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rfc:rfc7592

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Richer, Ed. Request for Comments: 7592 Category: Experimental M. Jones ISSN: 2070-1721 Microsoft

                                                            J. Bradley
                                                         Ping Identity
                                                           M. Machulak
                                                  Newcastle University
                                                             July 2015
     OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol

Abstract

 This specification defines methods for management of OAuth 2.0
 dynamic client registrations for use cases in which the properties of
 a registered client may need to be changed during the lifetime of the
 client.  Not all authorization servers supporting dynamic client
 registration will support these management methods.

Status of This Memo

 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
 published for examination, experimental implementation, and
 evaluation.
 This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
 community.  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
 Task Force (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF
 community.  It has received public review and has been approved for
 publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not
 all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of
 Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7592.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 1] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   1.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   1.3.  Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
 2.  Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.1.  Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.2.  Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.3.  Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
 3.  Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
 4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
 5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
 6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
 7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
 Appendix A.  Registration Tokens and Client Credentials . . . . .  15
   A.1.  Credential Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
 Appendix B.  Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL  . . .  16
 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
 Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1. Introduction

 In order for an OAuth 2.0 client to utilize an OAuth 2.0
 authorization server, the client needs specific information to
 interact with the server, including an OAuth 2.0 client identifier to
 use with that server.  "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
 Protocol" [RFC7591] describes how an OAuth 2.0 client can be
 dynamically registered with an authorization server to obtain this
 information and how metadata about the client can be registered with
 the server.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 2] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 This specification extends the core registration specification by
 defining a set of methods for management of dynamic OAuth 2.0 client
 registrations beyond those defined in the core registration
 specification.  In some situations, the registered metadata of a
 client can change over time, either by modification at the
 authorization server or by a change in the client software itself.
 This specification provides methods for the current registration
 state of a client to be queried at the authorization server, methods
 for the registration of a client to be updated at the authorization
 server, and methods for the client to be unregistered from the
 authorization server.
 This Experimental RFC is intended to encourage development and
 deployment of interoperable solutions with the intent that feedback
 from this experience will inform a future standard.

1.1. Notational Conventions

 The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
 Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
 are case sensitive.

1.2. Terminology

 This specification uses the terms "access token", "authorization
 code", "authorization endpoint", "authorization grant",
 "authorization server", "client", "client identifier", "client
 secret", "grant type", "protected resource", "redirection URI",
 "refresh token", "resource owner", "resource server", "response
 type", and "token endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] and the
 terms defined by "OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration Protocol"
 [RFC7591].
 This specification defines the following terms:
 Client Configuration Endpoint
    OAuth 2.0 endpoint through which registration information for a
    registered client can be managed.  This URL for this endpoint is
    returned by the authorization server in the client information
    response.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 3] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 Registration Access Token
    OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token issued by the authorization server through
    the client registration endpoint that is used to authenticate the
    caller when accessing the client's registration information at the
    client configuration endpoint.  This access token is associated
    with a particular registered client.

1.3. Protocol Flow

 This extends the flow in "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
 Protocol" [RFC7591] as follows:
      +--------(A)- Initial Access Token (OPTIONAL)
      |
      |   +----(B)- Software Statement (OPTIONAL)
      |   |
      v   v
  +-----------+                                      +---------------+
  |           |--(C)- Client Registration Request -->|    Client     |
  |           |                                      | Registration  |
  |           |<-(D)- Client Information Response ---|   Endpoint    |
  |           |                                      +---------------+
  |           |
  |           |                                      +---------------+
  | Client or |--(E)- Read or Update Request ------->|               |
  | Developer |                                      |               |
  |           |<-(F)- Client Information Response ---|    Client     |
  |           |                                      | Configuration |
  |           |                                      |   Endpoint    |
  |           |                                      |               |
  |           |--(G)- Delete Request --------------->|               |
  |           |                                      |               |
  |           |<-(H)- Delete Confirmation -----------|               |
  +-----------+                                      +---------------+
 Figure 1: Abstract Extended Dynamic Client Registration Flow
 The abstract OAuth 2.0 client dynamic registration flow illustrated
 in Figure 1 describes the interaction between the client or developer
 and the endpoints defined in this specification and its parent.  This
 figure does not demonstrate error conditions.  This flow includes the
 following steps:
 (A)   Optionally, the client or developer is issued an initial access
       token for use with the client registration endpoint.  The
       method by which the initial access token is issued to the
       client or developer is out of scope for this specification.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 4] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 (B)   Optionally, the client or developer is issued a software
       statement for use with the client registration endpoint.  The
       method by which the software statement is issued to the client
       or developer is out of scope for this specification.
 (C)   The client or developer calls the client registration endpoint
       with its desired registration metadata, optionally including
       the initial access token from (A) if one is required by the
       authorization server.
 (D)   The authorization server registers the client and returns:
  • the client's registered metadata,
  • a client identifier that is unique to the server,
  • a set of client credentials such as a client secret, if

