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rfc:rfc7382

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kent Request for Comments: 7382 D. Kong BCP: 173 K. Seo Category: Best Current Practice BBN Technologies ISSN: 2070-1721 April 2015

       Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS)
                    for the Resource PKI (RPKI)

Abstract

 This document contains a template to be used for creating a
 Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is
 part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), e.g., a
 resource allocation registry or an ISP.

Status of This Memo

 This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 1] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

Table of Contents

 Preface ............................................................8
 1. Introduction ....................................................9
    1.1. Overview ..................................................10
    1.2. Document Name and Identification ..........................10
    1.3. PKI Participants ..........................................11
         1.3.1. Certification Authorities ..........................11
         1.3.2. Registration Authorities ...........................11
         1.3.3. Subscribers ........................................11
         1.3.4. Relying Parties ....................................11
         1.3.5. Other Participants .................................12
    1.4. Certificate Usage .........................................12
         1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses .......................12
         1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses ........................12
    1.5. Policy Administration .....................................12
         1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document ............12
         1.5.2. Contact Person .....................................12
         1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy ..12
         1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures ............................13
    1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................13
 2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................14
    2.1. Repositories ..............................................14
    2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................14
    2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................14
    2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................15
 3. Identification and Authentication ..............................15
    3.1. Naming ....................................................15
         3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................15
         3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................15
         3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........15
         3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........15
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................16
         3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of
                Trademarks .........................................16
    3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................16
         3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ..........16
         3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............16
         3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............17
         3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information ................17
         3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................17
         3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................17

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 2] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

    3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests .....18
         3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
                Routine Re-key .....................................18
         3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
                Re-key after Revocation ............................18
    3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..18
 4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements ................18
    4.1. Certificate Application ...................................18
         4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........18
         4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............19
    4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................19
         4.2.1. Performing Identification and
                Authentication Functions ...........................19
         4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..19
         4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........19
    4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................19
         4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............19
         4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
                Issuance of Certificate ............................20
         4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................20
    4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................20
         4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........20
         4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........20
         4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................20
    4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................20
         4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......20
         4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....21
    4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................21
         4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............21
         4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................21
         4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............22
         4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                Subscriber .........................................22
         4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                Renewal Certificate ................................22
         4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...22
         4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................22
    4.7. Certificate Re-key ........................................22
         4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key ................22
         4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..23
         4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests ..........23
         4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                Subscriber .........................................23

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 3] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

         4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                Re-keyed Certificate ...............................23
         4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA ..23
         4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................23
    4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................23
         4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........23
         4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........24
         4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......24
         4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate
                Issuance to Subscriber .............................24
         4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
                Certificate ........................................24
         4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..24
         4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................24
    4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................25
         4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................25
         4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................25
         4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................25
         4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................25
         4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the
                Revocation Request .................................25
         4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
                Parties ............................................25
         4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................26
         4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................26
    4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................26
 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................26
    5.1. Physical Controls .........................................26
         5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................26
         5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................26
         5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................26
         5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................26
         5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................26
         5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................26
         5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................26
         5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................26
    5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................27
         5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................27
         5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................27
         5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....27
         5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............27

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 4] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

    5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................27
         5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance
                Requirements .......................................27
         5.3.2. Background Check Procedures ........................27
         5.3.3. Training Requirements ..............................27
         5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements ..............27
         5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ................27
         5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .................27
         5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements ................27
         5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel ................27
    5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................28
         5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................28
         5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................28
         5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................28
         5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................28
         5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................28
         5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs.
                External) [OMITTED] ................................29
         5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED] ....29
         5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................29
    5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] ................................29
    5.6. Key Changeover ............................................29
    5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery ..........................29
    5.8. CA or RA Termination ......................................29
 6. Technical Security Controls ....................................29
    6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................29
         6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................29
         6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................30
         6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........30
         6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........30
         6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................30
         6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality
                Checking ...........................................30
         6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
                Usage Field) .......................................30
    6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
         Engineering Controls ......................................31
         6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........31
         6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control ......31
         6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................31
         6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................31
         6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................31
         6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
                Cryptographic Module ...............................31
         6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........31
         6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key ...................32

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 5] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

