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rfc:rfc5857

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) E. Ertekin Request for Comments: 5857 C. Christou Category: Standards Track R. Jasani ISSN: 2070-1721 Booz Allen Hamilton

                                                            T. Kivinen
                                                       AuthenTec, Inc.
                                                            C. Bormann
                                               Universitaet Bremen TZI
                                                              May 2010
  IKEv2 Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec

Abstract

 In order to integrate Robust Header Compression (ROHC) with IPsec, a
 mechanism is needed to signal ROHC channel parameters between
 endpoints.  Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a mechanism that can be
 leveraged to exchange these parameters.  This document specifies
 extensions to IKEv2 that will allow ROHC and its associated channel
 parameters to be signaled for IPsec Security Associations (SAs).

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5857.

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.
 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
 10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
 than English.

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................3
 2. Terminology .....................................................3
 3. ROHC Channel Initialization for ROHCoIPsec ......................3
    3.1. ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify Message ..............................3
         3.1.1. ROHC Attributes .....................................5
         3.1.2. ROHC Attribute Types ................................6
    3.2. ROHC Channel Parameters That Are Implicitly Set ............9
 4. Security Considerations .........................................9
 5. IANA Considerations .............................................9
 6. Acknowledgments ................................................10
 7. References .....................................................11
    7.1. Normative References ......................................11
    7.2. Informative References ....................................12

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

1. Introduction

 Increased packet header overhead due to IPsec [IPSEC] can result in
 the inefficient utilization of bandwidth.  Coupling ROHC [ROHC] with
 IPsec offers an efficient way to transfer protected IP traffic.
 ROHCoIPsec [ROHCOIPSEC] requires configuration parameters to be
 initialized at the compressor and decompressor.  Current
 specifications for hop-by-hop ROHC negotiate these parameters through
 a link-layer protocol such as the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)
 (i.e., ROHC over PPP [ROHC-PPP]).  Since key exchange protocols
 (e.g., IKEv2 [IKEV2]) can be used to dynamically establish parameters
 between IPsec peers, this document defines extensions to IKEv2 to
 signal ROHC parameters for ROHCoIPsec.

2. Terminology

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [BRA97].

3. ROHC Channel Initialization for ROHCoIPsec

 The following subsections define extensions to IKEv2 that enable an
 initiator and a responder to signal parameters required to establish
 a ROHC channel for a ROHCoIPsec session.

3.1. ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify Message

 ROHC channel parameters MUST be signaled separately for each ROHC-
 enabled IPsec SA.  Specifically, a new Notify message type MUST be
 included in the IKE_AUTH and CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges whenever a new
 ROHC-enabled IPsec SA is created, or an existing one is rekeyed.
 The Notify payload sent by the initiator MUST contain the channel
 parameters for the ROHC session.  These parameters indicate the
 capabilities of the ROHC decompressor at the initiator.  Upon receipt
 of the initiator's request, the responder will either ignore the
 payload (if it doesn't support ROHC or the proposed parameters) or
 respond with a Notify payload that contains its own ROHC channel
 parameters.
 Note that only one Notify payload is used to convey ROHC parameters.
 If multiple Notify payloads containing ROHC parameters are received,
 all but the first such Notify payload MUST be dropped.  If the
 initiator does not receive a Notify payload with the responder's ROHC
 channel parameters, ROHC MUST NOT be enabled on the Child SA.

