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rfc:rfc3835

Network Working Group A. Barbir Request for Comments: 3835 R. Penno Category: Informational Nortel Networks

                                                               R. Chen
                                                             AT&T Labs
                                                            M. Hofmann
                                         Bell Labs/Lucent Technologies
                                                              H. Orman
                                             Purple Streak Development
                                                           August 2004
      An Architecture for Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES)

Status of this Memo

 This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
 not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
 memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).

Abstract

 This memo defines an architecture that enables the creation of an
 application service in which a data provider, a data consumer, and
 zero or more application entities cooperatively implement a data
 stream service.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 1] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
 2 . The Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  OPES Entities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
           2.1.1.  Data Dispatcher. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  OPES Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.3.  OPES Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     2.4.  Callout Servers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.5.  Tracing Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
 3.  Security and Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.1.  Trust Domains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.2.  Establishing Trust and Service Authorization . . . . . . 11
     3.3.  Callout Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.4.  Privacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.5.  End-to-end Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 4.  IAB Architectural and Policy Considerations for OPES . . . . . 12
     4.1.  IAB consideration (2.1) One-party Consent. . . . . . . . 12
     4.2.  IAB consideration (2.2) IP-Layer Communications. . . . . 13
     4.3.  IAB consideration (3.1 and 3.2) Notification . . . . . . 13
     4.4.  IAB consideration (3.3) Non-Blocking . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.5.  IAB consideration (4.1) URI Resolution . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.6.  IAB consideration (4.2) Reference Validity . . . . . . . 13
     4.7.  IAB consideration (4.3) Application Addressing
           Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.8.  IAB consideration (5.1) Privacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 7.  Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
 10. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
 11. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1. Introduction

 When supplying a data stream service between a provider and a
 consumer, the need to provision the use of other application
 entities, in addition to the provider and consumer, may arise.  For
 example, some party may wish to customize a data stream as a service
 to a consumer.  The customization step might be based on the
 customer's resource availability (e.g., display capabilities).
 In some cases it may be beneficial to provide a customization service
 at a network location between the provider and consumer host rather
 than at one of these endpoints.  For certain services performed on

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 2] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

 behalf of the end-user, this may be the only option of service
 deployment.  In this case, zero or more additional application
 entities may participate in the data stream service.  There are many
 possible provisioning scenarios which make a data stream service
 attractive.  The OPES Use Cases and Deployment Scenarios [1] document
 provides examples of OPES services.  The document discusses services
 that modify requests, services that modify responses, and services
 that create responses.  It is recommended that the document on OPES
 Use Cases and Deployment Scenarios [1] be read before reading this
 document.
 This document presents the architectural components of Open Pluggable
 Edge Services (OPES) that are needed in order to perform a data
 stream service.  The architecture addresses the IAB considerations
 described in [2].  These considerations are covered in various parts
 of the document.  Section 2.5 addresses tracing; section 3 addresses
 security considerations.  Section 4 provides a summary of IAB
 considerations and how the architecture addresses them.
 The document is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the OPES
 architecture.  Section 3 discusses OPES security and privacy
 considerations.  Section 4 addresses IAB considerations for OPES.
 Section 5 discusses security considerations.  Section 6 addresses
 IANA considerations.  Section 7 provides a summary of the
 architecture and the requirements for interoperability.

2. The Architecture

 The architecture of Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) can be
 described in terms of three interrelated concepts, mainly:
 o  OPES entities: processes operating in the network;
 o  OPES flows:  data flows that are cooperatively realized by the
    OPES entities; and,
 o  OPES rules: these specify when and how to execute OPES services.

