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rfc:rfc5035

Network Working Group J. Schaad Request for Comments: 5035 Soaring Hawk Consulting Updates: 2634 August 2007 Category: Standards Track

              Enhanced Security Services (ESS) Update:
                  Adding CertID Algorithm Agility

Status of This Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

 In the original Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME document (RFC
 2634), a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to
 be used in validation with the signature was introduced; this
 structure was hardwired to use SHA-1.  This document allows for the
 structure to have algorithm agility and defines a new attribute for
 this purpose.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   1.1.  Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
   1.2.  Updates to RFC 2634  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
 2.  Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute
     Definitions' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
 3.  Insert New Section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute
     Definition Version 2'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
 4.  Insert New Section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification
     Version 2' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
 5.  Insert New Section 5.4.2 'Signing Certificate Attribute
     Definition Version 1'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
 6.  Insert New Section 5.4.2.1 'Certificate Identification
     Version 1' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
 7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
 8.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Schaad Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

1. Introduction

 In the original Enhanced Security Services (ESS) for S/MIME document
 [ESS], a structure for cryptographically linking the certificate to
 be used in validation with the signature was defined.  This
 structure, called ESSCertID, identifies a certificate by its hash.
 The structure is hardwired to use a SHA-1 hash value.  The recent
 attacks on SHA-1 require that we define a new attribute that allows
 for the use of different algorithms.  This document performs that
 task.
 This document defines the structure ESSCertIDv2 along with a new
 attribute SigningCertificateV2, which uses the updated structure.
 This document allows for the structure to have algorithm agility by
 including an algorithm identifier and defines a new signed attribute
 to use the new structure.
 This document specifies the continued use of ESSCertID to ensure
 compatibility when SHA-1 is used for certificate disambiguation.

1.1. Notation

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2. Updates to RFC 2634

 This document updates Section 5.4 of RFC 2634.  Once the updates are
 applied, the revised section will have the following structure:
 5.4  Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions
 5.4.1  Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2
 5.4.1.1  Certificate Identification Version 2
 5.4.2  Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1
 5.4.2.1  Certificate Identification Version 1
 In addition, the ASN.1 module in Appendix A is replaced.

Schaad Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

2. Replace Section 5.4 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions'

 5.4 Signing Certificate Attribute Definitions
 The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent simple
 substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
 of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
 Two different attributes exist for this due to a flaw in the original
 design.  The only substantial difference between the two attributes
 is that SigningCertificateV2 allows for hash algorithm agility, while
 SigningCertificate forces the use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm.  With
 the recent advances in the ability to create hash collisions for
 SHA-1, it is wise to move forward sooner rather than later.
 When the SHA-1 hash function is used, the SigningCertificate
 attribute MUST be used.  The SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be
 used if any algorithm other than SHA-1 is used and SHOULD NOT be used
 for SHA-1.  Applications SHOULD recognize both attributes as long as
 they consider SHA-1 able to distinguish between two different
 certificates, (i.e., the possibility of a collision is sufficiently
 low).  If both attributes exist in a single message, they are
 independently evaluated.
 Four cases exist that need to be taken into account when using this
 attribute for correct processing:
 1.  Signature validates and the hashes match: This is the success
     case.
 2.  Signature validates and the hashes do not match: In this case,
     the certificate contained the correct public key, but the
     certificate containing the public key is not the one that the
     signer intended to be used.  In this case the application should
     attempt a search for a different certificate with the same public
     key and for which the hashes match.  If no such certificate can
     be found, this is a failure case.
 3.  Signature fails validation and the hashes match: In this case, it
     can be assumed that the signature has been modified in some
     fashion.  This is a failure case.
 4.  Signature fails validation and the hashes do not match: In this
     case, it can be either that the signature has been modified, or
     that the wrong certificate has been used.  Applications should
     attempt a search for a different certificate that matches the
     hash value in the attribute and use the new certificate to retry
     the signature validation.

