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rfc:rfc6484

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kent Request for Comments: 6484 D. Kong BCP: 173 K. Seo Category: Best Current Practice R. Watro ISSN: 2070-1721 BBN Technologies

                                                         February 2012
                    Certificate Policy (CP) for
           the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

Abstract

 This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
 Infrastructure (PKI) used to support attestations about Internet
 Number Resource (INR) holdings.  Each organization that distributes
 IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers to an organization
 will, in parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this
 distribution.  These certificates will enable verification that the
 resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the
 holder of the associated private key and that this organization is
 the current, unique holder of these resources.

Status of This Memo

 This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 1] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................6
    1.1. Overview ...................................................7
    1.2. Document Name and Identification ...........................7
    1.3. PKI Participants ...........................................7
         1.3.1. Certification Authorities ...........................8
         1.3.2. Registration Authorities ............................8
         1.3.3. Subscribers .........................................8
         1.3.4. Relying Parties .....................................8
         1.3.5. Other Participants ..................................8
    1.4. Certificate Usage ..........................................9
         1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses ........................9
         1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses .........................9
    1.5. Policy Administration ......................................9
         1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document .............9
         1.5.2. Contact Person ......................................9
         1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures ..............................9
    1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................10
 2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................11
    2.1. Repositories ..............................................11
    2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................11
    2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................12
    2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................12
 3. Identification and Authentication ..............................12
    3.1. Naming ....................................................12
         3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................12
         3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................12
         3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........13
         3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........13
         3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................13
    3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................13
         3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key ......13
         3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............13
         3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............14
         3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information ................14
         3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................14
         3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................14
    3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests .....14
         3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
                Routine Re-Key .....................................14
         3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
                Re-Key after Revocation ............................15
    3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..15

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 2] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements ................16
    4.1. Certificate Application ...................................16
         4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........16
         4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............16
    4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................16
         4.2.1. Performing Identification and
                Authentication Functions ...........................16
         4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..16
         4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........17
    4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................17
         4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............17
         4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
                Issuance of Certificate ............................17
    4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................17
         4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........17
         4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........17
         4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................17
    4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................18
         4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......18
         4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....18
    4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................18
         4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............19
         4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................19
         4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............19
         4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                Subscriber .........................................19
         4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                Renewal Certificate ................................19
         4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...20
         4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................20
    4.7. Certificate Re-Key ........................................20
         4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key ................20
         4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..20
         4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests ..........21
         4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                Subscriber .........................................21
         4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
                Re-Keyed Certificate ...............................21
         4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA ..21
         4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................21
    4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................21
         4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........21
         4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........21
         4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......22

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 3] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

         4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
                Subscriber .........................................22
         4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
                Certificate ........................................22
         4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..22
         4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
                CA to Other Entities ...............................22
    4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................22
         4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................22
         4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................22
         4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................23
         4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................23
         4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the
                Revocation Request .................................23
         4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
                Parties ............................................23
         4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................23
         4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................23
    4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................24
 5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................24
    5.1. Physical Controls .........................................24
         5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................24
         5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................24
         5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................24
         5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................24
         5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................24
         5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................24
         5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................24
         5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................24
    5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................24
         5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................25
         5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................25
         5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....25
         5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............25
    5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................25
    5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................25
         5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................25
         5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................25
         5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................26
         5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................26
         5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................26
         5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................26
    5.6. Key Changeover ............................................26
    5.7. CA or RA Termination ......................................26
 6. Technical Security Controls ....................................26
    6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................27
         6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................27
         6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................27

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 4] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

         6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........27
         6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........27
         6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................27
         6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and
                Quality Checking ...................................28
         6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
                Usage Field) .......................................28
    6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
         Engineering Controls ......................................28
         6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........28
         6.2.2. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control ......28
         6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................28
         6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................28
         6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................28
         6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
                Cryptographic Module ...............................29
         6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........29
         6.2.8. Method of Activating a Private Key .................29
         6.2.9. Method of Deactivating a Private Key ...............29
         6.2.10. Method of Destroying a Private Key ................29
         6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................29
    6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................29
         6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................29
         6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
                Pair Usage Periods .................................29
    6.4. Activation Data ...........................................30
    6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................30
    6.6. Life-Cycle Technical Controls .............................30
         6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................30
         6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................30
         6.6.3. Life-Cycle Security Controls .......................30
    6.7. Network Security Controls .................................30
    6.8. Timestamping ..............................................30
 7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................31
 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................31
 9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................31
    9.12.  Amendments ..............................................31
         9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................31
         9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................31
         9.12.3. Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed .....32
 10. Security Considerations .......................................32
 11. Acknowledgments ...............................................33
 12. References ....................................................33
    12.1. Normative References .....................................33
    12.2. Informative References ...................................33

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 5] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

