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rfc:rfc6637

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Jivsov Request for Comments: 6637 Symantec Corporation Category: Standards Track June 2012 ISSN: 2070-1721

            Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) in OpenPGP

Abstract

 This document defines an Elliptic Curve Cryptography extension to the
 OpenPGP public key format and specifies three Elliptic Curves that
 enjoy broad support by other standards, including standards published
 by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology.  The
 document specifies the conventions for interoperability between
 compliant OpenPGP implementations that make use of this extension and
 these Elliptic Curves.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6637.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................3
 2. Conventions used in This Document ...............................3
 3. Elliptic Curve Cryptography .....................................3
 4. Supported ECC Curves ............................................3
 5. Supported Public Key Algorithms .................................4
 6. Conversion Primitives ...........................................4
 7. Key Derivation Function .........................................5
 8. EC DH Algorithm (ECDH) ..........................................5
 9. Encoding of Public and Private Keys .............................8
 10. Message Encoding with Public Keys ..............................9
 11. ECC Curve OID .................................................10
 12. Compatibility Profiles ........................................10
    12.1. OpenPGP ECC Profile ......................................10
    12.2. Suite-B Profile ..........................................11
         12.2.1. Security Strength at 192 Bits .....................11
         12.2.2. Security Strength at 128 Bits .....................11
 13. Security Considerations .......................................12
 14. IANA Considerations ...........................................14
 15. References ....................................................14
    15.1. Normative References .....................................14
    15.2. Informative References ...................................15
 16. Contributors ..................................................15
 17. Acknowledgment ................................................15

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

1. Introduction

 The OpenPGP protocol [RFC4880] supports RSA and DSA (Digital
 Signature Algorithm) public key formats.  This document defines the
 extension to incorporate support for public keys that are based on
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).

2. Conventions Used in This Document

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].  Any
 implementation that adheres to the format and methods specified in
 this document is called a compliant application.  Compliant
 applications are a subset of the broader set of OpenPGP applications
 described in [RFC4880].  Any [RFC2119] keyword within this document
 applies to compliant applications only.

3. Elliptic Curve Cryptography

 This document establishes the minimum set of Elliptic Curve
 Cryptography (ECC) public key parameters and cryptographic methods
 that will likely satisfy the widest range of platforms and
 applications and facilitate interoperability.  It adds a more
 efficient method for applications to balance the overall level of
 security with any AES algorithm specified in [RFC4880] than by simply
 increasing the size of RSA keys.  This document defines a path to
 expand ECC support in the future.
 The National Security Agency (NSA) of the United States specifies ECC
 for use in its [SuiteB] set of algorithms.  This document includes
 algorithms required by Suite B that are not present in [RFC4880].
 [KOBLITZ] provides a thorough introduction to ECC.

4. Supported ECC Curves

 This document references three named prime field curves, defined in
 [FIPS-186-3] as "Curve P-256", "Curve P-384", and "Curve P-521".
 The named curves are referenced as a sequence of bytes in this
 document, called throughout, curve OID.  Section 11 describes in
 detail how this sequence of bytes is formed.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

5. Supported Public Key Algorithms

 The supported public key algorithms are the Elliptic Curve Digital
 Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [FIPS-186-3] and the Elliptic Curve
 Diffie-Hellman (ECDH).  A compatible specification of ECDSA is given
 in [RFC6090] as "KT-I Signatures" and in [SEC1]; ECDH is defined in
 Section 8 of this document.
 The following public key algorithm IDs are added to expand Section
 9.1 of [RFC4880], "Public-Key Algorithms":
        ID        Description of Algorithm
        --        --------------------------
        18        ECDH public key algorithm
        19        ECDSA public key algorithm
 Compliant applications MUST support ECDSA and ECDH.