         6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key .................32
         6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key ..................32
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................32
    6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................32
         6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................32
         6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
                Pair Usage Periods .................................32
    6.4. Activation Data ...........................................32
         6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation ........32
         6.4.2. Activation Data Protection .........................32
         6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data ...................33
    6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................33
    6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls .............................33
         6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................33
         6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................33
         6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls .......................33
    6.7. Network Security Controls .................................33
    6.8. Time-Stamping .............................................33
 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................33
 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................34
 9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................34
    9.1. Fees ......................................................34
         9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ...............34
         9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED] ..................34
         9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access
                Fees [OMITTED] .....................................34
         9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable) ............34
         9.1.5. Refund Policy ......................................34
    9.2. Financial Responsibility ..................................34
         9.2.1. Insurance Coverage .................................34
         9.2.2. Other Assets .......................................34
         9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ....34
    9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information ...................34
         9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information ..................34
         9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of
                Confidential Information ...........................34
         9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential
                Information ........................................34
    9.4. Privacy of Personal Information ...........................34
         9.4.1. Privacy Plan .......................................34
         9.4.2. Information Treated as Private .....................35
         9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private .....................35
         9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information ......35
         9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information ......35
         9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or
                Administrative Process .............................35
         9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances .........35

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 6] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

    9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable) ..............35
    9.6. Representations and Warranties ............................35
         9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties ..................35
         9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties ..........35
         9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties .......35
    9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties .................................35
    9.8. Limitations of Liability ..................................35
    9.9. Indemnities ...............................................35
    9.10. Term and Termination .....................................35
         9.10.1. Term ..............................................35
         9.10.2. Termination .......................................35
         9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival ................35
    9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants ..35
    9.12. Amendments ...............................................35
         9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................35
         9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................35
    9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions ............................35
    9.14. Governing Law ............................................35
    9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law ...........................36
    9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions .................................36
         9.16.1. Entire Agreement ..................................36
         9.16.2. Assignment ........................................36
         9.16.3. Severability ......................................36
         9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of
                 Rights) ...........................................36
         9.16.5. Force Majeure .....................................36
 10. Security Considerations .......................................36
 11. References ....................................................37
    11.1. Normative References .....................................37
    11.2. Informative References ...................................37
 Acknowledgments ...................................................38
 Authors' Addresses ................................................38

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 7] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

Preface

 This RFC contains text intended for use as a template as designated
 below by the markers <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT>.
 Such Template Text is subject to the provisions of Section 9(b) of
 the Trust Legal Provisions.
 This document contains a template to be used for creating a
 Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is
 part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  (Throughout
 this document, the term "organization" is used broadly, e.g., the
 entity in question might be a business unit of a larger
 organization.)
 There is no expectation that a CPS will be published as an RFC.  An
 organization will publish the CPS in a manner appropriate for access
 by the users of the RPKI, e.g., on the organization's web site.  As a
 best current practice, organizations are expected to use this
 template instead of creating one from scratch.  This template
 contains both text that SHOULD appear in all Certification Practice
 Statements and places for text specific to the organization in
 question (indicated by <text in angle brackets>).
 The user of this document should:
 1. Extract the text between the <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and
    <END TEMPLATE TEXT> delimiters.
 2. Replace the instructions between the angle brackets with the
    required information.
 This document has been generated to complement the Certificate Policy
 (CP) for the RPKI [RFC6484].  Like RFC 6484, it is based on the
 template specified in RFC 3647 [RFC3647].  A number of sections
 contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did
 not apply to this PKI.  However, we have retained the section
 numbering scheme employed in that RFC to facilitate comparison with
 the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC and in RFC 6484.
 Conventions Used in This Document:
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 8] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

<BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT>

 <Create a title page saying, e.g., "<Name of organization>
 Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key
 Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.>
 <Create a table of contents.>

1. Introduction

 This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <name
 of organization>.  It describes the practices employed by the <name
 of organization> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public
 Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  These practices are defined in accordance
 with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] for
 the RPKI.
 The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
 holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs) (Section 1.6) in
 accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in
 this PKI.  The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring
 the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources.
 This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy.  These
 resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
 (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).  In some regions,
 National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy
 below the RIRs for INR distribution.  Internet Service Providers
 (ISPs) and network subscribers form additional tiers below
 registries.
 Conventions Used in This Document:
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 9] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

1.1. Overview

 This CPS describes:
 o  Participants
 o  Publication of the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists
    (CRLs)
 o  How certificates are issued, managed, re-keyed, renewed, and
    revoked
 o  Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
 o  Key management
 o  Audit procedures
 o  Business and legal issues
 This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [RFC6480] for
 more details):
 o  CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
    each subscriber INR holder.
 o  End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate
    digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in
    Section 1.6).
 o  In the future, the PKI also may include end-entity certificates in
    support of access control for the repository system as described
    in Section 2.4.

