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rfc:rfc4310

Network Working Group S. Hollenbeck Request for Comments: 4310 VeriSign, Inc. Category: Standards Track November 2005

        Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping
           for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)

Status of this Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

 This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
 extension mapping for the provisioning and management of Domain Name
 System security extensions (DNSSEC) for domain names stored in a
 shared central repository.  Specified in XML, this mapping extends
 the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required
 for the provisioning of DNS security extensions.

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ....................................................2
    1.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................2
 2. Object Attributes ...............................................3
    2.1. Delegation Signer Information ..............................3
         2.1.1. Public Key Information ..............................3
    2.2. Booleans ...................................................3
    2.3. Maximum Signature Lifetime Values ..........................4
 3. EPP Command Mapping .............................................4
    3.1. EPP Query Commands .........................................4
         3.1.1. EPP <check> Command .................................4
         3.1.2. EPP <info> Command ..................................4
         3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command ..............................8
    3.2. EPP Transform Commands .....................................8
         3.2.1. EPP <create> Command ................................8
         3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command ...............................11
         3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command ................................11
         3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command .............................11

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

         3.2.5. EPP <update> Command ...............................11
 4. Formal Syntax ..................................................15
 5. Internationalization Considerations ............................18
 6. IANA Considerations ............................................18
 7. Security Considerations ........................................18
 8. Acknowledgements ...............................................20
 9. References .....................................................20
    9.1. Normative References ......................................20
    9.2. Informative References ....................................21

1. Introduction

 This document describes an extension mapping for version 1.0 of the
 Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) described in RFC 3730 [1].
 This mapping, an extension of the domain name mapping described in
 RFC 3731 [2], is specified using the Extensible Markup Language (XML)
 1.0 [3] and XML Schema notation ([4], [5]).
 The EPP core protocol specification [1] provides a complete
 description of EPP command and response structures.  A thorough
 understanding of the base protocol specification is necessary to
 understand the mapping described in this document.  Familiarity with
 the Domain Name System (DNS) described in RFC 1034 [11] and RFC 1035
 [12] and with DNS security extensions described in RFC 4033 [13], RFC
 4034 [6], and RFC 4035 [7] is required to understand the DNS security
 concepts described in this document.
 The EPP mapping described in this document specifies a mechanism for
 the provisioning and management of DNS security extensions in a
 shared central repository.  Information exchanged via this mapping
 can be extracted from the repository and used to publish DNSSEC
 delegation signer (DS) resource records as described in RFC 4034 [6].

1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [8].
 In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and
 "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. "////" is used
 to note element values that have been shortened to better fit page
 boundaries.  Indentation and white space in examples is provided only
 to illustrate element relationships and is not a mandatory feature of
 this protocol.

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 XML is case sensitive.  Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
 and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
 character case presented in order to develop a conforming
 implementation.

2. Object Attributes

 This extension adds additional elements to the EPP domain name
 mapping [2].  Only new element descriptions are described here.
 This document describes operational scenarios in which a client can
 create, add, remove, and replace delegation signer (DS) information.
 Key data associated with the DS information MAY be provided by the
 client, but the server is not obligated to use the key data.  The
 server operator MAY also issue out-of-band DNS queries to retrieve
 the key data from the registered domain's apex in order to evaluate
 the received DS information.  It is RECOMMENDED that the child zone
 operator have this key data online in the DNS tree to allow the
 parent zone administrator to validate the data as necessary.  The key
 data SHOULD have the Secure Entry Point (SEP) bit set as described in
 RFC 3757 [9].

2.1. Delegation Signer Information

 Delegation signer (DS) information is published by a DNS server to
 indicate that a child zone is digitally signed and that the parent
 zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the child
 zone.  A DS RR contains four fields: a key tag field, a key algorithm
 number octet, an octet identifying the digest algorithm used, and a
 digest field.  See RFC 4034 [6] for specific field formats.

2.1.1. Public Key Information

 Public key information provided by a client maps to the DNSKEY RR
 presentation field formats described in section 2.2 of RFC 4034 [6].
 A DNSKEY RR contains four fields: flags, a protocol octet, an
 algorithm number octet, and a public key.

