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rfc:rfc8063

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H.W. Ribbers Request for Comments: 8063 M.W. Groeneweg Category: Standards Track SIDN ISSN: 2070-1721 R. Gieben

                                                     A.L.J. Verschuren
                                                         February 2017
     Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol

Abstract

 This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
 mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material
 between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in RFC 5730.
 This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator
 of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8063.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   1.2.  Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material  . . . . . . . . .   3
 2.  Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.1.  DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.1.  <keyRelayData> Element  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
 3.  EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.1.  EPP Query Commands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.1.  EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.2.  EPP <info> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.3.  EPP <transfer> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.2.  EPP Transform Commands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.1.  EPP <create> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.2.  EPP <delete> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.3.  EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.4.  EPP <transfer> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     3.2.5.  EPP <update> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
 4.  Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
 5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.1.  XML Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.2.  XML Schema  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.3.  EPP Extension Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
 6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
 7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
 Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
 Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1. Introduction

 There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS operator that
 require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS
 operators.  Often, there is no direct channel between these parties
 or it is non-scalable and insecure.
 One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when
 changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC-signed zones.  We suggest that
 DNS operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the
 delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone.
 In this document, we define an EPP extension to send DNSSEC key
 material between EPP clients.  This allows DNS operators to
 automatically, reliably, and securely bootstrap the transfer of a
 domain name while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
 [RFC2119].
 XML is case sensitive.  Unless stated otherwise, the XML
 specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be
 interpreted in the character case presented in order to develop a
 conforming implementation.
 In the examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client and
 "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server.  Indentation and
 white space in the examples are provided only to illustrate element
 relationships and are not mandatory features of this protocol.

1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material

 Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name
 transfer is one of the phases in the life cycle of a domain name
 [DNSOP].
 DNS operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the
 registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust
 intact.  This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining
 registrar.
 The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each
 other (see Figure 1) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often there is no
 trusted path between the two.  As both can securely interact with the
 registry over the administrative channel through the registrar, the
 registry can act as a relay for the key material exchange.
 The registry is merely used as a relay channel.  Therefore, it is up
 to the losing DNS operator to complete the intended transaction.  The
 registry SHOULD have certain policies in place that require the
 losing DNS operator to cooperate with this transaction; however, this
 is beyond the scope of this document.  This document focuses on the
 EPP protocol syntax.

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

         +--------------------+  DNSKEY   +---------------------+
         |gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator |
         +--------------------+           +---------------------+
                        |                   ^
                        |                   |
                        V                   |
         +--------------------+         +---------------------+
         |  gaining registrar |         | registrar of record |
         +--------------------+         +---------------------+
                        |                   ^
          EPP key relay |                   | EPP poll
                        V                   |
                   +-----------------------------+
                   |           registry          |
                   +-----------------------------+
               Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material
 There is no distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and
 DNS operators, and there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP
 server.  Therefore, the term "EPP client" will be used for the
 interaction with the EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material.

2. Object Attributes

2.1. DNSSEC Key Material

 The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData>
 element.

2.1.1. <keyRelayData> Element

 The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements:
 o  One REQUIRED <keyData> element that contains the DNSSEC key
    material as described in [RFC5910], Section 4.
 o  An OPTIONAL <expiry> element that describes the expected lifetime
    of the relayed key(s) in the zone.  When the <expiry> element is
    provided, the losing DNS operator SHOULD remove the inserted key
    material from the zone after the expiry time.  This may be because
    the transaction that needed the insertion should be either
    completed or abandoned by that time.  If a client receives a key
    relay object that has been sent previously, it MUST update the
    expiry time of the key material.  This enables the clients to
    update the lifetime of the key material when a transfer is
    delayed.

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

 The <expiry> element MUST contain exactly one of the following child
 elements:
 <absolute>:  The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date
    and time until it expires on the specified date and time.  If a
    date in the past is provided, this MUST be interpreted as a
    revocation of a previously sent key relay object.
 <relative>:  The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date
    and time until the end of the specified duration.  If a period of
    zero is provided, this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a
    previously sent key relay object.

3. EPP Command Mapping

 A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
 in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730].  The command
 mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay
 mapping.

3.1. EPP Query Commands

 EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
 to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
 detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
 retrieve object transfer status information.

3.1.1. EPP <check> Command

 Check that semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is
 no mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check>
 response.

3.1.2. EPP <info> Command

 Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so
 there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> command.
 The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll
 response, as described in [RFC5730].  The key relay object created
 with the <create> command, described in Section 3.2.1 is inserted
 into the receiving client's poll queue.  The receiving client will
 receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as
 described in [RFC5730].