1.2. Document Name and Identification

 The name of this document is "<Name of organization> Certification
 Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
 (RPKI)".  <If this document is available via the Internet, the CA can
 provide the URI for the CPS here.  It SHOULD be the same URI as the
 URI that appears as a policy qualifier in the CA certificate for the
 CA, if the CA elects to make use of that feature.>

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 10] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

1.3. PKI Participants

 Note that in a PKI the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
 organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA.  The
 term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
 qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
 the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
 service from an ISP.  In such cases, the term "network subscriber"
 will be used.  Also note that, for brevity, this document always
 refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
 some of them are individuals.

1.3.1. Certification Authorities

 <Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI.  One approach
 is to operate two CAs: one designated "offline" and the other
 designated "production".  The offline CA is the top-level CA for the
 <name of organization> portion of the RPKI.  It provides a secure
 revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is
 compromised or becomes unavailable.  Thus, the offline CA issues
 certificates only to instances of the production CA, and the CRLs it
 issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production
 CA.  The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <name of
 organization> members, to whom INRs have been distributed.>

1.3.2. Registration Authorities

 <Describe how the Registration Authority (RA) function is handled for
 the CA(s) that you operate.  The RPKI does not require establishment
 or use of a separate Registration Authority in addition to the CA
 function.  The RA function MUST be provided by the same entity
 operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1.  An entity
 acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with
 each organization to which it distributes INRs.  These organizations
 already perform the RA function implicitly, since they already assume
 responsibility for distributing INRs.>

1.3.3. Subscribers

 Organizations receiving INR allocations from this CA are subscribers
 in the RPKI.

1.3.4. Relying Parties

 Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or
 RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.
 Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI.
 (See Section 1.6 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 11] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

1.3.5. Other Participants

 <Specify one or more entities that operate a repository holding
 certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects issued by this
 organization, and provide a URL for the repository.>

1.4. Certificate Usage

1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses

 The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
 support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
 Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
 cited above, are also permitted under RFC 6484.
 Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be
 used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access
 control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4.  Such
 uses also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.

1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses

 Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.

1.5. Policy Administration

1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document

 This CPS is administered by <name of organization>.  <Include the
 mailing address, email address, and similar contact info here.>

1.5.2. Contact Person

 <Insert organization contact info here.>

1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

 Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
 is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
 key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  The issuing
 organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
 distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the
 accuracy of this binding.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 12] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures

 Not applicable.  Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI
 is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private
 key corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  The issuing
 organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the
 distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the
 accuracy of this binding.

1.6. Definitions and Acronyms

 BPKI   Business PKI.  A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an
        organization to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can
        be issued.  If a BPKI is employed by a CA, it may have its own
        CP, separate from the RPKI CP.
 CP     Certificate Policy.  A CP is a named set of rules that
        indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
        community and/or class of applications with common security
        requirements.  The CP for the RPKI is [RFC6484].
 CPS    Certification Practice Statement.  A CPS is a document that
        specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs
        in issuing certificates.
 Distribution of INRs   A process of distribution of the INRs along
        the respective number hierarchy.  IANA distributes blocks of
        IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to the five
        Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).  RIRs distribute smaller
        address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations
        within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP
        addresses to their customers.
 IANA   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.  IANA is responsible for
        global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing
        systems and ASNs used for routing Internet traffic.  IANA
        distributes INRs to RIRs.
 INRs   Internet Number Resources.  INRs are number values for three
        protocol parameter sets, namely:
        o  IP version 4 addresses,
        o  IP version 6 addresses, and
        o  Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing,
           currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 ASNs.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 13] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

 ISP    Internet Service Provider.  An ISP is an organization managing
        and selling Internet services to other organizations.
 NIR    National Internet Registry.  An NIR is an organization that
        manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
        geopolitical area covered by a Regional Internet Registry.
        NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to
        manage INR distribution.
 RIR    Regional Internet Registry.  An RIR is an organization that
        manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
 RPKI-signed object   An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data
        object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such
        an object by a Standards Track RFC.  An RPKI-signed object can
        be validated using certificates issued under this PKI.  The
        content and format of these data constructs depend on the
        context in which validation of claims of current holdings of
        INRs takes place.  Examples of these objects are repository
        manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
        [RFC6482].