1. Introduction

 This document describes the certificate policy for a Public Key
 Infrastructure (PKI) used to attest to Internet Number Resource (INR)
 holdings (IP addresses or Autonomous System (AS) numbers).  An
 organization that distributes INRs to another organization MAY, in
 parallel, issue a (public key) certificate reflecting this
 distribution.  These certificates will enable verification that the
 resources indicated in the certificate have been distributed to the
 holder of the associated private key and that this organization is
 the current holder of these resources.
 The most important and distinguishing aspect of the PKI for which
 this policy was created is that it does not purport to identify an
 INR holder via the subject name contained in the certificate issued
 to that entity.  Rather, each certificate issued under this policy is
 intended to enable an entity to assert, in a verifiable fashion, that
 it is the current holder of an INR based on the current records of
 the entity responsible for the resources in question.  Verification
 of the assertion is based on two criteria: the ability of the entity
 to digitally sign data that is verifiable using the public key
 contained in the corresponding certificate, and validation of that
 certificate in the context of this PKI.
 This PKI is designed exclusively for use in support of validation of
 claims related to current INR holdings.  This includes any
 certificates issued in support of operation of this infrastructure,
 e.g., for integrity or access control of the repository system
 described in Section 2.4.  Such transitive uses of certificates also
 are permitted under this policy.  Use of the certificates and
 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) managed under this PKI for any
 other purpose is a violation of this CP, and relying parties (RPs)
 SHOULD reject certificates presented for such uses.
 Note: This document is based on the template specified in RFC 3647
 [RFC3647], a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
 stream.  In the interest of keeping the document as short as
 reasonable, a number of sections contained in the template have been
 omitted from this policy because they do not apply to this PKI.
 However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in
 RFC 3647 to facilitate comparison with the outline in Section 6 of
 RFC 3647.  Each of these omitted sections should be read as "No
 stipulation" in Certificate Policy (CP) / Certification Practice
 Statement (CPS) parlance.
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 6] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

1.1. Overview

 This PKI is designed to support validation of claims by current
 holders of INRs, in accordance with the records of the organizations
 that act as Certification Authorities (CAs) in this PKI.  The ability
 to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unambiguous
 distribution of these resources [RFC6480].
 The structure of the RPKI is congruent with the number resource
 allocation framework of the Internet.  The IANA allocates number
 resources to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), to others, and for
 special purposes [RFC5736].  The RIRs, in turn, manage the allocation
 of number resources to end users, Internet Service Providers, and
 others.
 This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [RFC6487] for
 more details):
 o  CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for
    INR holders
 o  End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to validate digital
    signatures on RPKI signed objects

1.2. Document Name and Identification

 The name of this document is "Certificate Policy (CP) for the
 Resource PKI (RPKI)".
 This policy has been assigned the following OID:
 id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
                       identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
                       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) cp(14) 2 }

1.3. PKI Participants

 Note that in a PKI, the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or
 organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA.  The
 term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without
 qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of
 the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives
 service from an ISP.  In such cases, the term "network subscriber"
 will be used.  Also note that, for brevity, this document always
 refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though
 some of them are individuals.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 7] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

1.3.1. Certification Authorities

 The organizations that distribute IP addresses and AS numbers (IANA,
 RIRs, NIRs, ISPs) act as CAs in this PKI.
 Organizations that do not distribute INRs but hold such resources
 also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.

1.3.2. Registration Authorities

 This PKI does not require establishment or use of a registration
 authority (RA) function separate from the one provided inherently in
 conjunction with the CA function.  The RA function MUST be provided
 by the same entity operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in
 Section 1.3.1.  An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a
 formal relationship with each organization to which it distributes
 INRs.  These entities (the CAs) already perform the RA function
 implicitly since they already assume responsibility for distributing
 INRs.

1.3.3. Subscribers

 These are the organizations receiving distributions of INRs: RIRs,
 NIRs, ISPs, and other organizations.
 Note that any of these organizations may have received distributions
 from more than one source over time.  This is true even for RIRs,
 which participate in inter-registry exchanges of address space.  This
 PKI accommodates such relationships.

1.3.4. Relying Parties

 Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI
 signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties.  Relying
 parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI.  (See Section
 1.6 for the definition of an RPKI signed object.)

1.3.5. Other Participants

 Every organization that undertakes a role as a CA in this PKI is
 responsible for populating the RPKI distributed repository system
 with the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects that it issues.
 The organization MAY operate its own publication point, or it MAY
 outsource this function (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2).

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 8] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

1.4. Certificate Usage

1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses

 The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in
 support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
 Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal
 cited above, also are permitted under this policy.  For example,
 certificates may be issued in support of integrity and access control
 for the repository system described in Section 2.4.  Such transitive
 uses are permitted under this policy.

1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses

 Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited
 under this policy.

1.5. Policy Administration

1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document

 This CP is administered by
 Internet Engineering Steering Group
 c/o Internet Society
 1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 201
 Reston, VA 20190-5108
 U.S.A.

1.5.2. Contact Person

 The contact information is
 EMail: iesg@ietf.org
 Phone: +1-703-439-2120 (Internet Society)

1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures

 If a replacement BCP is needed that updates or obsoletes the current
 BCP, then the replacement BCP MUST be approved by the IESG following
 the procedures of the IETF Standards Process as defined in RFC 2026
 [RFC2026].

