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rfc:rfc3195

Network Working Group D. New Request for Comments: 3195 M. Rose Category: Standards Track Dover Beach Consulting, Inc.

                                                         November 2001
                    Reliable Delivery for syslog

Status of this Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

 The BSD Syslog Protocol describes a number of service options related
 to propagating event messages.  This memo describes two mappings of
 the syslog protocol to TCP connections, both useful for reliable
 delivery of event messages.  The first provides a trivial mapping
 maximizing backward compatibility.  The second provides a more
 complete mapping.  Both provide a degree of robustness and security
 in message delivery that is unavailable to the usual UDP-based syslog
 protocol, by providing encryption and authentication over a
 connection-oriented protocol.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

Table of Contents

 1.    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
 2.    The Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
 3.    The RAW Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
 3.1   RAW Profile Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
 3.2   RAW Profile Identification and Initialization  . . . . . . .  9
 3.3   RAW Profile Message Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 3.4   RAW Profile Message Semantics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
 4.    The COOKED Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 4.1   COOKED Profile Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 4.2   COOKED Profile Identification and Initialization . . . . . . 11
 4.3   COOKED Profile Message Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
 4.4   COOKED Profile Message Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 4.4.1 The IAM Element  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
 4.4.2 The ENTRY Element  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
 4.4.3 The PATH Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
 5.    Additional Provisioning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
 5.1   Message Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
 5.2   Message Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
 5.3   Message Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
 5.4   Message Observation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
 5.5   Summary of Recommended Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
 6.    Initial Registrations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 6.1   Registration: The RAW Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 6.2   Registration: The COOKED Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 7.    The syslog DTD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
 8.    Reply Codes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
 9.    IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
 9.1   Registration: BEEP Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
 9.2   Registration: The System (Well-Known) TCP port number for
          syslog-conn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
 10.   Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
 11.   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
 12.   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
 Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

1. Introduction

 The syslog protocol [1] presents a spectrum of service options for
 provisioning an event-based logging service over a network.  Each
 option has associated benefits and costs.  Accordingly, the choice as
 to what combination of options is provisioned is both an engineering
 and administrative decision.  This memo describes how to realize the
 syslog protocol when reliable delivery is selected as a required
 service.  It is beyond the scope of this memo to argue for, or
 against, the use of reliable delivery for the syslog protocol.
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [2].

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

2. The Model

 The syslog service supports three roles of operation: device, relay,
 and collector.
 Devices and collectors act as sources and sinks, respectively, of
 syslog entries.  In the simplest case, only a device and collector
 are present.  E.g.,
   +--------+        +-----------+
   | Device | -----> | Collector |
   +--------+        +-----------+
 The relationship between devices and collectors is potentially many-
 to-many.  I.e., a device might communicate with many collectors;
 similarly, a collector might communicate with many devices.
 A relay operates in both modes, accepting syslog entries from devices
 and other relays and forwarding those entries to collectors and other
 relays.
 For example,
   +--------+      +-------+        +-------+      +-----------+
   | Device | ---> | Relay | -...-> | Relay | ---> | Collector |
   +--------+      +-------+        +-------+      +-----------+
 As shown, more than one relay may be present between any particular
 device and collector.
 A relay may be necessary for administrative reasons.  For example, a
 relay might run as an application proxy on a firewall.  Also, there
 might be one relay per company department, which authenticates all
 the devices in the department, and which in turn authenticates itself
 to a company-wide collector.
 A relay can also serve to filter messages.  For example, one relay
 may collect the syslog information from an entire web server farm,
 summarizing hit counts for report generation, forwarding "page not
 found" messages (indicating a possible broken link) to a collector
 that presents it to the webmaster, and sending more urgent messages
 (such as hardware failure reports) to a collector that gateways them
 to a pager.  A relay may also be used to convert formats from a
 device's output to a collector's input.
 It should be noted that a role of device, relay, or collector is
 relevant only to a particular BEEP channel (q.v., below).  A single
 server can serve as a device, a relay, and a collector, all at once,

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 if so configured.  It can even serve as a relay and a collector to
 the same device at the same time using different BEEP channels over
 the same connection-oriented session; this might be useful to collect
 status yet relay urgent error messages.
 To provide reliable delivery when realizing the syslog protocol, this
 memo defines two BEEP profiles.  BEEP [3] is a generic application
 protocol framework for connection-oriented, asynchronous
 interactions.  Within BEEP, features such as authentication, privacy,
 and reliability through retransmission are provided.  There are two
 profiles defined in this memo:
 o  The RAW profile is designed to provide a high-performance, low-
    impact footprint, using essentially the same format as the
    existing UDP-based syslog service.
 o  The COOKED profile is designed to provide a structured entry
    format, in which individual entries are acknowledged (either
    positively or negatively).
 Note that both profiles run over BEEP.  BEEP defines "transport
 mappings," specifying how BEEP messages are carried over the
 underlying transport technologies.  At the time of this writing, only
 one such transport is defined, in [4], which specifies BEEP over TCP.
 All transport mappings are required to support enough reliability and
 sequencing to allow all BEEP messages on a given channel to be
 delivered reliably and in order.  Hence, both the RAW and COOKED
 profile provide reliable delivery of their messages.
 The choice of profile is independent of the operational roles
 discussed above.
 For example, in
   +--------+        +-------+        +-----------+
   | Device | -----> | Relay | -----> | Collector |
   +--------+        +-------+        +-----------+
 the device-to-relay link could be configured to use the RAW profile,
 while the relay-to-collector link could be configured to use the
 COOKED profile.  (For example, the relay may be parsing the RAW
 syslog messages from the device, knowing the details of their
 formats, before passing them to a more generic collector.) Indeed,
 the same device may use different profiles, depending on the
 collector to which it is sending entries.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 Devices and relays MAY discover relays and collectors via the DNS SRV
 algorithm [5].  If so configured, the service used is "syslog" and
 the protocol used is "tcp".  This allows for central administration
 of addressing, fallback for failed relays and collectors, and static
 load balancing.  Security policies and hardware configurations may be
 such that device configuration is more secure than the DNS server.
 Hardware devices may be of such limited resources that DNS SRV access
 is inappropriate.  Firewalls and other restrictive routing mechanisms
 may need to be dealt with before a reliable syslog connection can be
 established.  In these cases, DNS might not be the most appropriate
 configuration mechanism.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