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

 A new Notify Message Type value, denoted ROHC_SUPPORTED, indicates
 that the Notify payload is conveying ROHC channel parameters (Section
 4).
 The Notify payload (defined in RFC 4306 [IKEV2]) is illustrated in
 Figure 1.
                         1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    ! Next Payload  !C!  RESERVED   !         Payload Length        !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    !  Protocol ID  !   SPI Size    !      Notify Message Type      !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    !                                                               !
    ~                Security Parameter Index (SPI)                 ~
    !                                                               !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    !                                                               !
    ~                       Notification Data                       ~
    !                                                               !
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                       Figure 1. Notify Payload Format
 The fields of the Notify payload are set as follows:
 Next Payload (1 octet)
    Identifier for the payload type of the next payload in the
    message.  Further details can be found in RFC 4306 [IKEV2].
 Critical (1 bit)
    Since all IKEv2 implementations support the Notify payload, this
    value MUST be set to zero.
 Payload Length (2 octets)
    As defined in RFC 4306 [IKEV2], this field indicates the length of
    the current payload, including the generic payload header.
 Protocol ID (1 octet)
    Since this notification message is used during the creation of a
    Child SA, this field MUST be set to zero.

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

 SPI Size (1 octet)
    This value MUST be set to zero, since no SPI is applicable (ROHC
    parameters are set at SA creation; thus, the SPI has not been
    defined).
 Notify Message Type (2 octets)
    This field MUST be set to ROHC_SUPPORTED.
 Security Parameter Index (SPI)
    Since the SPI Size field is 0, this field MUST NOT be transmitted.
 Notification Data (variable)
    This field MUST contain at least three ROHC Attributes (Section
    3.1.1).

3.1.1. ROHC Attributes

 The ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message is used to signal channel
 parameters between ROHCoIPsec compressor and decompressor.  The
 message contains a list of "ROHC Attributes", which contain the
 parameters required for the ROHCoIPsec session.
 The format for signaling ROHC Attributes takes a similar format to
 the Transform Attributes described in Section 3.3.5 of RFC 4306
 [IKEV2].  The format of the ROHC Attribute is shown in Figure 2.
                          1                   2                   3
      0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     !A!     ROHC Attribute Type     !  AF=0  ROHC Attribute Length  !
     !F!                             !  AF=1  ROHC Attribute Value   !
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     !                   AF=0  ROHC Attribute Value                  !
     !                   AF=1  Not Transmitted                       !
     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
               Figure 2.  Format of the ROHC Attribute
 o  Attribute Format (AF) (1 bit) - If the AF bit is a zero (0), then
    the ROHC Attribute is expressed in a Type/Length/Value format.  If
    the AF bit is a one (1), then the ROHC attribute is expressed in a
    Type/Value (TV) format.

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

 o  ROHC Attribute Type (15 bits) - Unique identifier for each type of
    ROHC attribute (Section 3.1.2).
 o  ROHC Attribute Length (2 octets) - Length (in octets) of the
    Attribute Value.  When the AF bit is a one (1), the ROHC Attribute
    Value is 2 octets and the ROHC Attribute Length field is not
    present.
 o  ROHC Attribute Value (variable length) - Value of the ROHC
    Attribute associated with the ROHC Attribute Type.  If the AF bit
    is a zero (0), this field's length is defined by the ROHC
    Attribute Length field.  If the AF bit is a one (1), the length of
    the ROHC Attribute Value is 2 octets.

3.1.2. ROHC Attribute Types

 This section describes five ROHC Attribute Types: MAX_CID,
 ROHC_PROFILE, ROHC_INTEG, ROHC_ICV_LEN, and MRRU.  The value
 allocated for each ROHC Attribute Type is specified in Section 4.
 MAX_CID (Maximum Context Identifier, AF = 1)
    The MAX_CID attribute is a mandatory attribute.  Exactly one
    MAX_CID attribute MUST be sent.  The MAX_CID field indicates the
    maximum value of a context identifier supported by the ROHCoIPsec
    decompressor.  This attribute value is 2 octets in length.  The
    value for MAX_CID MUST be at least 0 and at most 16383.  Since
    CIDs can take values between 0 and MAX_CID, the actual number of
    contexts that can be used are MAX_CID+1.  If MAX_CID is 0, this
    implies having one context.  The recipient of the MAX_CID
    Attribute MUST only use context identifiers up to MAX_CID for
    compression.
    Note that the MAX_CID parameter is a one-way notification (i.e.,
    the sender of the attribute indicates what it can handle to the
    other end); therefore, different values for MAX_CID may be
    announced in each direction.
 ROHC_PROFILE (ROHC Profile, AF = 1)
    The ROHC_PROFILE attribute is a mandatory attribute.  Each
    ROHC_PROFILE attribute has a fixed length of 4 octets, and its
    attribute value is a 2-octet long ROHC Profile Identifier
    [ROHCPROF].  There MUST be at least one ROHC_PROFILE attribute
    included in the ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message.  If multiple
    ROHC_PROFILE attributes are sent, the order is arbitrary.  The
    recipient of a ROHC_PROFILE attribute(s) MUST only use the
    profile(s) proposed for compression.