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 9] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

1.6. Definitions and Acronyms

 CPS -  Certification Practice Statement.  A CPS is a document that
        specifies the practices that a Certification Authority (CA)
        employs in issuing certificates in this PKI.
 Distribution of INRs - A process of distribution of the INRs along
        the respective number hierarchy.  IANA distributes blocks of
        IP addresses and AS numbers to the five Regional Internet
        Registries (RIRs).  RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and
        AS numbers to organizations within their service regions, who
        in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.
 IANA - Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.  IANA is responsible for
        global coordination of the IP addressing system and AS numbers
        used for routing Internet traffic.  IANA distributes INRs to
        Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).
 INRs - Internet Number Resources.  INRs are number values for three
        protocol parameter sets, namely:
        o  IP version 4 addresses,
        o  IP version 6 addresses, and
        o  Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing,
           currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 AS numbers.
 ISP -  Internet Service Provider.  This is an organization managing
        and providing Internet services to other organizations.
 LIR -  Local Internet Registry.  In some regions, this term is used
        to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.
 NIR -  National Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
        manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the
        geopolitical area covered by a Regional Registry.  NIRs form
        an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage
        INRs.
 RIR -  Regional Internet Registry.  This is an organization that
        manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 10] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 RPKI signed object - An RPKI signed object is a digitally signed data
        object (other than a certificate or CRL) that is declared to
        be such by a Standards Track RFC, and that can be validated
        using certificates issued under this PKI.  The content and
        format of these data constructs depend on the context in which
        validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place.
        Examples of these objects are repository manifests [RFC6486]
        and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482].

2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities

2.1. Repositories

 Certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects (intended for public
 consumption) MUST be made available for downloading by all relying
 parties, to enable them to validate this data.  This motivates use of
 a robust, distributed repository system.  Each CA MUST maintain a
 publicly accessible online repository and publish all RPKI-signed
 objects (intended for public consumption) via this repository in a
 manner that conforms with "A Profile for Resource Certificate
 Repository Structure" [RFC6481].  (This function MAY be outsourced,
 as noted in Section 2.2 below.)  The collection of repositories forms
 the RPKI distributed repository system.

2.2. Publication of Certification Information

 Each CA MUST publish the certificates (intended for public
 consumption) that it issues via the repository system.
 Each CA MUST publish the CRLs (intended for public consumption) that
 it issues via the repository system.
 Each CA MUST publish its RPKI signed objects (intended for public
 consumption) via the repository system.
 Each CA that issues certificates to entities outside of its
 administrative domain SHOULD create and publish a CPS that meets the
 requirements set forth in this CP.  Publication means that the
 entities to which the CA issues certificates MUST be able to acquire
 a copy of the CPS, and MUST be able to ascertain when the CPS
 changes.  (An organization that does not allocate or assign INRs does
 not need to create or publish a CPS.)
 An organization MAY choose to outsource publication of RPKI data --
 certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI signed objects.
 The CP will be published as an IETF-stream RFC and will be available
 from the RFC repository.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 11] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

 The CPS for each CA MUST specify the following information:
 The period of time within which a certificate will be published after
 the CA issues the certificate.
 The period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry
 for a revoked certificate after it revokes that certificate.
 Expired and revoked certificates SHOULD be removed from the RPKI
 repository system, upon expiration or revocation, respectively.
 Also, please note that each CA MUST publish its CRL prior to the
 nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.

2.4. Access Controls on Repositories

 Each CA or repository operator MUST implement access controls to
 prevent unauthorized persons from adding, modifying, or deleting
 repository entries.  A CA or repository operator MUST NOT
 intentionally use technical means of limiting read access to its CPS,
 certificates, CRLs, or RPKI signed objects.  This data is intended to
 be accessible to the public.

3. Identification and Authentication

3.1. Naming

3.1.1. Types of Names

 The distinguished name for every CA and end-entity consists of a
 single CommonName (CN) attribute with a value generated by the issuer
 of the certificate.  Optionally, the serialNumber attribute MAY be
 included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative
 distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of
 certificates associated with the same entity.

3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful

 The subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful",
 i.e., the name is not intended to convey the identity of the subject
 to relying parties.  The rationale here is that certificates issued
 under this PKI are used for authorization in support of applications
 that make use of attestations of INR holdings.  They are not used to
 identify subjects.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 12] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

 Although subject (and issuer) names need not be meaningful, and may
 appear "random," anonymity is not a function of this PKI; thus, no
 explicit support for this feature is provided.

3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

 None.

3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names

 There is no guarantee that subject names are globally unique in this
 PKI.  Each CA certifies subject names that MUST be unique among the
 certificates it issues.  Although it is desirable that these subject
 names be unique throughout the PKI, name uniqueness within the RPKI
 cannot be guaranteed.
 However, subject names in certificates SHOULD be constructed in a way
 that minimizes the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be
 assigned the same name.  The RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487]
 provides an example of how to generate (meaningless) subject names in
 a way that minimizes the likelihood of collisions.

3.2. Initial Identity Validation

3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of the Private Key

 Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST require each
 subject to demonstrate proof of possession (PoP) of the private key
 corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to issuing
 the certificate.  The means by which PoP is achieved is determined by
 each CA and MUST be declared in the CPS of that CA.

3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity

 Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
 procedures to ensure that each certificate it issues accurately
 reflects its records with regard to the organization to which the CA
 has distributed the INRs identified in the certificate.  The specific
 procedures employed for this purpose MUST be described by the CPS for
 each CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA to employ procedures
 commensurate with those it already employs as a registry or ISP in
 the management of the INRs.  This authentication is solely for use by
 each CA in dealing with the organizations to which it distributes
 INRs, and thus should not be relied upon outside of this
 CA-subscriber relationship.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 13] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity

 Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
 procedures to identify at least one individual as a representative of
 each organization that is an INR holder.  The specific means by which
 each CA authenticates individuals as representatives for an
 organization MUST be described by the CPS for each CA.  Relying
 parties can expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with
 those it already employs as a registry or ISP in authenticating
 individuals as representatives for INR holders.