6. Conversion Primitives

 This document only defines the uncompressed point format.  The point
 is encoded in the Multiprecision Integer (MPI) format [RFC4880].  The
 content of the MPI is the following:
    B = 04 || x || y
 where x and y are coordinates of the point P = (x, y), each encoded
 in the big-endian format and zero-padded to the adjusted underlying
 field size.  The adjusted underlying field size is the underlying
 field size that is rounded up to the nearest 8-bit boundary.
 Therefore, the exact size of the MPI payload is 515 bits for "Curve
 P-256", 771 for "Curve P-384", and 1059 for "Curve P-521".
 Even though the zero point, also called the point at infinity, may
 occur as a result of arithmetic operations on points of an elliptic
 curve, it SHALL NOT appear in data structures defined in this
 document.
 This encoding is compatible with the definition given in [SEC1].
 If other conversion methods are defined in the future, a compliant
 application MUST NOT use a new format when in doubt that any
 recipient can support it.  Consider, for example, that while both the
 public key and the per-recipient ECDH data structure, respectively
 defined in Sections 9 and 10, contain an encoded point field, the
 format changes to the field in Section 10 only affect a given
 recipient of a given message.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

7. Key Derivation Function

 A key derivation function (KDF) is necessary to implement the EC
 encryption.  The Concatenation Key Derivation Function (Approved
 Alternative 1) [NIST-SP800-56A] with the KDF hash function that is
 SHA2-256 [FIPS-180-3] or stronger is REQUIRED.  See Section 12 for
 the details regarding the choice of the hash function.
 For convenience, the synopsis of the encoding method is given below
 with significant simplifications attributable to the restricted
 choice of hash functions in this document.  However, [NIST-SP800-56A]
 is the normative source of the definition.
        //   Implements KDF( X, oBits, Param );
        //   Input: point X = (x,y)
        //   oBits - the desired size of output
        //   hBits - the size of output of hash function Hash
        //   Param - octets representing the parameters
        //   Assumes that oBits <= hBits
       // Convert the point X to the octet string, see section 6:
       //   ZB' = 04 || x || y
       // and extract the x portion from ZB'
       ZB = x;
       MB = Hash ( 00 || 00 || 00 || 01 || ZB || Param );
       return oBits leftmost bits of MB.
 Note that ZB in the KDF description above is the compact
 representation of X, defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC6090].

8. EC DH Algorithm (ECDH)

 The method is a combination of an ECC Diffie-Hellman method to
 establish a shared secret, a key derivation method to process the
 shared secret into a derived key, and a key wrapping method that uses
 the derived key to protect a session key used to encrypt a message.
 The One-Pass Diffie-Hellman method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) [NIST-SP800-56A]
 MUST be implemented with the following restrictions: the ECC CDH
 primitive employed by this method is modified to always assume the
 cofactor as 1, the KDF specified in Section 7 is used, and the KDF
 parameters specified below are used.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

 The KDF parameters are encoded as a concatenation of the following 5
 variable-length and fixed-length fields, compatible with the
 definition of the OtherInfo bitstring [NIST-SP800-56A]:
 o  a variable-length field containing a curve OID, formatted as
    follows:
  1. a one-octet size of the following field
  1. the octets representing a curve OID, defined in Section 11
 o  a one-octet public key algorithm ID defined in Section 5
 o  a variable-length field containing KDF parameters, identical to
    the corresponding field in the ECDH public key, formatted as
    follows:
  1. a one-octet size of the following fields; values 0 and 0xff

are reserved for future extensions

  1. a one-octet value 01, reserved for future extensions
  1. a one-octet hash function ID used with the KDF
  1. a one-octet algorithm ID for the symmetric algorithm used to

wrap the symmetric key for message encryption; see Section 8

          for details
 o  20 octets representing the UTF-8 encoding of the string
    "Anonymous Sender    ", which is the octet sequence
    41 6E 6F 6E 79 6D 6F 75 73 20 53 65 6E 64 65 72 20 20 20 20
 o  20 octets representing a recipient encryption subkey or a master
    key fingerprint, identifying the key material that is needed for
    the decryption
 The size of the KDF parameters sequence, defined above, is either 54
 or 51 for the three curves defined in this document.
 The key wrapping method is described in [RFC3394].  KDF produces a
 symmetric key that is used as a key-encryption key (KEK) as specified
 in [RFC3394].  Refer to Section 13 for the details regarding the
 choice of the KEK algorithm, which SHOULD be one of three AES
 algorithms.  Key wrapping and unwrapping is performed with the
 default initial value of [RFC3394].