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

 When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay
 poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child
 <keyrelay:infData> element that is identified by the keyrelay
 namespace.  The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following
 child elements:
 o  A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the
    DNSSEC key material is relayed.
 o  A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
    information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],
    Section 3.2.1).
 o  One or more REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be
    relayed, as defined in Section 2.1.  A server MAY apply a server
    policy that specifies the number of <keyRelayData> elements that
    can be incorporated.  When a server policy is violated, a server
    MUST respond with an EPP result code 2308 "Data management policy
    violation".
 o  An OPTIONAL <crDate> element that contains the date and time of
    the submitted <create> command.
 o  An OPTIONAL <reID> element that contains the identifier of the
    client that requested the key relay.
 o  An OPTIONAL <acID> element that contains the identifier of the
    client that SHOULD act upon the key relay.
 Example <poll> response:

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

 S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 S:    xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
 S:  xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
 S:  xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
 S:  <response>
 S:    <result code="1301">
 S:      <msg>Command completed successfully; ack to dequeue</msg>
 S:    </result>
 S:    <msgQ count="5" id="12345">
 S:      <qDate>1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z</qDate>
 S:      <msg>Keyrelay action completed successfully.</msg>
 S:    </msgQ>
 S:    <resData>
 S:      <keyrelay:infData>
 S:        <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
 S:        <keyrelay:authInfo>
 S:          <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw>
 S:        </keyrelay:authInfo>
 S:        <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
 S:          <keyrelay:keyData>
 S:            <s:flags>256</s:flags>
 S:            <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
 S:            <s:alg>8</s:alg>
 S:            <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey>
 S:          </keyrelay:keyData>
 S:          <keyrelay:expiry>
 S:            <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative>
 S:          </keyrelay:expiry>
 S:        </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
 S:        <keyrelay:crDate>
 S:          1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z
 S:        </keyrelay:crDate>
 S:        <keyrelay:reID>
 S:          ClientX
 S:        </keyrelay:reID>
 S:        <keyrelay:acID>
 S:          ClientY
 S:        </keyrelay:acID>
 S:      </keyrelay:infData>
 S:    </resData>
 S:    <trID>
 S:      <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 S:      <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
 S:    </trID>
 S:  </response>
 S:</epp>

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command

 Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
 mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command.

3.2. EPP Transform Commands

 EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create
 an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an
 object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
 <transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
 change information associated with an object.

3.2.1. EPP <create> Command

 The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
 client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and
 DNSSEC key material to be relayed.  When the <create> command is
 validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the
 key relay info response (see Section 3.1.2), in the receiving
 client's poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the
 provided domain name.
 In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create>
 command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that is identified
 by the keyrelay namespace.  The <keyrelay:create> element contains
 the following child elements:
 o  A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for
    which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.
 o  A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
    information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],
    Section 3.2.1).
 o  One or more REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> elements containing
    data to be relayed, as defined in Section 2.1.

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

 Example <create> commands:
 Note that in the provided example, the second <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
 element has a period of zero, and thus represents the revocation of a
 previously sent key relay object (see Section 2.1.1).
 C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 C:    xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
 C:  xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
 C:  xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
 C:  <command>
 C:    <create>
 C:      <keyrelay:create>
 C:        <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
 C:        <keyrelay:authInfo>
 C:          <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw>
 C:        </keyrelay:authInfo>
 C:        <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
 C:          <keyrelay:keyData>
 C:            <s:flags>256</s:flags>
 C:            <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
 C:            <s:alg>8</s:alg>
 C:            <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey>
 C:          </keyrelay:keyData>
 C:          <keyrelay:expiry>
 C:            <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative>
 C:          </keyrelay:expiry>
 C:        </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
 C:        <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
 C:          <keyrelay:keyData>
 C:            <s:flags>256</s:flags>
 C:            <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
 C:            <s:alg>8</s:alg>
 C:            <s:pubKey>bWFyY2lzdGhlYmVzdA==</s:pubKey>
 C:          </keyrelay:keyData>
 C:          <keyrelay:expiry>
 C:            <keyrelay:relative>P0D</keyrelay:relative>
 C:          </keyrelay:expiry>
 C:        </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
 C:      </keyrelay:create>
 C:    </create>
 C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 C:  </command>
 C:</epp>

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

 When a server has successfully processed the <create> command, it
 MUST respond with a standard EPP response.  See [RFC5730],
 Section 2.6.
 Example <create> response:
 S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
 S:  <response>
 S:    <result code="1000">
 S:      <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
 S:    </result>
 S:    <trID>
 S:       <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 S:       <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
 S:    </trID>
 S:  </response>
 S:</epp>
 When a server cannot process the <create> command due to the server
 policy, it MUST return an EPP 2308 error message.  This might be the
 case when the server knows that the receiving client does not support
 key relay transactions.  See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.
 Example <create> response:
 S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
 S:  <response>
 S:    <result code="2308">
 S:      <msg>Data management policy violation</msg>
 S:    </result>
 S:    <trID>
 S:       <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 S:       <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
 S:    </trID>
 S:  </response>
 S:</epp>

3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command

 Delete semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
 mapping defined for the EPP <delete> command and the EPP <delete>
 response.

