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rfc:rfc2989

Network Working Group B. Aboba, Microsoft Request for Comments: 2989 P. Calhoun, S. Glass, Sun Microsystems, Inc. Category: Informational T. Hiller, P. McCann, H. Shiino, P. Walsh, Lucent

                               G. Zorn, G. Dommety, Cisco Systems, Inc.
                         C. Perkins, B. Patil, Nokia Telecommunications
                                 D. Mitton, S. Manning, Nortel Networks
                                            M. Beadles, SmartPipes Inc.
                                                       X. Chen, Alcatel
                       S. Sivalingham, Ericsson Wireless Communications
                                                     A. Hameed, Fujitsu
                                                M. Munson, GTE Wireless
                                            S. Jacobs, GTE Laboratories
                          B. Lim, LG Information & Communications, Ltd.
                                                 B. Hirschman, Motorola
                                                 R. Hsu, Qualcomm, Inc.
                       H. Koo, Samsung Telecommunications America, Inc.
                                                 M. Lipford, Sprint PCS
                                          E. Campbell, 3Com Corporation
                                              Y. Xu, Watercove Networks
                                S. Baba, Toshiba America Research, Inc.
                                          E. Jaques, Vodaphone Airtouch
                                                          November 2000
      Criteria for Evaluating AAA Protocols for Network Access

Status of this Memo

 This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
 not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
 memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

 This document represents a summary of Authentication, Authorization,
 Accounting (AAA) protocol requirements for network access.  In
 creating this document, inputs were taken from documents produced by
 the Network Access Server Requirements Next Generation (NASREQ),
 Roaming Operations (ROAMOPS), and MOBILEIP working groups, as well as
 from TIA 45.6.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 1] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 This document summarizes the requirements collected from those
 sources, separating requirements for authentication, authorization
 and accounting.  Details on the requirements are available in the
 original documents.

1. Introduction

 This document represents a summary of AAA protocol requirements for
 network access.  In creating this documents, inputs were taken from
 documents produced by the NASREQ [3], ROAMOPS [2], and MOBILEIP [5]
 working groups, as well as from TIA 45.6 [4].  This document
 summarizes the requirements collected from those sources, separating
 requirements for authentication, authorization and accounting.
 Details on the requirements are available in the original documents.

1.1. Requirements language

 In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "optional",
 "recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT", are to be interpreted as
 described in [1].
 Please note that the requirements specified in this document are to
 be used in evaluating AAA protocol submissions.  As such, the
 requirements language refers to capabilities of these protocols; the
 protocol documents will specify whether these features are required,
 recommended, or optional.  For example, requiring that a protocol
 support confidentiality is NOT the same thing as requiring that all
 protocol traffic be encrypted.
 A protocol submission is not compliant if it fails to satisfy one or
 more of the MUST or MUST NOT requirements for the capabilities that
 it implements.  A protocol submission that satisfies all the MUST,
 MUST NOT, SHOULD and SHOULD NOT requirements for its capabilities is
 said to be "unconditionally compliant"; one that satisfies all the
 MUST and MUST NOT requirements but not all the SHOULD or SHOULD NOT
 requirements for its protocols is said to be "conditionally
 compliant."

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 2] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