2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

 As per the CP, certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects MUST be
 made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them
 to validate this data.
 The <name of organization> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs,
 and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via
 <insert IETF-designated protocol name here> at <insert URL here>.
 This repository will conform to the structure described in [RFC6481].

2.2. Publication of Certification Information

 <Name of organization> will publish certificates, CRLs, and
 RPKI-signed objects issued by it to a repository that operates as
 part of a worldwide distributed system of RPKI repositories.

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

 <Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global
 repository system) of the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects
 that you issue.  If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data,
 you still need to provide this information for relying parties.  This
 MUST include the period of time within which a certificate will be

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 14] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

 published after the CA issues the certificate, and the period of time
 within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked
 certificate, after the CA revokes that certificate.>
 The <name of organization> CA will publish its CRL prior to the
 nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.

2.4. Access Controls on Repositories

 <Describe the access controls used by the organization to ensure that
 only authorized parties can modify repository data, and any controls
 used to mitigate denial-of-service attacks against the repository.
 If the organization offers repository services to its subscribers,
 then describe here the protocol(s) that it supports for publishing
 signed objects from subscribers.>

3. Identification and Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of Names

 The subject of each certificate issued by this organization is
 identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN).  The distinguished
 name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value
 generated by <name of organization>.  Optionally, the serialNumber
 attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a
 terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among
 successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity.

3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful

 The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful", in
 the conventional, human-readable sense.  The rationale here is that
 these certificates are used for authorization in support of
 applications that make use of attestations of INR holdings.  They are
 not used to identify subjects.

3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

 Although Subject names in certificates issued by this organization
 SHOULD NOT be meaningful and may appear "random", anonymity is not a
 function of this PKI; thus, no explicit support for this feature is
 provided.

3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

 None

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 15] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names

 <Name of organization> certifies Subject names that are unique among
 the certificates that it issues.  Although it is desirable that these
 Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate
 path discovery, such uniqueness is not required, nor is it enforced
 through technical means.  <Name of organization> generates Subject
 names to minimize the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
 assigned the same name.  Specifically, <insert Subject name
 generation description here, or cite RFC 6487>.

3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks

 Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, <name of
 organization> makes no provision either to recognize or to
 authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc.

3.2. Initial Identity Validation

3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key

 <Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to
 demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key
 corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to
 certificate issuance.>

3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity

 Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the
 organizational identity of subscribers.  However, certificates are
 issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of
 distributions of INRs as represented in <name of organization>
 records.
 <Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each RPKI
 certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with
 regard to the organization to which you have distributed (or
 sub-distributed) the INRs identified in the certificate.  For
 example, a BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a
 certificate request that serves as a link to the <name of
 organization> subscriber database that maintains the INR distribution
 records.  The certificate request could be matched against the
 database record for the subscriber in question, and an RPKI
 certificate would be issued only if the INRs requested were a subset
 of those held by the subscriber.  The specific procedures employed
 for this purpose should be commensurate with any you already employ
 in the maintenance of INR distribution.>

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 16] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity

 Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual
 identity of a subscriber.  However, <name of organization> maintains
 contact information for each subscriber in support of certificate
 renewal, re-key, and revocation.
 <Describe the procedures that are used to identify at least one
 individual as a representative of each subscriber.  This is done in
 support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate
 issued to the organization.  For example, one might say "The <name of
 organization> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST
 be used to identify individuals who represent <name of organization>
 subscribers."  The procedures should be commensurate with those you
 already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for
 INR holders.  Note that this authentication is solely for use by you
 in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or
 sub-distribute) INRs and thus MUST NOT be relied upon outside of this
 CA/subscriber relationship.>

3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information

 No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued
 under this certificate policy except for Subject Information Access
 (SIA) extensions [RFC6487].