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

 The input to the key wrapping method is the value "m" derived from
 the session key, as described in Section 5.1 of [RFC4880], "Public-
 Key Encrypted Session Key Packets (Tag 1)", except that the PKCS #1.5
 (Public-Key Cryptography Standards version 1.5) padding step is
 omitted.  The result is padded using the method described in [PKCS5]
 to the 8-byte granularity.  For example, the following AES-256
 session key, in which 32 octets are denoted from k0 to k31, is
 composed to form the following 40 octet sequence:
     09 k0 k1 ... k31 c0 c1 05 05 05 05 05
 The octets c0 and c1 above denote the checksum.  This encoding allows
 the sender to obfuscate the size of the symmetric encryption key used
 to encrypt the data.  For example, assuming that an AES algorithm is
 used for the session key, the sender MAY use 21, 13, and 5 bytes of
 padding for AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, respectively, to provide
 the same number of octets, 40 total, as an input to the key wrapping
 method.
 The output of the method consists of two fields.  The first field is
 the MPI containing the ephemeral key used to establish the shared
 secret.  The second field is composed of the following two fields:
 o  a one-octet encoding the size in octets of the result of the key
    wrapping method; the value 255 is reserved for future extensions
 o  up to 254 octets representing the result of the key wrapping
    method, applied to the 8-byte padded session key, as described
    above
 Note that for session key sizes 128, 192, and 256 bits, the size of
 the result of the key wrapping method is, respectively, 32, 40, and
 48 octets, unless the size obfuscation is used.
 For convenience, the synopsis of the encoding method is given below;
 however, this section, [NIST-SP800-56A], and [RFC3394] are the
 normative sources of the definition.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

       Obtain the authenticated recipient public key R
       Generate an ephemeral key pair {v, V=vG}
       Compute the shared point S = vR;
       m = symm_alg_ID || session key || checksum || pkcs5_padding;
       curve_OID_len = (byte)len(curve_OID);
       Param = curve_OID_len || curve_OID || public_key_alg_ID || 03
       || 01 || KDF_hash_ID || KEK_alg_ID for AESKeyWrap || "Anonymous
       Sender    " || recipient_fingerprint;
       Z_len = the key size for the KEK_alg_ID used with AESKeyWrap
       Compute Z = KDF( S, Z_len, Param );
       Compute C = AESKeyWrap( Z, m ) as per [RFC3394]
       VB = convert point V to the octet string
       Output (MPI(VB) || len(C) || C).
 The decryption is the inverse of the method given.  Note that the
 recipient obtains the shared secret by calculating
     S = rV = rvG, where (r,R) is the recipient's key pair.
 Consistent with Section 5.13 of [RFC4880], "Sym. Encrypted Integrity
 Protected Data Packet (Tag 18)", a Modification Detection Code (MDC)
 MUST be used anytime the symmetric key is protected by ECDH.