1.2. Terminology

 Accounting
           The act of collecting information on resource usage for the
           purpose of trend analysis, auditing, billing, or cost
           allocation.
 Administrative Domain
           An internet, or a collection of networks, computers, and
           databases under a common administration.  Computer entities
           operating in a common administration may be assumed to
           share administratively created security associations.
 Attendant A node designed to provide the service interface between a
           client and the local domain.
 Authentication
           The act of verifying a claimed identity, in the form of a
           pre-existing label from a mutually known name space, as the
           originator of a message (message authentication) or as the
           end-point of a channel (entity authentication).
 Authorization
           The act of determining if a particular right, such as
           access to some resource, can be granted to the presenter of
           a particular credential.
 Billing   The act of preparing an invoice.
 Broker    A Broker is an entity that is in a different administrative
           domain from both the home AAA server and the local ISP, and
           which provides services, such as facilitating payments
           between the local ISP and home administrative entities.
           There are two different types of brokers; proxy and
           routing.
 Client    A node wishing to obtain service from an attendant within
           an administrative domain.
 End-to-End
           End-to-End is the security model that requires that
           security information be able to traverse, and be validated
           even when an AAA message is processed by intermediate nodes
           such as proxies, brokers, etc.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 3] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Foreign Domain
           An administrative domain, visited by a Mobile IP client,
           and containing the AAA infrastructure needed to carry out
           the necessary operations enabling Mobile IP registrations.
           From the point of view of the foreign agent, the foreign
           domain is the local domain.
 Home Domain
           An administrative domain, containing the network whose
           prefix matches that of a mobile node's home address, and
           containing the AAA infrastructure needed to carry out the
           necessary operations enabling Mobile IP registrations.
           From the point of view of the home agent, the home domain
           is the local domain.
 Hop-by-hop
           Hop-by-hop is the security model that requires that each
           direct set of peers in a proxy network share a security
           association, and the security information does not traverse
           a AAA entity.
 Inter-domain Accounting
           Inter-domain accounting is the collection of information on
           resource usage of an entity within an administrative
           domain, for use within another administrative domain.  In
           inter-domain accounting, accounting packets and session
           records will typically cross administrative boundaries.
 Intra-domain Accounting
           Intra-domain accounting is the collection of information on
           resource within an administrative domain, for use within
           that domain.  In intra-domain accounting, accounting
           packets and session records typically do not cross
           administrative boundaries.
 Local Domain
           An administrative domain containing the AAA infrastructure
           of immediate interest to a Mobile IP client when it is away
           from home.
 Proxy     A AAA proxy is an entity that acts as both a client and a
           server.  When a request is received from a client, the
           proxy acts as a AAA server.  When the same request needs to
           be forwarded to another AAA entity, the proxy acts as a AAA
           client.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 4] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Local Proxy
           A Local Proxy is a AAA server that satisfies the definition
           of a Proxy, and exists within the same administrative
           domain as the network device (e.g., NAS) that issued the
           AAA request.  Typically, a local proxy will enforce local
           policies prior to forwarding responses to the network
           devices, and are generally used to multiplex AAA messages
           from a large number of network devices.
 Network Access Identifier
           The Network Access Identifier (NAI) is the userID submitted
           by the client during network access authentication.  In
           roaming, the purpose of the NAI is to identify the user as
           well as to assist in the routing of the authentication
           request.  The NAI may not necessarily be the same as the
           user's e-mail address or the user-ID submitted in an
           application layer authentication.
 Routing Broker
           A Routing Broker is a AAA entity that satisfies the
           definition of a Broker, but is NOT in the transmission path
           of AAA messages between the local ISP and the home domain's
           AAA servers.  When a request is received by a Routing
           Broker, information is returned to the AAA requester that
           includes the information necessary for it to be able to
           contact the Home AAA server directly.  Certain
           organizations providing Routing Broker services MAY also
           act as a Certificate Authority, allowing the Routing Broker
           to return the certificates necessary for the local ISP and
           the home AAA servers to communicate securely.
 Non-Proxy Broker
           A Routing Broker is occasionally referred to as a Non-Proxy
           Broker.
 Proxy Broker
           A Proxy Broker is a AAA entity that satisfies the
           definition of a Broker, and acts as a Transparent Proxy by
           acting as the forwarding agent for all AAA messages between
           the local ISP and the home domain's AAA servers.
 Real-time Accounting
           Real-time accounting involves the processing of information
           on resource usage within a defined time window.  Time
           constraints are typically imposed in order to limit
           financial risk.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 5] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Roaming Capability
           Roaming capability can be loosely defined as the ability to
           use any one of multiple Internet service providers (ISPs),
           while maintaining a formal, customer-vendor relationship
           with only one.  Examples of cases where roaming capability
           might be required include ISP "confederations" and ISP-
           provided corporate network access support.
 Session record
           A session record represents a summary of the resource
           consumption of a user over the entire session.  Accounting
           gateways creating the session record may do so by
           processing interim accounting events.
 Transparent Proxy
           A Transparent Proxy is a AAA server that satisfies the
           definition of a Proxy, but does not enforce any local
           policies (meaning that it does not add, delete or modify
           attributes or modify information within messages it
           forwards).

