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rfc:rfc3039

Network Working Group S. Santesson Request for Comments: 3039 AddTrust Category: Standards Track W. Polk

                                                                  NIST
                                                             P. Barzin
                                                                SECUDE
                                                            M. Nystrom
                                                          RSA Security
                                                          January 2001
              Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                   Qualified Certificates Profile

Status of this Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

 This document forms a certificate profile for Qualified Certificates,
 based on RFC 2459, for use in the Internet.  The term Qualified
 Certificate is used to describe a certificate with a certain
 qualified status within applicable governing law.  Further, Qualified
 Certificates are issued exclusively to physical persons.
 The goal of this document is to define a general syntax independent
 of local legal requirements.  The profile is however designed to
 allow further profiling in order to meet specific local needs.
 It is important to note that the profile does not define any legal
 requirements for Qualified Certificates.
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

Table of Contents

 1  Introduction ................................................    2
 2  Requirements and Assumptions ................................    3
 2.1  Properties ................................................    4
 2.2  Statement of Purpose ......................................    5
 2.3  Policy Issues .............................................    5
 2.4  Uniqueness of names .......................................    5
 3  Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile ..............    6
 3.1  Basic Certificate Fields ..................................    6
 3.1.1  Issuer ..................................................    6
 3.1.2  Subject .................................................    6
 3.2  Certificate Extensions ....................................    9
 3.2.1  Subject Directory Attributes ............................    9
 3.2.2  Certificate Policies ....................................   10
 3.2.3  Key Usage ...............................................   10
 3.2.4  Biometric Information ...................................   11
 3.2.5  Qualified Certificate Statements ........................   12
 4  Security Considerations .....................................   14
 5  References ..................................................   15
 6  Intellectual Property Rights ................................   16
 A  ASN.1 definitions ...........................................   17
 A.1  1988 ASN.1 Module .........................................   17
 A.2  1993 ASN.1 Module .........................................   19
 B  A Note on Attributes ........................................   24
 C.  Example Certificate ........................................   24
 C.1  ASN.1 Structure ...........................................   25
 C.1.1 Extensions ...............................................   25
 C.1.2 The certificate ..........................................   27
 C.2  ASN.1 Dump ................................................   29
 C.3  DER-encoding ..............................................   32
 C.4  CA's public key ...........................................   33
 Authors' Addresses .............................................   34
 Full Copyright Statement .......................................   35

1 Introduction

 This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509
 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet.  It is based on RFC
 2459, which defines underlying certificate formats and semantics
 needed for a full implementation of this standard.
 The standard profiles the format for a specific type of certificates
 named Qualified Certificates.  The term Qualified Certificates and
 the assumptions that affects the scope of this document are discussed
 in Section 2.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

 Section 3 defines requirements on information content in Qualified
 Certificates.  This profile addresses two fields in the basic
 certificate as well as five certificate extensions.  The certificate
 fields are the subject and issuer fields.  The certificate extensions
 are subject directory attributes, certificate policies, key usage, a
 private extension for storage of biometric data and a private
 extension for storage of statements related to Qualified
 Certificates.  The private extensions are presented in the 1993
 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1), but in conformance with RFC
 2459 the 1988 ASN.1 module in Appendix A contains all normative
 definitions (the 1993 module in Appendix A is informative).
 In Section 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to
 clarify the security context in which Qualified Certificates are
 assumed to be utilized.  Section 5 contains the references.
 Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 [X.680] structures that are
 not already defined in RFC 2459.  Appendix B contains a note on
 attributes.  Appendix C contains an example certificate.  Appendix D
 contains authors' addresses and Appendix E contains the IETF
 Copyright Statement.
 It should be noted that this specification does not define the
 specific semantics of Qualified Certificates, and does not define the
 policies that should be used with them.  That is, this document
 defines what information should go into Qualified Certificates, but
 not what that information means.  A system that uses Qualified
 Certificates must define its own semantics for the information in
 Qualified Certificates.  It is expected that laws and corporate
 policies will make these definitions.

2 Requirements and Assumptions

 The term "Qualified Certificate" has been used by the European
 Commission to describe a certain type of certificates with specific
 relevance for European legislation.  This specification is intended
 to support this class of certificates, but its scope is not limited
 to this application.
 Within this standard the term "Qualified Certificate" is used more
 generally, describing the format for a certificate whose primary
 purpose is identifying a person with high level of assurance in
 public non-repudiation services.  The actual mechanisms that will
 decide whether a certificate should or should not be considered to be
 a "Qualified Certificate" in regard to any legislation are outside
 the scope of this standard.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

 Harmonization in the field of Qualified Certificates is essential
 within several aspects that fall outside the scope of RFC 2459.  The
 most important aspects that affect the scope of this specification
 are:
  1. Definition of names and identity information in order to identify

the associated subject in a uniform way.

  1. Definition of information which identifies the CA and the

jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular

    certificate.
  1. Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified

Certificates.

  1. Definition of information structure for storage of biometric

information.

  1. Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements

with relevance for Qualified Certificates.