Schaad Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

3. Insert New Section 5.4.1 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definition

  Version 2'
 5.4.1 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 2
 The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple
 substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
 of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
 SigningCertificateV2 is identified by the OID:
     id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
         member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
         smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }
 The attribute has the ASN.1 definition:
     SigningCertificateV2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
         certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertIDv2,
         policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
     }
 certs
    contains the list of certificates that are to be used in
    validating the message.  The first certificate identified in the
    sequence of certificate identifiers MUST be the certificate used
    to verify the signature.  The encoding of the ESSCertIDv2 for this
    certificate SHOULD include the issuerSerial field.  If other
    constraints ensure that issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in
    the SignerInfo, the issuerSerial field MAY be omitted.  The
    certificate identified is used during the signature verification
    process.  If the hash of the certificate does not match the
    certificate used to verify the signature, the signature MUST be
    considered invalid.
    If more than one certificate is present, subsequent certificates
    limit the set of certificates that are used during validation.
    Certificates can be either attribute certificates (limiting
    authorizations) or public key certificates (limiting path
    validation).  The issuerSerial field (in the ESSCertIDv2
    structure) SHOULD be present for these certificates, unless the
    client who is validating the signature is expected to have easy
    access to all the certificates required for validation.  If only
    the signing certificate is present in the sequence, there are no
    restrictions on the set of certificates used in validating the
    signature.

Schaad Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

 policies
    contains a sequence of policy information terms that identify
    those certificate policies that the signer asserts apply to the
    certificate, and under which the certificate should be relied
    upon.  This value suggests a policy value to be used in the
    relying party's certification path validation.  The definition of
    PolicyInformation can be found in [RFC3280].
 If present, the SigningCertificateV2 attribute MUST be a signed
 attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute.  CMS defines
 SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute.  A SignerInfo MUST NOT
 include multiple instances of the SigningCertificateV2 attribute.
 CMS defines the ASN.1 syntax for the signed attributes to include
 attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.  A SigningCertificateV2 attribute
 MUST include only a single instance of AttributeValue.  There MUST
 NOT be zero or multiple instances of AttributeValue present in the
 attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.

4. Insert New Section 5.4.1.1 'Certificate Identification Version 2'

 Insert the following text as a new section.
 5.4.1.1 Certificate Identification Version 2
 The best way to identify certificates is an often-discussed issue.
 The ESSCertIDv2 structure supplies two different fields that are used
 for this purpose.
 The hash of the entire certificate allows for a verifier to check
 that the certificate used in the verification process was the same
 certificate the signer intended.  Hashes are convenient in that they
 are frequently used by certificate stores as a method of indexing and
 retrieving certificates as well.  The use of the hash is required by
 this structure since the detection of substituted certificates is
 based on the fact they would map to different hash values.
 The issuer/serial number pair is the method of identification of
 certificates used in [RFC3280].  That document imposes a restriction
 for certificates that the issuer distinguished name must be present.
 The issuer/serial number pair would therefore normally be sufficient
 to identify the correct signing certificate.  (This assumes the same
 issuer name is not reused from the set of trust anchors.)  The
 issuer/serial number pair can be stored in the sid field of the
 SignerInfo object.  However, the sid field is not covered by the
 signature.  In the cases where the issuer/serial number pair is not
 used in the sid or the issuer/serial number pair needs to be signed,
 it SHOULD be placed in the issuerSerial field of the ESSCertIDv2
 structure.

Schaad Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

 Attribute certificates and additional public key certificates
 containing information do not have an issuer/serial number pair
 represented anywhere in a SignerInfo object.  When an attribute
 certificate or an additional public key certificate is not included
 in the SignedData object, it becomes much more difficult to get the
 correct set of certificates based only on a hash of the certificate.
 For this reason, these certificates SHOULD be identified by the
 IssuerSerial object.
 This document defines a certificate identifier as:
      ESSCertIDv2 ::=  SEQUENCE {
          hashAlgorithm           AlgorithmIdentifier
                 DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256},
          certHash                 Hash,
          issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
      }
      Hash ::= OCTET STRING
      IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {
          issuer                   GeneralNames,
          serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber
     }
 The fields of ESSCertIDv2 are defined as follows:
 hashAlgorithm
    contains the identifier of the algorithm used in computing
    certHash.
 certHash
    is computed over the entire DER-encoded certificate (including the
    signature) using the SHA-1 algorithm.
 issuerSerial
    holds the identification of the certificate.  The issuerSerial
    would normally be present unless the value can be inferred from
    other information (e.g., the sid field of the SignerInfo object).
 The fields of IssuerSerial are defined as follows:
 issuer
    contains the issuer name of the certificate.  For non-attribute
    certificates, the issuer MUST contain only the issuer name from
    the certificate encoded in the directoryName choice of
    GeneralNames.  For attribute certificates, the issuer MUST contain
    the issuer name field from the attribute certificate.