3.2.5. Validation of Authority

 <Describe the procedures used to verify that an individual claiming
 to represent a subscriber is authorized to represent that subscriber
 in this context.  For example, one could say "Only an individual to
 whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been issued may
 request issuance of an RPKI certificate.  Each certificate issuance
 request is verified using the BPKI."  The procedures should be
 commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating
 individuals as representatives of subscribers.>

3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

 The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
 other PKI.  <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business
 purposes, e.g., a BPKI, then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is
 used to authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their
 resource distributions.>

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 17] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests

3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-key

 <Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and
 the manner by which it is requested.  Describe the procedures that
 are used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the
 legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed.  State the
 approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the
 new public key.  If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is
 used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>

3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-key after Revocation

 <Describe the procedures used to ensure that an organization
 requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the
 INRs in the certificate being re-keyed.  This MUST also include the
 method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to
 the new public key.  If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is
 used to authenticate re-key requests.  With respect to authentication
 of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those
 you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records.>

3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

 <Describe the procedures used by an RPKI subscriber to make a
 revocation request.  Describe the manner by which it is ensured that
 the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of the
 certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked.
 Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the
 legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as
 opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key.  These
 procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in
 the maintenance of subscriber records.>

4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

 Any subscriber in good standing who holds INRs distributed by <name
 of organization> may submit a certificate application to this CA.
 (The exact meaning of "in good standing" is in accordance with the
 policy of <name of organization>.)

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 18] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

 <Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for
 initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process.  Note that
 most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your
 normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and
 thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be
 necessary.  If so, reference should be made to where these practices
 are documented.>

4.2. Certificate Application Processing

 <Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will
 employ.  You should make use of existing standards for certificate
 application processing (see [RFC6487]).>

4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

 <Describe your practices for identification and authentication of
 certificate applicants.  Often, existing practices employed by you to
 identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis for
 issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  Reference can be made
 to documentation of such existing practices.>

4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

 <Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications,
 and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to
 this process.  Note that according to the CP, certificate
 applications will be approved based on the normal business practices
 of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of
 subscribers.  The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedure
 specified in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the
 private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the
 certificate the CA issues to the requester.>

4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications

 <Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate
 applications.>

4.3. Certificate Issuance

4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

 <Describe your procedures for issuance and publication of a
 certificate.>

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 19] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

 <Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the
 certificate is published.  <Describe here your procedures for
 notifying a subscriber when a certificate has been published.>

4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 <Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a
 certificate is published.>

4.4. Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

 When a certificate is issued, the <name of organization> CA will
 publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber.  <This may be
 done without subscriber review and acceptance.  State your policy
 with respect to subscriber certificate acceptance here.>

4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA

 Certificates will be published at <insert repository URL here> once
 issued, following the conduct described in Section 4.4.1.  This will
 be done within <specify the time frame within which the certificate
 will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will be
 notified>.  <Describe any additional procedures with respect to
 publication of the certificate here.>

4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 <Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a
 certificate is published.>

4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage

 A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

 The certificates issued by <name of organization> to subordinate INR
 holders are CA certificates.  The private key associated with each of
 these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE)
 certificates and CRLs.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 20] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

 The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations that use
 RPKI EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects.  Relying parties
 are referred to Section 4.5.2 of [RFC6484] for additional guidance
 with respect to acts of reliance on RPKI certificates.

4.6. Certificate Renewal

4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

 As per RFC 6484, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on
 its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate
 Subject.  The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing a
 resource holding agreement, or explicit.  If <name of organization>
 initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
 date, then <name of organization> will notify the subscriber <insert
 the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in advance of the
 expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in conjunction with
 notification of service expiration">.  The validity interval of the
 new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous
 certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to
 ensure uninterrupted coverage.
 Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the
 previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
 compromised (see Section 4.9.1).  If a new key pair is being used,
 the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply.

4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal

 The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the renewal
 process.  <For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures
 that will be used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate
 holder of the INRs in the certificate being renewed.  This MUST also
 include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key
 corresponding to the public key in the certificate being renewed or
 the new public key if the public key is being changed.  With respect
 to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be
 commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR
 distribution records.  If you operate a BPKI for this, describe how
 that business-based PKI is used to authenticate renewal requests, and
 refer to Section 3.2.6.>

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 21] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

 <Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests.
 Describe how you verify that the requester is the subscriber or is
 authorized by the subscriber, and that the certificate in question
 has not been revoked.>

4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

 <Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the
 certificate is published.  <Describe your procedure for notification
 of new certificate issuance to the subscriber.  This should be
 consistent with Section 4.3.2.>

4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

 See Section 4.4.1.  <If you employ a different policy from that
 specified in Section 4.4.1, describe it here.>

4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

 See Section 4.4.2.