2.1. OPES Entities

 An OPES entity is an application that operates on a data flow between
 a data provider application and a data consumer application.  OPES
 entities can be:
 o  an OPES service application, which analyzes and possibly
    transforms messages exchanged between the data provider
    application and the data consumer application;

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 3] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

 o  a data dispatcher, which invokes an OPES service application based
    on an OPES ruleset and application-specific knowledge.
 The cooperative behavior of OPES entities introduces additional
 functionality for each data flow provided that it matches the OPES
 rules.  In the network, OPES entities reside inside OPES processors.
 In the current work, an OPES processor MUST include a data
 dispatcher.  Furthermore, the data provider and data consumer
 applications are not considered as OPES entities.
 To provide verifiable system integrity (see section 3.1 on trust
 domains below) and to facilitate deployment of end-to-end encryption
 and data integrity control, OPES processors MUST be:
 o  explicitly addressable at the IP layer by the end user (data
    consumer application).  This requirement does not preclude a chain
    of OPES processors with the first one in the chain explicitly
    addressed at the IP layer by the end user (data consumer
    application).
 o  consented to by either the data consumer or data provider
    application.  The details of this process are beyond the scope of
    the current work.
 The OPES architecture is largely independent of the protocol that is
 used by the data provider application and the data consumer
 application to exchange data.  However, this document selects HTTP
 [3] as the example for the underlying protocol in OPES flows.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 4] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

2.1.1. Data Dispatcher

 Data dispatchers include a ruleset that can be compiled from several
 sources and MUST resolve into an unambiguous result.  The combined
 ruleset enables an OPES processor to determine which service
 applications to invoke for which data flow.  Accordingly, the data
 dispatcher constitutes an enhanced policy enforcement point, where
 policy rules are evaluated and service-specific data handlers and
 state information are maintained, as depicted in Figure 1.
                                      +----------+
                                      |  callout |
                                      |  server  |
                                      +----------+
                                           ||
                                           ||
                                           ||
                                           ||
                       +--------------------------+
                       | +-----------+     ||     |
                       | |   OPES    |     ||     |
                       | |  service  |     ||     |
                       | |application|     ||     |
                       | +-----------+     ||     |
                       | +----------------------+ |
       OPES flow <---->| | data dispatcher and  | |<----> OPES flow
                       | | policy enforcement   | |
                       | +----------------------+ |
                       |           OPES           |
                       |         processor        |
                       +--------------------------+
                        Figure 1: Data Dispatchers
 The architecture allows for more than one policy enforcement point to
 be present on an OPES flow.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 5] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

2.2. OPES Flows

 An OPES flow is a cooperative undertaking between a data provider
 application, a data consumer application, zero or more OPES service
 applications, and one or more data dispatchers.
 Since policies are enforced by data dispatchers, the presence of at
 least one data dispatcher is required in the OPES flow.
  data          OPES               OPES             data
    consumer        processor A        processor N      provider
  +-----------+    +-----------+  .  +-----------+    +-----------+
  |   data    |    |  OPES     |  .  |  OPES     |    |   data    |
  | consumer  |    | service   |  .  | service   |    | provider  |
  |application|    |application|  .  |application|    |application|
  +-----------+    +-----------+  .  +-----------+    +-----------+
  |           |    |           |  .  |           |    |           |
  |   HTTP    |    |    HTTP   |  .  |    HTTP   |    |   HTTP    |
  |           |    |           |  .  |           |    |           |
  +-----------+    +-----------+  .  +-----------+    +-----------+
  |  TCP/IP   |    |   TCP/IP  |  .  |   TCP/IP  |    |  TCP/IP   |
  +-----------+    +-----------+  .  +-----------+    +-----------+
       ||             ||    ||    .       ||    ||         ||
       ================      =====.========      ===========
       | <----------------- OPES flow -------------------> |
                     Figure 2: An OPES flow
 Figure 2 depicts two data dispatchers that are present in the OPES
 flow.  The architecture allows for one or more data dispatchers to be
 present in any flow.