2.2. Booleans

 Boolean values MUST be represented in the XML Schema format described
 in Part 2 of the W3C XML Schema recommendation [5].

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

2.3. Maximum Signature Lifetime Values

 Maximum signature lifetime values MUST be represented in seconds
 using an extended XML Schema "int" format.  The base "int" format,
 which allows negative numbers, is described in Part 2 of the W3C XML
 Schema recommendation [5].  This format is further restricted to
 enforce a minimum value of one.

3. EPP Command Mapping

 A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
 in the EPP core protocol specification [1].  The command mappings
 described here are specifically for use in provisioning and managing
 DNS security extensions via EPP.

3.1. EPP Query Commands

 EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
 to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
 detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
 retrieve object transfer status information.

3.1.1. EPP <check> Command

 This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <check> command
 or <check> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2].

3.1.2. EPP <info> Command

 This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <info> command
 described in the EPP domain mapping [2].  Additional elements are
 defined for the <info> response.
 When an <info> command has been processed successfully, the EPP
 <resData> element MUST contain child elements as described in the EPP
 domain mapping [2].  In addition, the EPP <extension> element MUST
 contain a child <secDNS:infData> element that identifies the
 extension namespace and the location of the extension schema.  The
 <secDNS:infData> element contains the following child elements:
    One or more <secDNS:dsData> elements that describe the delegation
    signer data provided by the client for the domain.  The <secDNS:
    dsData> element contains the following child elements:
       A <secDNS:keyTag> element that contains a key tag value as
       described in section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6].

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

       A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm value as
       described in section 5.1.2 of RFC 4034 [6].
       A <secDNS:digestType> element that contains a digest type value
       as described in section 5.1.3 of RFC 4034 [6].
       A <secDNS:digest> element that contains a digest value as
       described in section 5.1.4 of RFC 4034 [6].
       An OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> element that indicates a
       child's preference for the number of seconds after signature
       generation when the parent's signature on the DS information
       provided by the child will expire.  A client SHOULD specify the
       same <secDNS:maxSigLife> value for all <secDNS:dsData> elements
       associated with a domain.  If the <secDNS:maxSigLife> is not
       present, or if multiple <secDNS:maxSigLife> values are
       requested, the default signature expiration policy of the
       server operator (as determined using an out-of-band mechanism)
       applies.
       An OPTIONAL <secDNS:keyData> element that describes the key
       data used as input in the DS hash calculation.  The <secDNS:
       keyData> element contains the following child elements:
          A <secDNS:flags> element that contains a flags field value
          as described in section 2.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6].
          A <secDNS:protocol> element that contains a protocol field
          value as described in section 2.1.2 of RFC 4034 [6].
          A <secDNS:alg> element that contains an algorithm number
          field value as described in sections 2.1.3 of RFC 4034 [6].
          A <secDNS:pubKey> element that contains an encoded public
          key field value as described in sections 2.1.4 of RFC 4034
          [6].
 Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation:
 S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 S:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 S:     xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0
 S:     epp-1.0.xsd">
 S:  <response>
 S:    <result code="1000">
 S:      <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
 S:    </result>

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 S:    <resData>
 S:      <domain:infData
 S:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
 S:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
 S:       domain-1.0.xsd">
 S:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
 S:        <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
 S:        <domain:status s="ok"/>
 S:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
 S:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
 S:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
 S:        <domain:ns>
 S:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
 S:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
 S:        </domain:ns>
 S:        <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
 S:        <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
 S:        <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
 S:        <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
 S:        <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
 S:        <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
 S:        <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
 S:        <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
 S:        <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
 S:        <domain:authInfo>
 S:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
 S:        </domain:authInfo>
 S:      </domain:infData>
 S:    </resData>
 S:    <extension>
 S:      <secDNS:infData
 S:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
 S:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 S:       secDNS-1.0.xsd">
 S:        <secDNS:dsData>
 S:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
 S:          <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
 S:          <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
 S:          <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
 S:        </secDNS:dsData>
 S:      </secDNS:infData>
 S:    </extension>
 S:    <trID>
 S:      <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 S:      <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
 S:    </trID>
 S:  </response>
 S:</epp>

