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rfc:rfc8002

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Heer Request for Comments: 8002 Albstadt-Sigmaringen University Obsoletes: 6253 S. Varjonen Updates: 7401 University of Helsinki Category: Standards Track October 2016 ISSN: 2070-1721

                Host Identity Protocol Certificates

Abstract

 The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital
 certificates.  It is used for carrying these certificates in Host
 Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets.  This document specifies the
 certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed
 verification.  Additionally, this document specifies the
 representations of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in X.509 version 3 (v3).
 The concrete use cases of certificates, including how certificates
 are obtained and requested and which actions are taken upon
 successful or failed verification, are specific to the scenario in
 which the certificates are used.  Hence, the definition of these
 scenario-specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT
 parameter.
 This document updates RFC 7401 and obsoletes RFC 6253.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8002.

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
 2.  CERT Parameter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
 3.  X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities . . . . . . .   5
 4.  Revocation of Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
 5.  Error Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
 6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
 7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
 8.  Differences from RFC 6253 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
 9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
 Appendix A.  X.509 v3 Certificate Example . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
 Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

1. Introduction

 Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by
 means of a digital signature and thus enable the holder of a private
 key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements.  The Host
 Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC7401] defines a new cryptographic
 namespace based on asymmetric cryptography.  The identity of each
 host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign
 data and issue certificates with their private key.  This document
 specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital
 certificates in HIP.  It fills the placeholder specified in
 Section 5.2 of [RFC7401] and thus updates [RFC7401].

1.1. Requirements Language

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. CERT Parameter

 The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital
 certificates.  It does not specify any certificate semantics.
 However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to
 transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic
 way.  The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases
 is intentionally not discussed in this document.  Hence, the use of
 the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT
 parameter.
 The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP
 SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
 The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets.  However, using it
 in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED because it can
 increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when
 processing storms of I1s.  Each HIP control packet MAY contain
 multiple CERT parameters, each carrying one certificate.  These
 parameters MAY be related or unrelated.  Related certificates are
 managed in CERT groups.  A CERT group specifies a group of related
 CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g.,
 for expressing certificate chains).  Ungrouped certificates exhibit a
 unique CERT group field and set the CERT count to 1.  CERT parameters
 with the same group number in the CERT group field indicate a logical
 grouping.  The CERT count field indicates the number of CERT
 parameters in the group.

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

 CERT parameters that belong to the same CERT group MAY be contained
 in multiple sequential HIP control packets.  This is indicated by a
 higher CERT count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching
 CERT group fields in a HIP control packet.  The CERT parameters MUST
 be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according
 to their CERT group field.  CERT groups MAY only span multiple
 packets if the CERT group does not fit the packet.  A HIP packet MUST
 NOT contain more than one incomplete CERT group that continues in the
 next HIP control packet.
 The CERT ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in
 a CERT group.  The numbers in the CERT ID field MUST start from 1 up
 to CERT count.
 The CERT group and CERT ID namespaces are managed locally by each
 host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets.
    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |             Type              |             Length            |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |  CERT group   |  CERT count   |    CERT ID    |   CERT type   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                          Certificate                          /
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   /                               |   Padding (variable length)   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   Type          768
   Length        Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and
                 Padding.
   CERT group    Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters.
   CERT count    Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly
                 in several consecutive HIP control packets.
   CERT ID       The sequence number for this certificate.
   CERT Type     Indicates the type of the certificate.
   Padding       Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple
                 of 8 bytes.  Any added padding bytes MUST be zeroed
                 by the sender, and their values SHOULD NOT be checked
                 by the receiver.
 The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC7401] as the
 signature and hash algorithms.