  1. Requirements for critical extensions.

2.1 Properties

 A Qualified Certificate as defined in this standard is assumed to
 have the following properties:
  1. The certificate is issued by a CA that makes a public statement

that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified

    Certificate, as discussed in Section 2.2
  1. The certificate indicates a certificate policy consistent with

liabilities, practices and procedures undertaken by the CA, as

    discussed in 2.3
  1. The certificate is issued to a natural person (living human

being).

  1. The certificate contains an identity based on a pseudonym or a

real name of the subject.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

2.2 Statement of Purpose

 For a certificate to serve the purpose of being a Qualified
 Certificate, this profile assumes that the CA will have to include in
 the certificate information that explicitly defines this intent.
 The function of this information is thus to assist any concerned
 entity in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting
 signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate.
 This profile defines two complementary ways to include this
 information:
  1. As information defined by a certificate policy included in the

certificate policies extension, and

  1. As a statement included in the Qualified Certificates Statements

extension.

2.3 Policy Issues

 Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to
 be understood and used.  It is however outside the scope of this
 profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern
 services that issue or utilize certificates according to this
 profile.
 It is however assumed that the issuing CA will undertake to follow a
 publicly available certificate policy that is consistent with its
 liabilities, practices and procedures.

2.4 Uniqueness of names

 Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a
 representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that
 identifies a particular object from among the set of all objects.  An
 object can be assigned a distinguished name without being represented
 by an entry in the Directory, but this name is then the name its
 object entry could have had if it were represented in the Directory.
 In the context of qualified certificates, a distinguished name
 denotes a set of attribute values [X.501] which forms a name that is
 unambiguous within a certain domain that forms either a real or a
 virtual DIT (Directory Information Tree)[X.501].  In the case of
 subject names the domain is assumed to be at least the issuing domain
 of the CA.  The distinguished name MUST be unique for each subject
 entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field,
 during the whole life time of the CA.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

3 Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile

 This section defines a profile for Qualified Certificates.  The
 profile is based on the Internet certificate profile RFC 2459 which
 in turn is based on the X.509 version 3 format.  For full
 implementation of this section implementers are REQUIRED to consult
 the underlying formats and semantics defined in RFC 2459.
 ASN.1 definitions relevant for this section that are not supplied by
 RFC 2459 are supplied in Appendix A.

3.1 Basic Certificate Fields

 This specification provides additional details regarding the contents
 of two fields in the basic certificate.  These fields are the issuer
 and subject fields.

3.1.1 Issuer

 The issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for
 issuing the certificate.  The name SHOULD be an officially registered
 name of the organization.
 The identity of the issuer SHALL be specified using an appropriate
 subset of the following attributes:
       domainComponent;
       countryName;
       stateOrProvinceName;
       organizationName;
       localityName; and
       serialNumber.
 Additional attributes MAY be present but they SHOULD NOT be necessary
 to identify the issuing organization.
 Attributes present in the issuer field SHOULD be consistent with the
 laws under which the issuer operates.
 A relying party MAY have to consult associated certificate policies
 and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to determine the semantics of name
 fields and the laws under which the issuer operates.

3.1.2 Subject

 The subject field of a certificate compliant with this profile SHALL
 contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for definition
 of distinguished name).

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

 The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the
 following attributes:
    countryName;
    commonName;
    surname;
    givenName;
    pseudonym;
    serialNumber;
    organizationName;
    organizationalUnitName;
    stateOrProvinceName
    localityName and
    postalAddress.
 Other attributes may be present but MUST NOT be necessary to
 distinguish the subject name from other subject names within the
 issuer domain.
 Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of
 the following:
    Choice   I:  commonName
    Choice  II:  givenName
    Choice III:  pseudonym
 The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in which
 other attributes are to be understood.  The country attribute does
 not necessarily indicate the subject's country of citizenship or
 country of residence, nor does it have to indicate the country of
 issuance.
 Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName
 in the DIT.  In cases where the subject name, as specified in the
 subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the
 countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.
 The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name of
 the subject.  This MAY be in the subject's preferred presentation
 format, or a format preferred by the CA, or some other format.
 Pseudonyms, nicknames and names with spelling other than defined by
 the registered name MAY be used.  To understand the nature of the
 name presented in commonName, complying applications MAY have to
 examine present values of the givenName and surname attributes, or
 the pseudonym attribute.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