4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 See Section 4.4.3.

4.7. Certificate Re-key

4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key

 As per RFC 6484, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when
 required, based on:
 1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
    private key, or
 2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
    pair
 If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the
 replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a
 new key.
 If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
 certificate will be revoked.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 22] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

 Only the holder of a certificate may request a re-key.  In addition,
 <name of organization> may initiate a re-key based on a verified
 compromise report.  <If the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests
 the re-key, describe how authentication is effected, e.g., using the
 <name of registry> BPKI.  Describe how a compromise report received
 from other than a subscriber is verified.>

4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests

 <Describe your process for handling re-keying requests.  As per the
 RPKI CP, this should be consistent with the process described in
 Section 4.3, so reference can be made to that section.>

4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

 <Describe your policy for notifying the subscriber regarding
 availability of the new re-keyed certificate.  This should be
 consistent with the notification process for any new certificate
 issuance (see Section 4.3.2).>

4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate

 When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the
 repository and notify the subscriber.  See Section 4.4.1.

4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA

 <Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate.
 This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
 certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>

4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 See Section 4.4.3.

4.8. Certificate Modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification

 As per RFC 6484, modification of a certificate occurs to implement
 changes to the RFC 3779 extension values or the SIA extension in a
 certificate.  A subscriber can request a certificate modification
 when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed,
 as a result of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber, or as a
 result of change of the repository publication point data.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 23] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

 If a subscriber is to receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a
 current distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a
 new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then
 this is accomplished through a certificate modification.  When a
 certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued.
 The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same
 expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental
 information corrected and/or the INR distribution expanded.  When
 previously distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate,
 then the old certificate will be revoked and a new certificate
 (reflecting the new distribution) issued.

4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification

 The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the certificate
 modification process.  <For the case of the subscriber, state here
 what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of
 the entity requesting the modification.>

4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests

 <Describe your procedures for verification of the modification
 request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate.  These
 should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2
 and 4.3.1.>

4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

 <Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the
 issuance of a modified certificate.  This should be consistent
 with the notification process for any new certificate (see
 Section 4.3.2).>

4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

 When a modified certificate is issued, <name of organization> will
 publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber.  See
 Section 4.4.1.

4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

 <Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate.
 This should be consistent with the publication process for any new
 certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>

4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 See Section 4.4.3.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 24] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation

 As per RFC 6484, certificates can be revoked for several reasons.
 Either <name of organization> or the subject may choose to end the
 relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to
 revoke the certificate.  If one or more of the INRs bound to the
 public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the
 subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation.  A certificate
 also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key
 corresponding to the public key in the certificate.  Finally, a
 certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the
 private key associated with that certificate.

4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation

 The subscriber or <name of organization> may request a revocation.
 <For the case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to
 verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the
 revocation.>

4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request

 <Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request.
 This should include:
 o  Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation.
 o  Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation
    is initiated by <name of organization>.>

4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period

 A subscriber is required to request revocation as soon as possible
 after the need for revocation has been identified.

4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

 <Describe your policy on the time period within which you will
 process a revocation request.>

4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

 As per RFC 6484, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and
 checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
 certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 25] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency

 <State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.>
 Each CRL contains a nextUpdate value, and a new CRL will be published
 at or before that time.  <Name of organization> will set the
 nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next
 scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs

 A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the
 maximum latency> after generation.

4.10. Certificate Status Services

 <Name of organization> does not support the Online Certificate Status
 Protocol (OCSP) or the Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
 (SCVP).  <Name of organization> issues CRLs.

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1. Physical Controls

 <As per RFC 6484, describe the physical controls that you employ for
 certificate management.  These should be commensurate with those used
 in the management of INR distribution.>

5.1.1. Site Location and Construction

5.1.2. Physical Access

5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning

5.1.4. Water Exposures

5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection

5.1.6. Media Storage

5.1.7. Waste Disposal

5.1.8. Off-Site Backup

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 26] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

5.2. Procedural Controls

 <As per RFC 6484, describe the procedural security controls that you
 employ for certificate management.  These should be commensurate with
 those used in the management of INR distribution.>

