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rfc:rfc7717

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Pentikousis, Ed. Request for Comments: 7717 EICT Updates: 4656, 5357 E. Zhang Category: Standards Track Y. Cui ISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei Technologies

                                                         December 2015
                IKEv2-Derived Shared Secret Key for
        the One-Way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) and
            Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)

Abstract

 The One-Way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) and Two-Way Active
 Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) security mechanisms require that both
 the client and server endpoints possess a shared secret.  This
 document describes the use of keys derived from an IKEv2 security
 association (SA) as the shared key in OWAMP or TWAMP.  If the shared
 key can be derived from the IKEv2 SA, OWAMP or TWAMP can support
 certificate-based key exchange; this would allow for more operational
 flexibility and efficiency.  The key derivation presented in this
 document can also facilitate automatic key management.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7717.

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
 2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
 3.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
 4.  O/TWAMP Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.1.  O/TWAMP-Control Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.2.  O/TWAMP-Test Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.3.  O/TWAMP Security Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
 5.  O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.1.  Shared Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.2.  Server Greeting Message Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.3.  Set-Up-Response Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.4.  O/TWAMP over an IPsec Tunnel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
 6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
 7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
 8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
 Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
 Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

1. Introduction

 The One-Way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656] and the
 Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [RFC5357] can be used to
 measure network performance parameters such as latency, bandwidth,
 and packet loss by sending probe packets and monitoring their
 experience in the network.  In order to guarantee the accuracy of
 network measurement results, security aspects must be considered.
 Otherwise, attacks may occur and the authenticity of the measurement
 results may be violated.  For example, if no protection is provided,
 an adversary in the middle may modify packet timestamps, thus
 altering the measurement results.
 According to [RFC4656] and [RFC5357], the OWAMP and TWAMP (O/TWAMP)
 security mechanisms require that endpoints (i.e., both the client and
 the server) possess a shared secret.  In today's network deployments,
 however, the use of pre-shared keys is far from optimal.  For
 example, in wireless infrastructure networks, certain network
 elements (which can be seen as the two endpoints from an O/TWAMP
 perspective) support certificate-based security.  For instance,
 consider the case in which one wants to measure IP performance
 between an E-UTRAN Evolved Node B (eNB) and Security Gateway (SeGW),
 both of which are 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) nodes and support
 certificate mode and the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2
 (IKEv2).
 The O/TWAMP security mechanism specified in [RFC4656] and [RFC5357]
 supports the pre-shared key (PSK) mode only, hindering large-scale
 deployment of O/TWAMP: provisioning and management of "shared
 secrets" for massive deployments consumes a tremendous amount of
 effort and is prone to human error.  At the same time, recent trends
 point to wider IKEv2 deployment that, in turn, calls for mechanisms
 and methods that enable tunnel end-users, as well as operators, to
 measure one-way and two-way network performance in a standardized
 manner.
 With IKEv2 widely deployed, employing shared keys derived from an
 IKEv2 security association (SA) can be considered a viable
 alternative through the method described in this document.  If the
 shared key can be derived from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support
 certificate-based key exchange and practically increase operational
 flexibility and efficiency.  The use of IKEv2 also makes it easier to
 extend automatic key management.
 In general, O/TWAMP measurement packets can be transmitted inside the
 IPsec tunnel, as typical user traffic is, or transmitted outside the
 IPsec tunnel.  This may depend on the operator's policy and the
 performance evaluation goal, and it is orthogonal to the mechanism

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 described in this document.  When IPsec is deployed, protecting
 O/TWAMP traffic in unauthenticated mode using IPsec is one option.
 Another option is to protect O/TWAMP traffic using the O/TWAMP
 security established using the PSK derived from IKEv2 and bypassing
 the IPsec tunnel.
 Protecting unauthenticated O/TWAMP control and/or test traffic via
 the Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] or Encapsulating Security
 Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] cannot provide various security options,
 e.g., it cannot authenticate part of an O/TWAMP packet as mentioned
 in [RFC4656].  For measuring latency, a timestamp is carried in O/
 TWAMP test traffic.  The sender has to fetch the timestamp, encrypt
 it, and send it.  When the mechanism described in this document is
 used, partial authentication of O/TWAMP packets is possible and
 therefore the middle step can be skipped, potentially improving
 accuracy as the sequence number can be encrypted and authenticated
 before the timestamp is fetched.  The receiver obtains the timestamp
 without the need for the corresponding decryption step.  In such
 cases, protecting O/TWAMP traffic using O/TWAMP security but
 bypassing the IPsec tunnel has its advantages.
 This document specifies a method for enabling network measurements
 between a TWAMP client and a TWAMP server.  In short, the shared key
 used for securing TWAMP traffic is derived from IKEv2 [RFC7296].
 TWAMP implementations signal the use of this method by setting
 IKEv2Derived (see Section 7).  IKEv2-derived keys SHOULD be used
 instead of shared secrets when O/TWAMP is employed in a deployment
 using IKEv2.  From an operations and management perspective
 [RFC5706], the mechanism described in this document requires that
 both the TWAMP Control-Client and Server support IPsec.
 The remainder of this document is organized as follows.  Section 4
 summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security.
 Section 5 presents the method for binding TWAMP and IKEv2 for network
 measurements between the client and the server that both support
 IKEv2.  Finally, Section 6 discusses the security considerations
 arising from the proposed mechanisms.