 Note: Many client implementations presuppose the presence of the
 commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to
 display the subject's name regardless of present givenName, surname
 or pseudonym attribute values.
 The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL, if present, contain
 the registered name of the subject, in accordance with the laws under
 which the CA prepares the certificate.  These attributes SHALL be
 used in the subject field if the commonName attribute is not present.
 In cases where the subject only has a single name registered, the
 givenName attribute SHALL be used and the surname attribute SHALL be
 omitted.
 The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a pseudonym
 of the subject.  Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT be combined
 with use of any of the attributes surname and/or givenName.
 The serialNumber attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to
 differentiate between names where the subject field would otherwise
 be identical.  This attribute has no defined semantics beyond
 ensuring uniqueness of subject names.  It MAY contain a number or
 code assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a government or
 civil authority.  It is the CA's responsibility to ensure that the
 serialNumber is sufficient to resolve any subject name collisions.
 The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute types
 SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant
 information of an organization with which the subject is associated.
 The type of association between the organization and the subject is
 beyond the scope of this document.
 The postalAddress, the stateOrProvinceName and the localityName
 attribute types SHALL, when present, be used to store address and
 geographical information with which the subject is associated.  If an
 organizationName value also is present then the postalAddress,
 stateOrProvinceName and localityName attribute values SHALL be
 associated with the specified organization.  The type of association
 between the postalAddress, stateOrProvinceName and the localityName
 and either the subject or the organizationName is beyond the scope of
 this document.
 Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes
 named in this section.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

3.2 Certificate Extensions

 This specification provides additional details regarding the contents
 of five certificate extensions.  These extensions are the subject
 directory attributes, certificate policies, key usage, private
 extension for biometric information and private extension for
 Qualified Certificate statements.

3.2.1 Subject Directory Attributes

 The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MAY contain additional
 attributes, associated with the subject, as complement to present
 information in the subject field and the subject alternative name
 extension.
 Attributes suitable for storage in this extension are attributes,
 which are not part of the subject's distinguished name, but which MAY
 still be useful for other purposes (e.g., authorization).
 This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
 Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the following
 attributes:
    title;
    dateOfBirth;
    placeOfBirth;
    gender;
    countryOfCitizenship; and
    countryOfResidence.
 Other attributes MAY be included according to local definitions.
 The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a
 designated position or function of the subject within the
 organization specified by present organizational attributes in the
 subject field.  The association between the title, the subject and
 the organization is beyond the scope of this document.
 The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
 the date of birth of the subject.  The manner in which the date of
 birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
 document.
 The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of
 the place of birth of the subject.  The manner in which the place of
 birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of this
 document.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

 The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the
 gender of the subject.  For females the value "F" (or "f") and for
 males the value "M" (or "m") have to be used.  The manner in which
 the gender is associated with the subject is outside the scope of
 this document.
 The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
 identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed countries of
 citizenship at the time that the certificate was issued.  If the
 subject is a citizen of more than one country, more than one country
 MAY be present.  Determination of citizenship is a matter of law and
 is outside the scope of this document.
 The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the
 value of at least one country in which the subject is resident.  If
 the subject is a resident of more than one country, more than one
 country MAY be present.  Determination of residence is a matter of
 law and is outside the scope of this document.

3.2.2 Certificate Policies

 The certificate policies extension SHALL contain the identifier of at
 least one certificate policy which reflects the practices and
 procedures undertaken by the CA.  The certificate policy extension
 MAY be marked critical.
 Information provided by the issuer stating the purpose of the
 certificate as discussed in Section 2.2 SHOULD be evident through
 indicated policies.
 The certificate policies extension SHOULD include all policy
 information needed for validation of the certificate.  If policy
 information is included in the QCStatements extension (see 3.2.5),
 then this information SHOULD also be defined by indicated policies.
 Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined in
 RFC 2459.

3.2.3 Key Usage

 The key usage extension SHALL be present.  If the key usage
 nonRepudiation bit is asserted then it SHOULD NOT be combined with
 any other key usage , i.e., if set, the key usage non-repudiation
 SHOULD be set exclusively.
 The key usage extension MAY be marked critical.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

3.2.4 Biometric Information

 This section defines an extension for storage of biometric
 information.  Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash
 of a biometric template.
 The purpose of this extension is to provide means for authentication
 of biometric information.  The biometric information that corresponds
 to the stored hash is not stored in this extension, but the extension
 MAY include an URI pointing to a location where this information can
 be obtained.  If included, this URI does not imply that this is the
 only way to access this information.
 It is RECOMMENDED that biometric information in this extension is
 limited to information types suitable for human verification, i.e.,
 where the decision of whether the information is an accurate
 representation of the subject is naturally performed by a person.
 This implies a usage where the biometric information is represented
 by, for example, a graphical image displayed to the relying party,
 which MAY be used by the relying party to enhance identification of
 the subject.
 This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
    biometricInfo  EXTENSION ::= {
        SYNTAX             BiometricSyntax
        IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-biometricInfo }
    id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {id-pe 2}
    BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData
    BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {
        typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,
        hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
        biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,
        sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL }
    TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {
        predefinedBiometricType    PredefinedBiometricType,
        biometricDataID            OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
    PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),
        handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

 The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify
 that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical
 image of the subject.  The hash of the graphical image SHALL only be
 calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the
 image type.
 The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present,
 SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable
 graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature.  The hash of
 the graphical image SHALL only be calculated over the image data
 excluding any labels defining the image type.