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command

 Renew semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
 mapping defined for the EPP <renew> command and the EPP <renew>
 response.

3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command

 Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
 mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command and the EPP <transfer>
 response.

3.2.5. EPP <update> Command

 Update semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
 mapping defined for the EPP <update> command and the EPP <update>
 response.

4. Formal Syntax

 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
   xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
   xmlns:eppcom="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
   xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
   xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
   xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
   elementFormDefault="qualified">
   <annotation>
     <documentation>
       Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 protocol
       extension schema for relaying DNSSEC key material.
     </documentation>
   </annotation>
   <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0" />
   <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" />
   <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0" />
   <element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" />
   <element name="infData" type="keyrelay:infDataType" />
   <element name="create" type="keyrelay:createType" />

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

   <complexType name="createType">
     <sequence>
       <element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
       <element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
       <element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType"
           maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
     </sequence>
   </complexType>
  <complexType name="infDataType">
     <sequence>
       <element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
       <element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
       <element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType"
           maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
       <element name="crDate" type="dateTime"/>
       <element name="reID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
       <element name="acID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
     </sequence>
   </complexType>
   <complexType name="keyRelayDataType">
     <sequence>
       <element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType" />
       <element name="expiry" type="keyrelay:keyRelayExpiryType"
           minOccurs="0" />
     </sequence>
   </complexType>
   <complexType name="keyRelayExpiryType">
     <choice>
       <element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />
       <element name="relative" type="duration" />
     </choice>
   </complexType>
 </schema>

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

5. IANA Considerations

5.1. XML Namespace

 This document uses URNs to describe an XML namespace conforming to
 the registry mechanism described in [RFC3688].  The following URI
 assignment has been made by IANA:
 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0
 Registrant Contact: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this
 document.
 XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.

5.2. XML Schema

 This document uses URNs to describe an XML schema conforming to the
 registry mechanism described in [RFC3688].  The following URI
 assignment has been made by IANA:
 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyrelay-1.0
 XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.

5.3. EPP Extension Registry

 The EPP extension described in this document has been registered by
 IANA in the "Extensions for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
 (EPP)" registry described in [RFC7451].  The details of the
 registration are as follows:
 Name of Extension: "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning
 Protocol"
 Document status: Standards Track
 Reference: RFC 8063
 Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org
 Top-Level Domains (TLDs): Any
 IPR Disclosure: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/
 Status: Active
 Notes: None

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

6. Security Considerations

 A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server
 management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command.  The intent
 of this command is to put DNSSEC key material on the poll queue of
 another client.  Exceptions to this recommendation are allowable only
 for the purposes of achieving interoperability with the different
 server policies that have already implemented this EPP extension.
 Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message
 queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial-
 of-service attack.  However, this can and should be detected by the
 server.  A server MAY set a server policy that limits or rejects a
 <keyrelay:create> command if it detects that the mechanism is being
 abused.
 For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data, a correct <domain:authInfo>
 element should be used as an indication that putting the key material
 on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the
 _registrant_ of that domain name.  The authorization of EPP clients
 to perform DNS changes is not covered in this document as it depends
 on registry-specific policy.
 A client that uses this mechanism to send DNSSEC key material to
 another client could verify through DNS that the DNSSEC key material
 is added to the authoritative zone of the domain.  This check can be
 used to verify that the DNSSEC key material has traveled end-to-end
 from the gaining DNS operator to the losing DNS operator.  This check
 does not tell anything about the DNSSEC chain of trust and can merely
 be used as a verification of a successful transfer of the DNSSEC key
 material.

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

7. References

7.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
 [RFC5730]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
            STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.
 [RFC5731]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
            Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731>.
 [RFC5910]  Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS)
            Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible
            Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5910, May 2010,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5910>.

7.2. Informative References

 [DNSOP]    Koch, P., Sanz, M., and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS
            Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", Work in Progress,
            draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change-06, February 2014.
 [RFC7451]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible
            Provisioning Protocol", RFC 7451, DOI 10.17487/RFC7451,
            February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7451>.

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 8063 EPP Key Relay February 2017

Acknowledgements

 We would like to thank the following individuals for their valuable
 input, review, and constructive criticism in earlier revisions or
 support for the concepts described in this document:
 Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal,
 Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth
 Goldman, Maarten Bosteels, Ulrich Wisser, Kees Monshouwer, Scott
 Hollenbeck, and Job Snijders.

Authors' Addresses

 Rik Ribbers
 SIDN
 Meander 501
 Arnhem  6825 MD
 The Netherlands
 Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl
 URI:   https://www.sidn.nl/
 Marc Groeneweg
 SIDN
 Meander 501
 Arnhem  6825 MD
 The Netherlands
 Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl
 URI:   https://www.sidn.nl/
 Miek Gieben
 Email: miek@miek.nl
 Antoin Verschuren
 Email: ietf@antoin.nl

Ribbers, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]

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