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rfc:rfc5940

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner Request for Comments: 5940 IECA Category: Standards Track R. Housley ISSN: 2070-1721 Vigil Security

                                                           August 2010
           Additional Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                   Revocation Information Choices

Abstract

 The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) allows revocation information
 to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,
 AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The
 preferred format for revocation information is the Certificate
 Revocation List (CRL), but an extension mechanism supports other
 revocation information formats.  This document defines two additional
 revocation information formats for Online Certificate Status Protocol
 (OCSP) responses and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
 (SCVP) requests and responses.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5940.

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 5940 Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices August 2010

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

1. Introduction

 The RevocationInfoChoices type defined in [CMS] provides a set of
 revocation status information alternatives, which allows revocation
 information to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,
 AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The intent
 is to provide information sufficient to determine whether the
 certificates and attribute certificates carried elsewhere in the CMS-
 protected content have been revoked.  There may be more revocation
 status information than necessary or there may be less revocation
 status information than necessary.
 X.509 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [PROFILE] are the primary
 source of revocation status information, but any other revocation
 information format can be supported.  This document specifies two
 other formats: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses
 [OCSP] and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
 requests and responses [SCVP].
 Section 2 discusses the RevocationInformation structure.  Section 3
 defines a mechanism to carry OCSP responses.  Section 4 defines a
 mechanism to carry SCVP requests and responses.  Appendix A provides
 the normative ASN.1 syntax for the two mechanisms.

1.1. Requirements Terminology

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [WORDS].

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 5940 Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices August 2010

2. Revocation Information

 For convenience, the ASN.1 definition of the RevocationInfoChoices
 type from [CMS] is repeated here:
 RevocationInfoChoices ::= SET OF RevocationInfoChoice
 RevocationInfoChoice ::= CHOICE {
   crl        CertificateList,
   other  [1] IMPLICIT OtherRevocationInfoFormat }
 OtherRevocationInfoFormat ::= SEQUENCE {
   otherRevInfoFormat  OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
   otherRevInfo        ANY DEFINED BY otherRevInfoFormat }
 The other CHOICE MUST be used to convey OCSP responses, SCVP
 requests, and SCVP responses.
 This document defines the id-ri arc under which the revocation
 information formats are defined.  The id-ri object identifier is:
 id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }
 NOTE: Numbers 1 and 3 were assigned to CRL and Delta CRL.  These two
 numbers are not used because these formats use the
 RevocationInfoChoice crl CHOICE when included in CMS [CMS].

3. OCSP Response

 To carry an OCSP response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set to
 id-ri-ocsp-response, which has the following ASN.1 definition:
 id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }
 In this case, otherRevInfo MUST carry the OCSP response using the
 OCSPResponse type defined in [OCSP].  The responseStatus field MUST
 be successful and the responseBytes field MUST be present.

4. SCVP Request and Response

 Unlike OSCP, SCVP permits unprotected and protected responses, where
 protected responses can be digitally signed or include message
 authentication codes.  While this provides more flexibility, it
 complicates implementations when an SCVP response can be validated by
 entities other than the entity that generated the SCVP request.  If a
 lower layer provides authentication and integrity for the client-
 server interaction and the response is not protected, then a third

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 5940 Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices August 2010

 party cannot validate the response because there is no way to know
 that the response was returned over a protected connection.  If a
 message authentication code is used, then the third party will be
 unable to validate the message authentication code because it does
 not possess the necessary private key.  For these reasons, SCVP
 responses sent to a third party MUST be signed by the SCVP server so
 that the third party can validate them.
 SCVP response validation requires matching it to the SCVP request.
 This means that the SCVP request MUST always be included with the
 response.  SCVP permits the client to retain the response, and SCVP
 permits the request to be returned in the response (in the requestReq
 field).  The request need not be protected for matching to be
 performed; nonces and certIds can be checked.
 To carry the SCVP request and response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set
 to id-ri-scvp, which has the following ASN.1 definition:
 id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }
 In this case, the otherRevInfo MUST carry both the SCVP request and
 response with the following structure:
 SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
   request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
   response     ContentInfo }
 The SCVPReqRes has the following fields:
 o request contains the SCVP request.  It contains the unprotected
   request, authenticated request, or the signed request.  The request
   MUST be present if the response does not include the requestRef
   fullRequest field.
 o response contains the SCVP response.  It MUST contain the signed
   response.  Additionally, the responseStatus MUST be okay.
   Unprotected and authenticated responses MUST NOT be included.