3.2.5 Qualified Certificate Statements

 This section defines an extension for inclusion of defined statements
 related to Qualified Certificates.
 A typical statement suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be a
 statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified
 Certificate in accordance with a particular legal system (as
 discussed in Section 2.2).
 Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be
 statements related to the applicable legal jurisdiction within which
 the certificate is issued.  As an example this MAY include a maximum
 reliance limit for the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's
 liability.
 Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement
 and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the
 statementInfo parameter.
 If the statementInfo parameter is included then the object identifier
 of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the
 semantics of this parameter.  If the object identifier does not
 define the semantics, a relying party may have to consult a relevant
 certificate policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics.
 This extension may be critical or non-critical.  If the extension is
 critical, this means that all statements included in the extension
 are regarded as critical.
    qcStatements  EXTENSION ::= {
        SYNTAX             QCStatements
        IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-qcStatements }
    id-pe-qcStatements     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

    QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement
    QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {
        statementId   QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}),
        statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
        ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }
    SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...}

3.2.5.1 Predefined Statements

 This profile includes one predefined object identifier (id-qcs-
 pkixQCSyntax-v1), identifying conformance with syntax and semantics
 defined in this profile.  This Qualified Certificate profile is
 referred to as version 1.
    qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation
        IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }
    --  This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
    --  semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
    --  (Version 1). The SemanticsInformation may optionally contain
    --  additional semantics information as specified.
    SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
        semanticsIdentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER   OPTIONAL,
        nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities
                                                        OPTIONAL }
        (WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
         WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})
    NameRegistrationAuthorities ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
        GeneralName
 The SementicsInformation component identified by id-qcs-
 pkixQCSyntax-v1 MAY contain a semantics identifier and MAY identify
 one or more name registration authorities.
 The semanticsIdentifier component, if present, SHALL contain an OID,
 defining semantics for attributes and names in basic certificate
 fields and certificate extensions.  The OID may define semantics for
 all, or for a subgroup of all present attributes and/or names.
 The NameRegistrationAuthorities component, if present, SHALL contain
 a name of one or more name registration authorities, responsible for
 registration of attributes or names associated with the subject.  The
 association between an identified name registration authority and
 present attributes MAY be defined by a semantics identifier OID, by a
 certificate policy (or CPS) or some other implicit factors.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

 If a value of type SemanticsInformation is present in a QCStatement
 then at least one of the fields semanticsIdentifier and
 nameRegistrationAuthorities must be present, as indicated.

4 Security Considerations

 The legal value of a digital signature that is validated with a
 Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy
 governing the use of the associated private key.  Both the private
 key holder as well as the relying party should make sure that the
 private key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key
 holder.
 Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for
 involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issue
 certificates as Qualified Certificates.  The associated private keys
 must be unique for the subject, and must be maintained under the
 subject's sole control.  That is, a CA should not issue a qualified
 certificate if the means to use the private key is not protected
 against unintended usage.  This implies that the CA have some
 knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module.
 The CA must further verify that the public key contained in the
 certificate is legitimately representing the subject.
 CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions
 indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions
 are met.
 Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate
 extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications and
 this specification therefore recommends against such practices.
 The ability to compare two qualified certificates to determine if
 they represent the same physical entity is dependent on the semantics
 of the subjects' names.  The semantics of a particular attribute may
 be different for different issuers.  Comparing names without
 knowledge of the semantics of names in these particular certificates
 may provide misleading results.
 This specification is a profile of RFC 2459.  The security
 considerations section of that document applies to this specification
 as well.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

5 References

 [RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R. and S.
            Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished
            Names", RFC 2247, January 1998.
 [RFC 2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
            X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL
            Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
 [RFC 2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
            Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
            November 2000.
 [X.501]    ITU-T Recommendation X.501: Information Technology - Open
            Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Models, June
            1993.
 [X.509]    ITU-T Recommendation X.509: Information Technology - Open
            Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication
            Framework, June 1997.
 [X.520]    ITU-T Recommendation X.520: Information Technology - Open
            Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected
            Attribute Types, June 1993.
 [X.680]    ITU-T Recommendation X.680: Information Technology -
            Abstract Syntax Notation One, 1997.
 [ISO 3166] ISO Standard 3166: Codes for the representation of names
            of countries, 1993.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

6 Intellectual Property Rights

 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
 intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
 might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
 has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
 IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
 standards related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
 claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
 licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
 obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
 proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
 be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
 copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
 rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
 this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Executive
 Director.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

A. ASN.1 definitions

 As in RFC 2459, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants
 of the ASN.1 syntax.
 Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros.
 However, since the module imports type definitions from modules in
 RFC 2459 which are not completely in the 1988 syntax, the same
 comments as in RFC 2459 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e.,
 Appendix A.1 may be parsed by an 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the
 definitions for the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them in RFC
 2459's 1988 modules.
 Appendix A.2 is in the 1993 syntax.  However, since the module
 imports type definitions from modules in RFC 2459 which are not
 completely in the 1993 syntax, the same comments as in RFC 2459
 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e., Appendix A.2 may be
 parsed by an 1993 ASN.1-parser by removing the UTF8String choice from
 the definition of DirectoryString in the module PKIX1Explicit93 in
 RFC 2459.  Appendix A.2 may be parsed "as is" by an 1997 ASN.1
 parser, however.
 In case of discrepancies between these modules, the 1988 module is
 the normative one.