2. Requirements Summary

 The AAA protocol evaluation criteria for network access are
 summarized below.  For details on the requirements, please consult
 the documents referenced in the footnotes.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 6] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

2.1. General requirements

 These requirements apply to all aspects of AAA and thus are
 considered general requirements.
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  General                  | NASREQ  | ROAMOPS | MOBILE  |
 |  Reqts.                   |         |         |   IP    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Scalability             |    M    |   M     |    M    |
 |      a                    |   12    |   3     |  30 39  |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Fail-over               |    M    |         |    M    |
 |      b                    |   12    |         |   31    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Mutual auth             |    M    |         |    M    |
 |   AAA client/server       |   16    |         |   30    |
 |      c                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Transmission level      |         |   M     |    S    |
 |   security                |         |   6     |  31 39  |
 |      d                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Data object              |    M    |   M     |    M    |
 |  Confidentiality          |   26    |   6     |   40    |
 |      e                    |         |         |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Data object              |    M    |   M     |    M    |
 |  Integrity                |   16    |   6     |  31 39  |
 |      f                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Certificate transport    |    M    |         |  S/M    |
 |      g                    |   42    |         |31,33/46 |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 7] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Reliable AAA transport   |    M    |         |    M    |
 |  mechanism                |   22    |         |  31 32  |
 |      h                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Run Over IPv4           |    M    |   M     |    M    |
 |                           |   11    |   1     |   33    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Run Over IPv6           |    M    |         |    S    |
 |                           |   11    |   1     |   47    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Support Proxy and        |    M    |         |    M    |
 |  Routing Brokers          |   12    |         |  31 39  |
 |      i                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Auditability             |    S    |         |         |
 |      j                    |   25    |         |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Dual App and Transport  |         |   O     |     M   |
 |    Security not required  |         |   6     |    40   |
 |      k                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Ability to carry         |    M    |         |    S    |
 |  service-specific attr.   |   43    |         |  31 33  |
 |      l                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 Key
 M = MUST
 S = SHOULD
 O = MAY
 N = MUST NOT
 B = SHOULD NOT

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 8] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Clarifications
 [a]  The AAA protocol must be capable of supporting millions of users
      and tens of thousands of simultaneous requests.  The AAA
      architecture and protocol MUST be capable of supporting tens of
      thousands of devices, AAA servers, proxies and brokers.
 [b]  In the event of failure to communicate with a given server, the
      protocol must provide a mechanism to change service to another
      backup or secondary server.
 [c]  This requirement refers to the ability to support mutual
      authentication between the AAA client and server.
 [d]  The AAA protocol requires authentication, integrity protection
      and confidentiality at the transmission layer.  This security
      model is also referred to as hop-by-hop security, whereas the
      security is established between two communicating peers.  All of
      the security is removed when the AAA message is processed by a
      receiving AAA entity.
 [e]  The AAA protocol requires confidentiality at the object level,
      where an object consists of one or more attributes.  Object
      level confidentiality implies that only the target AAA entity
      for whom the data is ultimately destined may decrypt the data,
      regardless of the fact that the message may traverse one or more
      intermediate AAA entities (e.g., proxies, brokers).
 [f]  The AAA protocol requires authentication and integrity
      protection at the object level, which consists of one or more
      attributes.  Object level authentication must be persistent
      across one or more intermediate AAA entity (e.g., proxy, broker,
      etc), meaning that any AAA entity in a proxy chain may verify
      the authentication.  This implies that data that is covered by
      object level security CANNOT be modified by intermediate
      servers.
 [g]  The AAA protocol MUST be capable of transporting certificates.
      This requirement is intended as an optimization, in lieu of
      requiring that an out-of-band protocol be used to fetch
      certificates.
 [h]  This requirement refers to resilience against packet loss,
      including:
      1. Hop-by-hop retransmission and fail-over so that reliability
         does not solely depend on single hop transport
         retransmission.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 9] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

