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rfc:rfc2930

Network Working Group D. Eastlake, 3rd Request for Comments: 2930 Motorola Category: Standards Track September 2000

             Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)

Status of this Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

 [RFC 2845] provides a means of authenticating Domain Name System
 (DNS) queries and responses using shared secret keys via the
 Transaction Signature (TSIG) resource record (RR).  However, it
 provides no mechanism for setting up such keys other than manual
 exchange. This document describes a Transaction Key (TKEY) RR that
 can be used in a number of different modes to establish shared secret
 keys between a DNS resolver and server.

Acknowledgments

 The comments and ideas of the following persons (listed in alphabetic
 order) have been incorporated herein and are gratefully acknowledged:
       Olafur Gudmundsson (TIS)
       Stuart Kwan (Microsoft)
       Ed Lewis (TIS)
       Erik Nordmark (SUN)
       Brian Wellington (Nominum)

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction...............................................  2
 1.1 Overview of Contents......................................  3
 2. The TKEY Resource Record...................................  4
 2.1 The Name Field............................................  4
 2.2 The TTL Field.............................................  5
 2.3 The Algorithm Field.......................................  5
 2.4 The Inception and Expiration Fields.......................  5
 2.5 The Mode Field............................................  5
 2.6 The Error Field...........................................  6
 2.7 The Key Size and Data Fields..............................  6
 2.8 The Other Size and Data Fields............................  6
 3. General TKEY Considerations................................  7
 4. Exchange via Resolver Query................................  8
 4.1 Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying.................  8
 4.2 Query for TKEY Deletion...................................  9
 4.3 Query for GSS-API Establishment........................... 10
 4.4 Query for Server Assigned Keying.......................... 10
 4.5 Query for Resolver Assigned Keying........................ 11
 5. Spontaneous Server Inclusion............................... 12
 5.1 Spontaneous Server Key Deletion........................... 12
 6. Methods of Encryption...................................... 12
 7. IANA Considerations........................................ 13
 8. Security Considerations.................................... 13
 References.................................................... 14
 Author's Address.............................................. 15
 Full Copyright Statement...................................... 16

1. Introduction

 The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical, distributed, highly
 available database used for bi-directional mapping between domain
 names and addresses, for email routing, and for other information
 [RFC 1034, 1035].  It has been extended to provide for public key
 security and dynamic update [RFC 2535, RFC 2136].  Familiarity with
 these RFCs is assumed.
 [RFC 2845] provides a means of efficiently authenticating DNS
 messages using shared secret keys via the TSIG resource record (RR)
 but provides no mechanism for setting up such keys other than manual
 exchange. This document specifies a TKEY RR that can be used in a
 number of different modes to establish and delete such shared secret
 keys between a DNS resolver and server.

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

 Note that TKEY established keying material and TSIGs that use it are
 associated with DNS servers or resolvers.  They are not associated
 with zones.  They may be used to authenticate queries and responses
 but they do not provide zone based DNS data origin or denial
 authentication [RFC 2535].
 Certain modes of TKEY perform encryption which may affect their
 export or import status for some countries.  The affected modes
 specified in this document are the server assigned mode and the
 resolver assigned mode.
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119].
 In all cases herein, the term "resolver" includes that part of a
 server which may make full and incremental [RFC 1995] zone transfer
 queries, forwards recursive queries, etc.

1.1 Overview of Contents

 Section 2 below specifies the TKEY RR and provides a description of
 and considerations for its constituent fields.
 Section 3 describes general principles of operations with TKEY.
 Section 4 discusses key agreement and deletion via DNS requests with
 the Query opcode for RR type TKEY.  This method is applicable to all
 currently defined TKEY modes, although in some cases it is not what
 would intuitively be called a "query".
 Section 5 discusses spontaneous inclusion of TKEY RRs in responses by
 servers which is currently used only for key deletion.
 Section 6 describes encryption methods for transmitting secret key
 information. In this document these are used only for the server
 assigned mode and the resolver assigned mode.
 Section 7 covers IANA considerations in assignment of TKEY modes.
 Finally, Section 8 provides the required security considerations
 section.