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

    Several common profiles are defined in RFCs 3095 [ROHCV1] and 5225
    [ROHCV2].  Note, however, that two versions of the same profile
    MUST NOT be signaled.  For example, if a ROHCoIPsec decompressor
    supports both ROHCv1 UDP (0x0002) and ROHCv2 UDP (0x0102), both
    profiles MUST NOT be signaled.  This restriction is needed, as
    packets compressed by ROHC express only the 8 least-significant
    bits of the profile identifier; since the 8 least-significant bits
    for corresponding profiles in ROHCv1 and ROHCv2 are identical, the
    decompressor is not capable of determining the ROHC version that
    was used to compress the packet.
    Note that the ROHC_PROFILE attribute is a one-way notification;
    therefore, different values for ROHC_PROFILE may be announced in
    each direction.
 ROHC_INTEG (Integrity Algorithm for Verification of Decompressed
 Headers, AF = 1)
    The ROHC_INTEG attribute is a mandatory attribute.  There MUST be
    at least one ROHC_INTEG attribute contained within the
    ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message.  The attribute value contains the
    identifier of an integrity algorithm that is used to ensure the
    integrity of the decompressed packets (i.e., ensure that the
    decompressed packet headers are identical to the original packet
    headers prior to compression).
    Authentication algorithms that MUST be supported are specified in
    the "Authentication Algorithms" table in Section 3.1.1 ("ESP
    Encryption and Authentication Algorithms") of RFC 4835
    [CRYPTO-ALG] (or its successor).
    The integrity algorithm is represented by a 2-octet value that
    corresponds to the value listed in the IKEv2 Parameters registry
    [IKEV2-PARA], "Transform Type 3 - Integrity Algorithm Transform
    IDs" section.  Upon receipt of the ROHC_INTEG attribute(s), the
    responder MUST select exactly one of the proposed algorithms; the
    chosen value is sent back in the ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message
    returned by the responder to the initiator.  The selected
    integrity algorithm MUST be used in both directions.  If the
    responder does not accept any of the algorithms proposed by the
    initiator, ROHC MUST NOT be enabled on the SA.
    It is noted that:
    1.  The keys (one for each direction) for this integrity algorithm
        are derived from the IKEv2 KEYMAT (see [IKEV2], Section 2.17).
        For the purposes of this key derivation, ROHC is considered to

