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rfc:rfc4543

Network Working Group D. McGrew Request for Comments: 4543 Cisco Systems, Inc. Category: Standards Track J. Viega

                                                          McAfee, Inc.
                                                              May 2006
      The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in
                          IPsec ESP and AH

Status of This Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

 This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
 Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) as a mechanism to provide
 data origin authentication, but not confidentiality, within the IPsec
 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH).
 GMAC is based on the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation, and can
 be efficiently implemented in hardware for speeds of 10 gigabits per
 second and above, and is also well-suited to software
 implementations.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................2
    1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................3
 2. AES-GMAC ........................................................3
 3. The Use of AES-GMAC in ESP ......................................3
    3.1. Initialization Vector ......................................4
    3.2. Nonce Format ...............................................4
    3.3. AAD Construction ...........................................5
    3.4. Integrity Check Value (ICV) ................................6
    3.5. Differences with AES-GCM-ESP ...............................6
    3.6. Packet Expansion ...........................................7
 4. The Use of AES-GMAC in AH .......................................7
 5. IKE Conventions .................................................8
    5.1. Phase 1 Identifier .........................................8
    5.2. Phase 2 Identifier .........................................8
    5.3. Key Length Attribute .......................................9
    5.4. Keying Material and Salt Values ............................9
 6. Test Vectors ....................................................9
 7. Security Considerations ........................................10
 8. Design Rationale ...............................................11
 9. IANA Considerations ............................................11
 10. Acknowledgements ..............................................11
 11. References ....................................................12
    11.1. Normative References .....................................12
    11.2. Informative References ...................................12

1. Introduction

 This document describes the use of AES-GMAC mode (AES-GMAC) as a
 mechanism for data origin authentication in ESP [RFC4303] and AH
 [RFC4302].  We refer to these methods as ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC and
 AUTH_AES_GMAC, respectively.  ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC is a companion
 to the AES Galois/Counter Mode ESP [RFC4106], which provides
 authentication as well as confidentiality.  ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC
 is intended for cases in which confidentiality is not desired.  Like
 GCM, GMAC is efficient and secure, and is amenable to high-speed
 implementations in hardware.  ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC and
 AUTH_AES_GMAC are designed so that the incremental cost of
 implementation, given an implementation is AES-GCM-ESP, is small.
 This document does not cover implementation details of GCM or GMAC.
 Those details can be found in [GCM], along with test vectors.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. AES-GMAC

 GMAC is a block cipher mode of operation providing data origin
 authentication.  It is defined in terms of the GCM authenticated
 encryption operation as follows.  The GCM authenticated encryption
 operation has four inputs: a secret key, an initialization vector
 (IV), a plaintext, and an input for additional authenticated data
 (AAD).  It has two outputs, a ciphertext whose length is identical to
 the plaintext and an authentication tag.  GMAC is the special case of
 GCM in which the plaintext has a length of zero.  The (zero-length)
 ciphertext output is ignored, of course, so that the only output of
 the function is the Authentication Tag.  In the following, we
 describe how the GMAC IV and AAD are formed from the ESP and AH
 fields, and how the ESP and AH packets are formed from the
 Authentication Tag.
 Below we refer to the AES-GMAC IV input as a nonce, in order to
 distinguish it from the IV fields in the packets.  The same nonce and
 key combination MUST NOT be used more than once, since reusing a
 nonce/key combination destroys the security guarantees of AES-GMAC.
 Because of this restriction, it can be difficult to use this mode
 securely when using statically configured keys.  For the sake of good
 security, implementations MUST use an automated key management
 system, such as the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (either version two
 [RFC4306] or version one [RFC2409]), to ensure that this requirement
 is met.

3. The Use of AES-GMAC in ESP

 The AES-GMAC algorithm for ESP is defined as an ESP "combined mode"
 algorithm (see Section 3.2.3 of [RFC4303]), rather than an ESP
 integrity algorithm.  It is called ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC to
 highlight the fact that it performs no encryption and provides no
 confidentiality.
    Rationale: ESP makes no provision for integrity transforms to
    place an initialization vector within the Payload field; only
    encryption transforms are expected to use IVs.  Defining GMAC as
    an encryption transform avoids this issue, and allows GMAC to
    benefit from the same pipelining as does GCM.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

 Like all ESP combined modes, it is registered in IKEv2 as an
 encryption transform, or "Type 1" transform.  It MUST NOT be used in
 conjunction with any other ESP encryption transform (within a
 particular ESP encapsulation).  If confidentiality is desired, then
 GCM ESP [RFC4106] SHOULD be used instead.

