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rfc:rfc6750

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Jones Request for Comments: 6750 Microsoft Category: Standards Track D. Hardt ISSN: 2070-1721 Independent

                                                          October 2012
     The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage

Abstract

 This specification describes how to use bearer tokens in HTTP
 requests to access OAuth 2.0 protected resources.  Any party in
 possession of a bearer token (a "bearer") can use it to get access to
 the associated resources (without demonstrating possession of a
 cryptographic key).  To prevent misuse, bearer tokens need to be
 protected from disclosure in storage and in transport.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................2
    1.1. Notational Conventions .....................................3
    1.2. Terminology ................................................3
    1.3. Overview ...................................................3
 2. Authenticated Requests ..........................................4
    2.1. Authorization Request Header Field .........................5
    2.2. Form-Encoded Body Parameter ................................5
    2.3. URI Query Parameter ........................................6
 3. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field ......................7
    3.1. Error Codes ................................................9
 4. Example Access Token Response ..................................10
 5. Security Considerations ........................................10
    5.1. Security Threats ..........................................10
    5.2. Threat Mitigation .........................................11
    5.3. Summary of Recommendations ................................13
 6. IANA Considerations ............................................14
    6.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration ......................14
         6.1.1. The "Bearer" OAuth Access Token Type ...............14
    6.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration .......................14
         6.2.1. The "invalid_request" Error Value ..................14
         6.2.2. The "invalid_token" Error Value ....................15
         6.2.3. The "insufficient_scope" Error Value ...............15
 7. References .....................................................15
    7.1. Normative References ......................................15
    7.2. Informative References ....................................17
 Appendix A. Acknowledgements ......................................18

1. Introduction

 OAuth enables clients to access protected resources by obtaining an
 access token, which is defined in "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
 Framework" [RFC6749] as "a string representing an access
 authorization issued to the client", rather than using the resource
 owner's credentials directly.
 Tokens are issued to clients by an authorization server with the
 approval of the resource owner.  The client uses the access token to
 access the protected resources hosted by the resource server.  This
 specification describes how to make protected resource requests when
 the OAuth access token is a bearer token.
 This specification defines the use of bearer tokens over HTTP/1.1
 [RFC2616] using Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] to access
 protected resources.  TLS is mandatory to implement and use with this
 specification; other specifications may extend this specification for
 use with other protocols.  While designed for use with access tokens

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 resulting from OAuth 2.0 authorization [RFC6749] flows to access
 OAuth protected resources, this specification actually defines a
 general HTTP authorization method that can be used with bearer tokens
 from any source to access any resources protected by those bearer
 tokens.  The Bearer authentication scheme is intended primarily for
 server authentication using the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization
 HTTP headers but does not preclude its use for proxy authentication.

1.1. Notational Conventions

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in
 RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].
 This document uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation of
 [RFC5234].  Additionally, the following rules are included from
 HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617]: auth-param and auth-scheme; and from "Uniform
 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax" [RFC3986]: URI-reference.
 Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
 are case sensitive.

1.2. Terminology

 Bearer Token
    A security token with the property that any party in possession of
    the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way that any other
    party in possession of it can.  Using a bearer token does not
    require a bearer to prove possession of cryptographic key material
    (proof-of-possession).
 All other terms are as defined in "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
 Framework" [RFC6749].

