocol, special care is
 required when using some HTTP authentication schemes, especially the
 Basic [RFC7617] and Digest [RFC7616] schemes, which convey a shared
 secret (e.g., a password).  Implementers and deployments should be
 sure to review the Security Considerations section in the RFC for any
 HTTP client authentication scheme used.

6. IANA Considerations

 IANA has assigned three TCP port numbers in the "User Ports" range
 with the service names "netconf-ch-ssh", "netconf-ch-tls", and
 "restconf-ch-tls".  These ports will be the default ports for NETCONF
 Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home protocols.  Below is the
 registration template following the rules in [RFC6335].
 Service Name:           netconf-ch-ssh
 Port Number:            4334
 Transport Protocol(s):  TCP
 Description:            NETCONF Call Home (SSH)
 Assignee:               IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
 Contact:                IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
 Reference:              RFC 8071
 Service Name:           netconf-ch-tls
 Port Number:            4335
 Transport Protocol(s):  TCP
 Description:            NETCONF Call Home (TLS)
 Assignee:               IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
 Contact:                IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
 Reference:              RFC 8071
 Service Name:           restconf-ch-tls
 Port Number:            4336
 Transport Protocol(s):  TCP
 Description:            RESTCONF Call Home (TLS)
 Assignee:               IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
 Contact:                IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
 Reference:              RFC 8071

Watsen Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

7. References

7.1. Normative References

 [RFC793]   Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
            RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.
 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC4251]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
            Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
            January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251>.
 [RFC4252]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
            Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252,
            January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4252>.
 [RFC4253]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
            Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
            January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.
 [RFC4254]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
            Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, DOI 10.17487/RFC4254,
            January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4254>.
 [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
            (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
 [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
            Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
            within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
            (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
            Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
            2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
 [RFC6187]  Igoe, K. and D. Stebila, "X.509v3 Certificates for Secure
            Shell Authentication", RFC 6187, DOI 10.17487/RFC6187,
            March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6187>.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

 [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
            and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
            (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
 [RFC6242]  Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
            Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
 [RFC6335]  Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.
            Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
            Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and
            Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165,
            RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.
 [RFC6520]  Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
            Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
            (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", RFC 6520,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.
 [RFC7589]  Badra, M., Luchuk, A., and J. Schoenwaelder, "Using the
            NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) with
            Mutual X.509 Authentication", RFC 7589,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7589, June 2015,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7589>.
 [RFC8040]  Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
            Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.

7.2. Informative References

 [NETCONF-MODELS]
            Watsen, K., Wu, G., and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Client
            and Server Models", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-netconf-
            netconf-client-server-01, November 2016.
 [RESTCONF-MODELS]
            Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "RESTCONF Client and
            Server Models", Work in Progress draft-ietf-netconf-
            restconf-client-server-01, November 2016.
 [RFC7616]  Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP
            Digest Access Authentication", RFC 7616,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7616, September 2015,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616>.

Watsen Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 8071 NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home February 2017

 [RFC7617]  Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
            RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
 [RFC7950]  Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
            RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
 [Std-802.1AR-2009]
            IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
            networks - Secure Device Identity", IEEE Std 802.1AR-2009,
            DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2009.5367679, December 2009,
            <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
            standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
 [TLS1.3]   Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
            Version 1.3", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18,
            October 2016.
 [zmap]     Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J. Halderman, "ZMap: Fast
            Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications",
            22nd Usenix Security Symposium, August 2013,
            <https://zmap.io/paper.html>.

Acknowledgements

 The author would like to thank the following (ordered by last name)
 for lively discussions on the mailing list and in the halls: Jari
 Arkko, Andy Bierman, Martin Bjorklund, Ben Campbell, Spencer Dawkins,
 Mehmet Ersue, Stephen Farrell, Wes Hardaker, Stephen Hanna, David
 Harrington, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Simon Josefsson, Radek Krejci, Suresh
 Krishnan, Barry Leiba, Alan Luchuk, Kathleen Moriarty, Mouse, Russ
 Mundy, Tom Petch, Peter Saint-Andre, Joseph Salowey, Juergen
 Schoenwaelder, Martin Stiemerling, Joe Touch, Hannes Tschofenig, Sean
 Turner, and Bert Wijnen.

Author's Address

 Kent Watsen
 Juniper Networks
 Email: kwatsen@juniper.net

Watsen Standards Track [Page 13]

/data/webs/external/dokuwiki/data/pages/rfc/rfc8071.txt · Last modified: 2017/02/22 19:00 by 127.0.0.1

Donate Powered by PHP Valid HTML5 Valid CSS Driven by DokuWiki