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 Example <info> Response for a Secure Delegation with OPTIONAL Data:
 S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 S:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 S:     xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0
 S:     epp-1.0.xsd">
 S:  <response>
 S:    <result code="1000">
 S:      <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
 S:    </result>
 S:    <resData>
 S:      <domain:infData
 S:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
 S:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
 S:       domain-1.0.xsd">
 S:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
 S:        <domain:roid>EXAMPLE1-REP</domain:roid>
 S:        <domain:status s="ok"/>
 S:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
 S:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
 S:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
 S:        <domain:ns>
 S:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
 S:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
 S:        </domain:ns>
 S:        <domain:host>ns1.example.com</domain:host>
 S:        <domain:host>ns2.example.com</domain:host>
 S:        <domain:clID>ClientX</domain:clID>
 S:        <domain:crID>ClientY</domain:crID>
 S:        <domain:crDate>1999-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:crDate>
 S:        <domain:upID>ClientX</domain:upID>
 S:        <domain:upDate>1999-12-03T09:00:00.0Z</domain:upDate>
 S:        <domain:exDate>2005-04-03T22:00:00.0Z</domain:exDate>
 S:        <domain:trDate>2000-04-08T09:00:00.0Z</domain:trDate>
 S:        <domain:authInfo>
 S:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
 S:        </domain:authInfo>
 S:      </domain:infData>
 S:    </resData>
 S:    <extension>
 S:      <secDNS:infData
 S:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
 S:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 S:       secDNS-1.0.xsd">
 S:        <secDNS:dsData>
 S:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
 S:          <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 S:          <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
 S:          <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
 S:          <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
 S:          <secDNS:keyData>
 S:            <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
 S:            <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
 S:            <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
 S:            <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
 S:          </secDNS:keyData>
 S:        </secDNS:dsData>
 S:      </secDNS:infData>
 S:    </extension>
 S:    <trID>
 S:      <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 S:      <svTRID>54322-XYZ</svTRID>
 S:    </trID>
 S:  </response>
 S:</epp>
 An EPP error response MUST be returned if an <info> command can not
 be processed for any reason.

3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command

 This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer>
 command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping
 [2].

3.2. EPP Transform Commands

 EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create
 an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an
 object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
 <transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
 change information associated with an object.

3.2.1. EPP <create> Command

 This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <create>
 command described in the EPP domain mapping [2].  No additional
 elements are defined for the EPP <create> response.
 The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
 client to create a domain object.  In addition to the EPP command
 elements described in the EPP domain mapping [2], the command MUST
 contain an <extension> element.  The <extension> element MUST contain
 a child <secDNS:create> element that identifies the extension
 namespace and the location of the extension schema.  The <secDNS:

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 create> element MUST contain one or more <secDNS:dsData> elements.
 Child elements of the <secDNS:dsData> element are described in
 Section 3.1.2.
 The <secDNS:dsData> element contains OPTIONAL <secDNS:maxSigLife> and
 <secDNS:keyData> elements.  The server MUST abort command processing
 and respond with an appropriate EPP error if the values provided by
 the client can not be accepted for syntax or policy reasons.
 Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation:
 C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 C:     xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0
 C:     epp-1.0.xsd">
 C:  <command>
 C:    <create>
 C:      <domain:create
 C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
 C:       domain-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
 C:        <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
 C:        <domain:ns>
 C:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
 C:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
 C:        </domain:ns>
 C:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
 C:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
 C:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
 C:        <domain:authInfo>
 C:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
 C:        </domain:authInfo>
 C:      </domain:create>
 C:    </create>
 C:    <extension>
 C:      <secDNS:create
 C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 C:       secDNS-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <secDNS:dsData>
 C:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
 C:          <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
 C:          <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
 C:          <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
 C:        </secDNS:dsData>
 C:      </secDNS:create>