9. Encoding of Public and Private Keys

 The following algorithm-specific packets are added to Section 5.5.2
 of [RFC4880], "Public-Key Packet Formats", to support ECDH and ECDSA.
 This algorithm-specific portion is:
 Algorithm-Specific Fields for ECDSA keys:
    o  a variable-length field containing a curve OID, formatted
       as follows:
  1. a one-octet size of the following field; values 0 and

0xFF are reserved for future extensions

  1. octets representing a curve OID, defined in Section 11
    o  MPI of an EC point representing a public key

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

   Algorithm-Specific Fields for ECDH keys:
    o  a variable-length field containing a curve OID, formatted
       as follows:
  1. a one-octet size of the following field; values 0 and

0xFF are reserved for future extensions

  1. the octets representing a curve OID, defined in

Section 11

  1. MPI of an EC point representing a public key
    o  a variable-length field containing KDF parameters,
       formatted as follows:
  1. a one-octet size of the following fields; values 0 and

0xff are reserved for future extensions

  1. a one-octet value 01, reserved for future extensions
  1. a one-octet hash function ID used with a KDF
  1. a one-octet algorithm ID for the symmetric algorithm

used to wrap the symmetric key used for the message

          encryption; see Section 8 for details
 Observe that an ECDH public key is composed of the same sequence of
 fields that define an ECDSA key, plus the KDF parameters field.
 The following algorithm-specific packets are added to Section 5.5.3.
 of [RFC4880], "Secret-Key Packet Formats", to support ECDH and ECDSA.
   Algorithm-Specific Fields for ECDH or ECDSA secret keys:
    o  an MPI of an integer representing the secret key, which is a
       scalar of the public EC point

10. Message Encoding with Public Keys

 Section 5.2.2 of [RFC4880], "Version 3 Signature Packet Format"
 defines signature formats.  No changes in the format are needed for
 ECDSA.
 Section 5.1 of [RFC4880], "Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets
 (Tag 1)" is extended to support ECDH.  The following two fields are
 the result of applying the KDF, as described in Section 8.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

 Algorithm-Specific Fields for ECDH:
    o an MPI of an EC point representing an ephemeral public key
    o a one-octet size, followed by a symmetric key encoded using the
       method described in Section 8

11. ECC Curve OID

 The parameter curve OID is an array of octets that define a named
 curve.  The table below specifies the exact sequence of bytes for
 each named curve referenced in this document:
 ASN.1 Object          OID Curve OID bytes in         Curve name in
 Identifier            len hexadecimal                [FIPS-186-3]
                           representation
 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7    8   2A 86 48 CE 3D 03 01 07   NIST curve P-256
 1.3.132.0.34           5   2B 81 04 00 22            NIST curve P-384
 1.3.132.0.35           5   2B 81 04 00 23            NIST curve P-521
 The sequence of octets in the third column is the result of applying
 the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) to the ASN.1 Object Identifier
 with subsequent truncation.  The truncation removes the two fields of
 encoded Object Identifier.  The first omitted field is one octet
 representing the Object Identifier tag, and the second omitted field
 is the length of the Object Identifier body.  For example, the
 complete ASN.1 DER encoding for the NIST P-256 curve OID is "06 08 2A
 86 48 CE 3D 03 01 07", from which the first entry in the table above
 is constructed by omitting the first two octets.  Only the truncated
 sequence of octets is the valid representation of a curve OID.

12. Compatibility Profiles

12.1. OpenPGP ECC Profile

 A compliant application MUST implement NIST curve P-256, MAY
 implement NIST curve P-384, and SHOULD implement NIST curve P-521, as
 defined in Section 11.  A compliant application MUST implement
 SHA2-256 and SHOULD implement SHA2-384 and SHA2-512.  A compliant
 application MUST implement AES-128 and SHOULD implement AES-256.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

 A compliant application SHOULD follow Section 13 regarding the choice
 of the following algorithms for each curve:
 o  the KDF hash algorithm
 o  the KEK algorithm
 o  the message digest algorithm and the hash algorithm used in the
    key certifications
 o  the symmetric algorithm used for message encryption.
 It is recommended that the chosen symmetric algorithm for message
 encryption be no less secure than the KEK algorithm.