2.3. OPES Rules

 OPES' policy regarding services and the data provided to them is
 determined by a ruleset consisting of OPES rules.  The rules consist
 of a set of conditions and related actions.  The ruleset is the
 superset of all OPES rules on the processor.  The OPES ruleset
 determines which service applications will operate on a data stream.
 In this model, all data dispatchers are invoked for all flows.
 In order to ensure predictable behavior, the OPES architecture
 requires the use of a standardized schema for the purpose of defining
 and interpreting the ruleset.  The OPES architecture does not require
 a mechanism for configuring a ruleset into a data dispatcher.  This

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 6] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

 is treated as a local matter for each implementation (e.g., through
 the use of a text editor or a secure upload protocol), as long as
 such a mechanism complies with the requirements set forth in section
 3.

2.4. Callout Servers

 The evaluation of the OPES ruleset determines which service
 applications will operate on a data stream.  How the ruleset is
 evaluated is not the subject of the architecture, except to note that
 it MUST result in the same unambiguous result in all implementations.
 In some cases it may be useful for the OPES processor to distribute
 the responsibility of service execution by communicating with one or
 more callout servers.  A data dispatcher invokes the services of a
 callout server by using the OPES callout protocol (OCP).  The
 requirements for the OCP are given in [5].  The OCP is application-
 agnostic, being unaware of the semantics of the encapsulated
 application protocol (e.g., HTTP).  However, the data dispatcher MUST
 incorporate a service aware vectoring capability that parses the data
 flow according to the ruleset and delivers the data to either the
 local or remote OPES service application.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 7] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

 The general interaction situation is depicted in Figure 3, which
 illustrates the positions and interaction of different components of
 OPES architecture.
 +--------------------------+
 | +-----------+            |
 | |   OPES    |            |
 | |  service  |            |      +---------------+     +-----------+
 | |application|            |      | Callout       |     | Callout   |
 | +-----------+            |      | Server A      |     | Server X  |
 |     ||                   |      | +--------+    |     |           |
 | +----------------------+ |      | | OPES   |    |     |           |
 | |     data dispatcher  | |      | | Service|    |     | +--------+|
 | +----------------------+ |      | | Appl A |    |     | | OPES   ||
 |      ||           ||     |      | +--------+    |     | |Service ||
 |  +---------+  +-------+  |      |     ||        |     | | Appl X ||
 |  |  HTTP   |  |       |  |      | +--------+    | ... | +--------||
 |  |         |  |  OCP  |=========| | OCP    |    |     |    ||     |
 |  +---------+  +-------+  |      | +--------+    |     | +------+  |
 |  |         |     ||      |      +---------------+     | | OCP  |  |
 |  | TCP/IP  |     =======================================|      |  |
 |  |         |             |                            | +------+  |
 |  +---------+             |                            +-----------+
 +--------||-||-------------+
          || ||

+——–+ || || +——–+ |data |== =========================================|data | |producer| |consumer| +——–+ +——–+

            Figure 3: Interaction of OPES Entities

2.5. Tracing Facility

 The OPES architecture requires that each data dispatcher provides
 tracing facilities that allow the appropriate verification of its
 operation.  The OPES architecture requires that tracing be feasible
 on the OPES flow, per OPES processor, using in-band annotation.  One
 of those annotations could be a URI with more detailed information on
 the OPES services being executed in the OPES flow.
 Providing the ability for in-band annotation MAY require header
 extensions on the application protocol that is used (e.g., HTTP).
 However, the presence of an OPES processor in the data request/
 response flow SHALL NOT interfere with the operations of non-OPES
 aware clients and servers.  Non-OPES clients and servers need not
 support these extensions to the base protocol.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 8] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

 OPES processors MUST obey tracing, reporting, and notification
 requirements set by the center of authority in the trust domain to
 which an OPES processor belongs.  As part of these requirements, the
 OPES processor may be instructed to reject or ignore such
 requirements that originate from other trust domains.