3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information

 A CA MUST NOT include any non-verified subscriber data in
 certificates issued under this certificate policy except for Subject
 Information Access (SIA) extensions.

3.2.5. Validation of Authority

 Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
 procedures to verify that an individual claiming to represent an
 organization to which a certificate is issued is authorized to
 represent that organization in this context.  The procedures MUST be
 described by the CPS for the CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA
 to employ procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a
 registry or ISP, in authenticating individuals as representatives for
 INR holders.

3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

 This PKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any
 other PKI.

3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests

3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key

 Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
 procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key is the
 legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed and the
 associated INRs, and MUST require PoP of the private key
 corresponding to the new public key.  The procedures employed for
 these purposes MUST be described in the CPS for the CA.  With respect
 to authentication of the holder of the INRs, relying parties can
 expect each CA to employ procedures commensurate with those it
 already employs as a registry or ISP, in the management of INRs.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 14] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 Note: An issuer MAY choose to require periodic re-keying consistent
 with contractual agreements with the recipient.  If so, this MUST be
 described by the CPS for the CA.

3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after Revocation

 Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
 procedures to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after
 revocation is the same entity to which the revoked certificate was
 issued and is the legitimate holder of the associated INR.  The CA
 MUST require PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public
 key.  The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be
 described by the CPS for the CA.  With respect to authentication of
 the holder of the INRs, relying parties can expect each CA to employ
 procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
 or ISP, in the management of INRs.  Note that there MAY be different
 procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses
 the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has
 access to that key.

3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

 Each CA operating within the context of this PKI MUST employ
 procedures to ensure that:
 o  an organization requesting revocation is the legitimate holder of
    the certificate to be revoked.
 o  each certificate it revokes accurately reflects its records with
    regard to the organization to which the CA has distributed the
    INRs identified in the certificate.
 o  an individual claiming to represent an organization for which a
    certificate is to be revoked is authorized to represent that
    organization in this context.
 The specific procedures employed for these purposes MUST be described
 by the CPS for the CA.  Relying parties can expect each CA to employ
 procedures commensurate with those it already employs as a registry
 or ISP, in the management of INRs.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 15] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

4.1. Certificate Application

4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

 Any entity that distributes INRs SHOULD acquire a certificate.  This
 includes Internet Registries and ISPs.  Additionally, entities that
 hold INRs from an Internet Registry, or that are multi-homed, MAY
 acquire a certificate under this PKI.  The (CA) certificates issued
 to these entities MUST include one or both of the extensions defined
 by RFC 3779 [RFC3779], "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS
 Identifiers", as appropriate.
 The application procedure MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.

4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities

 The enrollment process and procedures MUST be described by the CPS
 for each CA.  An entity that desires one or more certificates should
 contact the organization from which it receives its INRs.

4.2. Certificate Application Processing

 CAs SHOULD make use of existing standards for certificate application
 processing.  Section 6 of the Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]
 defines the standard certificate request formats that MUST be
 supported.
 Each CA MUST define via its CPS, the certificate request/response
 standards that it employs.

4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

 Existing practices employed by registries and ISPs to identify and
 authenticate organizations that receive INRs form the basis for
 issuance of certificates to these subscribers.  It is important to
 note that the Resource PKI SHOULD NOT be used to authenticate the
 identity of an organization, but rather to bind subscribers to the
 INRs they hold.  Because identity is not being vouched for by this
 PKI, certificate application procedures need not verify legal
 organization names, etc.

4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

 Certificate applications MUST be approved based on the normal
 business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's
 records of INR holders.  Each CA MUST follow the procedures specified

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 16] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key
 corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate
 the CA issues to the requester.  The details of how certificate
 applications are approved MUST be described in the CPS for the CA in
 question.

4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications

 No stipulation.  As part of its CPS, each CA MUST declare its
 expected time frame to process (approve, issue, and publish) a
 certificate application.

4.3. Certificate Issuance

4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

 If a CA determines that the request is acceptable, it MUST issue the
 corresponding certificate and publish it in the RPKI distributed
 repository system via publication of the certificate at the CA's
 repository publication point.

4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate

 The CA MUST notify the subscriber when the certificate is published.
 The means by which a subscriber is notified MUST be defined by each
 CA in its CPS.

4.4. Certificate Acceptance

4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance

 Within the timeframe specified in its CPS, the CA MUST place the
 certificate in the repository and notify the subscriber.  This MAY be
 done without subscriber review and acceptance.  Each CA MUST state in
 its CPS the procedures it follows for publishing of the certificate
 and notification to the subscriber.

4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA

 Certificates MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository
 system via publication of the certificate at the CA's repository
 publication point as per the conduct described in Section 4.4.1.  The
 procedures for publication MUST be defined by each CA in its CPS.

4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 The CPS of each CA MUST indicate whether any other entities will be
 notified when a certificate is issued.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 17] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage

 A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.