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

2. The TKEY Resource Record

 The TKEY resource record (RR) has the structure given below.  Its RR
 type code is 249.
    Field       Type         Comment
    -----       ----         -------
    NAME         domain      see description below
    TTYPE        u_int16_t   TKEY = 249
    CLASS        u_int16_t   ignored, SHOULD be 255 (ANY)
    TTL          u_int32_t   ignored, SHOULD be zero
    RDLEN        u_int16_t   size of RDATA
    RDATA:
     Algorithm:   domain
     Inception:   u_int32_t
     Expiration:  u_int32_t
     Mode:        u_int16_t
     Error:       u_int16_t
     Key Size:    u_int16_t
     Key Data:    octet-stream
     Other Size:  u_int16_t
     Other Data:  octet-stream  undefined by this specification

2.1 The Name Field

 The Name field relates to naming keys.  Its meaning differs somewhat
 with mode and context as explained in subsequent sections.
 At any DNS server or resolver only one octet string of keying
 material may be in place for any particular key name.  An attempt to
 establish another set of keying material at a server for an existing
 name returns a BADNAME error.
 For a TKEY with a non-root name appearing in a query, the TKEY RR
 name SHOULD be a domain locally unique at the resolver, less than 128
 octets long in wire encoding, and meaningful to the resolver to
 assist in distinguishing keys and/or key agreement sessions.   For
 TKEY(s) appearing in a response to a query, the TKEY RR name SHOULD
 be a globally unique server assigned domain.
 A reasonable key naming strategy is as follows:
    If the key is generated as the result of a query with root as its
    owner name, then the server SHOULD create a globally unique domain
    name, to be the key name, by suffixing a pseudo-random [RFC 1750]
    label with a domain name of the server.  For example
    89n3mDgX072pp.server1.example.com.  If generation of a new

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

    pseudo-random name in each case is an excessive computation load
    or entropy drain, a serial number prefix can be added to a fixed
    pseudo-random name generated an DNS server start time, such as
    1001.89n3mDgX072pp.server1.example.com.
    If the key is generated as the result of a query with a non-root
    name, say 789.resolver.example.net, then use the concatenation of
    that with a name of the server.  For example
    789.resolver.example.net.server1.example.com.

2.2 The TTL Field

 The TTL field is meaningless in TKEY RRs. It SHOULD always be zero to
 be sure that older DNS implementations do not cache TKEY RRs.

2.3 The Algorithm Field

 The algorithm name is in the form of a domain name with the same
 meaning as in [RFC 2845].  The algorithm determines how the secret
 keying material agreed to using the TKEY RR is actually used to
 derive the algorithm specific key.

2.4 The Inception and Expiration Fields

 The inception time and expiration times are in number of seconds
 since the beginning of 1 January 1970 GMT ignoring leap seconds
 treated as modulo 2**32 using ring arithmetic [RFC 1982]. In messages
 between a DNS resolver and a DNS server where these fields are
 meaningful, they are either the requested validity interval for the
 keying material asked for or specify the validity interval of keying
 material provided.
 To avoid different interpretations of the inception and expiration
 times in TKEY RRs, resolvers and servers exchanging them must have
 the same idea of what time it is.  One way of doing this is with the
 NTP protocol [RFC 2030] but that or any other time synchronization
 used for this purpose MUST be done securely.

2.5 The Mode Field

 The mode field specifies the general scheme for key agreement or the
 purpose of the TKEY DNS message.  Servers and resolvers supporting
 this specification MUST implement the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
 mode and the key deletion mode for queries.  All other modes are
 OPTIONAL.  A server supporting TKEY that receives a TKEY request with
 a mode it does not support returns the BADMODE error.  The following
 values of the Mode octet are defined, available, or reserved:

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

       Value    Description
       -----    -----------
        0        - reserved, see section 7
        1       server assignment
        2       Diffie-Hellman exchange
        3       GSS-API negotiation
        4       resolver assignment
        5       key deletion
       6-65534   - available, see section 7
       65535     - reserved, see section 7

2.6 The Error Field

 The error code field is an extended RCODE.  The following values are
 defined:
       Value   Description
       -----   -----------
        0       - no error
        1-15   a non-extended RCODE
        16     BADSIG   (TSIG)
        17     BADKEY   (TSIG)
        18     BADTIME  (TSIG)
        19     BADMODE
        20     BADNAME
        21     BADALG
 When the TKEY Error Field is non-zero in a response to a TKEY query,
 the DNS header RCODE field indicates no error. However, it is
 possible if a TKEY is spontaneously included in a response the TKEY
 RR and DNS header error field could have unrelated non-zero error
 codes.

2.7 The Key Size and Data Fields

 The key data size field is an unsigned 16 bit integer in network
 order which specifies the size of the key exchange data field in
 octets. The meaning of this data depends on the mode.