2. Terminology

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

3. Scope

 This document specifies a method using keys derived from an IKEv2 SA
 as the shared key in O/TWAMP.  O/TWAMP implementations signal the use
 of this method by setting IKEv2Derived (see Section 7).

4. O/TWAMP Security

 Security for O/TWAMP-Control and O/TWAMP-Test are briefly reviewed in
 the following subsections.

4.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security

 O/TWAMP uses a simple cryptographic protocol that relies on
 o  AES-CBC for confidentiality
 o  HMAC-SHA1 truncated to 128 bits for message authentication
 Three modes of operation are supported in the OWAMP-Control protocol:
 unauthenticated, authenticated, and encrypted.  In addition to these
 modes, the TWAMP-Control protocol also supports a mixed mode, i.e.,
 the TWAMP-Control protocol operates in encrypted mode while TWAMP-
 Test protocol operates in unauthenticated mode.  The authenticated,
 encrypted, and mixed modes require that endpoints possess a shared
 secret, typically a passphrase.  The secret key is derived from the
 passphrase using a password-based key derivation function PBKDF2
 (PKCS #5) [RFC2898].
 In the unauthenticated mode, the security parameters are left unused.
 In the authenticated, encrypted, and mixed modes, the security
 parameters are negotiated during the control connection
 establishment.
 Figure 1 illustrates the initiation stage of the O/TWAMP-Control
 protocol between a Control-Client and a Server.  In short, the
 Control-Client opens a TCP connection to the Server in order to be
 able to send O/TWAMP-Control commands.  The Server responds with a
 Server Greeting, which contains the Modes, Challenge, Salt, Count,
 and MBZ ("MUST be zero") fields (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4656]).  If
 the Control-Client preferred mode is available, the client responds
 with a Set-Up-Response message, wherein the selected Mode, as well as
 the KeyID, Token, and Client initialization vector (IV) are included.
 The Token is the concatenation of a 16-octet Challenge, a 16-octet
 AES Session-key used for encryption, and a 32-octet HMAC-SHA1
 Session-key used for authentication.  The Token is encrypted using
 AES-CBC.

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 +----------------+                  +--------+
 | Control-Client |                  | Server |
 +----------------+                  +--------+
          |                               |
          |<------ TCP Connection-- ----->|
          |                               |
          |<------ Greeting message ------|
          |                               |
          |------- Set-Up-Response ------>|
          |                               |
          |<------ Server-Start ----------|
          |                               |
                Figure 1: Initiation of O/TWAMP-Control
 Encryption uses a key derived from the shared secret associated with
 KeyID.  In the authenticated, encrypted, and mixed modes, all further
 communication is encrypted using the AES Session-key and
 authenticated with the HMAC Session-key.  After receiving the Set-Up-
 Response, the Server responds with a Server-Start message containing
 the Server-IV.  The Control-Client encrypts everything it transmits
 through the just established O/TWAMP-Control connection using stream
 encryption with Client-IV as the IV.  Correspondingly, the Server
 encrypts its side of the connection using Server-IV as the IV.  The
 IVs themselves are transmitted in cleartext.  Encryption starts with
 the block immediately following that containing the IV.
 The AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key are generated randomly by
 the Control-Client.  The HMAC Session-key is communicated along with
 the AES Session-key during O/TWAMP-Control connection setup.  The
 HMAC Session-key is derived independently of the AES Session-key.