5.2.1. Trusted Roles

5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task

5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role

5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

5.3. Personnel Controls

 <As per RFC 6484, describe the personnel security controls that you
 employ for individuals associated with certificate management.  These
 should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR
 distribution.>

5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance Requirements

5.3.2. Background Check Procedures

5.3.3. Training Requirements

5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements

5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions

5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements

5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 27] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

5.4. Audit Logging Procedures

 <As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how
 you implement audit logging.>

5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded

 Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the
 Certification Authority computing equipment.  Audit records will
 include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
 content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:
 o  Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
 o  Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate
    requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
    notifications)
 o  Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
 o  Posting of any material to a repository
 o  Any attempts to change or delete audit data
 o  Key generation
 o  Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
 o  Clock adjustments
 <List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>

5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log

 <Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>

5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log

 <Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>

5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log

 <Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>

5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures

 <Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 28] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs. External) [OMITTED]

5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED]

5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments

 <Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have
 already applied) to the PKI subsystems.  This should include whether
 such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to
 perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>

5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED]

5.6. Key Changeover

 The <name of organization> CA certificate will contain a validity
 period that is at least as long as that of any certificate being
 issued under that certificate.  When <name of organization> CA
 changes keys, it will follow the procedures described in [RFC6489].

5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery

 <Describe your plans for dealing with CA key compromise and how you
 plan to continue/restore operation of your RPKI CA in the event of a
 disaster.>

5.8. CA or RA Termination

 <Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions
 in case of its own termination.>

6. Technical Security Controls

 This section describes the security controls used by <name of
 organization>.

6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1. Key Pair Generation

 <Describe the procedures used to generate the CA key pair and, if
 applicable, key pairs for subscribers.  In most instances, public-key
 pairs will be generated by the subscriber, i.e., the organization
 receiving the distribution of INRs.  However, your procedures may
 include one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if
 they so request.>

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 29] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

 <If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include providing key pair
 generation services for subscribers, describe the means by which
 private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion.
 Otherwise, say this is not applicable.>

6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

 <Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's
 public keys to the <name of organization> RPKI CA.  These procedures
 MUST ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit
 and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to
 the transferred public key.>  See RFC 6487 for details.

6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

 CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
 contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published
 to the RPKI repository system.  Relying parties will download these
 certificates from this system.  Public key values and associated data
 for (putative) trust anchors will be distributed out of band and
 accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally defined criteria,
 e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made
 available to the Internet community.

6.1.5. Key Sizes

 The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485].

6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality Checking

 The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as
 specified in [RFC6485].
 <If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair
 generation, EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is
 responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and
 saying that <name of organization> is not responsible for performing
 such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA
 for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>

6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

 The KeyUsage extension bit values employed in RPKI certificates are
 specified in [RFC6487].

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 30] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering

    Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

 <Describe the standards and controls employed for the CA
 cryptographic module, e.g., it was evaluated under FIPS 140-2/3, at
 level 2 or 3.  See [FIPS] for details.>

6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control

 <If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
 your CA's private keys, then insert the following text.  "There will
 be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
 control.">

6.2.3. Private Key Escrow

 <No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI, but if
 the CA chooses to employ escrow, state so here.>

6.2.4. Private Key Backup

 <Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key.
 The following aspects should be included.  (1) The copying should be
 done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling
 the original private key.  (2) At least one copy should be kept at an
 off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>

6.2.5. Private Key Archival

 See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.

6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

 The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if
 appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs">
 will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in
 Section 6.2.1.  The private keys will never leave the module except
 in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.

6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

 The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if
 appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs">
 will be stored in the cryptographic module.  It will be protected
 from unauthorized use <say how here>.

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6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key

 <Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private
 key.>

6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key

 <Describe the process and procedure for private key deactivation
 here.>

6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key

 <Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g.,
 when it is superseded.  This will depend on the particular module.>

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

 <Describe the rating of the cryptographic module used by the CA, if
 applicable.>

6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1. Public Key Archival

 <Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
 to archive public keys.  If keys are not archived, say so.  If they
 are, describe the archive processes and procedures.>

6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

 The <name of organization> CA's key pair will have a validity
 interval of <insert number of years>.  <These key pairs and
 certificates should have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g.,
 10 years, to minimize the disruption caused by key changeover.  Note
 that the CA's key lifetime is under the control of its issuer, so the
 CPS MUST reflect the key lifetime imposed by the issuer.>

6.4. Activation Data

6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation

 <Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>

6.4.2. Activation Data Protection

 Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <describe
 your procedures here>.