applicable for this client,

  • a URI pointing to the client configuration endpoint, and
  • a registration access token to be used when calling the

client configuration endpoint.

 (E)   The client or developer optionally calls the client
       configuration endpoint with a read or update request using the
       registration access token issued in (D).  An update request
       contains all of the client's registered metadata.
 (F)   The authorization server responds with the client's current
       configuration, potentially including a new registration access
       token and a new set of client credentials such as a client
       secret if applicable for this client.  If a new registration
       access token is issued, it replaces the token issued in (D) for
       all subsequent calls to the client configuration endpoint.
 (G)   The client or developer optionally calls the client
       configuration endpoint with a delete request using the
       registration access token issued in (D) or (F).
 (H)   The authorization server deprovisions the client and responds
       with a confirmation that the deletion has taken place.

2. Client Configuration Endpoint

 The client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected resource
 that is provisioned by the server to facilitate viewing, updating,
 and deleting a client's registered information.  The location of this

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 5] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 endpoint is communicated to the client through the
 "registration_client_uri" member of the client information response,
 as specified in Section 3.  The client MUST use its registration
 access token in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer
 Token [RFC6750].
 The client configuration endpoint MUST be protected by a transport-
 layer security mechanism, as described in Section 5.
 Operations on this endpoint are switched through the use of different
 HTTP methods [RFC7231].  If an authorization server does not support
 a particular method on the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
 respond with the appropriate error code.

2.1. Client Read Request

 To read the current configuration of the client on the authorization
 server, the client makes an HTTP GET request to the client
 configuration endpoint, authenticating with its registration access
 token.
 The following is a non-normative example request:
   GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
   Accept: application/json
   Host: server.example.com
   Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
 Upon successful read of the information for a currently active
 client, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 200 OK with
 content type of "application/json" and a payload as described in
 Section 3.  Some values in the response, including the
 "client_secret" and "registration_access_token", MAY be different
 from those in the initial registration response.  If the
 authorization server includes a new client secret and/or registration
 access token in its response, the client MUST immediately discard its
 previous client secret and/or registration access token.  The value
 of the "client_id" MUST NOT change from the initial registration
 response.
 If the registration access token used to make this request is not
 valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in the
 OAuth Bearer Token Usage specification [RFC6750].
 If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
 with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to
 make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 6] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 If the client does not have permission to read its record, the server
 MUST return an HTTP 403 Forbidden.