4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage

 Each holder of an INR is eligible to request an X.509 [X.509] CA
 certificate containing appropriate RFC 3779 extensions.  Holders of
 CA resource certificates also MAY issue EE certificates to themselves
 to enable verification of RPKI signed objects that they generate.

4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

 Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances.
 If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the
 relying party must obtain such assurances in order for such reliance
 to be deemed reasonable.
 Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST independently (1)
 verify that the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose
 that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CP (see
 Section 1.4), and (2) assess the status of the certificate and all
 the certificates in the chain (terminating at a trust anchor (TA)
 accepted by the RP) that issued the certificates relevant to the
 certificate in question.  If any of the certificates in the
 certificate chain have been revoked or have expired, the relying
 party is solely responsible for determining whether reliance on a
 digital signature to be verified by the certificate in question is
 acceptable.  Any such reliance is made solely at the risk of the
 relying party.
 If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is
 appropriate, the relying party must utilize appropriate software
 and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a
 condition of relying on the certificate.  Moreover, the relying party
 MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI
 Certificate Profile [RFC6487], which specifies the extended
 validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.

4.6. Certificate Renewal

 This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal.
 Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace
 an old one prior to its expiration.  Only the validity dates and the
 serial number (the field in the certificate, not the DN attribute)
 are changed.  The public key and all other information remain the
 same.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 18] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal

 A certificate MUST be processed for renewal based on its expiration
 date or a renewal request from the subscriber.  Prior to the
 expiration of an existing subscriber's certificate, it is the
 responsibility of the subscriber to renew the certificate to maintain
 continuity of certificate usage.  If the issuing CA initiates the
 renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then that
 CA MUST notify the holder in advance of the renewal process.  The
 validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate SHOULD overlap
 that of the previous certificate to ensure continuity of certificate
 usage.  It is RECOMMENDED that the renewed certificate be issued and
 published at least 1 week prior to the expiration of the certificate
 it replaces.
 Certificate renewal SHOULD incorporate the same public key as the
 previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as
 compromised.  If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of
 Section 4.7 apply.

4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal

 Only the certificate holder or the issuing CA may initiate the
 renewal process.  The certificate holder MAY request an early
 renewal, for example, if it expects to be unavailable to support the
 renewal process during the normal expiration period.  An issuing CA
 MAY initiate the renewal process based on the certificate expiration
 date.

4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

 Renewal procedures MUST ensure that the person or organization
 seeking to renew a certificate is in fact the subscriber (or
 authorized by the subscriber) of the certificate and the legitimate
 holder of the INR associated with the renewed certificate.  Renewal
 processing MUST verify that the certificate in question has not been
 revoked.

4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.

4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Renewal Certificate

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 19] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.

4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.

4.7. Certificate Re-Key

 This section describes the procedures for certificate re-key.
 Certificate re-key is the issuance of a new certificate to replace an
 old one because the key needs to be replaced.  Unlike with
 certificate renewal, the public key is changed.

4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-Key

 Re-key of a certificate SHOULD be performed only when required, based
 on:
 1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated
    private key, or
 2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key
    pair
 A CA re-key operation has dramatic consequences, requiring the
 reissuance of all certificates issued by the re-keyed entity.  So it
 should be performed only when necessary and in a way that preserves
 the ability of relying parties to validate certificates whose
 validation path includes the re-keyed entity.  CA key rollover MUST
 follow the procedures defined in "CA Key Rollover in the RPKI"
 [RFC6489].
 Note that if a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779
 extensions, the replacement certificate MUST incorporate the same
 public key rather than a new key.  This applies when one is adding
 INRs (revocation not required) and when one is removing INRs
 (revocation required (see Section 4.8.1)).
 If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous
 certificate MUST be revoked.

4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

 The holder of the certificate may request a re-key.  In addition, the
 CA that issued the certificate MAY choose to initiate a re-key based
 on a verified compromise report.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 20] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests

 The re-key process follows the general procedures of certificate
 generation as defined in Section 4.3.

4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.

4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.

4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.

4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.

4.8. Certificate Modification

4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification

 Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to selected
 attribute values in a certificate.  In the context of the RPKI, the
 only changes that are accommodated by certificate modification are
 changes to the INR holdings described by the RFC 3779 extension(s)
 and changes to the SIA extension.
 When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
 issued.  If no INR holdings are removed from the certificate, the new
 certificate MUST contain the same public key and the same expiration
 date as the original certificate, but with the SIA extension and/or
 the INR set expanded.  In this case, revocation of the previous
 certificate is not required.
 When previously distributed INRs are removed from a certificate, then
 the old certificate MUST be revoked and a new certificate MUST be
 issued, reflecting the changed INR holdings.  (The SIA extension in
 the new certificate will be unchanged, unless the affected INR holder
 supplies a new SIA value.)

4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification

 Either the certificate holder or the issuer may initiate the
 certificate modification process.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 21] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests

 The CA MUST determine that the requested modification is appropriate
 and that the procedures for the issuance of a new certificate are
 followed (see Section 4.3).

4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.3.2.

4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.1.

4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.2.

4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

 No additional stipulations beyond those of Section 4.4.3.