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 C:    </extension>
 C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 C:  </command>
 C:</epp>
 Example <create> Command for a Secure Delegation with OPTIONAL data:
 C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 C:     xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0
 C:     epp-1.0.xsd">
 C:  <command>
 C:    <create>
 C:      <domain:create
 C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
 C:       domain-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
 C:        <domain:period unit="y">2</domain:period>
 C:        <domain:ns>
 C:          <domain:hostObj>ns1.example.com</domain:hostObj>
 C:          <domain:hostObj>ns2.example.com</domain:hostObj>
 C:        </domain:ns>
 C:        <domain:registrant>jd1234</domain:registrant>
 C:        <domain:contact type="admin">sh8013</domain:contact>
 C:        <domain:contact type="tech">sh8013</domain:contact>
 C:        <domain:authInfo>
 C:          <domain:pw>2fooBAR</domain:pw>
 C:        </domain:authInfo>
 C:      </domain:create>
 C:    </create>
 C:    <extension>
 C:      <secDNS:create
 C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 C:       secDNS-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <secDNS:dsData>
 C:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
 C:          <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
 C:          <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
 C:          <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
 C:          <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
 C:          <secDNS:keyData>
 C:            <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
 C:            <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
 C:            <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 C:            <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
 C:          </secDNS:keyData>
 C:        </secDNS:dsData>
 C:      </secDNS:create>
 C:    </extension>
 C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 C:  </command>
 C:</epp>
 When a <create> command has been processed successfully, the EPP
 response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2].

3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command

 This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <delete> command
 or <delete> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2].

3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command

 This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <renew> command
 or <renew> response described in the EPP domain mapping [2].

3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command

 This extension does not add any elements to the EPP <transfer>
 command or <transfer> response described in the EPP domain mapping
 [2].

3.2.5. EPP <update> Command

 This extension defines additional elements for the EPP <update>
 command described in the EPP domain mapping [2].  No additional
 elements are defined for the EPP <update> response.
 The EPP <update> command provides a transform operation that allows a
 client to modify the attributes of a domain object.  In addition to
 the EPP command elements described in the EPP domain mapping, the
 command MUST contain an <extension> element.  The <extension> element
 MUST contain a child <secDNS:update> element that identifies the
 extension namespace and the location of the extension schema.  The
 <secDNS:update> element contains a <secDNS:add> element to add
 security information to a delegation, a <secDNS:rem> element to
 remove security information from a delegation, or a <secDNS:chg>
 element to replace security information with new security
 information.
 The <secDNS:update> element also contains an OPTIONAL "urgent"
 attribute that a client can use to ask the server operator to

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 complete and implement the update request with high priority.  This
 attribute accepts boolean values as described in Section 2.2; the
 default value is boolean false.  "High priority" is relative to
 standard server operator policies that are determined using an
 out-of-band mechanism.
 The <secDNS:add> element is used to add DS information to an existing
 set.  The <secDNS:add> element MUST contain one or more <secDNS:
 dsData> elements as described in Section 3.1.2.
 The <secDNS:rem> element contains one or more <secDNS:keyTag>
 elements that are used to remove DS data from a delegation.  The
 <secDNS:keyTag> element MUST contain a key tag value as described in
 section 5.1.1 of RFC 4034 [6].  Removing all DS information can
 remove the ability of the parent to secure the delegation to the
 child zone.
 The <secDNS:chg> element is used to replace existing DS information
 with new DS information.  The <secDNS:chg> element MUST contain one
 or more <secDNS:dsData> elements as described in Section 3.1.2.  The
 data in these elements is used to replace whatever other data is
 currently archived for the delegation.
 The <secDNS:update> element contains an OPTIONAL "urgent" attribute.
 In addition, the <secDNS:dsData> element contains OPTIONAL <secDNS:
 maxSigLife> and <secDNS:keyData> elements.  The server MUST abort
 command processing and respond with an appropriate EPP error if the
 values provided by the client can not be accepted for syntax or
 policy reasons.
 Example <update> Command, Adding DS Data:
 C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 C:     xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0
 C:     epp-1.0.xsd">
 C:  <command>
 C:    <update>
 C:      <domain:update
 C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
 C:       domain-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
 C:      </domain:update>
 C:    </update>
 C:    <extension>
 C:      <secDNS:update