Schaad Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

 serialNumber
    holds the serial number that uniquely identifies the certificate
    for the issuer.

5. Insert New Section 5.4.2 'Signing Certificate Attribute Definition

  Version 1'
 (Note: This section does not present new material.  This section
 contains the original contents of Section 5.4 in [ESS], which are
 retained with minor changes in this specification to achieve
 backwards compatibility.)
 Insert the following text as a new section.
 5.4.2 Signing Certificate Attribute Definition Version 1
 The signing certificate attribute is designed to prevent the simple
 substitution and re-issue attacks, and to allow for a restricted set
 of certificates to be used in verifying a signature.
 The definition of SigningCertificate is
     SigningCertificate ::=  SEQUENCE {
         certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
         policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
     }
     id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
         member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
         smime(16) id-aa(2) 12 }
 The first certificate identified in the sequence of certificate
 identifiers MUST be the certificate used to verify the signature.
 The encoding of the ESSCertID for this certificate SHOULD include the
 issuerSerial field.  If other constraints ensure that
 issuerAndSerialNumber will be present in the SignerInfo, the
 issuerSerial field MAY be omitted.  The certificate identified is
 used during the signature verification process.  If the hash of the
 certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the
 signature, the signature MUST be considered invalid.
 If more than one certificate is present in the sequence of
 ESSCertIDs, the certificates after the first one limit the set of
 certificates that are used during validation.  Certificates can be
 either attribute certificates (limiting authorizations) or public key
 certificates (limiting path validation).  The issuerSerial field (in
 the ESSCertID structure) SHOULD be present for these certificates,
 unless the client who is validating the signature is expected to have

Schaad Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

 easy access to all the certificates required for validation.  If only
 the signing certificate is present in the sequence, there are no
 restrictions on the set of certificates used in validating the
 signature.
 The sequence of policy information terms identifies those certificate
 policies that the signer asserts apply to the certificate, and under
 which the certificate should be relied upon.  This value suggests a
 policy value to be used in the relying party's certification path
 validation.
 If present, the SigningCertificate attribute MUST be a signed
 attribute; it MUST NOT be an unsigned attribute.  Cryptographic
 Message Syntax (CMS) defines SignedAttributes as a SET OF Attribute.
 A SignerInfo MUST NOT include multiple instances of the
 SigningCertificate attribute.  CMS defines the ASN.1 syntax for the
 signed attributes to include attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.  A
 SigningCertificate attribute MUST include only a single instance of
 AttributeValue.  There MUST NOT be zero or multiple instances of
 AttributeValue present in the attrValues SET OF AttributeValue.

6. Insert New Section 5.4.2.1 'Certificate Identification Version 1'

 (Note: This section does not present new material.  This section
 contains the original contents of Section 5.4 in [ESS], which are
 retained with minor changes in this specification to achieve
 backwards compatibility.)
 Delete old Section 5.4.1
 Insert the following as new text
 5.4.2.1 Certificate Identification Version 1
 Certificates are uniquely identified using the information in the
 ESSCertID structure.  Discussion can be found in Section 5.4.1.1.
 This document defines a certificate identifier as:
     ESSCertID ::=  SEQUENCE {
          certHash                 Hash,
          issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
     }

Schaad Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

 The fields of ESSCertID are defined as follows:
 certHash
    is computed over the entire DER-encoded certificate (including the
    signature).
 issuerSerial
    holds the identification of the certificate.  This field would
    normally be present unless the value can be inferred from other
    information (e.g., the sid field of the SignerInfo object).
 The fields of IssuerSerial are discussed in Section 5.4.1.1