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

 The following certificate types are defined:
           +--------------------------------+-------------+
           |          CERT format           | Type number |
           +--------------------------------+-------------+
           |            Reserved            |      0      |
           |            X.509 v3            |      1      |
           |           Obsoleted            |      2      |
           |    Hash and URL of X.509 v3    |      3      |
           |           Obsoleted            |      4      |
           |      LDAP URL of X.509 v3      |      5      |
           |           Obsoleted            |      6      |
           | Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 |      7      |
           |           Obsoleted            |      8      |
           +--------------------------------+-------------+
 The next sections outline the use of HITs in X.509 v3.  X.509 v3
 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in [RFC5280].
 The wire format for X.509 v3 is the Distinguished Encoding Rules
 format as defined in [X.690].
 Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encoding (3) is used as
 defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC7296].  Using hash and URL encodings
 result in smaller HIP control packets than by including the
 certificate(s) but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check
 a local cache against the hash.
 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encoding (5) is used
 as defined in [RFC4516].  Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller
 HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the
 certificate or check a local cache against the URL.
 Distinguished Name (DN) encoding (7) is represented by the string
 representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in
 [RFC4514].  Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control
 packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or
 check a local cache against the DN.

3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities

 If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509
 v3.  HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC7343].
 When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the
 respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name
 (IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in
 [RFC5280].  When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified
 by a HIT and an HI, the respective HIT SHOULD be placed into the

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

 Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form
 iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key
 info as defined in [RFC5280].
 The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as the
 issuer and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.
     Format of X509v3 extensions:
         X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
             IP Address:hit-of-issuer
         X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
             IP Address:hit-of-subject
     Example X509v3 extensions:
         X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
             IP Address:2001:24:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
         X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
             IP Address:2001:2c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
 Appendix A shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP
 content.
 As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure
 (PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are
 anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains.  In this
 scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by
 intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA.  In
 this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware nor
 can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the
 certificates.
 When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need
 to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their
 certificates) but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to
 the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote
 peer.  This chain of certificates SHOULD be sent in a CERT group as
 specified in Section 2.  The HIP peers validate each other's
 certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public
 keys.

4. Revocation of Certificates

 Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in
 Section 5 of [RFC5280] with two exceptions.  First, any HIP
 certificate serial number that appears on the Certificate Revocation
 List (CRL) is treated as invalid regardless of the reason code.
 Second, the certificateHold is not supported.

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

5. Error Signaling

 If the Initiator does not send all the certificates that the
 Responder requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g., reject the
 connection).  The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by
 sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type
 CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.
 If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal
 this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY
 message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
   NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES     Value
   ------------------------------------     -----
   CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED                      48
   The Responder is unwilling to set up an association,
   as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.
   INVALID_CERTIFICATE                       50
   Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate.
   Notification Data MAY contain a CERT group and CERT ID octet
   (in this order) of the CERT parameter that caused the
   failure.

6. IANA Considerations

 This document defines the CERT parameter for HIP [RFC7401].  The CERT
 parameter type number (768) is defined in [RFC7401].
 The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different
 certificate types, for which IANA has created and maintains a
 subregistry entitled "HIP Certificate Types" under "Host Identity
 Protocol (HIP) Parameters".  Values for the "HIP Certificate Types"
 registry are given in Section 2.  New values for the Certificate
 types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Review.
 In Section 5, this document defines two types for the "NOTIFY Message
 Types" subregistry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".
 As this document obsoletes [RFC6253], references to [RFC6253] in IANA
 registries have been replaced by references to this document.  This
 document changes the "HIP Certificate Types" registry in Section 2.

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

 The following updates to the "HIP Certificate Types" registry have
 been made.
    The references have been updated from [RFC6253] to this document.
    This document obsoleted the type numbers "2", "4", "6", and "8"
    for the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.

7. Security Considerations

 Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple
 consecutive packets.  This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer
 fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the
 wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet
 processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or
 memory).  Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard
 certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is
 scarce.
 Although the CERT parameter is allowed in the I1 packet, it is NOT
 RECOMMENDED because it can increase the processing times of I1s,
 which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s.  Furthermore,
 the Initiator has to take into consideration that the Responder can
 drop the CERT parameter in I1 without processing the parameter.
 Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service
 (DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
 Security considerations for X.509 v3 are discussed in [RFC5280].

8. Differences from RFC 6253

 This section summarizes the technical changes made from [RFC6253].
 This section is informational and is intended to help implementors of
 the previous protocol version.  If any text in this section
 contradicts text in other portions of this specification, the text
 found outside of this section should be considered normative.
 The following change has been made.
 o  Support for SPKI certificates has been removed.