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 C:       secDNS-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <secDNS:add>
 C:          <secDNS:dsData>
 C:            <secDNS:keyTag>12346</secDNS:keyTag>
 C:            <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
 C:            <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
 C:            <secDNS:digest>38EC35D5B3A34B44C39B</secDNS:digest>
 C:          </secDNS:dsData>
 C:        </secDNS:add>
 C:      </secDNS:update>
 C:    </extension>
 C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 C:  </command>
 C:</epp>
 Example <update> Command, Removing DS Data:
 C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 C:     xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0
 C:     epp-1.0.xsd">
 C:  <command>
 C:    <update>
 C:      <domain:update
 C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
 C:       domain-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
 C:      </domain:update>
 C:    </update>
 C:    <extension>
 C:      <secDNS:update
 C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 C:       secDNS-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <secDNS:rem>
 C:          <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
 C:        </secDNS:rem>
 C:      </secDNS:update>
 C:    </extension>
 C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 C:  </command>
 C:</epp>

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 Example Urgent <update> Command, Changing DS Data:
 C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 C:     xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0
 C:     epp-1.0.xsd">
 C:  <command>
 C:    <update>
 C:      <domain:update
 C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
 C:       domain-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
 C:      </domain:update>
 C:    </update>
 C:    <extension>
 C:      <secDNS:update urgent="1"
 C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 C:       secDNS-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <secDNS:chg>
 C:          <secDNS:dsData>
 C:            <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
 C:            <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
 C:            <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
 C:            <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
 C:          </secDNS:dsData>
 C:        </secDNS:chg>
 C:      </secDNS:update>
 C:    </extension>
 C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 C:  </command>
 C:</epp>
 Example <update> Command, Changing Data to Include OPTIONAL Data:
 C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
 C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
 C:     xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 C:     xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0
 C:     epp-1.0.xsd">
 C:  <command>
 C:    <update>
 C:      <domain:update
 C:       xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0
 C:       domain-1.0.xsd">

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 C:        <domain:name>example.com</domain:name>
 C:      </domain:update>
 C:    </update>
 C:    <extension>
 C:      <secDNS:update
 C:       xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
 C:       xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 C:       secDNS-1.0.xsd">
 C:        <secDNS:chg>
 C:          <secDNS:dsData>
 C:            <secDNS:keyTag>12345</secDNS:keyTag>
 C:            <secDNS:alg>3</secDNS:alg>
 C:            <secDNS:digestType>1</secDNS:digestType>
 C:            <secDNS:digest>49FD46E6C4B45C55D4AC</secDNS:digest>
 C:            <secDNS:maxSigLife>604800</secDNS:maxSigLife>
 C:            <secDNS:keyData>
 C:              <secDNS:flags>256</secDNS:flags>
 C:              <secDNS:protocol>3</secDNS:protocol>
 C:              <secDNS:alg>1</secDNS:alg>
 C:              <secDNS:pubKey>AQPJ////4Q==</secDNS:pubKey>
 C:            </secDNS:keyData>
 C:          </secDNS:dsData>
 C:        </secDNS:chg>
 C:      </secDNS:update>
 C:    </extension>
 C:    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
 C:  </command>
 C:</epp>
 When an extended <update> command has been processed successfully,
 the EPP response is as described in the EPP domain mapping [2].  A
 server operator MUST return an EPP error result code of 2306 if an
 urgent update (noted with an "urgent" attribute value of boolean
 true) can not be completed with high priority.

4. Formal Syntax

 An EPP object mapping is specified in XML Schema notation.  The
 formal syntax presented here is a complete schema representation of
 the object mapping suitable for automated validation of EPP XML
 instances.  The BEGIN and END tags are not part of the schema; they
 are used to note the beginning and ending of the schema for URI
 registration purposes.