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6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data

 <Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the
 activation data for your CA.  If there are none, say "None".>

6.5. Computer Security Controls

 <Describe your security requirements for the computers used to
 support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit
 capabilities, etc.  These requirements should be commensurate with
 those used for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>

6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1. System Development Controls

 <Describe any system development controls that apply to the PKI
 systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology (TSDM).>

6.6.2. Security Management Controls

 <Describe the security management controls that will be used for the
 RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA.  These security
 measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used
 by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>

6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls

 <Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI
 functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated.  This
 should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which
 equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled.>

6.7. Network Security Controls

 <Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA
 operation.  These should be commensurate with the network security
 controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution of
 INRs.>

6.8. Time-Stamping

 The RPKI does not make use of time-stamping.

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

 See [RFC6487].

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8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

 <List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the
 security of the administration of INRs.  These are sufficient for the
 RPKI systems.  However, additional forms of security assessments are
 a good idea and should be listed if performed.>

9. Other Business and Legal Matters

 <The sections below are optional.  Fill them in as appropriate for
 your organization.  The CP says that CAs should cover Sections 9.1
 to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.16, although not every CA will choose to do so.
 Note that the manner in which you manage your business and legal
 matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you
 manage business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>

9.1. Fees

9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED]

9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees [OMITTED]

9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable)

9.1.5. Refund Policy

9.2. Financial Responsibility

9.2.1. Insurance Coverage

9.2.2. Other Assets

9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities

9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information

9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information

9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of Confidential Information

9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential Information

9.4. Privacy of Personal Information

9.4.1. Privacy Plan

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 34] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

9.4.2. Information Treated as Private

9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private

9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information

9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information

9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process

9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances

9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable)

9.6. Representations and Warranties

9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties

9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties

9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties

9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties

9.8. Limitations of Liability

9.9. Indemnities

9.10. Term and Termination

9.10.1. Term

9.10.2. Termination

9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival

9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment

9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period

9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions

9.14. Governing Law

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 35] RFC 7382 Template CPS for the RPKI April 2015

9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law

9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions

9.16.1. Entire Agreement

9.16.2. Assignment

9.16.3. Severability

9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of Rights)

9.16.5. Force Majeure

<END TEMPLATE TEXT>

10. Security Considerations

 The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
 a certificate depends on several factors.  These factors can include
 o  the practices followed by the Certification Authority (CA) in
    authenticating the subject
 o  the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security
    controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities
    (for example, in protecting the private key)
 o  the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of
    the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and
    limitations of liability)
 This document provides a framework to address the technical,
 procedural, personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification
 Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and
 relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the
 certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and
 revocation are done in a secure manner.  Specifically, the following
 sections are oriented towards ensuring the secure operation of the
 PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and
 relying party systems:
    Section 3 ("Identification and Authentication" (I&A))
    Section 4 ("Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements")
    Section 5 ("Facility, Management, and Operational Controls")
    Section 6 ("Technical Security Controls")
    Section 7 ("Certificate and CRL Profiles")
    Section 8 ("Compliance Audit and Other Assessments")

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11. References

11.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC6484]  Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
            Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
            (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.
 [RFC6485]  Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
            Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
            RFC 6485, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/
            info/rfc6485>.
 [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
            X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
            February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

11.2. Informative References

 [FIPS]     Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3
            (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic
            Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National
            Institute of Standards and Technology, Work in Progress.
 [RFC3647]  Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
            Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
            Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
            November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
 [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
            Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
 [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
            Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
            February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
 [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
            Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

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 [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
            "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
            (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
 [RFC6489]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification
            Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key
            Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012,
            <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489>.

Acknowledgments

 The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for help with the
 formatting, Ron Watro for assistance with the editing, and other
 members of the SIDR working group for reviewing this document.

Authors' Addresses

 Stephen Kent
 BBN Technologies
 10 Moulton Street
 Cambridge, MA  02138
 United States
 Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
 EMail: skent@bbn.com
 Derrick Kong
 BBN Technologies
 10 Moulton Street
 Cambridge, MA  02138
 United States
 Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
 EMail: dkong@bbn.com
 Karen Seo
 BBN Technologies
 10 Moulton Street
 Cambridge, MA  02138
 United States
 Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
 EMail: kseo@bbn.com

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 38]

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