3.1. Initialization Vector

 With ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC, an explicit Initialization Vector (IV)
 is included in the ESP Payload, at the outset of that field.  The IV
 MUST be eight octets long.  For a given key, the IV MUST NOT repeat.
 The most natural way to meet this requirement is to set the IV using
 a counter, but implementations are free to set the IV field in any
 way that guarantees uniqueness, such as a linear feedback shift
 register (LFSR).  Note that the sender can use any IV generation
 method that meets the uniqueness requirement without coordinating
 with the receiver.

3.2. Nonce Format

 The nonce passed to the AES-GMAC authentication algorithm has the
 following layout:
  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                             Salt                              |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                     Initialization Vector                     |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
                      Figure 1: Nonce Format
 The components of the nonce are as follows:
 Salt
    The salt field is a four-octet value that is assigned at the
    beginning of the security association, and then remains constant
    for the life of the security association.  The salt SHOULD be
    unpredictable (i.e., chosen at random) before it is selected, but
    need not be secret.  We describe how to set the salt for a
    Security Association established via the Internet Key Exchange in
    Section 5.4.
 Initialization Vector
    The IV field is described in Section 3.1.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

3.3. AAD Construction

 Data integrity and data origin authentication are provided for the
 SPI, (Extended) Sequence Number, Authenticated Payload, Padding, Pad
 Length, and Next Header fields.  This is done by including those
 fields in the AES-GMAC Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) field.
 Two formats of the AAD are defined: one for 32-bit sequence numbers,
 and one for 64-bit extended sequence numbers.  The format with 32-bit
 sequence numbers is shown in Figure 2, and the format with 64-bit
 extended sequence numbers is shown in Figure 3.
  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                               SPI                             |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                     32-bit Sequence Number                    |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 ~                Authenticated Payload (variable)               ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                    Padding (0-255 bytes)                      |
 +                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                               |  Pad Length   | Next Header   |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
          Figure 2: AAD Format with 32-bit Sequence Number
  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                               SPI                             |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                 64-bit Extended Sequence Number               |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 ~                Authenticated Payload (variable)               ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                    Padding (0-255 bytes)                      |
 +                               +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                               |  Pad Length   | Next Header   |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      Figure 3: AAD Format with 64-bit Extended Sequence Number

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

 The use of 32-bit sequence numbers vs. 64-bit extended sequence
 numbers is determined by the security association (SA) management
 protocol that is used to create the SA.  For IKEv2 [RFC4306] this is
 negotiated via Transform Type 5, and the default for ESP is to use
 64-bit extended sequence numbers in the absence of negotiation (e.g.,
 see Section 2.2.1 of [RFC4303]).

3.4. Integrity Check Value (ICV)

 The ICV consists solely of the AES-GMAC Authentication Tag.  The
 Authentication Tag MUST NOT be truncated, so the length of the ICV is
 16 octets.

3.5. Differences with AES-GCM-ESP

 In this section, we highlight the differences between this
 specification and AES-GCM-ESP [RFC4106].  The essential difference is
 that in this document, the AAD consists of the SPI, Sequence Number,
 and ESP Payload, and the AES-GCM plaintext is zero-length, while in
 AES-GCM-ESP, the AAD consists only of the SPI and Sequence Number,
 and the AES-GCM plaintext consists of the ESP Payload.  These
 differences are illustrated in Figure 4.  This figure shows the case
 in which the Extended Sequence Number option is not used.  When that
 option is exercised, the Sequence Number field in the figure would be
 replaced with the Extended Sequence Number.
 Importantly, ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC is *not* equivalent to AES-GCM-
 ESP with encryption "turned off".  However, the ICV computations
 performed in both cases are similar because of the structure of the
 GHASH function [GCM].

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

                   +-> +-----------------------+ <-+
    AES-GCM-ESP    |   |          SPI          |   |
        AAD -------+   +-----------------------+   |
                   |   |    Sequence Number    |   |
                   +-> +-----------------------+   |
                       |    Authentication     |   |
                       |          IV           |   |
                +->+-> +-----------------------+   +
    AES-GCM-ESP |      |                       |   |
     Plaintext -+      ~       ESP Payload     ~   |
                |      |                       |   |
                |      +-----------+-----+-----+   |
                |      | Padding   |  PL | NH  |   |
                +----> +-----------+-----+-----+ <-+
                                                   |
                     ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC AAD --+
 Figure 4: Differences between ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC and AES-GCM-ESP

3.6. Packet Expansion

 The IV adds an additional eight octets to the packet and the ICV adds
 an additional 16 octets.  These are the only sources of packet
 expansion, other than the 10-13 bytes taken up by the ESP SPI,
 Sequence Number, Padding, Pad Length, and Next Header fields (if the
 minimal amount of padding is used).

