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rfc:rfc5756

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner Request for Comments: 5756 IECA Updates: 4055 D. Brown Category: Standards Track Certicom ISSN: 2070-1721 K. Yiu

                                                             Microsoft
                                                            R. Housley
                                                        Vigil Security
                                                               T. Polk
                                                                  NIST
                                                          January 2010
     Updates for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS Algorithm Parameters

Abstract

 This document updates RFC 4055.  It updates the conventions for using
 the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
 (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key
 Infrastructure (PKI).  Specifically, it updates the conventions for
 algorithm parameters in an X.509 certificate's subjectPublicKeyInfo
 field.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5756.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

Turner, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 5756 RFC 4055 Update January 2010

 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.
 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
 10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
 than English.

1. Introduction

 RFC 4055 specifies conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme -
 Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport
 algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  It
 provides algorithm identifiers and parameters for RSAES-OAEP.
 This document updates the conventions for RSAES-OAEP parameters in
 the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of an X.509 certificate.  The PKIX WG
 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) design team recommended that Key
 Derivation Functions (KDFs) should not be constrained within a
 certificate; rather, KDF constraints should be negotiated in
 protocols that need to employ certificates.
 Only two paragraphs in [RFC4055] discuss RSAES-OAEP parameters in
 X.509 certificates: the second paragraph of Section 4 and the first
 paragraph of Section 4.1.  This document only updates these two
 paragraphs.  Section 3 updates the second paragraph in Section 4 of
 [RFC4055], while Section 4 updates the second paragraph in Section
 4.1 of [RFC4055].  "Old:" prefaces the text to be replaced and "New:"
 prefaces the replacement text.
 This document also replaces incorrect references to the
 publicKeyAlgorithms field in Section 3 with references to the
 parameters field in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field.
 Section 3 also rewords the second and third paragraphs for clarity.

Turner, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 5756 RFC 4055 Update January 2010

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Changes to Section 3 (Second and Third Paragraphs)

 This change clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS-params in the
 signature, signatureAlgorithm, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields for
 certification authority (CA) and end-entity (EE) certificates.  It
 also clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS-params in the
 signatureAlgorithm field in certificate revocation lists (CRLs).
 Old:
 CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSASSA-PSS algorithm
 identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the
 publicKeyAlgorithms field if the cA boolean flag is set in the basic
 constraints certificate extension.  CAs MAY require that the
 parameters be present in the publicKeyAlgorithms field for end-entity
 certificates.
 CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS algorithm for signing certificates SHOULD
 include RSASSA-PSS-params in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm
 parameters in their own certificates.  CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS
 algorithm for signing certificates or CRLs MUST include RSASSA-PSS-
 params in the signatureAlgorithm parameters in the TBSCertificate or
 TBSCertList structures.
 New:
 When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the
 TBSCertificate or TBSCertList signature algorithm field, then the
 RSASSA-PSS-params structure MUST be included in the TBSCertificate or
 TBSCertList signature parameters field.
 When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the
 TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of CA
 certificates, then the parameters field SHOULD include the RSASSA-
 PSS-params structure.  When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier
 appears in the TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of
 EE certificates, then the parameters field MAY include the RSASSA-
 PSS-params structure.

Turner, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 5756 RFC 4055 Update January 2010

 All certificates and CRLs signed by a CA that supports the id-RSASSA-
 PSS algorithm MUST include the RSASSA-PSS-params in the
 signatureAlgorithm parameters in Certificate and CertList structures,
 respectively.

3. Changes to Section 4 (Second Paragraph)

 This change prohibits the inclusion of RSAES-OAEP-params in the
 subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  This was done because a) it does not
 affect interoperability and b) it aligns with PKIX practice to not
 include limitations on how the public key can be used in
 subjectPublicKeyInfo.  A poll of implementers was taken and there
 were no objections to this change as it did not affect current
 implementations.
 Old:
 CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm
 identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the
 publicKeyAlgorithms field for all certificates.  Entities that use a
 certificate with a publicKeyAlgorithm value of id-RSA-OAEP where the
 parameters are absent SHOULD use the default set of parameters for
 RSAES-OAEP-params.  Entities that use a certificate with a
 publicKeyAlgorithm value of rsaEncryption SHOULD use the default set
 of parameters for RSAES-OAEP-params.
 New:
 CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm
 identifier MUST NOT include parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo
 algorithm field.

4. Changes to Section 4.1 (First Paragraph)

 This change prohibits the inclusion of parameters in the
 subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  This was done because a) it does not
 affect interoperability and b) it aligns with PKIX practice to not
 include limitations on how the public key can be used in
 subjectPublicKeyInfo.  A poll of implementers was taken and there
 were no objections to this change as it did not affect current
 implementations.
 Old:
 When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters
 MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax.  The parameters may be
 either absent or present when used as subject public key information.

Turner, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 5756 RFC 4055 Update January 2010

 The parameters MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier
 associated with an encrypted value.
 New:
 When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters
 MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax.  The parameters MUST be
 absent when used in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field.  The parameters
 MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier associated with
 an encrypted value.

5. Security Considerations

 The security considerations from [RFC4055] apply.
 If the RSAES-OAEP-params are negotiated, then the negotiation
 mechanism needs to provide integrity for these parameters.  For
 example, an S/MIME Agent can advertise their capabilities in the
 SMIMECapabilities attribute, which is either a signed attribute
 [RFC5751] or a certificate extension [RFC4262].

6. References

6.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC4055]     Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
               Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use
               in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
               Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
               Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.

6.2. Informative References

 [RFC4262]     Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for
               Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
               Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005.
 [RFC5751]     Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose
               Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
               Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.

Turner, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 5756 RFC 4055 Update January 2010

Authors' Addresses

 Sean Turner
 IECA, Inc.
 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
 Fairfax, VA 22031
 USA
 EMail: turners@ieca.com
 Kelvin Yiu
 Microsoft
 One Microsoft Way
 Redmond, WA 98052-6399
 USA
 EMail: kelviny@microsoft.com
 Daniel R. L. Brown
 Certicom Corp
 5520 Explorer Drive #400
 Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
 CANADA
 EMail: dbrown@certicom.com
 Russ Housley
 Vigil Security, LLC
 918 Spring Knoll Drive
 Herndon, VA 20170
 USA
 EMail: housley@vigilsec.com
 Tim Polk
 NIST
 Building 820, Room 426
 Gaithersburg, MD 20899
 USA
 EMail: wpolk@nist.gov

Turner, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]

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