4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension

4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation

 A certificate MUST be revoked (and published on a CRL) if there is
 reason to believe that there has been a compromise of a subscriber's
 private key.  A certificate also MAY be revoked to invalidate a data
 object signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
 Other circumstances that justify revocation of a certificate MAY be
 specified in a CA's CPS.
 Note:  If new INRs are being added to an organization's existing
 distribution, the old certificate need not be revoked.  Instead, a
 new certificate MAY be issued with both the old and the new resources
 and the old key.  If INRs are being removed or if there has been a
 key compromise, then the old certificate MUST be revoked (and a
 re-key MUST be performed in the event of key compromise).

4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation

 This MUST be defined in the CPS of the organization that issued the
 certificate.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 22] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request

 A subscriber MAY submit a request to the certificate issuer for a
 revocation.  This request MUST identify the certificate to be revoked
 and MUST be authenticated.  The procedures for making the request
 MUST be described in the CPS for each CA.  The RPKI provisioning
 document [RFC6492] describes a protocol that MAY be used to make
 revocation requests.
 A certificate issuer MUST notify the subscriber when revoking a
 certificate.  The notification requirement is satisfied by CRL
 publication.  The CPS for a CA MUST indicate the means by which the
 CA will inform a subscriber of certificate revocation.

4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period

 A subscriber SHOULD request revocation as soon as possible after the
 need for revocation has been identified.  There is no specified grace
 period for the subscriber in this process.

4.9.5. Time within which CA Must Process the Revocation Request

 No stipulation.  Each CA SHOULD specify its expected revocation
 processing time in its CPS.

4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties

 A relying party MUST acquire and check the most recent, scheduled CRL
 from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party
 validates a certificate.

4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency

 The CRL issuance frequency MUST be determined by each CA and stated
 in its CPS.  Each CRL carries a nextScheduledUpdate value, and a new
 CRL MUST be published at or before that time.  A CA MUST set the
 nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL to signal when the next
 scheduled CRL will be issued.

4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs

 The CPS for each CA MUST specify the maximum latency associated with
 posting its CRL to the repository system.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 23] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

4.10. Certificate Status Services

 This PKI does not make provision for use of the Online Certificate
 Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC2560] or Server-Based Certificate
 Validation Protocol (SCVP) [RFC5055].  This is because it is
 anticipated that the primary RPs (ISPs) will acquire and validate
 certificates for all participating resource holders.  These protocols
 are not designed for such large-scale, bulk certificate status
 checking.  RPs MUST check for new CRLs at least daily.  It is
 RECOMMENDED that RPs perform this check several times per day, but no
 more than 8-12 times per day (to avoid excessive repository
 accesses).

5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls

5.1. Physical Controls

 Each CA MUST maintain physical security controls for its operation
 that are commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
 management of INR distribution.  The physical controls employed for
 CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS.  Possible topics to be
 covered in the CPS are shown below.  (These sections are taken from
 [RFC3647].)

5.1.1. Site Location and Construction

5.1.2. Physical Access

5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning

5.1.4. Water Exposures

5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection

5.1.6. Media Storage

5.1.7. Waste Disposal

5.1.8. Off-Site Backup

5.2. Procedural Controls

 Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are
 commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
 management of INR distribution.  The procedural security controls
 employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS.  Possible
 topics to be covered in the CPS are shown below.  (These sections are
 taken from [RFC3647].)

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 24] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

5.2.1. Trusted Roles

5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task

5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role

5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties

5.3. Personnel Controls

 Each CA MUST maintain personnel security controls that are
 commensurate with those employed by the organization in the
 management of INR distribution.  The details for each CA MUST be
 specified in its CPS.

5.4. Audit Logging Procedures

 Details of how a CA implements the audit logging described in
 Sections 5.4.1 to 5.4.8 MUST be addressed in its CPS.

5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded

 Audit records MUST be generated for the basic operations of the
 certification authority computing equipment.  Audit records MUST
 include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary
 content data relating to the event.  Auditable events include:
 o  Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
 o  Messages received requesting CA actions  (e.g., certificate
    requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise
    notifications)
 o  Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
 o  Posting of any material to a repository
 o  Any attempts to change or delete audit data
 o  Key generation
 o  Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
 o  Clock adjustments

5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log

 Each CA MUST establish its own procedures for review of audit logs.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 25] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log

 Each CA MUST establish its own polices for retention of audit logs.

5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log

 The audit log SHOULD be protected based on current industry
 standards.

5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures

 The audit log SHOULD be backed up based on current industry
 standards.

5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments

 The RPKI subsystems of a registry or ISP SHOULD participate in any
 vulnerability assessments that these organizations run as part of
 their normal business practice.

5.6. Key Changeover

 When a CA wishes to change keys, it MUST acquire a new certificate
 containing its new public key.  See [RFC6489] for a description of
 how key changeover is effected in the RPKI.

5.7. CA or RA Termination

 In the RPKI, each subscriber acts as a CA for the specified INRs that
 were distributed to that entity.  Procedures associated with the
 termination of a CA MUST be described in the CPS for that CA.  These
 procedures MUST include a provision to notify each entity that issued
 a certificate to the organization that is operating the CA that is
 terminating.
 Since the RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating
 as the CA (see Section 1.3.2), there are no separate stipulations for
 RAs.