3. The RAW Profile

3.1 RAW Profile Overview

 The RAW profile is designed for minimal implementation effort, high
 efficiency, and backwards compatibility.  It is appropriate
 especially in cases where legacy syslog processing will be applied.
 It should be noted that even though the RAW profile uses the same
 format for message payloads as the UDP version of syslog uses,
 delivery is reliable.  The RAW syslog profile is a profile of BEEP
 [3], and BEEP guarantees ordered reliable delivery of messages within
 each individual channel.
 When the profile is started, no piggyback data is supplied.  All BEEP
 messages in the RAW profile are specified as having a MIME Content-
 Type [6] of application/octet-stream.  Once the channel is open, the
 listener (not the initiator) sends a MSG message indicating it is
 ready to act as a syslog sink.  (Refer to [3]'s Section 2.1 for a
 discussion of roles that a BEEP peer may perform, including
 definitions of the terms "listener", "initiator", "client", and
 "server".)
 The initiator uses ANS replies to supply one or more syslog entries
 in the current UDP format, as specified in [1]'s Section 3.  When the
 initiator has no more entries to send, it finishes with a NUL reply
 and closes the channel.
 An example might appear as follows:
    L: <wait for incoming connection>
    I: <establish connection>
    L: RPY 0 0 . 0 201
    L: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    L:
    L: <greeting>
    L:   <profile
    L:     uri='http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/COOKED' />
    L:   <profile uri='http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/RAW' />
    L: </greeting>
    L: END
    I: RPY 0 0 . 0 52
    I: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    I:
    I: <greeting />
    I: END
    I: MSG 0 1 . 52 133
    I: Content-type: application/beep+xml

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

    I:
    I: <start number='1'>
    I:   <profile uri='http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/RAW' />
    I: </start>
    I: END
    L: RPY 0 1 . 201 100
    L: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    L:
    L: <profile uri='http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/RAW' />
    L: END
    L: MSG 1 0 . 0 50
    L:
    L: Central Services. This has not been a recording.
    L: END
    I: ANS 1 0 . 0 61 0
    I:
    I: <29>Oct 27 13:21:08 ductwork imxpd[141]: Heating emergency.END
    I: ANS 1 0 . 61 58 1
    I:
    I: <29>Oct 27 13:22:15 ductwork imxpd[141]: Contact Tuttle.END
    I: NUL 1 0 . 119 0
    I: END
    L: MSG 0 3 . 301 70
    L: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    L:
    L: <close number='1' code='200' />
    L: END
    I: RPY 0 3 . 185 46
    I: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    I:
    I: <ok />
    I: END
    I: MSG 0 4 . 231 72
    I: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    I:
    I: <close number='0' code='200' />
    I: END
    L: RPY 0 4 . 371 46
    L: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    L:
    L: <ok />
    L: END
    L: <closes connection>
    I: <closes connection>
    L: <awaits next connection>

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 Here we see a BEEP session established, followed by the use of the
 RAW profile.  The initiator is a device, while the listener is a
 collector.  The initiator opens the channel, but the listener sends
 the first MSG.  This allows the initiator to send any number of ANS
 replies carrying syslog event messages.  The initiator sends a NUL
 reply to indicate it is finished.  Upon receiving the NUL, the
 listener closes the RAW channel.  The initiator has the choice of
 closing the entire BEEP session or opening a new syslog channel (RAW
 or COOKED) for more transfers.  In this example, the initiator
 chooses to close the entire BEEP session.
 The overhead for one ANS frame is about thirty octets, once the
 initial handshakes have been exchanged.  If this overhead is too
 high, then messages are likely being generated at a high rate.  In
 this case, multiple syslog messages can be aggregated into a single
 ANS frame, each separated by a CRLF sequence from the preceding.  The
 final message still MUST NOT end with a CRLF.
 For example,
    L: MSG 1 0 . 0 50
    L:
    L: Central Services. This has not been a recording.
    L: END
    I: ANS 1 0 . 0 119 0
    I:
    I: <29>Oct 27 13:21:08 ductwork imxpd[141]: Heating emergency.
    I: <29>Oct 27 13:21:09 ductwork imxpd[141]: Contact Tuttle.END
    I: NUL 1 0 . 119 0
    I: END

3.2 RAW Profile Identification and Initialization

 The RAW syslog profile is identified as
         http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/RAW
 in the BEEP "profile" element during channel creation.
 No data is piggybacked during channel creation.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

3.3 RAW Profile Message Syntax

 All BEEP messages in this profile have a MIME content-type of
 application/octet-stream.  The listener's first BEEP message is
 ignored and indeed may be empty except for headers; hence, any syntax
 is acceptable.
 The ANS replies the initiator sends in response MUST be formatted
 according to Section 4 of [1].  In particular, If the receiver is
 acting as a relay, then it MUST follow the rules as laid out in
 Section 4.2.2 of [1].
 If multiple syslog messages are included in a single ANS reply, each
 is separated from the preceding with a CRLF.  There is no ending
 delimiter, but each syslog event message body length MUST be 1024
 bytes or less, excluding BEEP framing overhead.  Note that there MUST
 NOT be a CRLF between the text of the final syslog event message and
 the "END" marking the trailer of the BEEP frame.