      2. Control of the retransmission mechanism by the AAA
         application.
      3. Acknowledgment by the transport that a message was delivered
         successfully, separate from message semantics or syntax
         evaluation.
      5. Piggy-backing of acknowledgments in AAA messages.
      6. Timely delivery of AAA responses.
 [i]  In the Mobile IP AAA architecture, brokers can be in the
      forwarding path, in which case they act as transparent proxies
      (proxy brokers).  Alternatively, it is also possible to conceive
      of brokers operating as certifying authorities outside of the
      forwarding path (routing brokers).
 [j]  An auditable process is one in which it is possible to
      definitively determine what actions have been performed on AAA
      packets as they travel from the home AAA server to the network
      device and back.
 [k]  The AAA protocol MUST allow communication to be secured.
      However, the AAA protocol MUST also allow an underlying security
      service (e.g., IP Security) to be used.  When the latter is
      used, the former MUST NOT be required.
 [l]  The AAA protocol MUST be extensible by third parties (e.g.,
      other IETF Working Groups), in order to define attributes that
      are specific to the service being defined.  This requirement
      simply means that the AAA protocol MUST allow groups other than
      the AAA WG to define standard attributes.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 10] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

2.2. Authentication Requirements

 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 | Authentication            | NASREQ  | ROAMOPS | MOBILE  |
 | Reqts.                    |         |         |   IP    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   NAI Support             |    M    |   M     |   S/M   |
 |      a                    |    9    |   2     |32,34,39/|
 |                           |         |         |   40    |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   CHAP Support            |    M    |   M     |         |
 |      b                    |   10    |   3     |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   EAP Support             |    M    |   S     |         |
 |      c                    |   10    |   3     |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   PAP/Clear-Text Support  |    M    |   B     |         |
 |      d                    |   26    |   3     |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Re-authentication       |    M    |         |    S    |
 |   on demand               |   17    |         |   33    |
 |      e                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Authorization Only      |    M    |         |         |
 |   without Authentication  |    9    |         |         |
 |      f                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 Key
 M = MUST
 S = SHOULD
 O = MAY
 N = MUST NOT
 B = SHOULD NOT

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 11] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Clarifications
 [a]  The AAA protocol MUST allow the use of Network Access
      Identifiers (NAI) [8] to identify users and/or devices.
 [b]  The AAA protocol MUST allow CHAP [20] authentication information
      to be transported.  This is commonly used by Network Access
      Servers that request authentication of a PPP user.
 [c]  The AAA protocol MUST allow for Extensible Authentication
      Protocol (EAP) [14] payload to be transported.  Since some EAP
      authentication mechanisms require more than one round trip, the
      AAA protocol must allow for such authentication mechanisms to be
      used.  The actual EAP authentication mechanism negotiated MUST
      be transparent to the AAA protocol.  When EAP is used,
      authentication typically occurs between the user being
      authenticated and his/her home AAA server.
 [d]  While PAP is deprecated, it is still in widespread use for its
      original intended purpose, which is support of clear-text
      passwords.  As a result, a AAA protocol will need to be able to
      securely transport clear-text passwords.  This includes
      providing for confidentiality of clear-text passwords traveling
      over the wire, as well as protecting against disclosure of
      clear-text passwords to proxies in the forwarding path.
 [e]  The AAA protocol MUST allow for a user to be re-authenticated
      on-demand.  The protocol MUST allow for this event to be
      triggered by either the user, access device (AAA client), or the
      home or visited AAA server.
 [f]  The AAA protocol MUST NOT require that credentials of the user
      be provided during authorization.  The AAA protocol supports
      authorization by identification or assertion only.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 12] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