12.2. Suite-B Profile

 A subset of algorithms allowed by this document can be used to
 achieve [SuiteB] compatibility.  The references to [SuiteB] in this
 document are informative.  This document is primarily concerned with
 format specification, leaving additional security restrictions
 unspecified, such as matching the assigned security level of
 information to authorized recipients or interoperability concerns
 arising from fewer allowed algorithms in [SuiteB] than allowed by
 [RFC4880].

12.2.1. Security Strength at 192 Bits

 To achieve the security strength of 192 bits, [SuiteB] requires NIST
 curve P-384, AES-256, and SHA2-384.  The symmetric algorithm
 restriction means that the algorithm of KEK used for key wrapping in
 Section 8 and an [RFC4880] session key used for message encryption
 must be AES-256.  The hash algorithm restriction means that the hash
 algorithms of KDF and the [RFC4880] message digest calculation must
 be SHA-384.

12.2.2. Security Strength at 128 Bits

 The set of algorithms in Section 12.2.1 is extended to allow NIST
 curve P-256, AES-128, and SHA2-256.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

13. Security Considerations

 Refer to [FIPS-186-3], B.4.1, for the method to generate a uniformly
 distributed ECC private key.
 The curves proposed in this document correspond to the symmetric key
 sizes 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits, as described in the table
 below.  This allows a compliant application to offer balanced public
 key security, which is compatible with the symmetric key strength for
 each AES algorithm allowed by [RFC4880].
 The following table defines the hash and the symmetric encryption
 algorithm that SHOULD be used with a given curve for ECDSA or ECDH.
 A stronger hash algorithm or a symmetric key algorithm MAY be used
 for a given ECC curve.  However, note that the increase in the
 strength of the hash algorithm or the symmetric key algorithm may not
 increase the overall security offered by the given ECC key.
 Curve name         ECC        RSA         Hash size   Symmetric
                    strength   strength,               key size
                               informative
 NIST curve P-256   256        3072        256         128
 NIST curve P-384   384        7680        384         192
 NIST curve P-521   521        15360       512         256
 Requirement levels indicated elsewhere in this document lead to the
 following combinations of algorithms in the OpenPGP profile: MUST
 implement NIST curve P-256 / SHA2-256 / AES-128, SHOULD implement
 NIST curve P-521 / SHA2-512 / AES-256, MAY implement NIST curve P-384
 / SHA2-384 / AES-256, among other allowed combinations.
 Consistent with the table above, the following table defines the KDF
 hash algorithm and the AES KEK encryption algorithm that SHOULD be
 used with a given curve for ECDH.  A stronger KDF hash algorithm or
 AES KEK algorithm MAY be used for a given ECC curve.
 Curve name          Recommended KDF      Recommended KEK
                     hash algorithm       encryption algorithm
 NIST curve P-256    SHA2-256             AES-128
 NIST curve P-384    SHA2-384             AES-192
 NIST curve P-521    SHA2-512             AES-256

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

 This document explicitly discourages the use of algorithms other than
 AES as a KEK algorithm because backward compatibility of the ECDH
 format is not a concern.  The KEK algorithm is only used within the
 scope of a Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet, which represents
 an ECDH key recipient of a message.  Compare this with the algorithm
 used for the session key of the message, which MAY be different from
 a KEK algorithm.
 Compliant applications SHOULD implement, advertise through key
 preferences, and use in compliance with [RFC4880], the strongest
 algorithms specified in this document.
 Note that the [RFC4880] symmetric algorithm preference list may make
 it impossible to use the balanced strength of symmetric key
 algorithms for a corresponding public key.  For example, the presence
 of the symmetric key algorithm IDs and their order in the key
 preference list affects the algorithm choices available to the
 encoding side, which in turn may make the adherence to the table
 above infeasible.  Therefore, compliance with this specification is a
 concern throughout the life of the key, starting immediately after
 the key generation when the key preferences are first added to a key.
 It is generally advisable to position a symmetric algorithm ID of
 strength matching the public key at the head of the key preference
 list.
 Encryption to multiple recipients often results in an unordered
 intersection subset.  For example, if the first recipient's set is
 {A, B} and the second's is {B, A}, the intersection is an unordered
 set of two algorithms, A and B.  In this case, a compliant
 application SHOULD choose the stronger encryption algorithm.
 Resource constraints, such as limited computational power, is a
 likely reason why an application might prefer to use the weakest
 algorithm.  On the other side of the spectrum are applications that
 can implement every algorithm defined in this document.  Most
 applications are expected to fall into either of two categories.  A
 compliant application in the second, or strongest, category SHOULD
 prefer AES-256 to AES-192.
 SHA-1 MUST NOT be used with the ECDSA or the KDF in the ECDH method.
 MDC MUST be used when a symmetric encryption key is protected by
 ECDH.  None of the ECC methods described in this document are allowed
 with deprecated V3 keys.  A compliant application MUST only use
 iterated and salted S2K to protect private keys, as defined in
 Section 3.7.1.3 of [RFC4880], "Iterated and Salted S2K".