A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module

PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)

  internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
  id-mod-qualified-cert-88(10) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

– EXPORTS ALL –

IMPORTS

GeneralName

  FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
  internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
  id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}

AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, Attribute, AttributeType,

  id-pkix, id-pe, id-at
  FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
  internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 17] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

  id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)};

– Locally defined OIDs

– Arc for QC personal data attributes id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 } – Arc for QC statements id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }

– Attributes

id-at-serialNumber AttributeType ::= { id-at 5 } SerialNumber ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1..64))

id-at-postalAddress AttributeType ::= { id-at 16 } PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString

id-at-pseudonym AttributeType ::= { id-at 65 } Pseudonym ::= DirectoryString

domainComponent AttributeType ::=

                          { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }

DomainComponent ::= IA5String

id-pda-dateOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 } DateOfBirth ::= GeneralizedTime

id-pda-placeOfBirth AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 } PlaceOfBirth ::= DirectoryString

id-pda-gender AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 } Gender ::= PrintableString (SIZE(1))

  1. - "M", "F", "m" or "f"

id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 } CountryOfCitizenship ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))

  1. - ISO 3166 Country Code

id-pda-countryOfResidence AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 } CountryOfResidence ::= PrintableString (SIZE (2))

  1. - ISO 3166 Country Code

– Private extensions

– Biometric info extension

id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-pe 2}

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 18] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {

  typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,
  hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,
  biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,
  sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL }

TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {

  predefinedBiometricType   PredefinedBiometricType,
  biometricDataOid          OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {

  picture(0),handwritten-signature(1)}
  (picture|handwritten-signature)

– QC Statements Extension

id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}

QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement

QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {

  statementId        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  statementInfo      ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}

– QC statements id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }

– This statement identifies conformance with syntax and – semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile – (Version 1). This statement may optionally contain – additional semantics information as specified below.

SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {

  semanticsIndentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
  nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
  } -- At least one field shall be present

NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

END

A.2 1993 ASN.1 Module

PKIXqualified93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)

  internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
  id-mod-qualified-cert-93(11) }

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 19] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

– EXPORTS ALL –

IMPORTS

authorityKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage,

  extendedKeyUsage, privateKeyUsagePeriod, certificatePolicies,
  policyMappings, subjectAltName, issuerAltName, basicConstraints,
  nameConstraints, policyConstraints, cRLDistributionPoints,
  subjectDirectoryAttributes, authorityInfoAccess, GeneralName,
  OTHER-NAME
  FROM PKIX1Implicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
  internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
  id-pkix1-implicit-93(4)}

id-pkix, AlgorithmIdentifier, ATTRIBUTE, Extension, EXTENSION,

  DirectoryString{}, ub-name, id-pe, id-at, id-at-commonName,
  id-at-surname, id-at-countryName, id-at-localityName,
  id-at-stateOrProvinceName, id-at-organizationName,
  id-at-organizationalUnitName, id-at-givenName, id-at-dnQualifier,
  pkcs9email, title, organizationName, organizationalUnitName,
  stateOrProvinceName, localityName, countryName,
  generationQualifier, dnQualifier, initials, givenName, surname,
  commonName, name
  FROM PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
  internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
  id-pkix1-explicit-93(3)};

– Object Identifiers

– Externally defined OIDs id-at-serialNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 5} id-at-postalAddress OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 16 } id-at-pseudonym OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-at 65 } id-domainComponent OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 }

– Locally defined OIDs

– Arc for QC personal data attributes

id-pda OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 } – Arc for QC statements id-qcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }

– Private extensions

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 20] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 } id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }

– Personal data attributes id-pda-dateOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 1 } id-pda-placeOfBirth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 2 } id-pda-gender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 3 } id-pda-countryOfCitizenship OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 4 } id-pda-countryOfResidence OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pda 5 }

– QC statements id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }

– Object Sets

– The following information object set is defined to constrain the – set of legal certificate extensions. Note that this set is an – extension of the ExtensionSet defined in RFC 2459. ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= {

  authorityKeyIdentifier |
  subjectKeyIdentifier |
  keyUsage |
  extendedKeyUsage |
  privateKeyUsagePeriod |
  certificatePolicies |
  policyMappings |
  subjectAltName |
  issuerAltName |
  basicConstraints |
  nameConstraints |
  policyConstraints |
  cRLDistributionPoints |
  subjectDirectoryAttributes |
  authorityInfoAccess |
  biometricInfo |
  qcStatements, ... }

– The following information object set is defined to constrain the – set of attributes applications are required to recognize in – distinguished names. The set may of course be augmented to meet – local requirements. Note that deleting members of the set may – prevent interoperability with conforming implementations, and that – this set is an extension of the SupportedAttributes set in RFC 2459.

SupportedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  countryName | commonName | surname | givenName | pseudonym |
  serialNumber | organizationName | organizationalUnitName |
  stateOrProvinceName | localityName | postalAddress |

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 21] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

  pkcs9email | domainComponent | dnQualifier,
  ... -- For future extensions -- }

– The following information object set is defined to constrain the – set of attributes applications are required to recognize in – subjectDirectoryAttribute extensions. The set may be augmented to – meet local requirements. Note that deleting members of the set – may prevent interoperability with conforming implementations. PersonalDataAttributeSet ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  title | dateOfBirth | placeOfBirth | gender | countryOfCitizenship |
  countryOfResidence, ... }

– Attributes

– serialNumber from X.520 serialNumber ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1..64))
  ID          id-at-serialNumber }

– postalAddress from X.520 postalAddress ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX SEQUENCE SIZE (1..6) OF DirectoryString { 30 }
  ID          id-at-postalAddress }

– pseudonym from (forthcoming) X.520) pseudonym ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }
  ID          id-at-pseudonym }

– domainComponent from RFC 2247 domainComponent ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX IA5String
  ID          id-domainComponent }

dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime
  ID          id-pda-dateOfBirth }

placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString { ub-name }
  ID          id-pda-placeOfBirth }

gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f"))
  ID          id-pda-gender }

countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 22] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

      (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
  ID          id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }

countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {

  WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))
      (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })
  ID          id-pda-countryOfResidence }

– Private extensions

– Biometric info extension

biometricInfo EXTENSION ::= {

  SYNTAX             BiometricSyntax
  IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-biometricInfo }

BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData

BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {

  typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,
  hashAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
  biometricDataHash   OCTET STRING,
  sourceDataUri       IA5String OPTIONAL,
  ... -- For future extensions -- }

TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {

  predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,
  biometricDataOid        OBJECT IDENTIFIER }

PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),

  handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)

– QC Statements Extension

qcStatements EXTENSION ::= {

  SYNTAX        QCStatements
  IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }

QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement

QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {

  statementId   QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}),
  statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type
  ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }

QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS {

  &id   OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
  &Type OPTIONAL }

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 23] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

WITH SYNTAX {

  [SYNTAX &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }

qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation

  IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1}
  --  This statement identifies conformance with syntax and
  --  semantics defined in this Qualified Certificate profile
  --  (Version 1). The SemanticsInformation may optionally contain
  --  additional semantics information as specified.

SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {

  semanticsIdentifier         OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
  nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL
  }(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|
    WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})

NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName

– The following information object set is defined to constrain the – set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs. SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= {

  qcStatement-1, ... -- For future extensions -- }

END

B. A Note on Attributes

 This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the
 subject field of issued certificates and in the
 subjectDirectoryAttributes extension.  In the interest of conformity,
 they have been defined here using the ASN.1 ATTRIBUTE definition from
 RFC 2459, which is sufficient for the purposes of this document, but
 greatly simplified in comparison with ISO/ITU's definition.  A
 complete definition of these new attributes (including matching
 rules), along with object classes to support them in LDAP-accessible
 directories, can be found in [PKCS 9].

C. Example Certificate

 This section contains the ASN.1 structure, an ASN.1 dump, and the
 DER-encoding of a certificate issued in conformance with this
 profile.  The example has been developed with the help of the OSS
 ASN.1 compiler.  The certificate has the following characteristics:
    1.  The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash
        algorithm
    2.  The issuer's distinguished name is O=GMD - Forschungszentrum
        Informationstechnik GmbH; C=DE

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 24] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

    3.  The subject's distinguished name is CN=Petra M.  Barzin, O=GMD
        - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE
    4.  The certificate was issued on May 1, 2000 and will expire on
        November 1, 2000
    5.  The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key
    6.  The certificate includes a critical key usage extension
        exclusively indicating non-repudiation
    7.  The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier
        extension indicating the practices and procedures undertaken
        by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1).  The
        certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust,
        Germany.  It is required to be set in a certificate conformant
        to the German digital signature law.
    8.  The certificate includes a subject directory attributes
        extension containing the following attributes:
        surname:               Barzin
        given name:            Petra
        date of birth:         October, 14th 1971
        place of birth:        Darmstadt
        country of citizenship:Germany
        gender:                Female
    9.  The certificate includes a qualified statement private
        extension indicating that the naming registration authority's
        name as "municipality@darmstadt.de".
    10. The certificate includes, in conformance with RFC 2459, an
        authority key identifier extension.

C.1 ASN.1 Structure

C.1.1 Extensions

 Since extensions are DER-encoded already when placed in the structure
 to be signed, they are for clarity shown here in the value notation
 defined in [X.680].

