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rfc:rfc4850

Network Working Group D. Wysochanski Request for Comments: 4850 Network Appliance, Inc. Updates: 3720 April 2007 Category: Standards Track

               Declarative Public Extension Key for
Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI) Node Architecture

Status of This Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

 The Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI) protocol,
 described in RFC 3720, allows for extension items to the protocol in
 the form of Private or Public Extension Keys.  This document
 describes a Public Extension Key for the purpose of enhancing iSCSI
 supportability.  The key accomplishes this objective by allowing
 iSCSI nodes to communicate architecture details during the iSCSI
 login sequence.  The receiving node can then use this information for
 enhanced logging and support.  This document updates RFC 3720 to
 allow iSCSI extension items to be defined by standards track RFCs and
 experimental RFCs in addition to informational RFCs.

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 4850 iSCSI Node Architecture April 2007

1. Introduction

1.1. Overview

 This document describes a declarative Public Extension Key, as
 defined by Section 12.22 of RFC 3720 [2], that may be used to
 communicate additional iSCSI node information to the peer node in a
 session.  The information carried in the described key has been found
 to be valuable in real iSCSI customer environments as initiator and
 target vendors collaborate to resolve technical issues and better
 understand the interaction of iSCSI implementations.
 The key has been modeled after the HTTP "Server" and "User-Agent"
 header fields as specified in Sections 14.38 and 14.43 of RFC 2616
 [3], with the text-value(s) of the key roughly equivalent to Product
 Tokens in Section 3.8 of RFC 2616 [3].  Note, however, that the text-
 value(s) in the key's list-of-values MUST conform to the Text Format
 as specified in Section 5.1 of RFC 3720 [2].
 The key is sent during operational parameter negotiation of an iSCSI
 session's login phase.  The intended use of this key is to provide
 enhanced logging and support capabilities, and to enable collection
 of iSCSI implementation and usage information.

1.2. Terminology

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].

2. Definition

 The definition of the key is as follows, conforming to Sections 11
 and 12 of RFC 3720 [2], with example list-of-values conforming to
 Section 5.1 of RFC 3720 [2].
 The key is defined with a use of "LO", making it a Leading Only key,
 and does not modify Sections 11 or 12 of RFC 3720 [2].  Thus, the key
 MUST only be sent on the leading connection, MUST NOT be changed
 after the leading connection login, and MUST only be sent after the
 security negotiation login stage has completed (during operational
 negotiation login stage).  The key may be sent during normal or
 discovery sessions.

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 4850 iSCSI Node Architecture April 2007

2.1. X#NodeArchitecture

 Use: LO, Declarative
 Senders: Initiator and Target
 Scope: SW
 X#NodeArchitecture=<list-of-values>
 Examples:
    X#NodeArchitecture=ExampleOS/v1234,ExampleInc_SW_Initiator/1.05a
    X#NodeArchitecture=ExampleInc_HW_Initiator/4010,Firmware/2.0.0.5
    X#NodeArchitecture=ExampleInc_SW_Initiator/2.1,CPU_Arch/i686
 The initiator or target declares the details of its iSCSI node
 architecture to the remote endpoint.  These details may include, but
 are not limited to, iSCSI vendor software, firmware, or hardware
 versions, the OS version, or hardware architecture.
 The length of the key value (total length of the list-of-values) MUST
 NOT be greater than 255 bytes.
 X#NodeArchitecture MUST NOT be redeclared.

3. Implementation

 Functional behavior of the iSCSI node (this includes the iSCSI
 protocol logic -- the SCSI, iSCSI, and TCP/IP protocols) MUST NOT
 depend on the presence, absence, or content of the key.  The key MUST
 NOT be used by iSCSI nodes for interoperability, or exclusion of
 other nodes.  To ensure proper use, key values SHOULD be set by the
 node itself, and there SHOULD NOT be provisions for the key values to
 contain user-defined text.
 Nodes implementing this key MUST choose one of the following
 implementation options:
    o  only transmit the key,
    o  only log the key values received from other nodes, or
    o  both transmit and log the key values.
 Each node choosing to implement transmission of the key values MUST
 be prepared to handle the response of RFC 3720 [2] compliant nodes
 that do not understand the key (RFC 3720 [2] states that compliant
 nodes MUST respond with X#NodeArchitecture=NotUnderstood).
 Nodes that implement transmission and/or logging of the key values
 may also implement administrative mechanisms that disable and/or

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 4850 iSCSI Node Architecture April 2007

 change the logging and key transmission detail (see Security
 Considerations).  Thus, a valid behavior for this key may be that a
 node is completely silent (the node does not transmit any key value,
 and simply discards any key values it receives without issuing a
 NotUnderstood response).