3.4 RAW Profile Message Semantics

 The listener's opening BEEP MSG message has no semantics.  (It is a
 good place to put in an identifying greeting.) The initiator's ANS
 replies MUST specify a facility, severity, and textual message, as
 described in [1].

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

4. The COOKED Profile

4.1 COOKED Profile Overview

 The COOKED profile is designed for new implementations of syslog
 protocol handlers.  It provides a much finer grain of information
 tagging, allowing a better degree of automation in processing.
 Naturally, it includes more overhead as well in support of this.
 The COOKED profile supports three elements of interest:
 o  The "iam" element identifies the sender to the receiver, allowing
    each peer to name itself for the other, and specifying the roles
    (device, relay, or collector) each is taking on.
 o  The "entry" element provides a parsed version of the syslog entry,
    with the various fields of interest broken out.
 o  The "path" element identifies a list of relays through which a
    tagged collection of "entry" elements has passed, along with a set
    of flags indicating what assurances of security have been in
    effect throughout its delivery.

4.2 COOKED Profile Identification and Initialization

 The COOKED syslog profile is identified as
     http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/COOKED
 in the BEEP "profile" element during channel creation.
 During channel creation, the corresponding "profile" element in the
 BEEP "start" element may contain an "iam" element.  If channel
 creation is successful, then before sending the corresponding reply,
 the BEEP peer processes the "iam" element and includes the resulting
 response in the reply.  This response will be an "ok" element or an
 "error" element.  The choice of which element is returned is
 dependent on local provisioning of the recipient.  Including an "iam"
 in the initial "start" element has exactly the same semantics as
 passing it as the first MSG message on the channel.

4.3 COOKED Profile Message Syntax

 All BEEP messages in this profile have a MIME Content-Type [6] of
 application/beep+xml.  The syntax of the individual elements is
 specified in Section 7.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

4.4 COOKED Profile Message Semantics

 Initiators issue two elements: "iam" and "entry", each using a "MSG"
 message.  The listener issues "ok" in "RPY" messages and "error" in
 "ERR" messages.  (See [3]'s Section 2.3.1 for the definitions of the
 "error" and "ok" elements.)

4.4.1 The IAM Element

 The "iam" element serves to identify a device, relay, or collector at
 one end of the BEEP channel to the device, relay, or collector at the
 other end of the channel.  The "iam" element includes the type of
 peer (device, relay, or collector), the fully qualified domain name
 of the peer, and an IP address of the peer.  (The IP address chosen
 SHOULD be the IP address associated with the underlying transport
 protocol carrying the channel.)  The character data of the element is
 free-form human-readable text.  It may be used to further identify
 the peer, such as by describing the physical location of the machine.
 An "iam" element may be sent by the initiator of the channel at any
 time.  The listener responds to an "iam" element with an "ok"
 (indicating acceptance), or an "error" (indicating rejection).  The
 identity and role in effect is specified by the most recent "iam"
 answered with an "ok".
 An "iam" could be rejected (with an "error" element) by the listener
 if the privacy or authentication that has been negotiated is
 inadequate or if the authenticated user does not have authorization
 to serve in the specified role.  It is expected that most
 installations will require an "iam" from the peer before accepting
 any "entry" messages.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 For example, a successful creation might look like this:
    I: MSG 0 10 . 1832 259
    I: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    I:
    I: <start number='1'>
    I:   <profile
    I:       uri='http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/COOKED'>
    I:     <![CDATA[ <iam fqdn='lowry.example.com' ip='10.0.0.27'
    I:       type='device'/> ]]>
    I:   </profile>
    I: </start>
    L: END
    L: RPY 0 10 . 704 138
    L: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    L:
    L: <profile uri='http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/COOKED'>
    L:   <![CDATA[ <ok /> ]]>
    L: </profile>
    L: END
 A creation with an embedded "iam" that fails might look like this:
    C: MSG 0 12 . 1832 259
    C: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    C:
    C: <start number='1'>
    C:   <profile
    C:       uri='http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/COOKED'>
    C:     <![CDATA[ <iam fqdn='tuttle.example.com' ip='10.0.0.29'
    C:       type='relay'/> ]]>
    C:   </profile>
    C: </start>
    C: END
    S: RPY 0 12 . 704 241
    S: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    S:
    S: <profile uri='http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/COOKED'>
    S:   <![CDATA[
    S:     <error code='535'>User 'buttle.example.com' not allowed
    S:       to "iam" for 'tuttle.example.com'</error> ]]>
    S: </profile>
    S: END
 In this case, the error code indicates that the user
 "buttle.example.com" has logged in via some SASL profile, but the
 syslog COOKED profile implementation is claiming to be
 "tuttle.example.com", a mismatch that the server is disallowing.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