3. Security and Privacy Considerations

 Each data flow MUST be secured in accordance with several policies.
 The primary stakeholders are the data consumer and the data provider.
 The secondary stakeholders are the entities to which they may have
 delegated their trust.  The other stakeholders are the owners of the
 callout servers.  Any of these parties may be participants in the
 OPES flow.
 These parties MUST have a model, explicit or implicit, describing
 their trust policy, which of the other parties are trusted to operate
 on data, and what security enhancements are required for
 communication.  The trust might be delegated for all data, or it
 might be restricted to granularity as small as an application data
 unit.
 All parties that are involved in enforcing policies MUST communicate
 the policies to the parties that are involved.  These parties are
 trusted to adhere to the communicated policies.
 In order to delegate fine-grained trust, the parties MUST convey
 policy information by implicit contract, by a setup protocol, by a
 dynamic negotiation protocol, or in-line with application data
 headers.

3.1. Trust Domains

 The delegation of authority starts at either a data consumer or data
 provider and moves to more distant entities in a "stepwise" fashion.
 Stepwise means A delegates to B, and B delegates to C, and so forth.
 The entities thus "colored" by the delegation are said to form a
 trust domain with respect to the original delegating party.  Here,
 "Colored" means that if the first step in the chain is the data
 provider, then the stepwise delegation "colors" the chain with that
 data "provider" color.  The only colors defined are the data
 "provider" and the data "consumer".  Delegation of authority
 (coloring) propagates from the content producer start of authority or
 from the content consumer start of authority, which may be different
 from the end points in the data flow.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 9] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

 Figure 4 illustrates administrative domains, out-of-band rules, and
 policy distribution.

provider administrative domain consumer administrative domain +——————————+ +——————————-+ | +————–+ | | +————–+ | | |Provider | ← out-of-band rules, → |Consumer | | | |Administrative|~~>~~~: policies and ~<~|Administrative| | | |Authority | : service authorization : |Authority | | | +————–+ : | | : +————–+ | | : : | | : : | | : : | | : : | | +———-+ : | | : +———-+ | | | callout | +———+ | | +———+ | callout | | | | server |====| | | | | |====| server | | | +———-+ | | | | | | +———-+ | | | OPES | | | | OPES | | | +———-+ |processor| | | |processor| +———-+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | data | | | | | | | | data | | | | provider | | | | | | | | consumer | | | | | +———+ | | +———+ +———-+ | | +———-+ || || | | || || +———-+ | | || || || | | || || || | | ============= ================= =========== | | | | | +——————————-+ +——————————-+

        | <----------------- OPES flow -----------------> |
  Figure 4: OPES administrative domains and policy distribution
 In order to understand the trust relationships between OPES entities,
 each is labeled as residing in an administrative domain.  Entities
 associated with a given OPES flow may reside in one or more
 administrative domains.
 An OPES processor may be in several trust domains at any time.  There
 is no restriction on whether the OPES processors are authorized by
 data consumers and/or data providers.  The original party has the
 option of forbidding or limiting redelegation.
 An OPES processor MUST have a representation of its trust domain
 memberships that it can report in whole or in part for tracing
 purposes.  It MUST include the name of the party that delegated each
 privilege to it.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 10] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

3.2. Establishing Trust and Service Authorization

 The OPES processor will have a configuration policy specifying what
 privileges the callout servers have and how they are to be
 identified.  OPES uses standard protocols for authentication and
 other security communication with callout servers.
 An OPES processor will have a trusted method for receiving
 configuration information, such as rules for the data dispatcher,
 trusted callout servers, primary parties that opt-in or opt-out of
 individual services, etc.
 Protocol(s) for policy/rule distribution are out of scope for this
 document, but the OPES architecture assumes the existence of such a
 mechanism.
 Requirements for the authorization mechanism are set in a separate
 document [4].
 Service requests may be done in-band.  For example, a request to
 bypass OPES services could be signalled by a user agent using an HTTP
 header string "Bypass-OPES".  Such requests MUST be authenticated.
 The way OPES entities will honor such requests is subordinate to the
 authorization policies effective at that moment.