4. Security Considerations

 This extension key transmits specific implementation details about
 the node that sends it; such details may be considered sensitive in
 some environments.  For example, if a certain software or firmware
 version is known to contain security weaknesses, announcing the
 presence of that version via this key may not be desirable.  The
 countermeasures for this security concern are:
 o  sending less detailed information in the key values,
 o  not sending the extension key, or
 o  using IPsec to provide confidentiality for the iSCSI connection on
    which the key is sent (see RFC 3720 [2] and RFC 3723 [4]).
 To support the first and second countermeasures, all implementations
 of this extension key MUST provide an administrative mechanism to
 disable sending the key.  In addition, all implementations SHOULD
 provide an administrative mechanism to configure a verbosity level of
 the key value, thereby controlling the amount of information sent.
 For example, a lower verbosity might enable transmission of node
 architecture component names only, but no version numbers.
 The choice of which countermeasure is most appropriate depends on the
 environment.  However, sending less detailed information in the key
 values may be an acceptable countermeasure in many environments,
 since it provides a compromise between sending too much information
 and the other more complete countermeasures of not sending the key at
 all or using IPsec.
 In addition to security considerations involving transmission of the
 key contents, any logging method(s) used for the key values MUST keep
 the information secure from intruders.  For all implementations, the
 requirements to address this security concern are:
 o  Display of the log MUST only be possible with administrative
    rights to the node.
 o  Options to disable logging to disk and to keep logs for a fixed
    duration SHOULD be provided.

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 4850 iSCSI Node Architecture April 2007

 Finally, it is important to note that different nodes may have
 different levels of risk, and these differences may affect the
 implementation.  The components of risk include assets, threats, and
 vulnerabilities.  Consider the following example iSCSI nodes, which
 demonstrate differences in assets and vulnerabilities of the nodes,
 and as a result, differences in implementation:
 o  One iSCSI target based on a special-purpose operating system.
    Since the iSCSI target controls access to the data storage
    containing company assets, the asset level is seen as very high.
    Also, because of the special-purpose operating system, in which
    vulnerabilities are less well-known, the vulnerability level is
    viewed as low.
 o  Multiple iSCSI initiators in a blade farm, each running a general-
    purpose operating system.  The asset level of each node is viewed
    as low, since blades are replaceable and low cost.  However, the
    vulnerability level is viewed as high, since there are many well-
    known vulnerabilities to the general-purpose operating system.
 For the above target, an appropriate implementation might be logging
 of received key values, but no transmission of the key.  For the
 initiators, an appropriate implementation might be transmission of
 the key, but no logging of received key values.

5. IANA Considerations

 The standards action of this document updates RFC 3720 to allow any
 iSCSI extension item, specifically X# extension text keys, Y# digest
 algorithms, and Z# authentication methods, to be defined by a
 standards track, experimental, or informational RFC.  This document
 is a standards track RFC that defines an X# extension text key.
 IANA registered this key as follows:
 o  Key Name: X#NodeArchitecture
 o  Description: Node architecture details
 o  Reference: [RFC4850]
 The update to RFC 3720 to allow additional types of RFCs for iSCSI
 Extension items has the same effect as if the following changes were
 made to the text of RFC 3720 (RFC text cannot be changed after
 publication):

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 4850 iSCSI Node Architecture April 2007

 1) In Section 11.1, the requirement that Z# Authentication methods
    "MUST be described by an informational RFC." is changed to "MUST
    be described by a standards track RFC, an experimental RFC, or an
    informational RFC."
 2) In Section 12.1, the requirement that Y# Digest algorithms "MUST
    be described by an informational RFC." is changed to "MUST be
    described by a standards track RFC, an experimental RFC, or an
    informational RFC."
 3) In Section 12.22, the requirement that X# text keys "MUST be
    described by an informational RFC." is changed to "MUST be
    described by a standards track RFC, an experimental RFC, or an
    informational RFC."
 4) In Section 13.3, the description of allowed RFC types for
    extension items is changed from "The RFC may be informational
    rather than Standards-Track," to "The RFC MUST be standards track,
    experimental, or informational,"
 5) In Section 13.5.2, the phrase "standards track" is changed to
    "standards track or experimental" in the last sentence of the
    first paragraph, so that the sentence reads: "If the specification
    is a standards track or experimental document, the usual IETF
    procedures for such documents are followed."
 The registries for iSCSI extension items should be managed as if
 these changes had been made to the text of RFC 3720.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

 [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
      Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [2]  Satran, J., Meth, K., Sapuntzakis, C., Chadalapaka, M., and E.
      Zeidner, "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI)",
      RFC 3720, April 2004.

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 4850 iSCSI Node Architecture April 2007

6.2. Informative References

 [3]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L.,
      Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol --
      HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
 [4]  Aboba, B., Tseng, J., Walker, J., Rangan, V., and F. Travostino,
      "Securing Block Storage Protocols over IP", RFC 3723, April
      2004.

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 4850 iSCSI Node Architecture April 2007

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

 The IP Storage (ips) Working Group in the Transport Area of IETF has
 been responsible for defining the iSCSI protocol (apart from a host
 of other relevant IP Storage protocols).  The author acknowledges the
 contributions of the entire working group.
 The following individuals directly contributed to identifying issues
 and/or suggesting resolutions to the issues found in this document:
 David Black, Mallikarjun Chadalapaka, Paul Koning, Julian Satran,
 John Hufferd, Claire Kraft, Ranga Sankar, Joseph Pittman, Greg Berg,
 John Forte, Jim Yuill, William Studenmund, and Ken Sandars.  This
 document benefited from all these contributions.
 Finally, the author recognizes Network Appliance, Inc. for
 sponsorship and support during the development of this work.

Author's Address

 Dave Wysochanski
 8311 Brier Creek Parkway
 Suite 105-296
 Raleigh, NC  27617
 US
 Phone: +1 919 696 8130
 EMail: wysochanski@pobox.com

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 4850 iSCSI Node Architecture April 2007

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
 retain all their rights.
 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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Acknowledgement

 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
 Internet Society.

Wysochanski Standards Track [Page 9]

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