4.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security

 The O/TWAMP-Test protocol runs over UDP, using the Session-Sender and
 Session-Reflector IP and port numbers that were negotiated during the
 Request-Session exchange.  O/TWAMP-Test has the same mode with O/
 TWAMP-Control and all O/TWAMP-Test sessions inherit the corresponding
 O/TWAMP-Control session mode except when operating in mixed mode.
 The O/TWAMP-Test packet format is the same in authenticated and
 encrypted modes.  The encryption and authentication operations are,
 however, different.  Similarly, with the respective O/TWAMP-Control
 session, each O/TWAMP-Test session has two keys: an AES Session-key
 and an HMAC Session-key.  However, there is a difference in how the
 keys are obtained:

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 O/TWAMP-Control:  the keys are generated by the Control-Client and
         communicated to the Server during the control connection
         establishment with the Set-Up-Response message (as part of
         the Token).
 O/TWAMP-Test:  the keys are derived from the O/TWAMP-Control keys and
         the session identifier (SID), which serve as inputs to the
         key derivation function (KDF).  The O/TWAMP-Test AES Session-
         key is generated using the O/TWAMP-Control AES Session-key,
         with the 16-octet SID, for encrypting and decrypting the
         packets of the particular O/TWAMP-Test session.  The O/TWAMP-
         Test HMAC Session-key is generated using the O/TWAMP-Control
         HMAC Session-key, with the 16-octet SID, for authenticating
         the packets of the particular O/TWAMP-Test session.

4.3. O/TWAMP Security Root

 As discussed above, the O/TWAMP-Test AES Session-key and HMAC
 Session-key are derived, respectively, from the O/TWAMP-Control AES
 Session-key and HMAC Session-key.  The AES Session-key and HMAC
 Session-key used in the O/TWAMP-Control protocol are generated
 randomly by the Control-Client, and encrypted with the shared secret
 associated with KeyID.  Therefore, the security root is the shared
 secret key.  Thus, for large deployments, key provision and
 management may become overly complicated.  Comparatively, a
 certificate-based approach using IKEv2 can automatically manage the
 security root and solve this problem, as we explain in Section 5.

5. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks

 This section presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for
 network measurements between a client and a server that both support
 IPsec.  In short, the shared key used for securing O/TWAMP traffic is
 derived using IKEv2 [RFC7296].

5.1. Shared Key Derivation

 In the authenticated, encrypted, and mixed modes, the shared secret
 key MUST be derived from the IKEv2 SA.  Note that we explicitly opt
 to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 SA, rather than the
 child SA, since it is possible that an IKEv2 SA is created without
 generating any child SA [RFC6023].
 When the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SK_d must be
 generated first.  SK_d must be computed as per [RFC7296].

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows:
    Shared secret key = prf( SK_d, "IPPM" )
 Wherein the string "IPPM" is encoded in ASCII and "prf" is a
 pseudorandom function.
 It is recommended that the shared secret key is derived in the IPsec
 layer so that IPsec keying material is not exposed to the O/TWAMP
 client.  Note, however, that the interaction between the O/TWAMP and
 IPsec layers is host internal and implementation specific.
 Therefore, this is clearly outside the scope of this document, which
 focuses on the interaction between the O/TWAMP client and server.
 That said, one possible way could be the following: at the Control-
 Client side, the IPsec layer can perform a lookup in the Security
 Association Database (SAD) using the IP address of the Server and
 thus match the corresponding IKEv2 SA.  At the Server side, the IPsec
 layer can look up the corresponding IKEv2 SA by using the Security
 Parameter Indexes (SPIs) sent by the Control-Client (see
 Section 5.3), and therefore extract the shared secret key.
 If both the client and server do support IKEv2 but there is no
 current IKEv2 SA, two alternative ways could be considered.  First,
 the O/TWAMP Control-Client initiates the establishment of the IKEv2
 SA, logs this operation, and selects the mode that supports IKEv2.
 Alternatively, the O/TWAMP Control-Client does not initiate the
 establishment of the IKEv2 SA, logs an error for operational
 management purposes, and proceeds with the modes defined in
 [RFC4656], [RFC5357], and [RFC5618].  Again, although both
 alternatives are feasible, they are in fact implementation specific.
 If rekeying for the IKEv2 SA or deletion of the IKEv2 SA occurs, the
 corresponding shared secret key generated from the SA MUST continue
 to be used until the O/TWAMP session terminates.

5.2. Server Greeting Message Update

 To trigger a binding association between the key generated from IKEv2
 and the O/TWAMP shared secret key, the Modes field in the Server
 Greeting Message (Figure 2) must support key derivation as discussed
 in Section 5.1.  Support for deriving the shared key from the IKEv2
 SA is indicated by setting IKEv2Derived (see Section 7).  Therefore,
 when this method is used, the Modes value extension MUST be
 supported.