6. Technical Security Controls

 The organizations that distribute INRs to network subscribers are
 authoritative for these distributions.  This PKI is designed to
 enable ISPs and network subscribers to demonstrate that they are the
 holders of the INRs that have been distributed to them.  Accordingly,
 the security controls used by CAs and subscribers for this PKI need
 only to be as secure as those that apply to the procedures for
 administering the distribution of INR data by the extant

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 26] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 organizations.  Details of each CA's security controls MUST be
 described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation

6.1.1. Key Pair Generation

 In most instances, public key pairs will be generated by the subject,
 i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs.  However,
 some CAs MAY offer to generate key pairs on behalf of their subjects
 at the request of the subjects, e.g., to accommodate subscribers who
 do not have the ability to perform key generation in a secure
 fashion.  (The CA has to check the quality of the keys only if it
 generates them; see Section 6.1.6.)  Since the keys used in this PKI
 are not for non-repudiation purposes, generation of key pairs by CAs
 does not inherently undermine the security of the PKI.  Each CA MUST
 describe its key pair generation procedures in its CPS.

6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

 If a CA provides key pair generation services for subscribers, its
 CPS MUST describe the means by which private keys are delivered to
 subscribers in a secure fashion.

6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

 When a public key is transferred to the issuing CA to be certified,
 it MUST be delivered through a mechanism ensuring that the public key
 has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses
 the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.

6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

 CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are
 contained in certificates issued by other CAs.  These certificates
 MUST be published in the RPKI distributed repository system.  Relying
 parties download these certificates from the repositories.  Public
 key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors are
 distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis
 of locally defined criteria.

6.1.5. Key Sizes

 The algorithms and key sizes used in the RPKI are specified in "A
 Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
 Key Infrastructure" [RFC6485].

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 27] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

 The public key parameters used in the RPKI are specified in
 [RFC6485].  Each subscriber is responsible for performing checks on
 the quality of its key pair.  A CA is not responsible for performing
 such checks for subscribers except in the case where the CA generates
 the key pair on behalf of the subscriber.

6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)

 The Key usage extension bit values used in the RPKI are specified in
 RPKI Certificate Profile [RFC6487].

6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering

    Controls

6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls

 The cryptographic module standards and controls employed by each CA
 MUST be described in the CPS issued by that CA.

6.2.2. Private Key (N out of M) Multi-Person Control

 CAs MAY employ multi-person controls to constrain access to their
 private keys, but this is not a requirement for all CAs in the PKI.
 The CPS for each CA MUST describe which, if any, multi-person
 controls it employs.

6.2.3. Private Key Escrow

 No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI.

6.2.4. Private Key Backup

 Because of the adverse operational implications associated with the
 loss of use of a CA private key in the PKI, each CA MUST employ a
 secure means to back up its private keys.  The details of the
 procedures for backing up a CA's private key MUST be described in the
 CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.5. Private Key Archival

 The details of the process and procedures used to archive the CA's
 private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 28] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

 The details of the process and procedures used to transfer the CA's
 private key into or from a cryptographic module MUST be described in
 the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

 The details of the process and procedures used to store the CA's
 private key on a cryptographic module and protect it from
 unauthorized use MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.8. Method of Activating a Private Key

 The details of the process and procedures used to activate the CA's
 private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.9. Method of Deactivating a Private Key

 The details of the process and procedures used to deactivate the CA's
 private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.10. Method of Destroying a Private Key

 The details of the process and procedures used to destroy the CA's
 private key MUST be described in the CPS issued by the CA.

6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating

 The security rating of the cryptographic module MUST be described in
 the CPS issued by the CA.

6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management

6.3.1. Public Key Archival

 Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need
 to archive public keys.

6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

 The INRs held by a CA may periodically change when it receives new
 distributions.  To minimize disruption, the CA key pair MUST NOT
 change when INRs are added to its certificate.
 If ISP and network-subscriber certificates are tied to the duration
 of service agreements, these certificates should have validity
 periods commensurate with the duration of these agreements.  In any

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 29] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 case, the validity period for certificates MUST be chosen by the
 issuing CA and described in its CPS.

6.4. Activation Data

 Each CA MUST document in its CPS how it will generate, install, and
 protect its activation data.

6.5. Computer Security Controls

 Each CA MUST document the technical security requirements it employs
 for CA computer operation in its CPS.

6.6. Life-Cycle Technical Controls

6.6.1. System Development Controls

 The CPS for each CA MUST document any system development controls
 required by that CA, if applicable.

6.6.2. Security Management Controls

 The CPS for each CA MUST document the security controls applied to
 the software and equipment used for this PKI.  These controls MUST be
 commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for
 managing the INRs.

6.6.3. Life-Cycle Security Controls

 The CPS for each CA MUST document how the equipment (hardware and
 software) used for this PKI will be procured, installed, maintained,
 and updated.  This MUST be done in a fashion commensurate with the
 way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is
 handled.

6.7. Network Security Controls

 The CPS for each CA MUST document the network security controls
 employed for CA operation.  These MUST be commensurate with the
 protection it employs for the computers used for managing
 distribution of INRs.

6.8. Timestamping

 The RPKI does not make use of timestamping.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 30] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

7. Certificate and CRL Profiles

 Please refer to the RPKI Certificate and CRL Profile [RFC6487].

8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

 The certificate policy for a typical PKI defines the criteria against
 which prospective CAs are evaluated and establishes requirements that
 they must meet.  In this PKI, the CAs are already authoritative for
 the management of INRs, and the PKI simply supports verification of
 the distribution of these resources to network subscribers.
 Accordingly, whatever audit and other assessments are already used to
 ensure the security of the management of INRs is sufficient for this
 PKI.  The CPS for each CA MUST describe what audits and other
 assessments are used.