7. Security Considerations

 This document is designed to address the security issue of a
 substituted certificate used by the validator.  If a different
 certificate is used by the validator than the signer, the validator
 may not get the correct result.  An example of this would be that the
 original certificate was revoked and a new certificate with the same
 public key was issued for a different individual.  Since the issuer/
 serial number field is not protected, the attacker could replace this
 and point to the new certificate and validation would be successful.
 The attributes defined in this document are to be placed in locations
 that are protected by the signature.  This attribute does not provide
 any additional security if placed in an unsigned or un-authenticated
 location.
 The attributes defined in this document permit a signer to select a
 hash algorithm to identify a certificate.  A poorly selected hash
 algorithm may provide inadequate protection against certificate
 substitution or result in denial of service for this protection.  By
 employing the attributes defined in this specification with the same
 hash algorithm used for message signing, the sender can ensure that
 these attributes provide commensurate security.
 Since recipients must support the hash algorithm to verify the
 signature, selecting the same hash algorithm also increases the
 likelihood that the hash algorithm is supported in the context of
 certificate identification.  Note that an unsupported hash algorithm
 for certificate identification does not preclude validating the
 message but does deny the message recipient protection against
 certificate substitution.
 To ensure that legacy implementations are provided protection against
 certificate substitution, clients are permitted to include both
 ESScertID and ESScertIDv2 in the same message.  Since these

Schaad Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

 attributes are generated and evaluated independently, the contents
 could conceivably be in conflict.  Specifically, where a signer has
 multiple certificates containing the same public key, the two
 attributes could specify different signing certificates.  The result
 of signature processing may vary depending on which certificate is
 used to validate the signature.
 Recipients that attempt to evaluate both attributes may choose to
 reject such a message.

8. Normative References

 [ESS]      Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME",
            RFC 2634, June 1999.
 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997.
 [RFC3280]  Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
            X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
            Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
            April 2002.
 [RFC3852]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
            RFC 3852, July 2004.
 [UTF8]     Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
            10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.

Schaad Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

Appendix A. ASN.1 Module

 Replace the ASN.1 module in RFC 2634 with this one.

ExtendedSecurityServices-2006

    { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
      pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS – Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852]

  ContentType, IssuerAndSerialNumber, SubjectKeyIdentifier
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004 { iso(1) member-body(2)
              us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
              modules(0) cms-2004(24)}

– PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Section A.1 Explicity Tagged Module – 1988 Syntax [RFC3280]

  AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateSerialNumber
     FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
              internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
              id-pkix1-explicit(18) }

– PKIX Certificate and CRL Profile, Sec A.2 Implicitly Tagged Module, – 1988 Syntax [RFC3280]

  PolicyInformation, GeneralNames
        FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
              internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
              id-pkix1-implicit(19)};

– Extended Security Services – The construct "SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF" appears in several ASN.1 – constructs in this module. A valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE can have zero or – more entries. The SIZE (1..MAX) construct constrains the SEQUENCE to – have at least one entry. MAX indicates the upper bound is – unspecified. Implementations are free to choose an upper bound that – suits their environment.

– UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING

– The contents are formatted as described in [UTF8]

– Section 2.7

ReceiptRequest ::= SEQUENCE {

signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
receiptsFrom ReceiptsFrom,
receiptsTo SEQUENCE SIZE (1..ub-receiptsTo) OF GeneralNames

}

Schaad Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

ub-receiptsTo INTEGER ::= 16

id-aa-receiptRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 1}

ContentIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING

id-aa-contentIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 7}

ReceiptsFrom ::= CHOICE { allOrFirstTier [0] AllOrFirstTier, – formerly "allOrNone [0]AllOrNone" receiptList [1] SEQUENCE OF GeneralNames }

AllOrFirstTier ::= INTEGER { – Formerly AllOrNone allReceipts (0), firstTierRecipients (1) }

– Section 2.8

Receipt ::= SEQUENCE {

version ESSVersion,
contentType ContentType,
signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING

}

id-ct-receipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)

 rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-ct(1) 1}

ESSVersion ::= INTEGER { v1(1) }

– Section 2.9

ContentHints ::= SEQUENCE {

contentDescription UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX)) OPTIONAL,
contentType ContentType

}

id-aa-contentHint OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)

  rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 4}

– Section 2.10

MsgSigDigest ::= OCTET STRING

Schaad Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

id-aa-msgSigDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 5}

– Section 2.11

ContentReference ::= SEQUENCE {

contentType ContentType,
signedContentIdentifier ContentIdentifier,
originatorSignatureValue OCTET STRING

}

id-aa-contentReference OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 10 }

– Section 3.2

ESSSecurityLabel ::= SET {

security-policy-identifier SecurityPolicyIdentifier,
security-classification SecurityClassification OPTIONAL,
privacy-mark ESSPrivacyMark OPTIONAL,
security-categories SecurityCategories OPTIONAL

}

id-aa-securityLabel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 2}

SecurityPolicyIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

SecurityClassification ::= INTEGER {

unmarked (0),
unclassified (1),
restricted (2),
confidential (3),
secret (4),
top-secret (5)

}(0..ub-integer-options)

ub-integer-options INTEGER ::= 256

ESSPrivacyMark ::= CHOICE {

  pString      PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-privacy-mark-length)),
  utf8String   UTF8String (SIZE (1..MAX))

}

ub-privacy-mark-length INTEGER ::= 128

SecurityCategories ::= SET SIZE (1..ub-security-categories) OF

      SecurityCategory

Schaad Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

ub-security-categories INTEGER ::= 64

SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {

type  [0] OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type

}

–Note: The aforementioned SecurityCategory syntax produces identical –hex encodings as the following SecurityCategory syntax that is –documented in the X.411 specification: – –SecurityCategory ::= SEQUENCE {

– type [0] SECURITY-CATEGORY, – value [1] ANY DEFINED BY type } – –SECURITY-CATEGORY MACRO ::= –BEGIN –TYPE NOTATION ::= type | empty –VALUE NOTATION ::= value (VALUE OBJECT IDENTIFIER) –END

– Section 3.4

EquivalentLabels ::= SEQUENCE OF ESSSecurityLabel

id-aa-equivalentLabels OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 9}

– Section 4.4

MLExpansionHistory ::= SEQUENCE

    SIZE (1..ub-ml-expansion-history) OF MLData

id-aa-mlExpandHistory OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)

  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 3 }

ub-ml-expansion-history INTEGER ::= 64 MLData ::= SEQUENCE {

mailListIdentifier EntityIdentifier,
expansionTime GeneralizedTime,
mlReceiptPolicy MLReceiptPolicy OPTIONAL

}

EntityIdentifier ::= CHOICE {

issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
subjectKeyIdentifier SubjectKeyIdentifier

}

Schaad Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

MLReceiptPolicy ::= CHOICE {

none [0] NULL,
insteadOf [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames,
inAdditionTo [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralNames

}

– Section 5.4

SigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {

  certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertID,
  policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL

}

id-aa-signingCertificate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)

  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
  smime(16) id-aa(2) 12 }

SigningCertificateV2 ::= SEQUENCE {

  certs        SEQUENCE OF ESSCertIDv2,
  policies     SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL

}

id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)

  member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
  smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }

id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)

  country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
  csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }

ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {

   hashAlgorithm           AlgorithmIdentifier
          DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256},
   certHash                Hash,
   issuerSerial            IssuerSerial OPTIONAL

}

ESSCertID ::= SEQUENCE {

   certHash                 Hash,
   issuerSerial             IssuerSerial OPTIONAL

}

Hash ::= OCTET STRING IssuerSerial ::= SEQUENCE {

   issuer                   GeneralNames,
   serialNumber             CertificateSerialNumber

}

END

Schaad Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

– of ExtendedSecurityServices-2006

Author's Address

 Jim Schaad
 Soaring Hawk Consulting
 PO Box 675
 Gold Bar, WA  98251
 EMail: jimsch@exmsft.com

Schaad Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 5035 ESSCertID Update August 2007

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
 retain all their rights.
 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
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Schaad Standards Track [Page 17]

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