5. Security Considerations

 The security considerations of [CMS], [CMS-ASN], [OCSP], [SCVP], and
 [PROFILE-ASN] apply.
 To locally store unprotected or authenticated SCVP responses, a
 client can encapsulate the unprotected or authenticated SCVP response
 in a SignedData.  It is a matter of local policy whether these SCVP
 responses that are encapsulated and signed by the client are
 considered valid by another entity.

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 5940 Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices August 2010

6. IANA Considerations

 This document makes use of object identifiers.  These object
 identifiers are defined in an arc delegated by IANA to the PKIX
 Working Group.  When the PKIX Working Group closes, this arc and its
 registration procedures will be transferred to IANA.  No further
 action by IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated
 updates.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

 [CMS]     Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
           5652, September 2009.
 [CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
           Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911,
           June 2010.
 [OCSP]    Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
           Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
           Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
 [PROFILE-ASN]
           Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
           Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
           June 2010.
 [SCVP]    Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.
           Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol
           (SCVP)", RFC 5055, December 2007.
 [WORDS]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
           Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [X.680]   ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1:2002.
           Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One.
 [X.681]   ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 2:2002.
           Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
           Information Object Specification.
 [X.682]   ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 3:2002.
           Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
           Constraint Specification.

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 5940 Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices August 2010

 [X.683]   ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 4:2002.
           Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:
           Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications, 2002.

7.2. Informative References

 [PROFILE] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
           Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
           Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
           (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 5940 Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices August 2010

Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules

 Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
 structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
 [X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1.
 Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the
 structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
 [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the
 2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information as Appendix
 A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, however Appendix
 A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.

A.1. 1988 ASN.1 Module

 CMS-Other-RIs-2009-88
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
     mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-88(63)
   }
 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
 BEGIN
  1. - EXPORTS ALL

IMPORTS

  1. - FROM CMS [CMS]
 ContentInfo
   FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
   { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
     smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
 ;
 id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }
  1. - RevocationInfoChoice for OCSP response
  2. - OID included in otherRevInfoFormat
  3. - signed OCSP response included in otherRevInfo
 id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }
  1. - RevocationInfoChoice for SCVP response
  2. - OID included in otherRevInfoFormat
  3. - SCVPReqRes included in otherRevInfo

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 5940 Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices August 2010

 id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }
 SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
   request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
   response     ContentInfo }
 END

A.2. 2002 ASN.1 Module

 CMS-Other-RIs-2009-02
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
     mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-93(64)
   }
 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
 BEGIN
  1. - EXPORT ALL

IMPORTS

  1. - FROM [PROFILE-ASN]
 OCSPResponse
   FROM OCSP-2009
   { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
     mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-02(48) }
  1. - FROM [CMS-ASN]
 ContentInfo, OTHER-REVOK-INFO
   FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }
 ;
  1. - Defines OCSP and SCVP formats for RevocationInfoChoice
 SupportedOtherRevokInfo OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
   ri-ocsp-response |
   ri-scvp,
   ... }
 ri-ocsp-response OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
   OCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-ocsp-response }

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 5940 Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices August 2010

 id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
   dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }
 id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }
 ri-scvp OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {
   SCVPReqRes IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-scvp }
 id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }
 SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {
   request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,
   response     ContentInfo }
 END

Authors' Addresses

 Sean Turner
 IECA, Inc.
 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
 Fairfax, VA 22031
 USA
 EMail: turners@ieca.com
 Russ Housley
 Vigil Security, LLC
 918 Spring Knoll Drive
 Herndon, VA 20170
 USA
 EMail: housley@vigilsec.com

Turner & Housley Standards Track [Page 9]

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