4.4.2 The ENTRY Element

 The "entry" element carries the details of a single syslog entry. The
 attributes of an "entry" element include "facility", "severity",
 "timestamp", "hostname", and "tag".  "Facility" and "severity" have
 the semantics defined in [1]'s 4.1.  The other attributes have the
 semantics as in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 of [1].  An "entry" element
 can also contain a "pathID" attribute, described below.
 If the client is a relay, the "entry" SHOULD also contain the
 attributes "deviceFQDN" and "deviceIP", specifying the FQDN and IP
 address of the device that originally created the entry.  These
 attributes may be added by either the relay or the originating
 device.  If possible, the device SHOULD add these entries, referring
 to the interface most closely associated with the syslog entry.
 Before a relay forwards an entry from a device that does not carry
 these attributes, it SHOULD add them based on the "iam" element it
 has received from the device, or based on the underlying transport
 connection address.  A relay MUST NOT add these fields if they are
 missing and an "iam" element on the channel has indicated that
 messages are coming from another relay.
 The "pathID" attribute indicates the path over which this entry has
 travelled, from device through relays to the final collector.
 Syntactically, its value is a string of digits that must match the
 "pathID" attribute of a "path" element sent earlier over the current
 channel.  Semantically, it indicates that the list of relays and
 flags indicated in that earlier "path" element apply to this "entry"
 element.
 The character data for the element is the unstructured syslog event
 message being logged.  If the original device delivers the message
 for the first time via the COOKED profile, it may have any structure
 inside the CDATA.  However, for maximum compatibility, the device
 SHOULD format the CDATA of the message in accordance with Sections
 4.2.1 through 4.2.3 of [1].

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 In the message is being relayed, "tag" SHOULD be those of the
 original device generating the entry (unless the device cannot supply
 a tag).  The "timestamp" SHOULD be that of the original entry
 generation time, rather than the time the entry was passed outward
 from the relay.  The "hostname" SHOULD be the host name or IP address
 by which the device knows itself; this MUST follow the rules
 established in Sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.3 of [1].  The original
 contents of the syslog message MUST be preserved in the CDATA of the
 "entry" element; this includes preservation of exact content during
 translation from the UDP or RAW formats.  In particular, the
 timestamps MUST NOT be rewritten in the CDATA of the "entry" element,
 the tag MUST NOT be removed from the CDATA even if presented in the
 "entry" attributes as well, and so on.
 To be consistent with the spirit of [1], a relay receiving a message
 that does not contain a valid priority, timestamp or hostname will
 follow the same general rules as described in section 4.2.2 of [1]
 while including the exact contents of the received syslog packet as
 the CDATA.  The values of the facility and severity will be construed
 to be 8 and 6 respectively and will be placed into the appropriate
 attributes of the "entry" element.  The hostname will be the name of
 the device as it is known to the relay and will also be inserted into
 the "entry" element's attributes.  The timestamp would be set to the
 received time, inserted only into the attributes of the "entry"
 element.  As an example, consider this message received on UDP port
 514 and interpreted as a traditional syslog message, assuming the
 underlying IP source address is that of the "pipeworks" machine:
   <.....eeeek!
 To be relayed, it must be modified as follows:
       C: MSG 1 0 . 2079 156
       C: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
       C:
       C: <entry facility='8' severity='6'
       C:   hostname='pipeworks'
       C:   timestamp='Oct 31 23:59:59'
       C:  >&lt;.....eeeek!</entry>
       C: END
       S: RPY 1 0 . 933 45
       S: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
       S:
       S: <ok/>
       S: END

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 As another example, consider a message being received that does not
 properly adhere to the conventions described in Section 4.2.2 of [1].
 In particular, the timestamp has a year, making it a nonstandard
 format:
      <166> 1990 Oct 22 01:00:00 bomb tick[0]: BOOM!
 This would be relayed as follows:
       C: MSG 1 0 . 2235 242
       C: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
       C:
       C: <entry facility='160' severity='6'
       C:   hostname='bomb'
       C:   deviceFQDN='bomb.terrorist.net' deviceIP='10.0.0.83'
       C:   timestamp='Oct 22 01:00:04'
       C:  >&lt;166> 1990 Oct 22 01:00:00 bomb tick[0]: BOOM!</entry>
       C: END
       S: RPY 1 0 . 978 45
       S: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
       S:
       S: <ok/>
       S: END
 Note that the tag value was not readily apparent from the received
 message (due to the failed parsing of the timestamp), so it was not
 included in the "entry" element.
 It is explicitly permitted for a relay to parse raw messages in a
 more sophisticated way, but all implementations MUST be able to parse
 messages presented in the format described in [1].  A more
 sophisticated relay could have recognized the year and completely
 parsed out the correct time, tag, and hostname, but such additional
 parsing capability is OPTIONAL.
 Consider the following example, in contrast:
      <166> Oct 22 01:00:00 bomb tick[0]: BOOM!

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 This conformant message would be relayed as follows:
       C: MSG 1 0 . 2477 248
       C: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
       C:
       C: <entry facility='160' severity='6'
       C:   hostname='bomb'
       C:   deviceFQDN='bomb.terrorist.net' deviceIP='10.0.0.83'
       C:   timestamp='Oct 22 01:00:00' tag='tick'
       C:  >&lt;166> Oct 22 01:00:00 bomb tick[0]: BOOM!</entry>
       C: END
       S: RPY 1 0 . 1023 45
       S: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
       S:
       S: <ok/>
       S: END
 In this case, the tag is detected and the timestamp represents the
 message generation time rather than the message reception time.
 Finally, the "entry" element may also contain an "xml:lang"
 attribute, indicating the language in which the CDATA content of the
 tag is presented, as described in [7].
 The "entry" element is answered with either an empty "ok" element if
 everything was successful, or a standard "error" element if there was
 a problem.  An "entry" element can be rejected if no "iam" element
 has been accepted by the listener.  It can also be rejected if the
 user authenticated on the BEEP session (if any) does not have the
 authority to generate (as a device) or relay that entry.  An error is
 also possible if the "pathID" attribute refers to an unknown (or
 rejected) "path" element.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 17] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 A successful exchange of an "entry" element may look like this:
    C: MSG 1 0 . 2725 173
    C: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    C:
    C: <entry facility='24' severity='5'
    C:   timestamp='Jan 26 15:16:17'
    C:   hostname='pipework' tag='imxp'>
    C:     No 27B/6 available</entry>
    C: END
    S: RPY 1 0 . 1068 45
    S: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    S:
    S: <ok/>
    S: END
 Here, the device IP address and FQDN are taken from the "iam"
 element, if any, or from the underlying connection information.
 An example where an "entry" element is rejected with an "error"
 element:
    C: MSG 1 2 . 2898 223
    C: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    C:
    C: <entry facility='24' severity='5' timestamp='Jan 02 13:22:15'
    C:   deviceFQDN='jack.example.net' deviceIP='10.0.0.83'
    C:   tag='imxpd'>
    C:     Replacement device found in nostril.
    C: </entry>
    C: END
    S: ERR 1 2 . 1113 111
    S: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    S:
    S: <error code='554'>Not allowed to relay for
    S:    jack.example.net</error>
    S: END
 Here, the client attempts to relay an entry on behalf of
 jack.example.com, but the entry is refused by the collector for
 administrative reasons.  This may occur, for example, if
 lowry.example.com is in a different department than jack.example.com.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 18] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