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |                       Unused (12 octets)                      |
 |                                                               |
 |+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           Modes                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |                     Challenge (16 octets)                     |
 |                                                               |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |                        Salt (16 octets)                       |
 |                                                               |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                        Count (4 octets)                       |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |                        MBZ (12 octets)                        |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                   Figure 2: Server Greeting Format
 The choice of this set of Modes values poses no backwards-
 compatibility problems to existing O/TWAMP clients.  Robust legacy
 Control-Client implementations would disregard the fact that the
 IKEv2Derived Modes bit in the Server Greeting is set.  On the other
 hand, a Control-Client implementing this method can identify that the
 O/TWAMP Server contacted does not support this specification.  If the
 Server supports other Modes, as one could assume, the Control-Client
 would then decide which Mode to use and indicate such accordingly as
 per [RFC4656] and [RFC5357].  A Control-Client that is implementing
 this method and decides not to employ IKEv2 derivation can simply
 behave as a client that is purely compatible with [RFC4656] and
 [RFC5357].

5.3. Set-Up-Response Update

 The Set-Up-Response message Figure 3 is updated as follows.  When an
 O/TWAMP Control-Client implementing this method receives a Server
 Greeting indicating support for Mode IKEv2Derived, it SHOULD reply to
 the O/TWAMP Server with a Set-Up-Response that indicates so.  For

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 example, a compatible O/TWAMP Control-Client choosing the
 authenticated mode with IKEv2 shared secret key derivation should set
 the Mode bits as per Section 7.
 0                   1                   2                   3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                            Mode                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |                      KeyID (80 octets)                        |
 |                                                               |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |                     Token (16 octets)                         |
 |                                                               |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |                    Client-IV (12 octets)                      |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                   Figure 3: Set-Up-Response Message
 The Security Parameter Index (SPI), as described in [RFC4301] and
 [RFC7296], uniquely identifies the SA.  If the Control-Client
 supports shared secret key derivation for the IKEv2 SA, it will
 choose the corresponding Mode value and carry SPIi and SPIr in the
 KeyID field.  SPIi and SPIr MUST be included in the KeyID field of
 the Set-Up-Response Message to indicate the IKEv2 SA from which the
 O/TWAMP shared secret key was derived.  The length of SPI is 8
 octets.  Therefore, the first 8 octets of the KeyID field MUST carry
 SPIi, and the second 8 octets MUST carry SPIr.  The remaining bits of
 the KeyID field MUST be set to zero.
 An O/TWAMP Server implementation MUST obtain the SPIi and SPIr from
 the first 16 octets and ignore the remaining octets of the KeyID
 field.  Then, the Control-Client and the Server can derive the shared
 secret key based on the Mode value and SPI.  If the O/TWAMP Server
 cannot find the IKEv2 SA corresponding to the SPIi and SPIr received,
 it MUST log the event for operational management purposes.  In
 addition, the O/TWAMP Server SHOULD set the Accept field of the
 Server-Start message to the value 6 to indicate that the Server is
 not willing to conduct further transactions in this O/TWAMP-Control
 session since it cannot find the corresponding IKEv2 SA.

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

5.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec Tunnel

 The IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and Encapsulating
 Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] provide confidentiality and data
 integrity to IP datagrams.  An IPsec tunnel can be used to provide
 the protection needed for O/TWAMP Control and Test packets, even if
 the peers choose the unauthenticated mode of operation.  In order to
 ensure authenticity and security, O/TWAMP packets between two IKEv2
 systems SHOULD be configured to use the corresponding IPsec tunnel
 running over an external network even when using the O/TWAMP
 unauthenticated mode.

6. Security Considerations

 As the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, the key
 derivation algorithm strength and limitations are as per [RFC7296].
 The strength of a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange using
 any of the groups defined here depends on the inherent strength of
 the group, the size of the exponent used, and the entropy provided by
 the random number generator employed.  The strength of all keys and
 implementation vulnerabilities, particularly denial-of-service (DoS)
 attacks are as defined in [RFC7296].

7. IANA Considerations

 During the production of this document, the authors and reviewers
 noticed that the TWAMP-Modes registry should describe a field of
 single bit position flags, rather than the existing registry
 construction with assignment of integer values.  In addition, the
 Semantics Definition column seemed to have spurious information in
 it.  The registry has been reformatted to simplify future
 assignments.  Thus, the contents of the TWAMP-Modes registry are as
 follows:
 Bit|Description                               |Semantics   |Reference
 Pos|                                          |Definition  |
 ---|------------------------------------------|------------|---------
 0   Unauthenticated                            Section 3.1  [RFC4656]
 1   Authenticated                              Section 3.1  [RFC4656]
 2   Encrypted                                  Section 3.1  [RFC4656]
 3   Unauth. TEST protocol, Encrypted CONTROL   Section 3.1  [RFC5618]
 4   Individual Session Control                              [RFC5938]
 5   Reflect Octets Capability                               [RFC6038]
 6   Symmetrical Size Sender Test Packet Format              [RFC6038]
                         Figure 4: TWAMP Modes