4. The Use of AES-GMAC in AH

 In AUTH_AES_GMAC, the AH Authentication Data field consists of the IV
 and the Authentication Tag, as shown in Figure 5.  Unlike the usual
 AH case, the Authentication Data field contains both an input to the
 authentication algorithm (the IV) and the output of the
 authentication algorithm (the tag).  No padding is required in the
 Authentication Data field, because its length is a multiple of 64
 bits.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                    Initialization Vector (IV)                 |
 |                            (8 octets)                         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 |             Integrity Check Value (ICV) (16 octets)           |
 |                                                               |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
     Figure 5: The AUTH_AES_GMAC Authentication Data Format
 The IV is as described in Section 3.1.  The Integrity Check Value
 (ICV) is as described in Section 3.4.
 The GMAC Nonce input is formed as described in Section 3.2.  The GMAC
 AAD input consists of the authenticated data as defined in Section
 3.1 of [RFC4302].  These values are provided as to that algorithm,
 along with the secret key, and the resulting authentication tag given
 as output is used to form the ICV.

5. IKE Conventions

 This section describes the conventions used to generate keying
 material and salt values for use with ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC and
 AUTH_AES_GMAC using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) versions one
 [RFC2409] and two [RFC4306].

5.1. Phase 1 Identifier

 This document does not specify the conventions for using AES-GMAC for
 IKE Phase 1 negotiations.  For AES-GMAC to be used in this manner, a
 separate specification would be needed, and an Encryption Algorithm
 Identifier would need to be assigned.  Implementations SHOULD use an
 IKE Phase 1 cipher that is at least as strong as AES-GMAC.  The use
 of AES-CBC [RFC3602] with the same AES key size as used by
 ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC or AUTH_AES_GMAC is RECOMMENDED.

5.2. Phase 2 Identifier

 For IKE Phase 2 negotiations, IANA has assigned identifiers as
 described in Section 9.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

5.3. Key Length Attribute

 AES-GMAC can be used with any of the three AES key lengths.  The way
 that the key length is indicated is different for AH and ESP.
 For AH, each key length has its own separate integrity transform
 identifier and algorithm name (Section 9).  The IKE Key Length
 attribute MUST NOT be used with these identifiers.  This transform
 MUST NOT be used with ESP.
 For ESP, there is a single encryption transform identifier (which
 represents the combined transform) (Section 9).  The IKE Key Length
 attribute MUST be used with each use of this identifier to indicate
 the key length.  The Key Length attribute MUST have a value of 128,
 192, or 256.

5.4. Keying Material and Salt Values

 IKE makes use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) to derive keying
 material.  The PRF is used iteratively to derive keying material of
 arbitrary size, called KEYMAT.  Keying material is extracted from the
 output string without regard to boundaries.
 The size of the KEYMAT for the ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC and
 AUTH_AES_GMAC MUST be four octets longer than is needed for the
 associated AES key.  The keying material is used as follows:
 ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC with a 128-bit key and AUTH_AES_128_GMAC
    The KEYMAT requested for each AES-GMAC key is 20 octets.  The
    first 16 octets are the 128-bit AES key, and the remaining four
    octets are used as the salt value in the nonce.
 ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC with a 192-bit key and AUTH_AES_192_GMAC
    The KEYMAT requested for each AES-GMAC key is 28 octets.  The
    first 24 octets are the 192-bit AES key, and the remaining four
    octets are used as the salt value in the nonce.
 ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC with a 256-bit key and AUTH_AES_256_GMAC
    The KEYMAT requested for each AES-GMAC key is 36 octets.  The
    first 32 octets are the 256-bit AES key, and the remaining four
    octets are used as the salt value in the nonce.

6. Test Vectors

 Appendix B of [GCM] provides test vectors that will assist
 implementers with AES-GMAC.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