2.3. Authorization Requirements

 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 | Authorization             | NASREQ  | ROAMOPS | MOBILE  |
 | Reqts.                    |         |         |   IP    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |   Static and Dynamic      |         |         |         |
 |   IPv4/6 Address Assign.  |    M    |   M     |   M     |
 |      a                    |   11    |   5     | 32 36   |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   RADIUS gateway          |    M    |   M     |    M    |
 |   capability              |   44    |   3     |    45   |
 |      b                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Reject                  |    M    |   M     |   M     |
 |   capability              |   12    |   4     |  39     |
 |      c                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Precludes layer 2       |    N    |   N     |         |
 |   tunneling               |   11    |   5     |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Re-Authorization on      |    M    |         |   S     |
 |   demand                  |   18    |         | 30 33   |
 |      d                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Support for Access Rules,|    M    |         |         |
 |  Restrictions, Filters    | 11, 19  |         |         |
 |      e                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  State Reconciliation     |    M    |         |         |
 |      f                    |   20    |         |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Unsolicited Disconnect   |    M    |         |         |
 |      g                    |   18    |         |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 13] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Key
 M = MUST
 S = SHOULD
 O = MAY
 N = MUST NOT
 B = SHOULD NOT
 Clarifications
 [a]  The AAA protocol MUST allow a server to provide a static or
      dynamic address during the authorization phase of a user and/or
      device.  The address assigned MUST be either of type IPv4 or
      IPv6.  If both the client AND the server are aware of a pre-
      configured address, then it is considered static.  Anything else
      is dynamic.
 [b]  This requirement refers to the ability of a new AAA protocol be
      sufficiently compatible with the large installed base of
      attributes for existing approaches (RADIUS), such that a server
      implementation could speak both protocols, or translate between
      them.
 [c]  This requirement refers to the ability of a proxy broker to deny
      access without forwarding the access request to the AAA server,
      or to deny access after receiving an access accept from the AAA
      server.
 [d]  This requirement refers to the ability of the AAA client or
      server to trigger re-authorization, or to the ability of the
      server to send updated authorization information to the device,
      such as "stop service."  Authorization can allow for a time
      period, then additional authorization can be sought to continue.
      A server can initially authorize a user to connect and receive
      services, but later decide the user is no longer allowed use of
      the service, for example after N minutes.  Authorizations can
      have a time limit.  Re-authorization does not necessarily imply
      re-authentication.
 [e]  This requirement refers to the ability to of the protocol to
      describe access operational limitations and authorization
      restrictions to usage to the NAS which includes (but is not
      limited to):
      1. Session expirations and Idle Timeouts
      2. Packet filters
      3. Static routes
      4. QoS parameters

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 14] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 [f]  This requirement refers to the ability of the NAS to use the AAA
      server to manage resource allocation state.  This capability can
      assist with, but it is not synonymous with, simultaneous user
      login control, port usage limitations, or IP address pooling.
      The design must provide for recovery from data loss due to a
      variety of faults, including NAS and AAA server reboots, and
      NAS/AAA server communication outages, and MUST be independent of
      the accounting stream.  The granularity of the recovery of state
      information after an outage may be on the order of a fraction of
      a minute.  In order to provide for state recovery, explicit
      session/resource status and update and disconnect messages will
      be required.
      Because of potential multi-domain issues, only systems that
      allocate or use a resource should track its state.
 [g]  This requirement refers to the ability of the AAA server to
      request the NAS to disconnect an active session for
      authorization policy reasons.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 15] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

2.4. Accounting Requirements

 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 | Accounting                | NASREQ  | ROAMOPS | MOBILE  |
 | Reqts.                    |         |         |   IP    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Real-time accounting    |    M    |    M    |   M     |
 |      a                    |   14    |    7    |  31     |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Mandatory Compact       |         |    M    |         |
 |    Encoding               |         |    7    |         |
 |      b                    |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Accounting Record       |         |    M    |   M     |
 |    Extensibility          |         |    7    |  33     |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Batch Accounting        |    S    |         |         |
 |      c                    |   21    |         |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Guaranteed Delivery     |    M    |         |    M    |
 |      d                    |   22    |         |   31    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |   Accounting Time Stamps  |    M    |         |    M    |
 |      e                    |   23    |         |   40    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Dynamic Accounting       |    M    |         |         |
 |      f                    |   48    |         |         |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 16] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Key
 M = MUST
 S = SHOULD
 O = MAY
 N = MUST NOT
 B = SHOULD NOT
 Clarifications
 [a]  This requirement may be loosely defined as reporting
      synchronously with events.  Typically the time window is on the
      order of seconds, not milliseconds.
 [b]  The AAA protocol's Accounting data format MUST NOT be bloated,
      imposing a large overhead for one or more accounting data
      elements.
 [c]  This requirement refers to the ability to buffer or store
      multiple accounting records, and send them together at some
      later time.
 [d]  This is an application layer acknowledgment.  This is sent when
      the receiving server is willing to take responsibility for the
      message data.
 [e]  This requirement refers to the ability to reflect the time of
      occurrence of events such as log-on, logoff, authentication,
      authorization and interim accounting.  It also implies the
      ability to provide for unambiguous time-stamps.
 [f]  This requirement refers to the ability to account for dynamic
      authentication and authorization.  To support this, there can be
      multiple accounting records for a single session.

