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rfc:rfc2947

Network Working Group J. Altman Request for Comments: 2947 Columbia University Category: Standards Track September 2000

           Telnet Encryption: DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback

Status of this Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

 This document specifies how to use the Triple-DES (data encryption
 standard) encryption algorithm in cipher feedback mode with the
 telnet encryption option.

1. Command Names and Codes

 Encryption Type
    DES3_CFB64       3
 Suboption Commands
    CFB64_IV         1
    CFB64_IV_OK      2
    CFB64_IV_BAD     3

2. Command Meanings

 IAC SB ENCRYPT IS DES3_CFB64 CFB64_IV <initial vector> IAC SE
 The sender of this command generates a random 8 byte initial vector,
 and sends it to the other side of the connection using the CFB64_IV
 command.  The initial vector is sent in clear text.  Only the side of
 the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the CFB64_IV command.

Altman Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 2947 DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback September 2000

 IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY DES3_CFB64 CFB64_IV_OK IAC SE IAC SB ENCRYPT
 REPLY DES3_CFB64 CFB64_IV_BAD IAC SE
   The sender of these commands either accepts or rejects the initial
   vector received in a CFB64_IV command.  Only the side of the
   connection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the CFB64_IV_OK and
   CFB64_IV_BAD commands.  The CFB64_IV_OK command MUST be sent for
   backwards compatibility with existing implementations; there really
   isn't any reason why a sender would need to send the CFB64_IV_BAD
   command except in the case of a protocol violation where the IV
   sent was not of the correct length (i.e., 8 bytes).

3. Implementation Rules

 Once a CFB64_IV_OK command has been received, the WILL ENCRYPT side
 of the connection should do keyid negotiation using the ENC_KEYID
 command.  Once the keyid negotiation has successfully identified a
 common keyid, then START and END commands may be sent by the side of
 the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT.  Data will be encrypted using
 the DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback algorithm.
 If encryption (decryption) is turned off and back on again, and the
 same keyid is used when re-starting the encryption (decryption), the
 intervening clear text must not change the state of the encryption
 (decryption) machine.
 If a START command is sent (received) with a different keyid, the
 encryption (decryption) machine must be re-initialized immediately
 following the end of the START command with the new key and the
 initial vector sent (received) in the last CFB64_IV command.
 If a new CFB64_IV command is sent (received), and encryption
 (decryption) is enabled, the encryption (decryption) machine must be
 re-initialized immediately following the end of the CFB64_IV command
 with the new initial vector, and the keyid sent (received) in the
 last START command.
 If encryption (decryption) is not enabled when a CFB64_IV command is
 sent (received), the encryption (decryption) machine must be re-
 initialized after the next START command, with the keyid sent
 (received) in that START command, and the initial vector sent
 (received) in this CFB64_IV command.

Altman Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 2947 DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback September 2000

4. Algorithm

 DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback
               key1       key2       key3
                |          |          |
                v          v          v
            +-------+  +-------+  +-------+
         +->| DES-e |->| DES-d |->| DES-e |-- +
         |  +-------+  +-------+  +-------+   |
         |                                    v
 INPUT --(-------------------------------->(+)+---> DATA
         |                                    |
         +------------------------------------+
 Given:
 iV: Initial vector, 64 bits (8 bytes) long.
 Dn: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of data to encrypt (decrypt).
 On: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of encrypted (decrypted) output.
 V0 = DES-e(DES-d(DES-e(iV, key1),key2),key3)
 On = Dn ^ Vn
 V(n+1) = DES-e(DES-d(DES-e(On, key1),key2),key3)

5. Integration with the AUTHENTICATION telnet option

 As noted in the telnet ENCRYPTION option specifications, a keyid
 value of zero indicates the default encryption key, as might be
 derived from the telnet AUTHENTICATION option.  If the default
 encryption key negotiated as a result of the telnet AUTHENTICATION
 option contains less than 16 bytes, then the DES3_CFB64 option must
 not be offered or used as a valid telnet encryption option.
 The following rules are to be followed for creating three DES
 encryption keys based upon the available encrypt key data:
   keys_to_use = bytes of key data / DES block size (8 bytes)
 where the keys are labeled "key1" through "key6" with "key1" being
 the first 8 bytes; "key2" the second 8 bytes; ... and "key6" being
 sixth 8 bytes (if available).

Altman Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 2947 DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback September 2000

  When two keys are available:
  . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
    key2, and encrypted with key1;
  . data sent from the client is encrypted with key2, decrypted with
    key1, and encrypted with key2
 When three keys are available:
  . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
    key2, and encrypted with key3;
  . data sent from the client is encrypted with key2, decrypted with
    key3, and encrypted with key1
 When four keys are available:
  . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
    key2, and encrypted with key3;
  . data sent from the client is encrypted with key2, decrypted with
    key4, and encrypted with key1
 When five keys are available:
  . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
    key2, and encrypted with key3;
  . data sent from the client is encrypted with key2, decrypted with
    key4, and encrypted with key5
 When six keys are available:
  . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
    key2, and encrypted with key3;
  . data sent from the client is encrypted with key4, decrypted with
    key5, and encrypted with key6
  In all cases, the keys used by DES3_CFB64 must have their parity
  corrected after they are determined using the above algorithm.
   Note that the above algorithm assumes that it is safe to use a
   non-DES key (or part of a non-DES key) as a DES key.  This is not
   necessarily true of all cipher systems, but we specify this
   behaviour as the default since it is true for most authentication
   systems in popular use today, and for compatibility with existing

Altman Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 2947 DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback September 2000

   implementations.  New telnet AUTHENTICATION mechanisms may specify
   alternative methods for determining the keys to be used for this
   cipher suite in their specification, if the session key negotiated
   by that authentication mechanism is not a DES key and and where
   this algorithm may not be safely used.

6. Security Considerations

 Encryption using Cipher Feedback does not ensure data integrity; the
 active attacker has a limited ability to modify text, if he can
 predict the clear-text that was being transmitted.  The limitations
 faced by the attacker (that only 8 bytes can be modified at a time,
 and the following 8-byte block of data will be corrupted, thus making
 detection likely) are significant, but it is possible that an active
 attacker still might be able to exploit this weakness.
 The tradeoff here is that adding a message authentication code (MAC)
 will significantly increase the number of bytes needed to send a
 single character in the telnet protocol, which will impact
 performance on slow (i.e. dialup) links.

7. Acknowledgments

 This document was based on the "Telnet Encryption: DES 64 bit Cipher
 Feedback" document originally written by Dave Borman of Cray Research
 with the assistance of the IETF Telnet Working Group.

Author's Address

 Jeffrey Altman, Editor
 Columbia University
 612 West 115th Street Room 716
 New York NY 10025 USA
 Phone: +1 (212) 854-1344
 EMail: jaltman@columbia.edu

Altman Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 2947 DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback September 2000

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.
 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
 included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
 English.
 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
 Internet Society.

Altman Standards Track [Page 6]

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