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

        be an IPsec protocol.  When a ROHC-enabled CHILD_SA is
        rekeyed, the key associated with this integrity algorithm is
        rekeyed as well.
    2.  A ROHCoIPsec initiator MAY signal a value of zero (0x0000) in
        a ROHC_INTEG attribute.  This corresponds to "NONE" in the
        "IKEv2 Integrity Algorithm Transform IDs" registry.  The
        ROHCoIPsec responder MAY select this value by responding to
        the initiator with a ROHC_INTEG attribute of zero (0x0000).
        In this scenario, no integrity algorithm is applied in either
        direction.
    3.  The ROHC_INTEG attribute is a parameter that is negotiated
        between two ends.  In other words, the initiator indicates
        what it supports, the responder selects one of the ROHC_INTEG
        values proposed and sends the selected value to the initiator.
 ROHC_ICV_LEN (Integrity Algorithm Length, AF = 1)
    The ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute is an optional attribute.  There MAY be
    zero or one ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute contained within the
    ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message.  The attribute specifies the number
    of Integrity Check Value (ICV) octets the sender expects to
    receive on incoming ROHC packets.  The ICV of the negotiated
    ROHC_INTEG algorithms MUST be truncated to ROHC_ICV_LEN bytes by
    taking the first ROHC_ICV_LEN bytes of the output.  Both the
    initiator and responder announce a single value for their own ICV
    length.  The recipient of the ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute MUST truncate
    the ICV to the length contained in the message.  If the value of
    the ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute is zero, then an ICV MUST NOT be sent.
    If no ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute is sent at all or if the ROHC_ICV_LEN
    is larger than the length of the ICV of selected algorithm, then
    the full ICV length as specified by the ROHC_INTEG algorithm MUST
    be sent.
    Note that the ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute is a one-way notification;
    therefore, different values for ROHC_ICV_LEN may be announced in
    each direction.
 MRRU (Maximum Reconstructed Reception Unit, AF = 1)
    The MRRU attribute is an optional attribute.  There MAY be zero or
    one MRRU attribute contained within the ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify
    message.  The attribute value is 2 octets in length.  The
    attribute specifies the size of the largest reconstructed unit in
    octets that the ROHCoIPsec decompressor is expected to reassemble
    from ROHC segments (see Section 5.2.5 of [ROHCV1]).  This size
    includes the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and the ROHC ICV.  If

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

    MRRU is 0 or if no MRRU attribute is sent, segment headers MUST
    NOT be transmitted on the ROHCoIPsec channel.
    Note that the MRRU attribute is a one-way notification; therefore,
    different values for MRRU may be announced in each direction.
 If an unknown ROHC Attribute Type Value is received, it MUST be
 silently ignored.

3.2. ROHC Channel Parameters That Are Implicitly Set

 The following ROHC channel parameters MUST NOT be signaled:
 o  LARGE_CIDS: This value is implicitly determined by the value of
    MAX_CID (i.e., if MAX_CID is <= 15, LARGE_CIDS is assumed to be
    0).
 o  FEEDBACK_FOR: When a pair of SAs is created (one in each
    direction), the ROHC channel parameter FEEDBACK_FOR MUST be set
    implicitly to the other SA of the pair (i.e., the SA pointing in
    the reverse direction).

4. Security Considerations

 The ability to negotiate the length of the ROHC ICV may introduce
 vulnerabilities to the ROHCoIPsec protocol.  Specifically, the
 capability to signal a short ICV length may result in scenarios where
 erroneous packets are forwarded into the protected domain.  This
 security consideration is documented in further detail in Section
 6.1.4 of [ROHCOIPSEC] and Section 5 of [IPSEC-ROHC].
 This security consideration can be mitigated by using longer ICVs,
 but this comes at the cost of additional overhead, which reduces the
 overall benefits offered by ROHCoIPsec.

5. IANA Considerations

 This document defines a new Notify message (Status Type).  Therefore,
 IANA has allocated one value from the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types"
 registry to indicate ROHC_SUPPORTED.
 In addition, IANA has created a new "ROHC Attribute Types" registry
 in the "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters" registry
 [IKEV2-PARA].  Within the "ROHC Attribute Types" registry, this
 document allocates the following values:

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

Registry: Value ROHC Attribute Type Format Reference ———– ————————————– —— ——— 0 RESERVED [RFC5857] 1 Maximum Context Identifier (MAX_CID) TV [RFC5857] 2 ROHC Profile (ROHC_PROFILE) TV [RFC5857] 3 ROHC Integrity Algorithm (ROHC_INTEG) TV [RFC5857] 4 ROHC ICV Length in bytes (ROHC_ICV_LEN) TV [RFC5857] 5 Maximum Reconstructed Reception Unit (MRRU) TV [RFC5857] 6-16383 Unassigned 16384-32767 Private use [RFC5857]

 Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], the IANA
 policy for assigning new values for the ROHC Attribute Types registry
 shall be Expert Review.
 For registration requests, the responsible IESG Area Director will
 appoint the Designated Expert.  The Designated Expert will post a
 request to both the ROHC and IPsec mailing lists (or a successor
 designated by the Area Director) for comment and review.  The
 Designated Expert will either approve or deny the registration
 request and publish a notice of the decision to both mailing lists
 (or their successors), as well as informing IANA.  A denial notice
 must be justified by an explanation.