2.5. Unique Mobile IP requirements

 In addition to the above requirements, Mobile IP also has the
 following additional requirements:

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 17] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Encoding of Mobile IP    |         |         |   M     |
 |  registration messages    |         |         |   33    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Firewall friendly        |         |         |   M     |
 |      a                    |         |         |   35    |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           |         |         |         |
 |  Allocation of local Home |         |         |   S/M   |
 |  agent                    |         |         |  37/41  |
 |                           |         |         |         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 Key
 M = MUST
 S = SHOULD
 O = MAY
 N = MUST NOT
 B = SHOULD NOT
 Clarifications
 [a]  A firewall friendly protocol is one which is designed to
      accommodate a firewall acting as a proxy.  For example, this
      would permit a Home Agent AAA server situated behind a firewall
      to be reachable from the Internet for the purposes of providing
      AAA services to a Mobile IP Foreign Agent.
      Notes
      [1] Section 4.2.1 of [2]
      [2] Section 4.2.2 of [2]. Also see [8].
      [3] Section 4.2.3 of [2]. Also see [14].
      [4] Section 4.2.4 of [2].
      [5] Section 4.2.5 of [2].
      [6] Section 4.2.6 of [2].
      [7] Section 4.3 of [2].
      [8] Section 6 of [3].  Also see [6].
      [9] Section 8.2.2.2 of [3].  Also see [14].
      [10] Section 8.2.2.1 of [3].  Also see [14].
      [11] Section 8.3.2.2 of [3].  Also see [7].
      [12] Section 8.1.1 of [3].
      [13] Section 8.1.4.4 of [3].
      [14] Section 8.4.1.2 of [3].

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 18] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

      [15] Section 8.4.2 of [3].
      [16] Section 8.1.3 of [3].
      [17] Section 8.2.1.2 of [3].
      [18] Section 8.3.1.1 of [3].
      [19] Section 8.3.2.1 of [3].  Also see [7].
      [20] Section 8.3.2.3 of [3].  Also see [6], [7].
      [21] Section 8.4.1.3 of [3].
      [22] Section 8.4.1.1 of [3].
      [23] Section 8.4.1.4 of [3].
      [24] Section 8.4.3.1 of [3].
      [25] Section 8.4.3.2 of [3].
      [26] Section 8.2.3.1 of [3].
      [27] Section 8.3.3.1 of [3].
      [28] Section 8.1.4.1 of [3].
      [29] Refer [15]
      [30] Section 3 of [5]
      [31] Section 3.1 of [5]
      [32] Section 4 of [5]
      [33] Section 5 of [5]
      [34] Section 5.1 of [5]
      [35] Section 5.2 of [5]
      [36] Section 5.3 of [5]
      [37] Section 5.4 of [5]
      [38] Section 5.5 of [5]
      [39] Section 6 of [5]
      [40] Section 5.1 of [4]
      [41] Section 5.2.2 of [4]
      [42] Section 8.2.2.2 of [3]
      [43] Section 8.1.2.3 of [3]
      [44] Section 8.1.2.2 of [3]
      [45] Section 5.4 of [4]
      [46] Section 7 of [4]
      [47] Section 8 of [5]
      [48] Section 8.4.1.5 of [3]