C.1.1.1 The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension

 petrasSubjDirAttrs AttributesSyntax ::= {
     {
         type id-pda-countryOfCitizenship,
         values {
             PrintableString : "DE"
         }
     },
     {
         type id-pda-gender,

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 25] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

         values {
             PrintableString : "F"
         }
     },
     {
         type id-pda-dateOfBirth,
         values {
             GeneralizedTime : "197110140000Z"
         }
     },
     {
         type id-pda-placeOfBirth,
         values {
             DirectoryString : utf8String : "Darmstadt"
         }
     }
 }

C.1.1.2 The keyUsage extension

 petrasKeyUsage KeyUsage ::= {nonRepudiation}

C.1.1.3 The certificatePolicies extension

 petrasCertificatePolicies CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= {
     {
         policyIdentifier {1 3 36 8 1 1}
     }
 }

C.1.1.4 The qcStatements extension

 petrasQCStatement QCStatements ::= {
     {
         statementId   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1,
         statementInfo SemanticsInformation : {
             nameRegistrationAuthorities {
                 rfc822Name : "municipality@darmstadt.de"
             }
        }
     }
 }

C.1.1.5 The authorityKeyIdentifier extension

 petrasAKI AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= {
     keyIdentifier '000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
 }

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 26] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

C.1.2 The certificate

 The signed portion of the certificate is shown here in the value
 notation defined in [X.680].  Note that extension values are already
 DER encoded in this structure.  Some values has been truncated for
 readability purposes.
 {
   version v3,
   serialNumber 1234567890,
   signature
   {
     algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 },
     parameters RSAParams : NULL
   },
   issuer rdnSequence :
     {
       {
         {
           type { 2 5 4 6 },
           value PrintableString : "DE"
         }
       },
       {
         {
           type { 2 5 4 10 },
           value UTF8String :
             "GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
         }
       }
     },
   validity
   {
     notBefore utcTime : "000501100000Z",
     notAfter utcTime : "001101100000Z"
   },
   subject rdnSequence :
     {
       {
         {
           type { 2 5 4 6 },
           value PrintableString : "DE"
         }
       },
       {
         {
           type { 2 5 4 10 },
           value UTF8String :

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 27] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

             "GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"
         }
       },
       {
         {
           type { 2 5 4 4 },
           value UTF8String : "Barzin"
         },
         {
           type { 2 5 4 42 },
           value UTF8String : "Petra"
         }
       }
     },
   subjectPublicKeyInfo
   {
     algorithm
     {
       algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 },
       parameters RSAParams : NULL
     },
     subjectPublicKey '00110000 10000001 10000111 00000010 1000 ...'B
   },
   extensions
   {
     {
       extnId { 2 5 29 9 },  -- subjectDirectoryAttributes
       extnValue '305B301006082B06010505070904310413024445300F0 ...'H
     },
     {
       extnId { 2 5 29 15 }, -- keyUsage
       critical TRUE,
       extnValue '03020640'H
     },
     {
       extnId { 2 5 29 32 }, -- certificatePolicies
       extnValue '3009300706052B24080101'H
     },
     {
       extnId { 2 5 29 35 }, -- authorityKeyIdentifier
       extnValue '30168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H
     },
     {
       extnId { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }, -- qcStatements
       extnValue '302B302906082B06010505070B01301D301B81196D756 ...'H
     }
   }
 }

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 28] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

C.2 ASN.1 dump

 This section contains an ASN.1 dump of the signed portion of the
 certificate.  Some values has been truncated for readability
 purposes.
 TBSCertificate SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
   length = 631
   version : tag = [0] constructed; length = 3
     Version INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2] primitive; length = 1
       2
   serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2]
     primitive; length = 4
     1234567890
   signature AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
     constructed; length = 13
     algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
       length = 9
       { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }
     parameters OpenType: NULL: tag = [UNIVERSAL 5] primitive;
       length = 0
       NULL
   issuer Name CHOICE
     rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
       constructed; length = 72
       RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 11
         AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 9
           type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 4 6 }
           value OpenType: PrintableString: tag = [UNIVERSAL 19]
             primitive; length = 2
             "DE"
       RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 57
         AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
         constructed; length = 55
           type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 4 10 }
           value OpenType : UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
             primitive; length = 48
             0x474d44202d20466f72736368756e67737a656e7472756d2049...
   validity Validity SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
     length = 30
     notBefore Time CHOICE

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 29] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

       utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
         000501100000Z
     notAfter Time CHOICE
       utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13
         001101100000Z
   subject Name CHOICE
     rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
       constructed; length = 101
       RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 11
         AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 9
           type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 4 6 }
           value OpenType: PrintableString: tag = [UNIVERSAL 19]
             primitive; length = 2
             "DE"
       RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 55
         AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 53
           type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 4 10 }
           value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
             primitive; length = 46
             0x474d4420466f72736368756e67737a656e7472756d20496e66...
       RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]
         constructed; length = 29
         AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 13
           type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 4 4 }
           value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
             primitive; length = 6
             0x4261727a696e
         AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
           constructed; length = 12
           type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
             length = 3
             { 2 5 4 42 }
           value OpenType: UTF8String: tag = [UNIVERSAL 12]
             primitive; length = 5
             0x5065747261
   subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE: tag =
     [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 157