1.3. Overview

 OAuth provides a method for clients to access a protected resource on
 behalf of a resource owner.  In the general case, before a client can
 access a protected resource, it must first obtain an authorization
 grant from the resource owner and then exchange the authorization
 grant for an access token.  The access token represents the grant's
 scope, duration, and other attributes granted by the authorization
 grant.  The client accesses the protected resource by presenting the
 access token to the resource server.  In some cases, a client can
 directly present its own credentials to an authorization server to
 obtain an access token without having to first obtain an
 authorization grant from a resource owner.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 The access token provides an abstraction, replacing different
 authorization constructs (e.g., username and password, assertion) for
 a single token understood by the resource server.  This abstraction
 enables issuing access tokens valid for a short time period, as well
 as removing the resource server's need to understand a wide range of
 authentication schemes.
   +--------+                               +---------------+
   |        |--(A)- Authorization Request ->|   Resource    |
   |        |                               |     Owner     |
   |        |<-(B)-- Authorization Grant ---|               |
   |        |                               +---------------+
   |        |
   |        |                               +---------------+
   |        |--(C)-- Authorization Grant -->| Authorization |
   | Client |                               |     Server    |
   |        |<-(D)----- Access Token -------|               |
   |        |                               +---------------+
   |        |
   |        |                               +---------------+
   |        |--(E)----- Access Token ------>|    Resource   |
   |        |                               |     Server    |
   |        |<-(F)--- Protected Resource ---|               |
   +--------+                               +---------------+
                   Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow
 The abstract OAuth 2.0 flow illustrated in Figure 1 describes the
 interaction between the client, resource owner, authorization server,
 and resource server (described in [RFC6749]).  The following two
 steps are specified within this document:
 (E)  The client requests the protected resource from the resource
      server and authenticates by presenting the access token.
 (F)  The resource server validates the access token, and if valid,
      serves the request.
 This document also imposes semantic requirements upon the access
 token returned in step (D).

2. Authenticated Requests

 This section defines three methods of sending bearer access tokens in
 resource requests to resource servers.  Clients MUST NOT use more
 than one method to transmit the token in each request.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

2.1. Authorization Request Header Field

 When sending the access token in the "Authorization" request header
 field defined by HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617], the client uses the "Bearer"
 authentication scheme to transmit the access token.
 For example:
   GET /resource HTTP/1.1
   Host: server.example.com
   Authorization: Bearer mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM
 The syntax of the "Authorization" header field for this scheme
 follows the usage of the Basic scheme defined in Section 2 of
 [RFC2617].  Note that, as with Basic, it does not conform to the
 generic syntax defined in Section 1.2 of [RFC2617] but is compatible
 with the general authentication framework being developed for
 HTTP 1.1 [HTTP-AUTH], although it does not follow the preferred
 practice outlined therein in order to reflect existing deployments.
 The syntax for Bearer credentials is as follows:
   b64token    = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /
                     "-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" ) *"="
   credentials = "Bearer" 1*SP b64token
 Clients SHOULD make authenticated requests with a bearer token using
 the "Authorization" request header field with the "Bearer" HTTP
 authorization scheme.  Resource servers MUST support this method.

2.2. Form-Encoded Body Parameter

 When sending the access token in the HTTP request entity-body, the
 client adds the access token to the request-body using the
 "access_token" parameter.  The client MUST NOT use this method unless
 all of the following conditions are met:
 o  The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type" header
    field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".
 o  The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
    "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
    HTML 4.01 [W3C.REC-html401-19991224].
 o  The HTTP request entity-body is single-part.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 o  The content to be encoded in the entity-body MUST consist entirely
    of ASCII [USASCII] characters.
 o  The HTTP request method is one for which the request-body has
    defined semantics.  In particular, this means that the "GET"
    method MUST NOT be used.
 The entity-body MAY include other request-specific parameters, in
 which case the "access_token" parameter MUST be properly separated
 from the request-specific parameters using "&" character(s) (ASCII
 code 38).
 For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using
 transport-layer security:
   POST /resource HTTP/1.1
   Host: server.example.com
   Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
   access_token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM
 The "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" method SHOULD NOT be used
 except in application contexts where participating browsers do not
 have access to the "Authorization" request header field.  Resource
 servers MAY support this method.

2.3. URI Query Parameter

 When sending the access token in the HTTP request URI, the client
 adds the access token to the request URI query component as defined
 by "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax" [RFC3986],
 using the "access_token" parameter.
 For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using
 transport-layer security:
   GET /resource?access_token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM HTTP/1.1
   Host: server.example.com
 The HTTP request URI query can include other request-specific
 parameters, in which case the "access_token" parameter MUST be
 properly separated from the request-specific parameters using "&"
 character(s) (ASCII code 38).

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 For example:
  https://server.example.com/resource?access_token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM&p=q
 Clients using the URI Query Parameter method SHOULD also send a
 Cache-Control header containing the "no-store" option.  Server
 success (2XX status) responses to these requests SHOULD contain a
 Cache-Control header with the "private" option.
 Because of the security weaknesses associated with the URI method
 (see Section 5), including the high likelihood that the URL
 containing the access token will be logged, it SHOULD NOT be used
 unless it is impossible to transport the access token in the
 "Authorization" request header field or the HTTP request entity-body.
 Resource servers MAY support this method.
 This method is included to document current use; its use is not
 recommended, due to its security deficiencies (see Section 5) and
 also because it uses a reserved query parameter name, which is
 counter to URI namespace best practices, per "Architecture of the
 World Wide Web, Volume One" [W3C.REC-webarch-20041215].

3. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field

 If the protected resource request does not include authentication
 credentials or does not contain an access token that enables access
 to the protected resource, the resource server MUST include the HTTP
 "WWW-Authenticate" response header field; it MAY include it in
 response to other conditions as well.  The "WWW-Authenticate" header
 field uses the framework defined by HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617].
 All challenges defined by this specification MUST use the auth-scheme
 value "Bearer".  This scheme MUST be followed by one or more
 auth-param values.  The auth-param attributes used or defined by this
 specification are as follows.  Other auth-param attributes MAY be
 used as well.
 A "realm" attribute MAY be included to indicate the scope of
 protection in the manner described in HTTP/1.1 [RFC2617].  The
 "realm" attribute MUST NOT appear more than once.
 The "scope" attribute is defined in Section 3.3 of [RFC6749].  The
 "scope" attribute is a space-delimited list of case-sensitive scope
 values indicating the required scope of the access token for
 accessing the requested resource. "scope" values are implementation
 defined; there is no centralized registry for them; allowed values
 are defined by the authorization server.  The order of "scope" values
 is not significant.  In some cases, the "scope" value will be used

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 when requesting a new access token with sufficient scope of access to
 utilize the protected resource.  Use of the "scope" attribute is
 OPTIONAL.  The "scope" attribute MUST NOT appear more than once.  The
 "scope" value is intended for programmatic use and is not meant to be
 displayed to end-users.
 Two example scope values follow; these are taken from the OpenID
 Connect [OpenID.Messages] and the Open Authentication Technology
 Committee (OATC) Online Multimedia Authorization Protocol [OMAP]
 OAuth 2.0 use cases, respectively:
   scope="openid profile email"
   scope="urn:example:channel=HBO&urn:example:rating=G,PG-13"
 If the protected resource request included an access token and failed
 authentication, the resource server SHOULD include the "error"
 attribute to provide the client with the reason why the access
 request was declined.  The parameter value is described in
 Section 3.1.  In addition, the resource server MAY include the
 "error_description" attribute to provide developers a human-readable
 explanation that is not meant to be displayed to end-users.  It also
 MAY include the "error_uri" attribute with an absolute URI
 identifying a human-readable web page explaining the error.  The
 "error", "error_description", and "error_uri" attributes MUST NOT
 appear more than once.
 Values for the "scope" attribute (specified in Appendix A.4 of
 [RFC6749]) MUST NOT include characters outside the set %x21 / %x23-5B
 / %x5D-7E for representing scope values and %x20 for delimiters
 between scope values.  Values for the "error" and "error_description"
 attributes (specified in Appendixes A.7 and A.8 of [RFC6749]) MUST
 NOT include characters outside the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
 Values for the "error_uri" attribute (specified in Appendix A.9 of
 [RFC6749]) MUST conform to the URI-reference syntax and thus MUST NOT
 include characters outside the set %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
 For example, in response to a protected resource request without
 authentication:
   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
   WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example"

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 And in response to a protected resource request with an
 authentication attempt using an expired access token:
   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
   WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example",
                     error="invalid_token",
                     error_description="The access token expired"

3.1. Error Codes

 When a request fails, the resource server responds using the
 appropriate HTTP status code (typically, 400, 401, 403, or 405) and
 includes one of the following error codes in the response:
 invalid_request
       The request is missing a required parameter, includes an
       unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats the same
       parameter, uses more than one method for including an access
       token, or is otherwise malformed.  The resource server SHOULD
       respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
 invalid_token
       The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, or
       invalid for other reasons.  The resource SHOULD respond with
       the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code.  The client MAY
       request a new access token and retry the protected resource
       request.
 insufficient_scope
       The request requires higher privileges than provided by the
       access token.  The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP
       403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include the "scope"
       attribute with the scope necessary to access the protected
       resource.
 If the request lacks any authentication information (e.g., the client
 was unaware that authentication is necessary or attempted using an
 unsupported authentication method), the resource server SHOULD NOT
 include an error code or other error information.
 For example:
   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
   WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example"

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

4. Example Access Token Response

 Typically, a bearer token is returned to the client as part of an
 OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] access token response.  An example of such a
 response is:
   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
   Cache-Control: no-store
   Pragma: no-cache
   {
     "access_token":"mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM",
     "token_type":"Bearer",
     "expires_in":3600,
     "refresh_token":"tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA"
   }

5. Security Considerations

 This section describes the relevant security threats regarding token
 handling when using bearer tokens and describes how to mitigate these
 threats.