3. References

 [1]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
      Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [2]  Aboba, B. and G. Zorn, "Criteria for Evaluating Roaming
      Protocols", RFC 2477, January 1999.
 [3]  Beadles, M. and D. Mitton, "Criteria for Evaluating Network
      Access Server Protocols", Work in Progress.
 [4]  Hiller, T., et al., "Cdma2000 Wireless Data Requirements for
      AAA", Work in Progress.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 19] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 [5]  Glass, S., Hiller, T., Jacobs, S. and C. Perkins, "Mobile IP
      Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting Requirements", RFC
      2977, October 2000.
 [6]  Mitton, D., Beadles, M., "Network Access Server Requirements
      Next Generation (NASREQNG) NAS Model", RFC 2881, July 2000.
 [7]  Mitton, D., "Network Access Server Requirements: Extended RADIUS
      Practices", RFC 2882, July 2000.
 [8]  Aboba,  B. and M. Beadles, "The Network Access Identifier", RFC
      2486, January 1999.
 [9]  Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson, "Remote
      Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
      2000.
 [10] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
 [11] Simpson, W., Editor, "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD
      51, RFC 1661, July 1994.
 [12] Sklower, K., Lloyd, B., McGregor, G., Carr, D. and T. Coradetti,
      "The PPP Multilink Protocol (MP)", RFC 1990, August 1996.
 [13] Simpson, W., Editor, "PPP LCP Extensions", RFC 1570, January
      1994.
 [14] Blunk, L. and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
      Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998.
 [15] Solomon, J. and S. Glass, "Mobile-IPv4 Configuration Option for
      PPP IPCP", RFC 2290, Feb 1998
 [16] Calhoun, P. and C. Perkins, "Mobile IP Network Access Identifier
      Extension for IPv4", RFC 2794, March 2000.
 [17] Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support", RFC 2002, Oct 1996.
 [18] Johnson, D. and C. Perkins, "Mobility Support in IPv6", Work in
      Progress.
 [19] Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
      Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.
 [20] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
      (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 20] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

4. Security Considerations

 This document, being a requirements document, does not have any
 security concerns.  The security requirements on protocols to be
 evaluated using this document are described in the referenced
 documents.

5. IANA Considerations

 This memo does not create any new number spaces for IANA
 administration.

6. Acknowledgments

 Thanks to the members of the Mobile IP, AAA, and NASREQ working
 groups who have discussed and commented on these requirements. We
 would also like to thank the members of the AAA evaluation team, Mike
 St. Johns, Barney Wolf, Mark Stevens, David Nelson, Dave Mitton,
 Basavaraj Patil and Stuart Barkley for their thorough review of this
 document.

7. Authors' Addresses

 Bernard Aboba
 Microsoft Corporation
 One Microsoft Way
 Redmond, WA 98052
 Phone: +1 425-936-6605
 Fax:   +1 425-936-7329
 EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
 Pat R. Calhoun
 Network and Security Research Center, Sun Labs
 Sun Microsystems, Inc.
 15 Network Circle
 Menlo Park, CA 94025
 Phone: +1 650-786-7733
 EMail: pcalhoun@eng.sun.com

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 21] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Steven M. Glass
 Sun Microsystems
 1 Network Drive
 Burlington, MA 01845
 Phone: +1 781-442-0504
 Fax:   +1 781-442-1677
 EMail: steven.glass@sun.com
 Tom Hiller
 Wireless Data Standards & Architectures
 Lucent Technologies
 263 Shuman Drive
 Room 1HP2F-218
 Naperville, IL 60563
 Phone: +1 630-976-7673
 EMail: tom.hiller@lucent.com
 Peter J. McCann
 Lucent Technologies
 Rm 2Z-305
 263 Shuman Blvd
 Naperville, IL  60566
 Phone: +1 630-713 9359
 EMail: mccap@lucent.com
 Hajime Shiino
 Lucent Technologies Japan Ltd.
 25 Mori Bldg. 1-4-30 Roppongi,
 Minato-ku Tokyo
 Japan
 Phone: +81-3-5561-3695
 EMail: hshiino@lucent.com
 Glen Zorn
 Cisco Systems, Inc.
 500 108th Avenue N.E., Suite 500
 Bellevue, WA 98004
 Phone: +1 425-468-0955
 EMail: gwz@cisco.com

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 22] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Gopal Dommety
 IOS Network Protocols
 Cisco Systems, Inc.
 170 West Tasman Drive
 San Jose, CA 95134-1706
 Phone: +1 408-525-1404
 Fax:   +1 408-526-4952
 EMail: gdommety@cisco.com
 Charles E. Perkins
 Communications Systems Lab
 Nokia Research Center
 313 Fairchild Drive
 Mountain View, CA
 Phone: +1 650-625-2986
 Fax:   +1-650-625-2502
 EMail: charliep@iprg.nokia.com
 Basavaraj Patil
 Nokia Networks
 6000 Connection Dr.
 Irving, TX 75039
 Phone: +1 972-894-6709
 Fax:   +1 972-894-5349
 EMail: Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com
 David Mitton
 Nortel Networks
 880 Technology Park Drive
 Billerica, MA 01821
 Phone: +1 978-288-4570
 EMail: dmitton@nortelnetworks.com
 Serge Manning
 Nortel Networks
 2201 Lakeside Blvd
 Richardson, TX  75082-4399
 Phone: +1 972-684-7277
 EMail: smanning@nortelnetworks.com