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 BEGIN
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
         xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0"
         xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
         elementFormDefault="qualified">
   <annotation>
     <documentation>
       Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0
       domain name extension schema for provisioning
       DNS security (DNSSEC) extensions.
     </documentation>
   </annotation>
 <!--
 Child elements found in EPP commands.
 -->
   <element name="create" type="secDNS:dsType"/>
   <element name="update" type="secDNS:updateType"/>
 <!--
 Child elements of the <create> command.
 -->
   <complexType name="dsType">
     <sequence>
       <element name="dsData" type="secDNS:dsDataType"
        maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
     </sequence>
   </complexType>
   <complexType name="dsDataType">
     <sequence>
       <element name="keyTag" type="unsignedShort"/>
       <element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
       <element name="digestType" type="unsignedByte"/>
       <element name="digest" type="hexBinary"/>
       <element name="maxSigLife" type="secDNS:maxSigLifeType"
        minOccurs="0"/>
       <element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType"
        minOccurs="0"/>
     </sequence>
   </complexType>
   <simpleType name="maxSigLifeType">
     <restriction base="int">
       <minInclusive value="1"/>

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

     </restriction>
   </simpleType>
   <complexType name="keyDataType">
     <sequence>
       <element name="flags" type="unsignedShort"/>
       <element name="protocol" type="unsignedByte"/>
       <element name="alg" type="unsignedByte"/>
       <element name="pubKey" type="secDNS:keyType"/>
     </sequence>
   </complexType>
   <simpleType name="keyType">
     <restriction base="base64Binary">
       <minLength value="1"/>
     </restriction>
   </simpleType>
 <!--
 Child elements of the <update> command.
 -->
   <complexType name="updateType">
     <choice>
       <element name="add" type="secDNS:dsType"/>
       <element name="chg" type="secDNS:dsType"/>
       <element name="rem" type="secDNS:remType"/>
     </choice>
     <attribute name="urgent" type="boolean" default="false"/>
   </complexType>
   <complexType name="remType">
     <sequence>
       <element name="keyTag" type="unsignedShort"
        maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
     </sequence>
   </complexType>
 <!--
 Child response elements.
 -->
   <element name="infData" type="secDNS:dsType"/>
 <!--
 End of schema.
 -->
 </schema>
 END

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 17] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

5. Internationalization Considerations

 EPP is represented in XML, which provides native support for encoding
 information using the Unicode character set and its more compact
 representations including UTF-8 [14].  Conformant XML processors
 recognize both UTF-8 and UTF-16 [15].  Though XML includes provisions
 to identify and use other character encodings through use of an
 "encoding" attribute in an <?xml?> declaration, use of UTF-8 is
 RECOMMENDED in environments where parser encoding support
 incompatibility exists.
 As an extension of the EPP domain mapping [2], the elements, element
 content, attributes, and attribute values described in this document
 MUST inherit the internationalization conventions used to represent
 higher-layer domain and core protocol structures present in an XML
 instance that includes this extension.

6. IANA Considerations

 This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
 conforming to a registry mechanism described in RFC 3688 [10].  Two
 URI assignments have been completed by the IANA.
 Registration request for the extension namespace:
 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.0
 Registrant Contact: IESG
 XML: None.  Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.
 Registration request for the extension XML schema:
 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:secDNS-1.0
 Registrant Contact: IESG
 XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.

7. Security Considerations

 The mapping extensions described in this document do not provide any
 security services beyond those described by EPP [1], the EPP domain
 name mapping [2], and protocol layers used by EPP.  The security
 considerations described in these other specifications apply to this
 specification as well.