2.2. Client Update Request

 To update a previously registered client's registration with an
 authorization server, the client makes an HTTP PUT request to the
 client configuration endpoint with a content type of "application/
 json".  The HTTP entity payload is a JSON [RFC7159] document
 consisting of a JSON object and all parameters as top-level members
 of that JSON object.  This request is authenticated by the
 registration access token issued to the client.
 This request MUST include all client metadata fields as returned to
 the client from a previous registration, read, or update operation.
 The updated client metadata fields request MUST NOT include the
 "registration_access_token", "registration_client_uri",
 "client_secret_expires_at", or "client_id_issued_at" fields described
 in Section 3.
 Valid values of client metadata fields in this request MUST replace,
 not augment, the values previously associated with this client.
 Omitted fields MUST be treated as null or empty values by the server,
 indicating the client's request to delete them from the client's
 registration.  The authorization server MAY ignore any null or empty
 value in the request just as any other value.
 The client MUST include its "client_id" field in the request, and it
 MUST be the same as its currently issued client identifier.  If the
 client includes the "client_secret" field in the request, the value
 of this field MUST match the currently issued client secret for that
 client.  The client MUST NOT be allowed to overwrite its existing
 client secret with its own chosen value.
 For all metadata fields, the authorization server MAY replace any
 invalid values with suitable default values, and it MUST return any
 such fields to the client in the response.
 For example, a client could send the following request to the client
 registration endpoint to update the client registration in the above
 example with new information.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 7] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 The following is a non-normative example request:
   PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
   Accept: application/json
   Host: server.example.com
   Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
   {
    "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
    "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
    "redirect_uris": [
      "https://client.example.org/callback",
      "https://client.example.org/alt"],
    "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
    "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
    "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks",
    "client_name": "My New Example",
    "client_name#fr": "Mon Nouvel Exemple",
    "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/newlogo.png",
    "logo_uri#fr": "https://client.example.org/fr/newlogo.png"
   }
 This example uses client metadata values defined in [RFC7591].
 Upon successful update, the authorization server responds with an
 HTTP 200 OK message with content type "application/json" and a
 payload as described in Section 3.  Some values in the response,
 including the "client_secret" and "registration_access_token", MAY be
 different from those in the initial registration response.  If the
 authorization server includes a new client secret and/or registration
 access token in its response, the client MUST immediately discard its
 previous client secret and/or registration access token.  The value
 of the "client_id" MUST NOT change from the initial registration
 response.
 If the registration access token used to make this request is not
 valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in the
 OAuth Bearer Token Usage specification [RFC6750].
 If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
 with HTTP 401 Unauthorized, and the registration access token used to
 make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
 If the client is not allowed to update its records, the server MUST
 respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.

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 If the client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the
 authorization server does not set a default value, the authorization
 server responds with an error as described in [RFC7591].

2.3. Client Delete Request

 To deprovision itself on the authorization server, the client makes
 an HTTP DELETE request to the client configuration endpoint.  This
 request is authenticated by the registration access token issued to
 the client.
 The following is a non-normative example request:
   DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
   Host: server.example.com
   Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
 A successful delete action will invalidate the "client_id",
 "client_secret", and "registration_access_token" for this client,
 thereby preventing the "client_id" from being used at either the
 authorization endpoint or token endpoint of the authorization server.
 If possible, the authorization server SHOULD immediately invalidate
 all existing authorization grants and currently active access tokens,
 all refresh tokens, and all other tokens associated with this client.
 If a client has been successfully deprovisioned, the authorization
 server MUST respond with an HTTP 204 No Content message.
 If the server does not support the delete method, the server MUST
 respond with HTTP 405 Not Supported.
 If the registration access token used to make this request is not
 valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in the
 OAuth Bearer Token Usage specification [RFC6750].
 If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
 with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to
 make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked, if possible.
 If the client is not allowed to delete itself, the server MUST
 respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.
 The following is a non-normative example response:
   HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
   Cache-Control: no-store
   Pragma: no-cache

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3. Client Information Response

 This specification extends the client information response defined in
 "OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration" [RFC7591], which states that
 the response contains the client identifier (as well as the client
 secret if the client is a confidential client).  When used with this
 specification, the client information response also contains the
 fully qualified URL of the client configuration endpoint (Section 2)
 for this specific client that the client or developer may use to
 manage the client's registration configuration, as well as a
 registration access token that is to be used by the client or
 developer to perform subsequent operations at the client
 configuration endpoint.
 registration_client_uri
    REQUIRED.  String containing the fully qualified URL of the client
    configuration endpoint for this client.
 registration_access_token
    REQUIRED.  String containing the access token to be used at the
    client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations
    upon the client registration.
 Additionally, the authorization server MUST return all registered
 metadata about this client, including any fields provisioned by the
 authorization server itself.  The authorization server MAY reject or
 replace any of the client's requested metadata values submitted
 during the registration or update requests and substitute them with
 suitable values.
 The response is an "application/json" document with all parameters as
 top-level members of a JSON object [RFC7159].