3.3. Callout Protocol

 The determination of whether or not OPES processors will use the
 measures that are described in the previous section during their
 communication with callout servers depends on the details of how the
 primary parties delegated trust to the OPES processors and the trust
 relationship between the OPES processors and the callout server.
 Strong authentication, message authentication codes, and encryption
 SHOULD be used.  If the OPES processors are in a single
 administrative domain with strong confidentiality and integrity
 guarantees, then cryptographic protection is recommended but
 optional.
 If the delegation mechanism names the trusted parties and their
 privileges in some way that permits authentication, then the OPES
 processors will be responsible for enforcing the policy and for using
 authentication as part of that enforcement.
 The callout servers MUST be aware of the policy governing the
 communication path.  They MUST not, for example, communicate
 confidential information to auxiliary servers outside the trust
 domain.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 11] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

 A separate security association MUST be used for each channel
 established between an OPES processor and a callout server.  The
 channels MUST be separate for different primary parties.

3.4. Privacy

 Some data from OPES flow endpoints is considered "private" or
 "sensitive", and OPES processors MUST advise the primary parties of
 their privacy policy and respect the policies of the primary parties.
 The privacy information MUST be conveyed on a per-flow basis.  This
 can be accomplished by using current available privacy techniques
 such as P3P [7] and HTTP privacy capabilities.
 The callout servers MUST also participate in the handling of private
 data, they MUST be prepared to announce their own capabilities, and
 enforce the policy required by the primary parties.

3.5. End-to-End Integrity

 Digital signature techniques can be used to mark data changes in such
 a way that a third-party can verify that the changes are or are not
 consistent with the originating party's policy.  This requires an
 inline method to specify policy and its binding to data, a trace of
 changes and the identity of the party making the changes, and strong
 identification and authentication methods.
 Strong end-to-end integrity can fulfill some of the functions
 required by "tracing".

4. IAB Architectural and Policy Considerations for OPES

 This section addresses the IAB considerations for OPES [2] and
 summarizes how the architecture addresses them.

4.1. IAB Consideration (2.1) One-Party Consent

 The IAB recommends that all OPES services be explicitly authorized by
 one of the application-layer end-hosts (that is, either the data
 consumer application or the data provider application).
 The current work requires that either the data consumer application
 or the data provider application consent to OPES services.  These
 requirements have been addressed in sections 2 (section 2.1) and 3.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 12] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

4.2. IAB Consideration (2.2) IP-Layer Communications

 The IAB recommends that OPES processors must be explicitly addressed
 at the IP layer by the end user (data consumer application).
 This requirement has been addressed in section 2.1, by the
 requirement that OPES processors be addressable at the IP layer by
 the data consumer application.

4.3. IAB Consideration (3.1 and 3.2) Notification

 The IAB recommends that the OPES architecture incorporate tracing
 facilities.  Tracing enables data consumer and data provider
 applications to detect and respond to actions performed by OPES
 processors that are deemed inappropriate to the data consumer or data
 provider applications.
 Section 3.2 of this document discusses the tracing and notification
 facilities that must be supported by OPES services.

4.4. IAB Consideration (3.3) Non-Blocking

 The OPES architecture requires the specification of extensions to
 HTTP.  These extensions will allow the data consumer application to
 request a non-OPES version of the content from the data provider
 application.  These requirements are covered in Section 3.2.

4.5. IAB Consideration (4.1) URI Resolution

 This consideration recommends that OPES documentation must be clear
 in describing OPES services as being applied to the result of URI
 resolution, not as URI resolution itself.
 This requirement has been addressed in sections 2.5 and 3.2, by
 requiring OPES entities to document all the transformations that have
 been performed.

4.6. IAB Consideration (4.2) Reference Validity

 This consideration recommends that all proposed services must define
 their impact on inter- and intra-document reference validity.
 This requirement has been addressed in section 2.5 and throughout the
 document whereby OPES entities are required to document the performed
 transformations.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 13] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

4.7. IAB Consideration (4.3) Application Addressing Extensions

 This consideration recommends that any OPES services that cannot be
 achieved while respecting the above two considerations may be
 reviewed as potential requirements for Internet application
 addressing architecture extensions, but must not be undertaken as ad
 hoc fixes.
 The current work does not require extensions of the Internet
 application addressing architecture.