6. Acknowledgments

 The authors would like to thank Sean O'Keeffe, James Kohler, and
 Linda Noone of the Department of Defense, as well as Rich Espy of
 OPnet for their contributions and support in the development of this
 document.
 The authors would also like to thank Yoav Nir and Robert A Stangarone
 Jr.: both served as committed document reviewers for this
 specification.
 In addition, the authors would like to thank the following for their
 numerous reviews and comments to this document:
 o  Magnus Westerlund
 o  Stephen Kent
 o  Lars-Erik Jonsson
 o  Pasi Eronen
 o  Jonah Pezeshki

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

 o  Carl Knutsson
 o  Joseph Touch
 o  David Black
 o  Glen Zorn
 Finally, the authors would also like to thank Tom Conkle, Michele
 Casey, and Etzel Brower.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

 [IPSEC]      Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
 [ROHC]       Sandlund, K., Pelletier, G., and L-E. Jonsson, "The
              RObust Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 5795,
              March 2010.
 [IKEV2]      Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.
 [BRA97]      Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [ROHCV1]     Bormann, C., Burmeister, C., Degermark, M., Fukushima,
              H., Hannu, H., Jonsson, L-E., Hakenberg, R., Koren, T.,
              Le, K., Liu, Z., Martensson, A., Miyazaki, A., Svanbro,
              K., Wiebke, T., Yoshimura, T., and H. Zheng, "RObust
              Header Compression (ROHC): Framework and four profiles:
              RTP, UDP, ESP, and uncompressed", RFC 3095, July 2001.
 [ROHCV2]     Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header
              Compression Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP,
              IP, ESP and UDP-Lite", RFC 5225, April 2008.
 [IPSEC-ROHC] Ertekin, E., Christou, C., and C. Bormann, "IPsec
              Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over
              IPsec", RFC 5858, May 2010.
 [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS]
              Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

7.2. Informative References

 [ROHCOIPSEC] Ertekin, E., Jasani, R., Christou, C., and C. Bormann,
              "Integration of Header Compression over IPsec Security
              Associations", RFC 5856, May 2010.
 [ROHC-PPP]   Bormann, C., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over
              PPP", RFC 3241, April 2002.
 [ROHCPROF]   IANA, "RObust Header Compression (ROHC) Profile
              Identifiers", <http://www.iana.org>.
 [CRYPTO-ALG] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
              Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
              and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4835, April 2007.
 [IKEV2-PARA] IANA, "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (KEv2)
              Parameters", <http://www.iana.org>.

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 5857 IKEv2 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec May 2010

Authors' Addresses

 Emre Ertekin
 Booz Allen Hamilton
 5220 Pacific Concourse Drive, Suite 200
 Los Angeles, CA  90045
 US
 EMail: ertekin_emre@bah.com
 Chris Christou
 Booz Allen Hamilton
 13200 Woodland Park Dr.
 Herndon, VA  20171
 US
 EMail: christou_chris@bah.com
 Rohan Jasani
 Booz Allen Hamilton
 13200 Woodland Park Dr.
 Herndon, VA  20171
 US
 EMail: ro@breakcheck.com
 Tero Kivinen
 AuthenTec, Inc.
 Fredrikinkatu 47
 HELSINKI
 FI
 EMail: kivinen@iki.fi
 Carsten Bormann
 Universitaet Bremen TZI
 Postfach 330440
 Bremen  D-28334
 Germany
 EMail: cabo@tzi.org

Ertekin, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]

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