7. Security Considerations

 Since the authentication coverage is different between AES-GCM-ESP
 and this specification (see Figure 4), it is worth pointing out that
 both specifications are secure.  In ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC, the IV
 is not included in either the plaintext or the additional
 authenticated data.  This does not adversely affect security, because
 the IV field only provides an input to the GMAC IV, which is not
 required to be authenticated (see [GCM]).  In AUTH_AES_GMAC, the IV
 is included in the additional authenticated data.  This fact has no
 adverse effect on security; it follows from the property that GMAC is
 secure even against attacks in which the adversary can manipulate
 both the IV and the message.  Even an adversary with these powerful
 capabilities cannot forge an authentication tag for any message
 (other than one that was submitted to the chosen-message oracle).
 Since such an adversary could easily choose messages that contain the
 IVs with which they correspond, there are no security problems with
 the inclusion of the IV in the AAD.
 GMAC is provably secure against adversaries that can adaptively
 choose plaintexts, ICVs and the AAD field, under standard
 cryptographic assumptions (roughly, that the output of the underlying
 cipher under a randomly chosen key is indistinguishable from a
 randomly selected output).  Essentially, this means that, if used
 within its intended parameters, a break of GMAC implies a break of
 the underlying block cipher.  The proof of security is available in
 [GCMP].
 The most important security consideration is that the IV never
 repeats for a given key.  In part, this is handled by disallowing the
 use of AES-GMAC when using statically configured keys, as discussed
 in Section 2.
 When IKE is used to establish fresh keys between two peer entities,
 separate keys are established for the two traffic flows.  If a
 different mechanism is used to establish fresh keys, one that
 establishes only a single key to protect packets, then there is a
 high probability that the peers will select the same IV values for
 some packets.  Thus, to avoid counter block collisions, ESP or AH
 implementations that permit use of the same key for protecting
 packets with the same peer MUST ensure that the two peers assign
 different salt values to the security association (SA).
 The other consideration is that, as with any block cipher mode of
 operation, the security of all data protected under a given security
 association decreases slightly with each message.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

 To protect against this problem, implementations MUST generate a
 fresh key before processing 2^64 blocks of data with a given key.
 Note that it is impossible to reach this limit when using 32-bit
 Sequence Numbers.
 Note that, for each message, GMAC calls the block cipher only once.

8. Design Rationale

 This specification was designed to be as similar to AES-GCM-ESP
 [RFC4106] as possible.  We re-use the design and implementation
 experience from that specification.  We include all three AES key
 sizes since AES-GCM-ESP supports all of those sizes, and the larger
 key sizes provide future users with more high-security options.

9. IANA Considerations

 IANA has assigned the following IKEv2 parameters.  For the use of AES
 GMAC in AH, the following integrity (type 3) transform identifiers
 have been assigned:
     "9" for AUTH_AES_128_GMAC
    "10" for AUTH_AES_192_GMAC
    "11" for AUTH_AES_256_GMAC
 For the use of AES-GMAC in ESP, the following encryption (type 1)
 transform identifier has been assigned:
    "21" for ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC

10. Acknowledgements

 Our discussions with Fabio Maino and David Black significantly
 improved this specification, and Tero Kivinen provided us with useful
 comments.  Steve Kent provided guidance on ESP interactions.  This
 work is closely modeled after AES-GCM, which itself is closely
 modeled after Russ Housley's AES-CCM transform [RFC4309].
 Additionally, the GCM mode of operation was originally conceived as
 an improvement to the CWC mode [CWC] in which Doug Whiting and Yoshi
 Kohno participated.  We express our thanks to Fabio, David, Tero,
 Steve, Russ, Doug, and Yoshi.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

11. References

11.1. Normative References

 [GCM]      McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Galois/Counter Mode of
            Operation (GCM)", Submission to NIST. http://
            csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes/proposedmodes/gcm/
            gcm-spec.pdf, January 2004.
 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC3602]  Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher
            Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, September
            2003.

11.2. Informative References

 [CWC]      Kohno, T., Viega, J., and D. Whiting, "CWC: A high-
            performance conventional authenticated encryption mode",
            Fast Software Encryption.
            http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/106.pdf, February 2004.
 [GCMP]     McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Security and Performance of
            the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)", Proceedings of INDOCRYPT
            '04, http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/193, December 2004.
 [RFC2409]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
            (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.
 [RFC4106]  Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
            (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
            4106, June 2005.
 [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302, December
            2005.
 [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
            4303, December 2005.
 [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC
            4306, December 2005.
 [RFC4309]  Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM
            Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC
            4309, December 2005.

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

Authors' Addresses

 David A. McGrew
 Cisco Systems, Inc.
 510 McCarthy Blvd.
 Milpitas, CA  95035
 US
 Phone: (408) 525 8651
 EMail: mcgrew@cisco.com
 URI:   http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/dam.htm
 John Viega
 McAfee, Inc.
 1145 Herndon Parkway, Suite 500
 Herndon, VA 20170
 EMail: viega@list.org

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 4543 GMAC in IPsec ESP and AH May 2006

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
 retain all their rights.
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 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
 ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
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 INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
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 Administrative Support Activity (IASA).

McGrew & Viega Standards Track [Page 14]

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