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

9. References

9.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC4514]  Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
            (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
            RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4514>.
 [RFC4516]  Smith, M., Ed. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access
            Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC4516, June 2006,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4516>.
 [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
            Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
            Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
            (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
 [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
            Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
            (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
            2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
 [RFC7343]  Laganier, J. and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay
            Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers Version 2
            (ORCHIDv2)", RFC 7343, DOI 10.17487/RFC7343, September
            2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7343>.
 [RFC7401]  Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
            Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
            RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
 [X.690]    ITU-T, , "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
            Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
            Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
            (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690 | ISO/IEC 8825-1,
            August 2015.

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

9.2. Informative References

 [RFC6253]  Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
            Certificates", RFC 6253, DOI 10.17487/RFC6253, May 2011,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253>.

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

Appendix A. X.509 v3 Certificate Example

 This section shows an X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.
 Certificate:
     Data:
         Version: 3 (0x2)
         Serial Number: 12705268244493839545 (0xb0522e27291b2cb9)
     Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
         Issuer: DC=Example, DC=com, CN=Example issuing host
         Validity
             Not Before: Feb 25 11:28:29 2016 GMT
             Not After : Feb 24 11:28:29 2017 GMT
         Subject: DC=Example, DC=com, CN=Example issuing host
         Subject Public Key Info:
             Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                 Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                 Modulus:
                     00:c9:b0:85:94:af:1f:3a:77:39:c9:d5:81:a5:ee:
                     d2:b5:6b:72:91:5d:22:2c:1e:59:e5:06:29:bd:a2:
                     19:f6:ac:ca:eb:f7:88:d8:54:55:41:01:58:d8:87:
                     64:d8:c8:cf:6e:c2:38:81:22:1a:ae:e9:a6:80:22:
                     03:ee:f3:1b:7e:68:11:e3:f4:7b:98:33:28:bf:40:
                     ec:4f:19:e8:10:8a:8b:07:60:f7:9f:e4:82:f8:a7:
                     58:04:3d:42:07:c8:34:ca:99:6d:11:eb:73:c1:d9:
                     96:93:55:e5:c7:ed:80:4f:8a:f2:1a:6f:83:c8:15:
                     a4:8f:b8:6a:fe:f3:4f:49:1a:5c:1f:89:bb:30:e6:
                     98:bc:ce:a3:a2:37:85:b1:79:1c:26:e6:44:0c:b9:
                     3e:d8:37:81:46:f4:02:25:46:a2:ea:da:25:5c:46:
                     a2:a3:c5:58:80:53:1f:c5:e5:11:a0:da:d8:f2:ad:
                     d6:98:d4:ce:55:35:cc:0b:d3:5b:09:48:ef:57:65:
                     80:cb:65:79:fd:cb:4d:5b:b3:8d:1a:ff:2a:58:3e:
                     96:65:10:3e:04:81:78:2b:d5:ca:89:78:ea:28:5c:
                     bc:02:4a:54:cd:aa:a9:99:8d:d6:39:e9:5e:a9:73:
                     1a:5d:93:55:39:9b:72:1a:c2:a0:1f:e3:4c:b0:41:
                     98:97
                 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
         X509v3 extensions:
             X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
                 IP Address:2001:27:DCFC:CB8:F885:D53F:4E63:48B7
             X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
                 IP Address:2001:2D:F878:64C1:67E3:9716:88BD:68E4