4.4.3 The PATH Element

 The "path" element serves to describe a list of the relays through
 which that element has passed, along with a set of flags that
 indicate the properties that all links from the device to the relay
 have shared in common.  Each "path" element contains either another
 "path" element or is empty.  An empty "path" element identifies a
 device, while a "path" element with a nested "path" element
 identifies a relay.  Each "path" element names a FQDN and IP address
 of the interface that sent the element.  Each "path" element also
 names a FQDN and IP address for the interface that received the
 element.  Each "path" element also carries a "linkprops" attribute,
 specifying the properties of the link it describes.
 Each "path" element has a "pathID" attribute which must be unique for
 all "path" elements sent on this channel since its inception.
 Syntactically, the "pathID" attribute is a string of digits.
 Semantically, it serves to identify one "path" element out of many,
 and it serves to link a "path" element with one or more "entry"
 elements.  Any "pathID" attribute is unrelated to any "pathID"
 attribute in nested "path" elements or on other channels.
 Each "path" element has a "fromFQDN" attribute and an "fromIP"
 attribute.  The "fromFQDN" attribute SHOULD be the fully qualified
 domain name of the interface over which the "path" element was sent.
 (The "fromFQDN" can be omitted if that interface has no DNS entry.)
 Similarly, the "fromIP" attribute MUST be the IP address of the
 interface over which the "path" element was sent.
 Each "path" element has a "toFQDN" attribute and an "toIP" attribute.
 The "toFQDN" attribute SHOULD be the fully qualified domain name of
 the interface over which the "path" element was received.  (The
 "toFQDN" can be omitted if that interface has no DNS entry.)
 Similarly, the "toIP" attribute MUST be the IP address of the
 interface over which the "path" element was received.
 Finally, each "path" element carries a "linkprops" attribute.  This
 is syntactically a string of individual characters, each indicating
 one property of the channel over which this "path" element is being
 carried.  Note that outer "path" elements may have stronger
 guarantees than inner "path" elements; care should be taken in the
 interpretation of flags.  The semantics of each possible character in
 this string are as follows:

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 19] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 o: When present, "o" (lower-case letter "o") indicates that weak
    privacy has been negotiated over this link, weakly protecting from
    observation the content of entries associated with this "path"
    element.  (Weak privacy is encryption with less than 80 bits of
    key.)
 O: When present, "O" (upper-case letter "O") indicates that strong
    privacy has been negotiated over this link, strongly protecting
    from observation the content of entries associated with this
    "path" element.  (Strong privacy is encryption with 80 bits or
    more of key, or a transfer mechanism that is otherwise impossible
    to eavesdrop upon.)
 U: When present, "U" indicates that a valid user has been
    authenticated (via SASL or TLS) and an "iam" element has been
    accepted.
 A: When present, "A" indicates that this link has been protected by
    an authentication layer, authenticating the source of every
    "entry" associated with this path.
 R: When present, "R" indicates that this link has been protected
    against message replay.
 I: When present, "I" indicates that this link has been protected
    against modifications of messages in passing.  ("I" stands for
    message Integrity.)
 L: When present, "L" indicates that this link has been protected
    against loss of messages.  That is, this is a reliable delivery
    link.
 D: When present, "D" indicates that the "from" side of this link is a
    device.  If this is not present on the innermost "path" element,
    "entry" elements associated with this path have not been carried
    by the COOKED profile for their entire lifetime.
 Upon receiving a "path" element, the peer MUST perform the following
 checks:
 o  The "fromFQDN" and "fromIP" must match the underlying transport
    connection.
 o  The flags in the "linkprops" attribute must match the attributes
    of the session.
 o  The "toFQDN" and "toIP" must match the underlying transport
    connection.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 20] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 o  The "pathID" attribute must be unique with respect to all other
    "path" elements received on this channel.
 If all these checks pass, the "path" element is accepted with an "ok"
 element.  Otherwise, an "error" element is generated with an
 appropriate code.  In addition, if any of the nested "path" elements
 refer to the machine receiving the element, it may indicate a routing
 loop in the configuration for the so-identified path, and appropriate
 measures should be taken.
 If the peer receiving an "entry" element is receiving it directly
 from a device via either syslog-conn profile, and the device has not
 generated a "path" element, the receiver may itself generate an
 appropriate "path" element, either to be recorded in the logs (if
 this peer is a collector) or passed to the next peer (if this peer is
 a relay).  If a peer receives a syslog message via UDP, it may
 optionally generate an appropriate "peer" element based on any
 cryptographic information provided in the message itself.
 When a peer receives a "path" element, it remembers it for future
 use.  A collector will store it in the log for later reference.  A
 relay will remember it.  When an "entry" arrives referencing the
 received "path" element, and that entry needs to be forwarded to
 another relay or collector, and no appropriate "path" element has
 already been generated, an appropriate "path" element is generated
 and sent over the outbound channel before the entry is forwarded.  An
 appropriate "path" element is created by taking the received "path"
 element, wrapping it in a new "path" element with the appropriate
 attributes, and assigning it a new "pathID" attribute.  When future
 "entry" elements arrive with the same incoming "pathID" attribute,
 and they need to be forwarded to a channel over which an appropriate
 "pathID" attribute has already been sent, only the "pathID" attribute
 of the "entry" element needs to be rewritten to refer to the "path"
 element on the outgoing channel.
 It should be noted that the majority of the complexity in managing
 "path" elements arises only in relays.  In particular, devices never
 need to generate "path" elements and collectors need only verify
 them, log them, and possibly use them in displays and reports.
 Collectors do not need to generate "path" elements or rewrite "entry"
 elements.  Hence, only in complex configurations (where they are most
 useful) do complex "path" configurations occur.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 21] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 For example, here is a path element sent from
 lowry.records.example.com to kurtzman.records.example.com.  It
 indicates that entries from lowry to kurtzman tagged with
 pathID='173' originated from screen.lowry.records.example.com.  It
 indicates that screen.lowry.records.example.com is believed by
 lowry.records.example.com to be the originating device, and that
 entries over this path are delivered without loss and without
 modification, although messages might be replayed or observed.  The
 link between lowry and kurtzman, however, avoids replay attacks, lost
 messages, and modifications to messages.  While
 screen.lowry.records.example.com has not authenticated itself to
 lowry.records.example.com, lowry claims to have authenticated itself
 to kurtzman.
    C: MSG 2 1 . 3121 426
    C: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    C:
    C: <path fromFQDN='lowry.records.example.com'
    C:       fromIP='10.0.0.50'
    C:       toFQDN='kurtzman.records.example.com'
    C:       toIP='10.0.0.51'
    C:       linkprops='ULRI'
    C:       pathID='173'>
    C: <path fromFQDN='screen.lowry.records.example.com'
    C:       fromIP='10.0.0.47'
    C:       toFQDN='lowry.records.example.com'
    C:       toIP='10.0.0.50'
    C:       linkprops='DLI'
    C:       pathID='24'>
    C: </path>
    C: </path>
    C: END
    S: ERR 2 1 . 1224 114
    S: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    S:
    S: <error code='530'>linkprops includes 'U'
    S:   but no 'iam' received</error>
    S: END
 However, kurtzman.records.example.com rejects the "path" element,
 since the "linkprops" attribute claims that lowry has authenticated
 itself, but kurtzman disagrees, not having received an "iam" element.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 22] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 In a second example, this "path" element informs
 collector.example.com that the records department's firewall will be
 forwarding "entry" elements with a "pathID" attribute whose value is
 "17".  These "entry" elements will be coming in on the "10.0.0.2"
 interface of the firewall, to be forwarded out the "134.130.74.56"
 interface of the firewall.  The final hop has all possible
 guarantees, although the entries transferred within the records
 department (behind the firewall) may have been observed in passing.
    C: MSG 2 2 . 3547 813
    C: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    C:
    C: <path fromFQDN='fwall.records.example.com'
    C:       fromIP='134.130.74.56'
    C:       toFQDN='collector.example.com'
    C:       toIP='134.130.74.12'
    C:       linkprops='OUARIL'
    C:       pathID='17'>
    C: <path fromFQDN='kurtzman.records.example.com'
    C:       fromIP='10.0.0.50'
    C:       toFQDN='fwall.records.example.com'
    C:       toIP='10.0.0.2'
    C:       linkprops='ULRI'
    C:       pathID='120'>
    C: <path fromFQDN='lowry.records.example.com'
    C:       fromIP='10.0.0.50'
    C:       toFQDN='kurtzman.records.example.com'
    C:       toIP='10.0.0.51'
    C:       linkprops='ULRI'
    C:       pathID='173'>
    C: <path fromFQDN='screen.lowry.records.example.com'
    C:       fromIP='10.0.0.47'
    C:       toFQDN='lowry.records.example.com'
    C:       toIP='10.0.0.50'
    C:       linkprops='DLI'
    C:       pathID='24'>
    C: </path></path></path></path>
    C: END
    S: RPY 2 2 . 1338 45
    S: Content-type: application/beep+xml
    S:
    S: <ok/>
    S: END

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 23] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 As a final example, an "entry" element from Lowry's screen arrives at
 the firewall.  The "path" attribute is rewritten, and it is forwarded
 on to the collector.
    The entry arrives on the 10.0.0.2 interface:
    C: MSG 2 3 . 4360 250
    C: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    C:
    C: <entry facility='24' severity='5'
    C:   timestamp='Oct 27 13:24:12'
    C:   deviceFQDN='screen.lowry.records.example.com'
    C:   deviceIP='10.0.0.47'
    C:   pathID='173'
    C:   tag='dvd'>
    C:     Job paused - Boss watching.
    C: </entry>
    C: END
    S: RPY 2 3 . 1383 45
    S: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    S:
    S: <ok/>
    S: END
    It is forwarded out the 134.130.74.56 interface:
    C: MSG 7 9 . 9375 276
    C: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    C:
    C: <entry facility='24' severity='5'
    C:   timestamp='Oct 27 13:24:12'
    C:   deviceFQDN='screen.lowry.records.example.com'
    C:   deviceIP='10.0.0.47'
    C:   pathID='17'
    C:   tag='dvd'>
    C:     Job paused - Boss watching.
    C: </entry>
    C: END
    S: RPY 7 9 . 338 45
    S: Content-Type: application/beep+xml
    S:
    S: <ok/>
    S: END
 A discussion of the wisdom of configuring Lowry's machine to forward
 such messages via Kurtzman's machine is beyond the scope of this
 document.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 24] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