5.1. Security Threats

 The following list presents several common threats against protocols
 utilizing some form of tokens.  This list of threats is based on NIST
 Special Publication 800-63 [NIST800-63].  Since this document builds
 on the OAuth 2.0 Authorization specification [RFC6749], we exclude a
 discussion of threats that are described there or in related
 documents.
 Token manufacture/modification:  An attacker may generate a bogus
    token or modify the token contents (such as the authentication or
    attribute statements) of an existing token, causing the resource
    server to grant inappropriate access to the client.  For example,
    an attacker may modify the token to extend the validity period; a
    malicious client may modify the assertion to gain access to
    information that they should not be able to view.
 Token disclosure:  Tokens may contain authentication and attribute
    statements that include sensitive information.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 Token redirect:  An attacker uses a token generated for consumption
    by one resource server to gain access to a different resource
    server that mistakenly believes the token to be for it.
 Token replay:  An attacker attempts to use a token that has already
    been used with that resource server in the past.

5.2. Threat Mitigation

 A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the contents
 of the token by using a digital signature or a Message Authentication
 Code (MAC).  Alternatively, a bearer token can contain a reference to
 authorization information, rather than encoding the information
 directly.  Such references MUST be infeasible for an attacker to
 guess; using a reference may require an extra interaction between a
 server and the token issuer to resolve the reference to the
 authorization information.  The mechanics of such an interaction are
 not defined by this specification.
 This document does not specify the encoding or the contents of the
 token; hence, detailed recommendations about the means of
 guaranteeing token integrity protection are outside the scope of this
 document.  The token integrity protection MUST be sufficient to
 prevent the token from being modified.
 To deal with token redirect, it is important for the authorization
 server to include the identity of the intended recipients (the
 audience), typically a single resource server (or a list of resource
 servers), in the token.  Restricting the use of the token to a
 specific scope is also RECOMMENDED.
 The authorization server MUST implement TLS.  Which version(s) ought
 to be implemented will vary over time and will depend on the
 widespread deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time
 of implementation.  At the time of this writing, TLS version 1.2
 [RFC5246] is the most recent version, but it has very limited actual
 deployment and might not be readily available in implementation
 toolkits.  TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246] is the most widely deployed
 version and will give the broadest interoperability.
 To protect against token disclosure, confidentiality protection MUST
 be applied using TLS [RFC5246] with a ciphersuite that provides
 confidentiality and integrity protection.  This requires that the
 communication interaction between the client and the authorization
 server, as well as the interaction between the client and the
 resource server, utilize confidentiality and integrity protection.
 Since TLS is mandatory to implement and to use with this
 specification, it is the preferred approach for preventing token

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 disclosure via the communication channel.  For those cases where the
 client is prevented from observing the contents of the token, token
 encryption MUST be applied in addition to the usage of TLS
 protection.  As a further defense against token disclosure, the
 client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making requests
 to protected resources, including checking the Certificate Revocation
 List (CRL) [RFC5280].
 Cookies are typically transmitted in the clear.  Thus, any
 information contained in them is at risk of disclosure.  Therefore,
 bearer tokens MUST NOT be stored in cookies that can be sent in the
 clear.  See "HTTP State Management Mechanism" [RFC6265] for security
 considerations about cookies.
 In some deployments, including those utilizing load balancers, the
 TLS connection to the resource server terminates prior to the actual
 server that provides the resource.  This could leave the token
 unprotected between the front-end server where the TLS connection
 terminates and the back-end server that provides the resource.  In
 such deployments, sufficient measures MUST be employed to ensure
 confidentiality of the token between the front-end and back-end
 servers; encryption of the token is one such possible measure.
 To deal with token capture and replay, the following recommendations
 are made: First, the lifetime of the token MUST be limited; one means
 of achieving this is by putting a validity time field inside the
 protected part of the token.  Note that using short-lived (one hour
 or less) tokens reduces the impact of them being leaked.  Second,
 confidentiality protection of the exchanges between the client and
 the authorization server and between the client and the resource
 server MUST be applied.  As a consequence, no eavesdropper along the
 communication path is able to observe the token exchange.
 Consequently, such an on-path adversary cannot replay the token.
 Furthermore, when presenting the token to a resource server, the
 client MUST verify the identity of that resource server, as per
 Section 3.1 of "HTTP Over TLS" [RFC2818].  Note that the client MUST
 validate the TLS certificate chain when making these requests to
 protected resources.  Presenting the token to an unauthenticated and
 unauthorized resource server or failing to validate the certificate
 chain will allow adversaries to steal the token and gain unauthorized
 access to protected resources.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