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

     Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
          6d:e6:a9:a6:30:c4:ab:3e:86:39:1e:de:76:4d:4e:a4:2d:63:
          4d:bb:41:bf:d3:0c:66:13:8b:4d:b2:50:59:36:fc:ae:42:9e:
          c8:a0:41:1a:1c:94:56:05:28:82:34:4e:63:75:87:31:25:67:
          36:a6:1a:0f:b8:f7:db:03:e7:dd:a6:9a:26:c4:68:e2:cf:59:
          54:e6:ee:cc:a7:ce:fb:56:bf:31:60:f4:cb:e7:f0:0e:50:f8:
          b7:c5:3c:1a:de:74:d0:aa:83:e5:15:25:b1:bf:be:a4:7f:af:
          0a:de:08:09:0e:13:1d:2a:3b:1a:99:d9:af:10:fc:08:92:5f:
          d8:d0:10:d6:b9:0c:86:da:85:3b:44:b5:97:90:10:02:4f:5a:
          1f:ae:07:30:6b:f5:e6:12:93:72:e2:10:c9:8e:2c:00:8b:d6:
          f0:05:c3:ff:91:24:69:6d:5b:5a:0c:40:28:01:f2:5b:45:b8:
          9b:ae:9e:73:e9:dd:83:e0:85:d7:ad:6c:b1:81:ac:a0:30:37:
          9d:60:bd:92:3b:d2:a1:21:87:8b:c4:d9:5a:5c:21:56:3e:02:
          7e:f3:6f:a5:de:40:75:80:f5:41:68:5c:b2:61:fb:1d:9a:a5:
          97:a8:d4:a9:82:45:86:79:3c:63:76:3d:fd:86:a0:f8:14:84:
          55:c1:8c:fa
  1. —-BEGIN CERTIFICATE—–

MIIDWTCCAkGgAwIBAgIJALBSLicpGyy5MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAME0xFzAVBgoJ

 kiaJk/IsZAEZFgdFeGFtcGxlMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDY29tMR0wGwYDVQQD
 ExRFeGFtcGxlIGlzc3VpbmcgaG9zdDAeFw0xNjAyMjUxMTI4MjlaFw0xNzAyMjQx
 MTI4MjlaME0xFzAVBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFgdFeGFtcGxlMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQB
 GRYDY29tMR0wGwYDVQQDExRFeGFtcGxlIGlzc3VpbmcgaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZI
 hvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMmwhZSvHzp3OcnVgaXu0rVrcpFdIiweWeUG
 Kb2iGfasyuv3iNhUVUEBWNiHZNjIz27COIEiGq7ppoAiA+7zG35oEeP0e5gzKL9A
 7E8Z6BCKiwdg95/kgvinWAQ9QgfINMqZbRHrc8HZlpNV5cftgE+K8hpvg8gVpI+4
 av7zT0kaXB+JuzDmmLzOo6I3hbF5HCbmRAy5Ptg3gUb0AiVGouraJVxGoqPFWIBT
 H8XlEaDa2PKt1pjUzlU1zAvTWwlI71dlgMtlef3LTVuzjRr/Klg+lmUQPgSBeCvV
 yol46ihcvAJKVM2qqZmN1jnpXqlzGl2TVTmbchrCoB/jTLBBmJcCAwEAAaM8MDow
 GwYDVR0RBBQwEocQIAEAJ9z8DLj4hdU/TmNItzAbBgNVHRIEFDAShxAgAQAt+Hhk
 wWfjlxaIvWjkMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBt5qmmMMSrPoY5Ht52TU6kLWNN
 u0G/0wxmE4tNslBZNvyuQp7IoEEaHJRWBSiCNE5jdYcxJWc2phoPuPfbA+fdppom
 xGjiz1lU5u7Mp877Vr8xYPTL5/AOUPi3xTwa3nTQqoPlFSWxv76kf68K3ggJDhMd
 KjsamdmvEPwIkl/Y0BDWuQyG2oU7RLWXkBACT1ofrgcwa/XmEpNy4hDJjiwAi9bw
 BcP/kSRpbVtaDEAoAfJbRbibrp5z6d2D4IXXrWyxgaygMDedYL2SO9KhIYeLxNla
 XCFWPgJ+82+l3kB1gPVBaFyyYfsdmqWXqNSpgkWGeTxjdj39hqD4FIRVwYz6
 -----END CERTIFICATE-----

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 8002 HIP CERT October 2016

Acknowledgments

 The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu, and
 T. Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject.
 D. Mattes most notably contributed the non-HIP-aware use case in
 Section 3.

Authors' Addresses

 Tobias Heer
 Albstadt-Sigmaringen University
 Poststr. 6
 72458 Albstadt
 Germany
 Email: heer@hs-albsig.de
 Samu Varjonen
 University of Helsinki
 Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b
 00560 Helsinki
 Finland
 Email: samu.varjonen@helsinki.fi

Heer & Varjonen Standards Track [Page 13]

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