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 30] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

     algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]
       constructed; length = 13
       algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
         length = 9
         { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 }
       parameters OpenType: NULL: tag = [UNIVERSAL 5] primitive;
         length = 0
         NULL
     subjectPublicKey BIT STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 3] primitive;
       length = 139
       0x0030818702818100b8488400d4b6088be48ead459ca19ec717aaf3d1d...
   extensions : tag = [3] constructed; length = 233
     Extensions SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
       length = 230
       Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
         length = 100
         extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
           length = 3
           { 2 5 29 9 }
         extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
           length = 93
           0x305b301006082b06010505070904310413024445300f06082b060...
       Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
         length = 14
         extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
           length = 3
           { 2 5 29 15 }
         critical BOOLEAN: tag = [UNIVERSAL 1] primitive; length = 1
           TRUE
         extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
           length = 4
           0x03020640
       Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
         length = 18
         extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
           length = 3
           { 2 5 29 32 }
         extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
           length = 11
           0x3009300706052b24080101
       Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
         length = 31
         extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
           length = 3
           { 2 5 29 35 }
         extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
           length = 24
           0x30168014000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0ffedcba98

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 31] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

       Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed;
         length = 57
         extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6] primitive;
           length = 8
           { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }
         extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4] primitive;
           length = 45
           0x302b302906082b06010505070b01301d301b81196d756e6963697...

C.3 DER-encoding

 This section contains the full, DER-encoded certificate, in hex.
 3082030E30820277A0030201020204499602D2300D06092A864886F70D010105
 05003048310B300906035504061302444531393037060355040A0C30474D4420
 2D20466F72736368756E67737A656E7472756D20496E666F726D6174696F6E73
 746563686E696B20476D6248301E170D3030303530313130303030305A170D30
 30313130313130303030305A3065310B30090603550406130244453137303506
 0355040A0C2E474D4420466F72736368756E67737A656E7472756D20496E666F
 726D6174696F6E73746563686E696B20476D6248311D300C060355042A0C0550
 65747261300D06035504040C064261727A696E30819D300D06092A864886F70D
 010101050003818B0030818702818100B8488400D4B6088BE48EAD459CA19EC7
 17AAF3D1D4EE3ECCA496128A13597D16CC8B85EB37EFCE110C63B01E684E5CF6
 32291EAC60FD153C266EAAC36AD4CEA92319F9BFDD261AD2BFE41EAB4E17FE67
 8341EE52D9A0A8B4DEC07B7ACC76762514045CEE9994E0CF37BAE05F8DE33B35
 FF98BCE77742CE4B12273BD122137FE9020105A381E93081E630640603551D09
 045D305B301006082B06010505070904310413024445300F06082B0601050507
 09033103130146301D06082B060105050709013111180F313937313130313430
 30303030305A301706082B06010505070902310B0C094461726D737461647430
 0E0603551D0F0101FF04040302064030120603551D20040B3009300706052B24
 080101301F0603551D23041830168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
 FEDCBA98303906082B06010505070103042D302B302906082B06010505070B01
 301D301B81196D756E69636970616C697479406461726D73746164742E646530
 0D06092A864886F70D01010505000381810048FD14D9AFE961E4321D9AA40CC0
 1C12893550CF76FBECBDE448926B0AE6F904AB89E7B5F808666FB007218AC18D
 28CE1E2D40FBF8C16B275CBA0547D7885B74059DEC736223368FC1602A510BC1
 EB31E39F3967BE6B413D48BC743A0AB19C57FD20F3B393E8FEBD8B05CAA5007D
 AD36F9D789AEF636A0AC0F93BCB3711B5907

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 32] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

C.4 CA's public RSA key

 This section contains the DER-encoded public RSA key of the CA who
 signed the example certificate.  It is included with the purpose of
 simplifying verifications of the example certificate.
 30818902818100ad1f35964b3674c807b9f8a645d2c8174e514b69a4b46a7382
 915abbc44eccede914dae8fcc023abcea9c53380e641795cb0dda664b872fc10
 9f9bbb852bf42d994f634c681608e388dce240b558513e5b60027bd1a07cef9c
 9b6db37c7e1f1abd238eed96e4b669056b260f55e83f14e6027127c9deb3ad18
 afcd3f8a5f5bf50203010001

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 33] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

Authors' Addresses

 Stefan Santesson
 AddTrust AB
 P.O. Box 465
 S-201 24 Malmo
 Sweden
 EMail: stefan@addtrust.com
 Tim Polk
 NIST
 Building 820, Room 426
 Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA
 EMail: wpolk@nist.gov
 Petra Barzin
 SECUDE - Sicherheitstechnologie Informationssysteme GmbH
 Landwehrstrasse 50a
 D-64293 Darmstadt
 Germany
 EMail: barzin@secude.com
 Magnus Nystrom
 RSA Security AB
 Box 10704
 S-121 29 Stockholm
 Sweden
 EMail: magnus@rsasecurity.com

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 34] RFC 3039 Qualified Certificates Profile January 2001

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.
 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
 included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
 English.
 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
 Internet Society.

Santesson, et al. Standards Track [Page 35]

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