5.3. Summary of Recommendations

 Safeguard bearer tokens:  Client implementations MUST ensure that
    bearer tokens are not leaked to unintended parties, as they will
    be able to use them to gain access to protected resources.  This
    is the primary security consideration when using bearer tokens and
    underlies all the more specific recommendations that follow.
 Validate TLS certificate chains:  The client MUST validate the TLS
    certificate chain when making requests to protected resources.
    Failing to do so may enable DNS hijacking attacks to steal the
    token and gain unintended access.
 Always use TLS (https):  Clients MUST always use TLS [RFC5246]
    (https) or equivalent transport security when making requests with
    bearer tokens.  Failing to do so exposes the token to numerous
    attacks that could give attackers unintended access.
 Don't store bearer tokens in cookies:  Implementations MUST NOT store
    bearer tokens within cookies that can be sent in the clear (which
    is the default transmission mode for cookies).  Implementations
    that do store bearer tokens in cookies MUST take precautions
    against cross-site request forgery.
 Issue short-lived bearer tokens:  Token servers SHOULD issue
    short-lived (one hour or less) bearer tokens, particularly when
    issuing tokens to clients that run within a web browser or other
    environments where information leakage may occur.  Using
    short-lived bearer tokens can reduce the impact of them being
    leaked.
 Issue scoped bearer tokens:  Token servers SHOULD issue bearer tokens
    that contain an audience restriction, scoping their use to the
    intended relying party or set of relying parties.
 Don't pass bearer tokens in page URLs:  Bearer tokens SHOULD NOT be
    passed in page URLs (for example, as query string parameters).
    Instead, bearer tokens SHOULD be passed in HTTP message headers or
    message bodies for which confidentiality measures are taken.
    Browsers, web servers, and other software may not adequately
    secure URLs in the browser history, web server logs, and other
    data structures.  If bearer tokens are passed in page URLs,
    attackers might be able to steal them from the history data, logs,
    or other unsecured locations.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. OAuth Access Token Type Registration

 This specification registers the following access token type in the
 OAuth Access Token Types registry defined in [RFC6749].

6.1.1. The "Bearer" OAuth Access Token Type

 Type name:
    Bearer
 Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters:
    (none)
 HTTP Authentication Scheme(s):
    Bearer
 Change controller:
    IETF
 Specification document(s):
    RFC 6750

6.2. OAuth Extensions Error Registration

 This specification registers the following error values in the OAuth
 Extensions Error registry defined in [RFC6749].

6.2.1. The "invalid_request" Error Value

 Error name:
    invalid_request
 Error usage location:
    Resource access error response
 Related protocol extension:
    Bearer access token type
 Change controller:
    IETF
 Specification document(s):
    RFC 6750

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

6.2.2. The "invalid_token" Error Value

 Error name:
    invalid_token
 Error usage location:
    Resource access error response
 Related protocol extension:
    Bearer access token type
 Change controller:
    IETF
 Specification document(s):
    RFC 6750

6.2.3. The "insufficient_scope" Error Value

 Error name:
    insufficient_scope
 Error usage location:
    Resource access error response
 Related protocol extension:
    Bearer access token type
 Change controller:
    IETF
 Specification document(s):
    RFC 6750

7. References

7.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC2246]    Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
              RFC 2246, January 1999.
 [RFC2616]    Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