5. Additional Provisioning

 In more advanced configurations, syslog devices, relays, and
 collectors can be configured to support various delivery priorities.
 Multiple channels running the same profile can be opened between two
 peers, with higher priority syslog messages routed to a channel that
 is given more bandwidth.  Such provisioning is a local matter.
 syslog [1] discusses a number of reasons why privacy and
 authentication of syslog entry messages may be important in a
 networked computing environment.  The nature of BEEP allows for
 convenient layering of authentication and privacy over any BEEP
 channel.

5.1 Message Authenticity

 Section 6.2 of [1] discusses the dangers of unauthenticated syslog
 entries.  To prevent inauthentic syslog event messages from being
 accepted, configure syslog peers to require the use of a strong
 authentication technology for the BEEP session.
 If provisioned for message authentication, implementations SHOULD use
 SASL mechanism DIGEST-MD5 [8] to provision this service.

5.2 Message Replay

 Section 6.3.4 of [1] discusses the dangers of syslog message replay.
 To prevent syslog event messages from being replayed, configure
 syslog peers to require the use of a strong authentication technology
 for the BEEP session.
 If provisioned to detect message replay, implementations SHOULD use
 SASL mechanism DIGEST-MD5 [8] to provision this service.

5.3 Message Integrity

 Section 6.5 of [1] discusses the dangers of syslog event messages
 being maliciously altered by an attacker.  To prevent messages from
 being altered, configure syslog peers to require the use of a strong
 authentication technology for the BEEP session.
 If provisioned to protect message integrity, implementations SHOULD
 use SASL mechanism DIGEST-MD5 [8] to provision this service.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 25] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

5.4 Message Observation

 Section 6.6 of [1] discusses the dangers (and benefits) of syslog
 messages being visible at intermediate points along the transmission
 path between device and collector.  To prevent messages from being
 viewed by an attacker, configure syslog peers to require the use of a
 transport security profile for the BEEP session.  (However, other
 traffic characteristics, e.g., volume and timing of transmissions,
 remain observable.)
 If provisioned to secure messages against unauthorized observation,
 implementations SHOULD use the TLS profile [3] to provision this
 service.  The cipher algorithm used SHOULD be
 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.

5.5 Summary of Recommended Practices

 For the indicated protections, implementations SHOULD be configured
 to use the indicated mechanisms:
  Desired Protection  SHOULD tune using
  ------------------  -----------------
  Authentication      http://iana.org/beep/SASL/DIGEST-MD5
    + Replay          http://iana.org/beep/SASL/DIGEST-MD5
      + Integrity     http://iana.org/beep/SASL/DIGEST-MD5
        + Observation http://iana.org/beep/TLS
 BEEP peer identities used for authentication SHOULD correspond to the
 FQDN of the initiating peer.  That is, a relay running on
 relay.example.com should use a "user ID" of "relay.example.com"
 within the SASL authentication profiles, as well as in the FQDN of
 the "iam" element.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 26] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

6. Initial Registrations

6.1 Registration: The RAW Profile

 Profile Identification: http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/RAW
 Messages exchanged during Channel Creation: None
 Messages starting one-to-one exchanges: Anything
 Messages in positive replies: None
 Messages in negative replies: None
 Messages in one-to-many exchanges: Anything
 Message Syntax: See Section 3.3
 Message Semantics: See Section 3.4
 Contact Information: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this
    memo

6.2 Registration: The COOKED Profile

 Profile Identification:
    http://xml.resource.org/profiles/syslog/COOKED
 Messages exchanged during Channel Creation: iam
 Messages starting one-to-one exchanges: iam, entry, path
 Messages in positive replies: ok
 Messages in negative replies: error
 Messages in one-to-many exchanges: None
 Message Syntax: See Section 4.3
 Message Semantics: See Section 4.4
 Contact Information: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this
    memo

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 27] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

7. The syslog DTD

 The following is the DTD defining the valid elements for the syslog
 over BEEP mapping.
 <!--
   DTD for syslog over BEEP, as of 2000-10-10
   Refer to this DTD as:
     <!ENTITY % SYSLOG PUBLIC "-//Blocks//DTD SYSLOGRELIABLE//EN" "">
     %SYSLOG;
   -->
 <!--
   Contents
     Overview
     Includes
     Profile Summaries
     Entity Definitions
     Operations
         iam
         entry
         path
   -->
 <!--
   Overview
     Syslog packets delivered via BEEP
 <!-- Includes -->
        <!ENTITY % BEEP PUBLIC "-//Blocks//DTD BEEP//EN"
                   "">
        %BEEP;

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 28] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 <!--
   Profile summaries
     BEEP profile SYSLOG-RAW
     role        MSG        ANS        ERR
     ====        ===        ===        ===
      L          text       text       text
     BEEP profile SYSLOG-COOKED
     role        MSG        RPY        ERR
     ====        ===        ===        ===
     I or L      iam        ok         error
     I or L      entry      ok         error
     I or L      path       ok         error
 <!--
   Entity Definitions
         entity        syntax/reference     example
         ======        ================     =======
     a fully qualified domain name
         FQDN          See [RFC-1034]       www.example.com
     a dotted-quad IP address
         IP            1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT "."
                        1*3DIGIT "." 1*3DIGIT
                                            10.0.0.27
     a syslog facility
         FACILITY      See [1]
                       1*3DIGIT             80
     a syslog severity
         SEVERITY      See [1]
                       DIGIT                 4
     a timestamp       See [1]               Jan 03 18:43:12
         TIMESTAMP
     an identifying integer
         IDINT         1*DIGIT               1027