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 18] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 As with other domain object transforms, the EPP transform operations
 described in this document MUST be restricted to the sponsoring
 client as authenticated using the mechanisms described in sections
 2.9.1.1 and 7 of RFC 3730 [1].  Any attempt to perform a transform
 operation on a domain object by any client other than the sponsoring
 client MUST be rejected with an appropriate EPP authorization error.
 The provisioning service described in this document involves the
 exchange of information that can have an operational impact on the
 DNS.  A trust relationship MUST exist between the EPP client and
 server, and provisioning of public key information MUST only be done
 after the identities of both parties have been confirmed using a
 strong authentication mechanism.
 An EPP client might be acting as an agent for a zone administrator
 who wants to send delegation information to be signed and published
 by the server operator.  Man-in-the-middle attacks are thus possible
 as a result of direct client activity or inadvertent client data
 manipulation.
 Acceptance of a false key by a server operator can produce
 significant operational consequences.  The child and parent zones
 MUST be consistent to secure the delegation properly.  In the absence
 of consistent signatures, the delegation will not appear in the
 secure name space, yielding untrustworthy query responses.  If a key
 is compromised, a client can either remove the compromised
 information or update the delegation information via EPP commands
 using the "urgent" attribute.
 Operational scenarios requiring quick removal of a secure domain
 delegation can be implemented using a two-step process.  First,
 security credentials can be removed using an "urgent" update as just
 described.  The domain can then be removed from the parent zone by
 changing the status of the domain to either of the EPP "clientHold"
 or "serverHold" domain status values.  The domain can also be removed
 from the zone using the EPP <delete> command, but this is a more
 drastic step that needs to be considered carefully before use.
 Data validity checking at the server requires computational
 resources.  A purposeful or inadvertent denial-of-service attack is
 possible if a client requests some number of update operations that
 exceed a server's processing capabilities.  Server operators SHOULD
 take steps to manage command load and command processing requirements
 to minimize the risk of a denial-of-service attack.
 The signature lifetime values provided by clients are requests that
 can be rejected.  Blind acceptance by a server operator can have an
 adverse impact on a server's processing capabilities.  Server

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 19] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 operators SHOULD seriously consider adopting implementation rules to
 limit the range of acceptable signature lifetime values to counter
 potential adverse situations.

8. Acknowledgements

 The author would like to thank the following people who have provided
 significant contributions to the development of this document:
 David Blacka, Olafur Gudmundsson, Mark Kosters, Ed Lewis, Dan Massey,
 Marcos Sanz, Sam Weiler, and Ning Zhang.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

 [1]   Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
       RFC 3730, March 2004.
 [2]   Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain
       Name Mapping", RFC 3731, March 2004.
 [3]   Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C., Bray, T., and E. Maler,
       "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Second Edition)", W3C
       FirstEdition REC-xml-20001006, October 2000.
 [4]   Maloney, M., Beech, D., Mendelsohn, N., and H. Thompson, "XML
       Schema Part 1: Structures", W3C REC REC-xmlschema-1-20010502,
       May 2001.
 [5]   Malhotra, A. and P. Biron, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes", W3C
       REC REC-xmlschema-2-20010502, May 2001.
 [6]   Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
       "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
       March 2005.
 [7]   Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
       "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions",
       RFC 4035, March 2005.
 [8]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
       Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [9]   Kolkman, O., Schlyter, J., and E. Lewis, "Domain Name System
       KEY (DNSKEY) Resource Record (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP)
       Flag", RFC 3757, April 2004.

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 20] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

 [10]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
       January 2004.

9.2. Informative References

 [11]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
       STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
 [12]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
       specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
 [13]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
       "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
       March 2005.
 [14]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646",
       STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
 [15]  Hoffman, P. and F. Yergeau, "UTF-16, an encoding of ISO 10646",
       RFC 2781, February 2000.

Author's Address

 Scott Hollenbeck
 VeriSign, Inc.
 21345 Ridgetop Circle
 Dulles, VA  20166-6503
 US
 EMail: shollenbeck@verisign.com

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 21] RFC 4310 EPP DNS Security Extensions Mapping November 2005

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
 retain all their rights.
 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
 ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
 INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
 INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

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 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
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 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
 made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
 on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
 found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
 Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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Acknowledgement

 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
 Internet Society.

Hollenbeck Standards Track [Page 22]

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