 [RFC2617]    Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence,
              S., Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.
 [RFC2818]    Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
 [RFC3986]    Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, January 2005.
 [RFC5234]    Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
 [RFC5246]    Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              August 2008.
 [RFC5280]    Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
              List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
 [RFC6265]    Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              April 2011.
 [RFC6749]    Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, October 2012.
 [USASCII]    American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
              Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
              Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.
 [W3C.REC-html401-19991224]
              Raggett, D., Le Hors, A., and I. Jacobs, "HTML 4.01
              Specification", World Wide Web Consortium
              Recommendation REC-html401-19991224, December 1999,
              <http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224>.
 [W3C.REC-webarch-20041215]
              Jacobs, I. and N. Walsh, "Architecture of the World Wide
              Web, Volume One", World Wide Web Consortium
              Recommendation REC-webarch-20041215, December 2004,
              <http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-webarch-20041215>.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

7.2. Informative References

 [HTTP-AUTH]  Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", Work
              in Progress, October 2012.
 [NIST800-63] Burr, W., Dodson, D., Newton, E., Perlner, R., Polk, T.,
              Gupta, S., and E. Nabbus, "NIST Special Publication
              800-63-1, INFORMATION SECURITY", December 2011,
              <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/>.
 [OMAP]       Huff, J., Schlacht, D., Nadalin, A., Simmons, J.,
              Rosenberg, P., Madsen, P., Ace, T., Rickelton-Abdi, C.,
              and B. Boyer, "Online Multimedia Authorization Protocol:
              An Industry Standard for Authorized Access to Internet
              Multimedia Resources", April 2012,
              <http://www.oatc.us/Standards/Download.aspx>.
 [OpenID.Messages]
              Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B.,
              Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, "OpenID Connect Messages
              1.0", June 2012, <http://openid.net/specs/
              openid-connect-messages-1_0.html>.

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 17] RFC 6750 OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage October 2012

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

 The following people contributed to preliminary versions of this
 document: Blaine Cook (BT), Brian Eaton (Google), Yaron Y. Goland
 (Microsoft), Brent Goldman (Facebook), Raffi Krikorian (Twitter),
 Luke Shepard (Facebook), and Allen Tom (Yahoo!).  The content and
 concepts within are a product of the OAuth community, the Web
 Resource Authorization Profiles (WRAP) community, and the OAuth
 Working Group.  David Recordon created a preliminary version of this
 specification based upon an early draft of the specification that
 evolved into OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].  Michael B. Jones in turn created
 the first version (00) of this specification using portions of
 David's preliminary document and edited all subsequent versions.
 The OAuth Working Group has dozens of very active contributors who
 proposed ideas and wording for this document, including Michael
 Adams, Amanda Anganes, Andrew Arnott, Derek Atkins, Dirk Balfanz,
 John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Francisco Corella, Leah Culver, Bill de
 hOra, Breno de Medeiros, Brian Ellin, Stephen Farrell, Igor Faynberg,
 George Fletcher, Tim Freeman, Evan Gilbert, Yaron Y. Goland, Eran
 Hammer, Thomas Hardjono, Dick Hardt, Justin Hart, Phil Hunt, John
 Kemp, Chasen Le Hara, Barry Leiba, Amos Jeffries, Michael B. Jones,
 Torsten Lodderstedt, Paul Madsen, Eve Maler, James Manger, Laurence
 Miao, William J. Mills, Chuck Mortimore, Anthony Nadalin, Axel
 Nennker, Mark Nottingham, David Recordon, Julian Reschke, Rob
 Richards, Justin Richer, Peter Saint-Andre, Nat Sakimura, Rob Sayre,
 Marius Scurtescu, Naitik Shah, Justin Smith, Christian Stuebner,
 Jeremy Suriel, Doug Tangren, Paul Tarjan, Hannes Tschofenig, Franklin
 Tse, Sean Turner, Paul Walker, Shane Weeden, Skylar Woodward, and
 Zachary Zeltsan.

Authors' Addresses

 Michael B. Jones
 Microsoft
 EMail: mbj@microsoft.com
 URI:   http://self-issued.info/
 Dick Hardt
 Independent
 EMail: dick.hardt@gmail.com
 URI:   http://dickhardt.org/

Jones & Hardt Standards Track [Page 18]

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