9. Other Business and Legal Matters

 As noted throughout this certificate policy, the organizations
 managing the distribution of INRs are authoritative in their roles as
 managers of this data.  They MUST operate this PKI to allow the
 holders of INRs to generate digitally signed data that attest to
 these distributions.  Therefore, the manner in which the
 organizations in question manage their business and legal matters for
 this PKI MUST be commensurate with the way in which they already
 manage business and legal matters in their existing roles.  Since
 there is no single set of responses to this section that would apply
 to all organizations, the topics listed in Sections 4.9.1 to 4.9.11
 and 4.9.13 to 4.9.17 of RFC 3647 SHOULD be covered in the CPS issued
 by each CA, although not every CA may choose to address all of these
 topics.  Please note that the topics in the above sections of RFC
 3647 become sections 9.1 to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.17 in the CPS.

9.12. Amendments

9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment

 The procedure for amending this CP is via written notice from the
 IESG in the form of a new (BCP) RFC that updates or obsoletes this
 document.

9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period

 Successive versions of the CP will be published with the following
 statement:
    This CP takes effect on MM/DD/YYYY.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 31] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 MM/DD/YYYY MUST be a minimum of 6 months from the date of
 publication.

9.12.3. Circumstances under Which OID Must Be Changed

 If the IESG judges that changes to the CP do not materially reduce
 the acceptability of certificates issued for RPKI purposes, there
 will be no change to the CP OID.  If the IESG judges that changes to
 the CP do materially change the acceptability of certificates for
 RPKI purposes, then there MUST be a new CP OID.

10. Security Considerations

 According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
 rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
 particular community and/or class of applications with common
 security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
 in deciding whether a certificate and the binding therein are
 sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
 application.  This document describes the CP for the Resource Public
 Key Infrastructure (RPKI).  There are separate documents (CPSs) that
 cover the factors that determine the degree to which a relying party
 can trust the binding embodied in a certificate.  The degree to which
 such a binding can be trusted depends on several factors, e.g., the
 practices followed by the CA in authenticating the subject; the CA's
 operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls,
 including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for
 example, in protecting the private key), and the stated
 responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
 example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
 liability).
 Since name uniqueness within the RPKI cannot be guaranteed, there is
 a risk that two or more CAs in the RPKI will issue certificates and
 CRLs under the same issuer name.  Path validation implementations
 that conform to the resource certification path validation algorithm
 (see [RFC6487]) verify that the same key was used to sign both the
 target (the resource certificate) and the corresponding CRL.  So, a
 name collision will not change the result.  Use of the basic X.509
 path validation algorithm, which assumes name uniqueness, could
 result in a revoked certificate being accepted as valid or a valid
 certificate being rejected as revoked.  Relying parties must ensure
 that the software they use to validate certificates issued under this
 policy verifies that the same key was used to sign both the
 certificate and the corresponding CRL, as specified in [RFC6487].

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 32] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

11. Acknowledgments

 The authors would like to thank Geoff Huston, Randy Bush, Andrei
 Robachevsky, and other members of the RPKI community for reviewing
 this document and Matt Lepinski for his help with the formatting.

12. References

12.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
             Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC2026]   Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
             3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.
 [RFC3779]   Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
             Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
 [RFC6481]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile
             for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
             February 2012.
 [RFC6485]   Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
             Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
             RFC 6485, February 2012.
 [RFC6487]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile
             for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February
             2012.
 [RFC6489]   Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "CA Key Rollover
             in the RPKI", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012.

12.2. Informative References

 [RFC2560]   Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
             Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
             Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
 [RFC3647]   Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
             Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
             Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647,
             November 2003.
 [RFC5055]   Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
             Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
             (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 33] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

 [RFC5736]   Huston, G., Cotton, M., and L. Vegoda, "IANA IPv4 Special
             Purpose Address Registry", RFC 5736, January 2010.
 [RFC6480]   Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
             Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
 [RFC6482]   Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
             Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
 [RFC6486]   Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
             "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
             (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.
 [RFC6492]   Huston, G., Loomans, R., Ellacott, B., and R. Austein, "A
             Protocol for Provisioning Resource Certificates", RFC
             6492, February 2012.
 [X.509]     ITU-T Recommendation X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8, "Information
             technology -- Open systems interconnection -- The
             Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate
             frameworks", November 2008.

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 34] RFC 6484 Certificate Policy for the RPKI February 2012

Authors' Addresses

 Stephen Kent
 BBN Technologies
 10 Moulton Street
 Cambridge MA 02138
 USA
 Phone: +1 617 873 3988
 EMail: skent@bbn.com
 Derrick Kong
 BBN Technologies
 Moulton Street
 Cambridge MA 02138
 USA
 Phone: +1 617 873 1951
 EMail: dkong@bbn.com
 Karen Seo
 BBN Technologies
 10 Moulton Street
 Cambridge MA 02138
 USA
 Phone: +1 617 873 3152
 EMail: kseo@bbn.com
 Ronald Watro
 BBN Technologies
 10 Moulton Street
 Cambridge MA 02138
 USA
 Phone: +1 617 873 2551
 EMail: rwatro@bbn.com

Kent, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 35]

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