4.8. IAB Consideration (5.1) Privacy

 This consideration recommends that the overall OPES framework must
 provide for mechanisms for end users to determine the privacy
 policies of OPES intermediaries.
 This consideration has been addressed in section 3.

5. Security Considerations

 The proposed work has to deal with security from various
 perspectives.  There are security and privacy issues that relate to
 data consumer application, callout protocol, and the OPES flow.  In
 [6], there is an analysis of the threats against OPES entities.

6. IANA Considerations

 The proposed work will evaluate current protocols for OCP.  If the
 work determines that a new protocol needs to be developed, then there
 may be a need to request new numbers from IANA.

7. Summary

 Although the architecture supports a wide range of cooperative
 transformation services, it has few requirements for
 interoperability.
 The necessary and sufficient elements are specified in the following
 documents:
 o  the OPES ruleset schema, which defines the syntax and semantics of
    the rules interpreted by a data dispatcher; and,
 o  the OPES callout protocol (OCP) [5], which defines the
    requirements for the protocol between a data dispatcher and a
    callout server.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 14] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

8. References

8.1. Normative References

 [1]  Barbir, A., Burger, E., Chen, R., McHenry, S., Orman, H., and R.
      Penno, "Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) Use Cases and
      Deployment Scenarios", RFC 3752, April 2004.
 [2]  Floyd, S. and L. Daigle, "IAB Architectural and Policy
      Considerations for Open Pluggable Edge Services", RFC 3238,
      January 2002.
 [3]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L.,
      Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol --
      HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
 [4]  Barbir, A., Batuner, O., Beck, A., Chan, T., and H. Orman,
      "Policy, Authorization, and Enforcement Requirements of the Open
      Pluggable Edge Services (OPES)", RFC 3838, August 2004.
 [5]  Beck, A., Hofmann, M., Orman, H., Penno, R., and A. Terzis,
      "Requirements for Open Pluggable Edge Services (OPES) Callout
      Protocols", RFC 3836, August 2004.
 [6]  Barbir, A., Batuner, O., Srinivas, B., Hofmann, M., and H.
      Orman, "Security Threats and Risks for Open Pluggable Edge
      Services (OPES)", RFC 3837, August 2004.

8.2. Informative References

 [7]  Cranor, L. et. al, "The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0
      (P3P1.0) Specification", W3C Recommendation 16
      http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-P3P-20020416/, April 2002.

9. Acknowledgements

 This document is the product of OPES WG.  Oskar Batuner (Independent
 consultant) and Andre Beck (Lucent) are additional authors that have
 contributed to this document.
 Earlier versions of this work were done by Gary Tomlinson (The
 Tomlinson Group) and Michael Condry (Intel).
 The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of: John Morris,
 Mark Baker, Ian Cooper and Marshall T. Rose.

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 15] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

10. Authors' Addresses

 Abbie Barbir
 Nortel Networks
 3500 Carling Avenue
 Nepean, Ontario  K2H 8E9
 Canada
 Phone: +1 613 763 5229
 EMail: abbieb@nortelnetworks.com
 Yih-Farn Robin Chen
 AT&T Labs - Research
 180 Park Avenue
 Florham Park, NJ  07932
 US
 Phone: +1 973 360 8653
 EMail: chen@research.att.com
 Markus Hofmann
 Bell Labs/Lucent Technologies
 Room 4F-513
 101 Crawfords Corner Road
 Holmdel, NJ  07733
 US
 Phone: +1 732 332 5983
 EMail: hofmann@bell-labs.com
 Hilarie Orman
 Purple Streak Development
 EMail: ho@alum.mit.edu
 Reinaldo Penno
 Nortel Networks
 600 Technology Park Drive
 Billerica, MA 01821
 USA
 EMail: rpenno@nortelnetworks.com

Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 16] RFC 3835 An Architecture for OPES August 2004

11. Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  This document is subject
 to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
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Barbir, et al. Informational [Page 17]

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