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

 Side channel attacks are a concern when a compliant application's use
 of the OpenPGP format can be modeled by a decryption or signing
 oracle model, for example, when an application is a network service
 performing decryption to unauthenticated remote users.  ECC scalar
 multiplication operations used in ECDSA and ECDH are vulnerable to
 side channel attacks.  Countermeasures can often be taken at the
 higher protocol level, such as limiting the number of allowed
 failures or time-blinding of the operations associated with each
 network interface.  Mitigations at the scalar multiplication level
 seek to eliminate any measurable distinction between the ECC point
 addition and doubling operations.

14. IANA Considerations

 Per this document, IANA has assigned an algorithm number from the
 "Public Key Algorithms" range (or the "name space" in the terminology
 of [RFC5226]) of the "Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)" registry, created by
 [RFC4880].  Two ID numbers have been assigned, as defined in Section
 5.  The first one, value 19, is already designated for ECDSA and is
 currently unused, while the other one, value 18, is new.

15. References

15.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]        Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                  Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC4880]        Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D.,
                  and R. Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
                  November 2007.
 [SuiteB]         National Security Agency, "NSA Suite B
                  Cryptography", March 11, 2010,
                  http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/.
 [FIPS-186-3]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
                  Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature
                  Standard", FIPS 186-3, June 2009.
 [NIST-SP800-56A] Barker, E., Johnson, D., and M. Smid,
                  "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
                  Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", NIST
                  Special Publication 800-56A Revision 1, March 2007.
 [FIPS-180-3]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
                  Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard
                  (SHS)", FIPS 180-3, October 2008.

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 6637 ECC in OpenPGP June 2012

 [RFC3394]        Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption
                  Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394,
                  September 2002.
 [PKCS5]          RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #5 v2.0: Password-Based
                  Cryptography Standard", March 25, 1999.
 [RFC5226]        Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for
                  Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP
                  26, RFC 5226, May 2008.

15.2. Informative References

 [KOBLITZ]        N. Koblitz, "A course in number theory and
                  cryptography", Chapter VI. Elliptic Curves, ISBN:
                  0-387-96576-9, Springer-Verlag, 1987
 [RFC6090]        McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental
                  Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
                  February 2011.
 [SEC1]           Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
                  Elliptic Curve Cryptography", September 2000.

16. Contributors

 Hal Finney provided important criticism on compliance with
 [NIST-SP800-56A] and [SuiteB], and pointed out a few other mistakes.

17. Acknowledgment

 The author would like to acknowledge the help of many individuals who
 kindly voiced their opinions on the IETF OpenPGP Working Group
 mailing list, in particular, the help of Jon Callas, David Crick, Ian
 G, Werner Koch, and Marko Kreen.

Author's Address

 Andrey Jivsov
 Symantec Corporation
 EMail: Andrey_Jivsov@symantec.com

Jivsov Standards Track [Page 15]

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