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 29] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 <!ENTITY % FQDN         "CDATA">
 <!ENTITY % IP           "CDATA">
 <!ENTITY % FACILITY     "CDATA">
 <!ENTITY % SEVERITY     "CDATA">
 <!ENTITY % TIMESTAMP    "CDATA">
 <!ENTITY % IDINT        "CDATA">
 <!--
   The iam element declares the role and identity of the peer
   issuing it. The contents of the element may include human-readable
   informative text, such as the physical location of the computer
   issuing the "iam".
 <!ELEMENT iam         (#PCDATA)>
 <!ATTLIST iam
           fqdn        %FQDN;                   #REQUIRED
           ip          %IP;                     #REQUIRED
           type        (device|relay|collector) #REQUIRED>
 <!--
   The entry element conveys a single syslog message.
   -->
 <!ELEMENT entry       (#PCDATA)>
 <!ATTLIST entry
           xml:lang    %LANG;                   "i-default"
           facility    %FACILITY;                #REQUIRED
           severity    %SEVERITY;                #REQUIRED
           timestamp   %TIMESTAMP;               #IMPLIED
           tag         %ATEXT;                   #IMPLIED
           deviceFQDN  %FQDN;                    #IMPLIED
           deviceIP    %IP;                      #IMPLIED
           pathID      %IDINT;                   #IMPLIED>

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 30] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

 <!--
   The path element conveys a list of relays through which
   entries have passed.
   -->
 <!ELEMENT path        (path?)>
 <!ATTLIST path
           pathID      %IDINT;                   #REQUIRED
           fromFQDN    %FQDN;                    #IMPLIED
           fromIP      %IP;                      #REQUIRED
           toFQDN      %FQDN;                    #IMPLIED
           toIP        %IP;                      #REQUIRED
           linkprops   %ATEXT;                   #REQUIRED>
 <!-- End of DTD -->

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 31] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

8. Reply Codes

 The following error codes are used in the protocol:
 code    meaning
 ====    =======
 200     success
 421     service not available
 451     requested action aborted
         (e.g., local error in processing)
 454     temporary authentication failure
 500     general syntax error
         (e.g., poorly-formed XML)
 501     syntax error in parameters
         (e.g., non-valid XML)
 504     parameter not implemented
 530     authentication required
 534     authentication mechanism insufficient
         (e.g., too weak, sequence exhausted, etc.)
 535     authentication failure
 537     action not authorized for user
 538     authentication mechanism requires encryption
 550     requested action not taken
         (e.g., no requested profiles are acceptable)
 553     parameter invalid
 554     transaction failed
         (e.g., policy violation)

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 32] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

9. IANA Considerations

9.1 Registration: BEEP Profiles

 The IANA registers the profiles specified in Section 6, and selects
 IANA-specific URIs "http://iana.org/beep/SYSLOG/RAW" and
 "http://iana.org/beep/SYSLOG/COOKED".

9.2 Registration: The System (Well-Known) TCP port number for syslog-

  conn
 A single well-known port (601) is allocated to syslog-conn.  In-band
 negotiation determines whether COOKED or RAW syslog-conn is in use.
 Protocol Number: TCP
 Message Formats, Types, Opcodes, and Sequences: See Section 3.3 and
    Section 4.4.
 Functions: See Section 3.4 and Section 4.4.
 Use of Broadcast/Multicast: none
 Proposed Name: Reliable syslog service
 Short name: syslog-conn
 Contact Information: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this
    memo

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 33] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

10. Security Considerations

 Consult Section 6 of [1] for a discussion of security issues for the
 syslog service.  In addition, since the RAW and COOKED profiles are
 defined using the BEEP framework, consult [3]'s Section 8 for a
 discussion of BEEP-specific security issues.
 BEEP is used to provide communication security but not object
 integrity.  In other words, the messages "on the wire" can be
 protected, but a compromised device may undetectably generate
 incorrect messages, and relays and collectors can modify, insert, or
 delete messages undetectably.  Other techniques must be used to
 assure that such compromises are detectable.

11. Acknowledgements

 The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Christopher
 Calabrese, Keith McCloghrie, Balazs Scheidler, and David Waitzman.

12. References

 [1]  Lonvick, C., "The BSD Syslog Protocol", RFC 3164, August 2001.
 [2]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
      Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [3]  Rose, M., "The Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol Core", RFC
      3080, March 2001.
 [4]  Rose, M., "Mapping the BEEP Core onto TCP", RFC 3081, March
      2001.
 [5]  Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
      specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
      February 2000.
 [6]  Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
      Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, November
      1996.
 [7]  Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of Languages", BCP
      47, RFC 3066, January 2001.
 [8]  Leach, P. and C. Newman, "Using Digest Authentication as a SASL
      Mechanism", RFC 2831, May 2000.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 34] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

Authors' Addresses

 Darren New
 5390 Caminito Exquisito
 San Diego, CA  92130
 US
 Phone: +1 858 350 9733
 EMail: dnew@san.rr.com
 Marshall T. Rose
 Dover Beach Consulting, Inc.
 POB 255268
 Sacramento, CA  95865-5268
 US
 Phone: +1 916 483 8878
 EMail: mrose@dbc.mtview.ca.us

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 35] RFC 3195 Reliable Delivery for syslog November 2001

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.
 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
 included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
 English.
 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
 Internet Society.

New & Rose Standards Track [Page 36]

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