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 23] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Mark Anthony Beadles
 SmartPipes, Inc.
 565 Metro Place South
 Suite 300
 Dublin, OH 43017
 Phone: +1 614-923-5657
 EMail: mbeadles@smartpipes.com
 Pat Walsh
 Lucent Technologies
 263 Shuman Blvd.
 1F-545
 Naperville, IL
 Phone: +1 630-713-5063
 EMail: walshp@lucent.com
 Xing Chen
 Alcatel USA
 1000 Coit Road
 Plano, TX 75075
 Phone: +1 972-519-4142
 Fax:   +1 972-519-3300
 EMail: xing.chen@usa.alcatel.com
 Sanjeevan Sivalingham
 Ericsson Wireless Communications Inc.,
 Rm Q-356C
 6455 Lusk Blvd
 San Diego, CA 92126
 Phone: +1 858-332-5670
 EMail: s.sivalingham@ericsson.com
 Alan Hameed
 Fujitsu
 2801 Telecom Parkway
 Richardson, TX 75082
 Phone: +1 972-479-2089

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 24] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Mark Munson
 GTE Wireless
 One GTE Place
 Alpharetta, GA  30004
 Phone: +1 678-339-4439
 EMail: mmunson@mobilnet.gte.com
 Stuart Jacobs
 Secure Systems Department
 GTE Laboratories
 40 Sylvan Road,
 Waltham, MA 02451-1128
 Phone: +1 781-466-3076
 Fax:   +1 781-466-2838
 EMail: sjacobs@gte.com
 Byung-Keun Lim
 LG Electronics, Ltd.
 533, Hogye-dong, Dongan-ku, Anyang-shi,
 Kyungki-do,431-080
 Korea
 Phone: +82-31-450-7199
 Fax:   +82-31-450-7050
 EMail: bklim@lgic.co.kr
 Brent Hirschman
 1501 Shure Dr.
 Arlington Hieghts, IL 60006
 Phone: +1 847-632-1563
 EMail: qa4053@email.mot.com
 Raymond T. Hsu
 Qualcomm Inc.
 6455 Lusk Blvd.
 San Diego, CA 92121
 Phone: +1 619-651-3623
 EMail: rhsu@qualcomm.com

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 25] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Haeng S. Koo
 Samsung Telecommunications America, Inc.
 1130 E. Arapaho Road
 Richardson, TX 75081
 Phone: +1 972-761-7755
 EMail: hskoo@sta.samsung.com
 Mark A. Lipford
 Sprint PCS
 8001 College Blvd.; Suite 210
 Overland Park, KS  66210
 Phone: +1 913-664-8335
 EMail: mlipfo01@sprintspectrum.com
 Ed Campbell
 3Com Corporation
 1800 W. Central Rd.
 Mount Prospect, IL 60056
 Phone: +1 847-342-6769
 EMail: ed_campbell@3com.com
 Name: Yingchun Xu
 WaterCove Networks
 One Century Centre, Suite 550
 1750 E. Golf Road
 Schaumburg, IL
 Phone: +1 847-477-9280
 EMail: yxu@watercove.com
 Shinichi Baba
 Toshiba America Research, Inc.
 PO Box 136,
 Convent Station, NJ 07961-0136
 Phone: +1 973-829-4795
 EMail: sbaba@tari.toshiba.com

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 26] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

 Eric Jaques
 Vodafone AirTouch
 2999 Oak Road, MS-750
 Walnut Creek, CA 94596
 Phone: +1 925-279-6142
 EMail: ejaques@akamail.com

8. Intellectual Property Statement

 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
 intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
 might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
 has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
 IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
 standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
 claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
 licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
 obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
 proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
 be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
 copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
 rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
 this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Executive
 Director.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 27] RFC 2989 Network Access AAA Evaluation Criteria November 2000

9. Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.
 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
 included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
 English.
 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
 Internet Society.

Aboba, et al. Informational [Page 28]

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