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 10] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 The following is a non-normative example response:
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json
   Cache-Control: no-store
   Pragma: no-cache
   {
    "registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
    "registration_client_uri":
       "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3",
    "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
    "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
    "client_id_issued_at": 2893256800,
    "client_secret_expires_at": 2893276800,
    "client_name": "My Example Client",
    "client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
       "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
    "redirect_uris": [
      "https://client.example.org/callback",
      "https://client.example.org/callback2"],
    "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
    "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
    "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
    "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
   }

4. IANA Considerations

 This specification registers the following client metadata names and
 descriptions in the "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata"
 registry established by [RFC7591]:
 o  Client Metadata Name: "registration_access_token"
 o  Client Metadata Description: OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token used to access
    the client configuration endpoint
 o  Change Controller: IESG
 o  Specification Document(s): RFC 7592
 o  Client Metadata Name: "registration_client_uri"
 o  Client Metadata Description: Fully qualified URI of the client
    registration endpoint
 o  Change Controller: IESG

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 o  Specification Document(s): RFC 7592

5. Security Considerations

 While the client secret can expire, the registration access token
 SHOULD NOT expire while a client is still actively registered.  If
 this token were to expire, a developer or client could be left in a
 situation where they have no means of retrieving, updating, or
 deleting the client's registration information.  Were that the case,
 a new registration would be required, thereby generating a new client
 identifier.  However, to limit the exposure surface of the
 registration access token, the registration access token MAY be
 rotated when the developer or client does a read or update operation
 on the client's client configuration endpoint.  As the registration
 access tokens are relatively long-term credentials, and since the
 registration access token is a Bearer Token and acts as the sole
 authentication for use at the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
 be protected by the developer or client as described in the OAuth 2.0
 Bearer Token Usage specification [RFC6750].
 Since requests to the client configuration endpoint result in the
 transmission of clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and
 response), the authorization server MUST require the use of a
 transport-layer security mechanism when sending requests to the
 endpoint.  The server MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support
 additional transport-layer security mechanisms meeting its security
 requirements.  When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL
 server certificate check, per RFC 6125 [RFC6125].  Implementation
 security considerations can be found in Recommendations for Secure
 Use of TLS and DTLS [BCP195].
 Since possession of the registration access token authorizes the
 holder to potentially read, modify, or delete a client's registration
 (including its credentials such as a client_secret), the registration
 access token MUST contain sufficient entropy to prevent a random
 guessing attack of this token, such as described in Section 5.2 of
 [RFC6750] and Section 5.1.4.2.2 of [RFC6819].
 If a client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding
 registration access token for that client MUST be invalidated at the
 same time.  Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein
 a client could make requests to the client configuration endpoint
 where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail
 because the client is no longer valid.  The authorization server MUST
 treat all such requests as if the registration access token was
 invalid by returning an HTTP 401 Unauthorized error, as described.

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6. Privacy Considerations

 This specification poses no additional privacy considerations beyond
 those described in the core "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
 Protocol" [RFC7591].

7. Normative References

 [BCP195]   Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
            "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
            Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
            (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, May 2015,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>.
 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
            (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
 [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
            Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
            within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
            (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
            Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
            2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
 [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
            RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
 [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
            Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
 [RFC6819]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
            Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
 [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
            Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
            2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 13] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
            Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
 [RFC7591]  Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
            P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
            RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.

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Appendix A. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials

 Throughout the course of the dynamic registration protocol, there are
 three different classes of credentials in play, each with different
 properties and targets.
 o  The initial access token is optionally used by the client or
    developer at the registration endpoint.  This is an OAuth 2.0
    token that is used to authorize the initial client registration
    request.  The content, structure, generation, and validation of
    this token are out of scope for this specification.  The
    authorization server can use this token to verify that the
    presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients.  This
    token may be shared among multiple instances of a client to allow
    them to each register separately, thereby letting the
    authorization server use this token to tie multiple instances of
    registered clients (each with their own distinct client
    identifier) back to the party to whom the initial access token was
    issued, usually an application developer.  This token is usually
    intended to be used only at the client registration endpoint.
 o  The registration access token is used by the client or developer
    at the client configuration endpoint and represents the holder's
    authorization to manage the registration of a client.  This is an
    OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token that is issued from the client registration
    endpoint in response to a client registration request and is
    returned in a client information response.  The registration
    access token is uniquely bound to the client identifier and is
    required to be presented with all calls to the client
    configuration endpoint.  The registration access token should be
    protected as described in [RFC6750] and should not be shared
    between instances of a client.  If a registration access token is
    shared between client instances, one instance could change or
    delete registration values for all other instances of the client.
    The registration access token can be rotated through the use of
    the client read or update method on the client configuration
    endpoint.  The registration access token is intended to be used
    only at the client configuration endpoint.

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 o  The client credentials (such as "client_secret") are optional
    depending on the type of client and are used to retrieve OAuth
    tokens.  Client credentials are most often bound to particular
    instances of a client and should not be shared between instances.
    Note that since not all types of clients have client credentials,
    they cannot be used to manage client registrations at the client
    configuration endpoint.  The client credentials can be rotated
    through the use of the client read or update method on the client
    configuration endpoint.  The client credentials are intended to be
    used only at the token endpoint.

A.1. Credential Rotation

 The authorization server may be configured to issue new registration
 access tokens and/or client credentials (such as a "client_secret")
 throughout the lifetime of the client.  This may help minimize the
 impact of exposed credentials.  The authorization server conveys new
 registration access tokens and client credentials (if applicable) to
 the client in the client information response of either a read or
 update request to the client configuration endpoint.  The client's
 current registration access token and client credentials (if
 applicable) MUST be included in the client information response.
 The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only in response to a
 read or update request to the client configuration endpoint.  At this
 point, the new registration access token is returned to the client,
 the old registration access token MUST be discarded by the client,
 and it SHOULD be discarded by the server, if possible.  If, instead,
 the registration access token were to expire or be invalidated
 outside of such requests, the client or developer might be locked out
 of managing the client's configuration.
 Note that the authorization server decides the frequency of the
 credential rotation and not the client.  Methods by which the client
 can request credential rotation are outside the scope of this
 document.

Appendix B. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL

 The authorization server MUST provide the client with the fully
 qualified URL in the "registration_client_uri" element of the Client
 Information Response, as specified in Section 3.  The authorization
 server MUST NOT expect the client to construct or discover this URL
 on its own.  The client MUST use the URL as given by the server and
 MUST NOT construct this URL from component pieces.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 16] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

 Depending on deployment characteristics, the client configuration
 endpoint URL may take any number of forms.  It is RECOMMENDED that
 this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
 URL string that combines the client registration endpoint's URL and
 the issued "client_id" for this client, with the latter as either a
 path parameter or a query parameter.  For example, a client with the
 client identifier "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a client configuration
 endpoint URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3"
 (path parameter) or of "https://server.example.com/
 register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query parameter).  In both of these
 cases, the client simply uses the URL as given by the authorization
 server.
 These common patterns can help the server to more easily determine
 the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched
 against the client to which the registration access token was issued.
 If desired, the server MAY simply return the client registration
 endpoint URL as the client configuration endpoint URL and change
 behavior based on the authentication context provided by the
 registration access token.

Acknowledgments

 The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
 Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
 their input to this document.  In particular, the following
 individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
 to various draft versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Derek
 Atkins, Tim Bray, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, Vladimir
 Dzhuvinov, George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, Phil Hunt, William Kim,
 Torsten Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake, Tony
 Nadalin, Nat Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig.

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 17] RFC 7592 OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Registration Management July 2015

Authors' Addresses

 Justin Richer (editor)
 Email: ietf@justin.richer.org
 Michael B. Jones
 Microsoft
 Email: mbj@microsoft.com
 URI:   http://self-issued.info/
 John Bradley
 Ping Identity
 Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
 Maciej Machulak
 Newcastle University
 Email: maciej.machulak@gmail.com

Richer, et al. Experimental [Page 18]

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