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 The new description and registry management instructions follow.
 Registry Specification: TWAMP-Modes are specified in TWAMP Server
 Greeting messages and Set-Up-Response messages consistent with
 Section 3.1 of [RFC5357].  Modes are indicated by setting single bits
 in the 32-bit Modes field.
 Registry Management: Because the "TWAMP-Modes" are based on only 32
 bit positions with each position conveying a unique feature, and
 because TWAMP is an IETF protocol, this registry must be updated only
 by "IETF Review" as specified in [RFC5226].  IANA SHOULD allocate
 monotonically increasing bit positions when requested.
 Experimental Numbers: No experimental bit positions are currently
 assigned in the Modes registry, as indicated in the initial contents
 above.
 In addition, per this document, a new entry has been added to the
 TWAMP-Modes registry:
 Bit|Description                               |Semantics   |Reference
 Pos|                                          |Definition  |
 ---|------------------------------------------|------------|---------
 7   IKEv2Derived Mode Capability               Section 5    RFC 7717
             Figure 5: TWAMP IKEv2-Derived Mode Capability
 For the new OWAMP-Modes registry, see the IANA Considerations in
 [RFC7718].

8. References

8.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC4656]  Shalunov, S., Teitelbaum, B., Karp, A., Boote, J., and M.
            Zekauskas, "A One-way Active Measurement Protocol
            (OWAMP)", RFC 4656, DOI 10.17487/RFC4656, September 2006,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4656>.
 [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
            IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 [RFC5357]  Hedayat, K., Krzanowski, R., Morton, A., Yum, K., and J.
            Babiarz, "A Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)",
            RFC 5357, DOI 10.17487/RFC5357, October 2008,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5357>.
 [RFC5618]  Morton, A. and K. Hedayat, "Mixed Security Mode for the
            Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)", RFC 5618,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5618, August 2009,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5618>.
 [RFC7296]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
            Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
            (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
            2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
 [RFC7718]  Morton, A., "Registries for the One-Way Active Measurement
            Protocol (OWAMP)", RFC 7718, DOI 10.17487/RFC7718,
            December 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7718>.

8.2. Informative References

 [RFC2898]  Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
            Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2898, September 2000,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2898>.
 [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
            Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
            December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
 [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4302>.
 [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
            RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
 [RFC5706]  Harrington, D., "Guidelines for Considering Operations and
            Management of New Protocols and Protocol Extensions",
            RFC 5706, DOI 10.17487/RFC5706, November 2009,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5706>.
 [RFC5938]  Morton, A. and M. Chiba, "Individual Session Control
            Feature for the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol
            (TWAMP)", RFC 5938, DOI 10.17487/RFC5938, August 2010,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5938>.

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

 [RFC6023]  Nir, Y., Tschofenig, H., Deng, H., and R. Singh, "A
            Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version
            2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6023, October 2010,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6023>.
 [RFC6038]  Morton, A. and L. Ciavattone, "Two-Way Active Measurement
            Protocol (TWAMP) Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size
            Features", RFC 6038, DOI 10.17487/RFC6038, October 2010,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6038>.

Acknowledgements

 We thank Eric Chen, Yaakov Stein, Brian Trammell, Emily Bi, John
 Mattsson, Steve Baillargeon, Spencer Dawkins, Tero Kivinen, Fred
 Baker, Meral Shirazipour, Hannes Tschofenig, Ben Campbell, Stephen
 Farrell, Brian Haberman, and Barry Leiba for their reviews, comments,
 and text suggestions.
 Al Morton deserves a special mention for his thorough reviews and
 text contributions to this document as well as the constructive
 discussions over several IPPM meetings.

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 7717 Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP December 2015

Authors' Addresses

 Kostas Pentikousis (editor)
 EICT GmbH
 EUREF-Campus Haus 13
 Torgauer Strasse 12-15
 10829 Berlin
 Germany
 Email: k.pentikousis@eict.de
 Emma Zhang
 Huawei Technologies
 Huawei Building, No.3, Rd. XinXi
 Haidian District, Beijing  100095
 China
 Email: emma.zhanglijia@huawei.com
 Yang Cui
 Huawei Technologies
 Otemachi First Square 1-5-1 Otemachi
 Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo  100-0004
 Japan
 Email: cuiyang@huawei.com

Pentikousis, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]

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