2.8 The Other Size and Data Fields

 The Other Size and Other Data fields are not used in this
 specification but may be used in future extensions.  The RDLEN field
 MUST equal the length of the RDATA section through the end of Other
 Data or the RR is to be considered malformed and rejected.

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

3. General TKEY Considerations

 TKEY is a meta-RR that is not stored or cached in the DNS and does
 not appear in zone files.  It supports a variety of modes for the
 establishment and deletion of shared secret keys information between
 DNS resolvers and servers.  The establishment of such a shared key
 requires that state be maintained at both ends and the allocation of
 the resources to maintain such state may require mutual agreement. In
 the absence of willingness to provide such state, servers MUST return
 errors such as NOTIMP or REFUSED for an attempt to use TKEY and
 resolvers are free to ignore any TKEY RRs they receive.
 The shared secret keying material developed by using TKEY is a plain
 octet sequence.  The means by which this shared secret keying
 material, exchanged via TKEY, is actually used in any particular TSIG
 algorithm is algorithm dependent and is defined in connection with
 that algorithm.  For example, see [RFC 2104] for how TKEY agreed
 shared secret keying material is used in the HMAC-MD5 algorithm or
 other HMAC algorithms.
 There MUST NOT be more than one TKEY RR in a DNS query or response.
 Except for GSS-API mode, TKEY responses MUST always have DNS
 transaction authentication to protect the integrity of any keying
 data, error codes, etc.  This authentication MUST use a previously
 established secret (TSIG) or public (SIG(0) [RFC 2931]) key and MUST
 NOT use any key that the response to be verified is itself providing.
 TKEY queries MUST be authenticated for all modes except GSS-API and,
 under some circumstances, server assignment mode.  In particular, if
 the query for a server assigned key is for a key to assert some
 privilege, such as update authority, then the query must be
 authenticated to avoid spoofing.  However, if the key is just to be
 used for transaction security, then spoofing will lead at worst to
 denial of service.  Query authentication SHOULD use an established
 secret (TSIG) key authenticator if available.  Otherwise, it must use
 a public (SIG(0)) key signature.  It MUST NOT use any key that the
 query is itself providing.
 In the absence of required TKEY authentication, a NOTAUTH error MUST
 be returned.
 To avoid replay attacks, it is necessary that a TKEY response or
 query not be valid if replayed on the order of 2**32 second (about
 136 years), or a multiple thereof, later.  To accomplish this, the
 keying material used in any TSIG or SIG(0) RR that authenticates a
 TKEY message MUST NOT have a lifetime of more then 2**31 - 1 seconds

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

 (about 68 years).  Thus, on attempted replay, the authenticating TSIG
 or SIG(0) RR will not be verifiable due to key expiration and the
 replay will fail.

4. Exchange via Resolver Query

 One method for a resolver and a server to agree about shared secret
 keying material for use in TSIG is through DNS requests from the
 resolver which are syntactically DNS queries for type TKEY.  Such
 queries MUST be accompanied by a TKEY RR in the additional
 information section to indicate the mode in use and accompanied by
 other information where required.
 Type TKEY queries SHOULD NOT be flagged as recursive and servers MAY
 ignore the recursive header bit in TKEY queries they receive.

4.1 Query for Diffie-Hellman Exchanged Keying

 Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange is a means whereby two parties can
 derive some shared secret information without requiring any secrecy
 of the messages they exchange [Schneier].  Provisions have been made
 for the storage of DH public keys in the DNS [RFC 2539].
 A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR in
 the additional information section specifying the Diffie-Hellman mode
 and accompanied by a KEY RR also in the additional information
 section specifying a resolver Diffie-Hellman key.  The TKEY RR
 algorithm field is set to the authentication algorithm the resolver
 plans to use. The "key data" provided in the TKEY is used as a random
 [RFC 1750] nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material
 for the same pair of DH KEYs.
 The server response contains a TKEY in its answer section with the
 Diffie-Hellman mode. The "key data" provided in this TKEY is used as
 an additional nonce to avoid always deriving the same keying material
 for the same pair of DH KEYs. If the TKEY error field is non-zero,
 the query failed for the reason given. FORMERR is given if the query
 included no DH KEY and BADKEY is given if the query included an
 incompatible DH KEY.
 If the TKEY error field is zero, the resolver supplied Diffie-Hellman
 KEY RR SHOULD be echoed in the additional information section and a
 server Diffie-Hellman KEY RR will also be present in the answer
 section of the response.  Both parties can then calculate the same
 shared secret quantity from the pair of Diffie-Hellman (DH) keys used
 [Schneier] (provided these DH keys use the same generator and
 modulus) and the data in the TKEY RRs.  The TKEY RR data is mixed
 with the DH result as follows:

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

    keying material =
         XOR ( DH value, MD5 ( query data | DH value ) |
                         MD5 ( server data | DH value ) )
 Where XOR is an exclusive-OR operation and "|" is byte-stream
 concatenation.  The shorter of the two operands to XOR is byte-wise
 left justified and padded with zero-valued bytes to match the length
 of the other operand.  "DH value" is the Diffie-Hellman value derived
 from the KEY RRs. Query data and server data are the values sent in
 the TKEY RR data fields.  These "query data" and "server data" nonces
 are suffixed by the DH value, digested by MD5, the results
 concatenated, and then XORed with the DH value.
 The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
 requested for the keying material.  The inception and expiry times in
 the response TKEY RR are the maximum period the server will consider
 the keying material valid.  Servers may pre-expire keys so this is
 not a guarantee.

4.2 Query for TKEY Deletion

 Keys established via TKEY can be treated as soft state.  Since DNS
 transactions are originated by the resolver, the resolver can simply
 toss keys, although it may have to go through another key exchange if
 it later needs one.  Similarly, the server can discard keys although
 that will result in an error on receiving a query with a TSIG using
 the discarded key.
 To avoid attempted reliance in requests on keys no longer in effect,
 servers MUST implement key deletion whereby the server "discards" a
 key on receipt from a resolver of an authenticated delete request for
 a TKEY RR with the key's name.  If the server has no record of a key
 with that name, it returns BADNAME.
 Key deletion TKEY queries MUST be authenticated.  This authentication
 MAY be a TSIG RR using the key to be deleted.
 For querier assigned and Diffie-Hellman keys, the server MUST truly
 "discard" all active state associated with the key.  For server
 assigned keys, the server MAY simply mark the key as no longer
 retained by the client and may re-send it in response to a future
 query for server assigned keying material.

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

4.3 Query for GSS-API Establishment

 This mode is described in a separate document under preparation which
 should be seen for the full description.  Basically the resolver and
 server can exchange queries and responses for type TKEY with a TKEY
 RR specifying the GSS-API mode in the additional information section
 and a GSS-API token in the key data portion of the TKEY RR.
 Any issues of possible encryption of parts the GSS-API token data
 being transmitted are handled by the GSS-API level.  In addition, the
 GSS-API level provides its own authentication so that this mode of
 TKEY query and response MAY be, but do not need to be, authenticated
 with TSIG RR or SIG(0) RR [RFC 2931].
 The inception and expiry times in a GSS-API mode TKEY RR are ignored.

4.4 Query for Server Assigned Keying

 Optionally, the server can assign keying for the resolver.  It is
 sent to the resolver encrypted under a resolver public key.  See
 section 6 for description of encryption methods.
 A resolver sends a query for type TKEY accompanied by a TKEY RR
 specifying the "server assignment" mode and a resolver KEY RR to be
 used in encrypting the response, both in the additional information
 section. The TKEY algorithm field is set to the authentication
 algorithm the resolver plans to use.  It is RECOMMENDED that any "key
 data" provided in the query TKEY RR by the resolver be strongly mixed
 by the server with server generated randomness [RFC 1750] to derive
 the keying material to be used.  The KEY RR that appears in the query
 need not be accompanied by a SIG(KEY) RR.  If the query is
 authenticated by the resolver with a TSIG RR [RFC 2845] or SIG(0) RR
 and that authentication is verified, then any SIG(KEY) provided in
 the query SHOULD be ignored.  The KEY RR in such a query SHOULD have
 a name that corresponds to the resolver but it is only essential that
 it be a public key for which the resolver has the corresponding
 private key so it can decrypt the response data.
 The server response contains a TKEY RR in its answer section with the
 server assigned mode and echoes the KEY RR provided in the query in
 its additional information section.
 If the response TKEY error field is zero, the key data portion of the
 response TKEY RR will be the server assigned keying data encrypted
 under the public key in the resolver provided KEY RR.  In this case,
 the owner name of the answer TKEY RR will be the server assigned name
 of the key.

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

 If the error field of the response TKEY is non-zero, the query failed
 for the reason given.  FORMERR is given if the query specified no
 encryption key.
 The inception and expiry times in the query TKEY RR are those
 requested for the keying material.  The inception and expiry times in
 the response TKEY are the maximum period the server will consider the
 keying material valid.  Servers may pre-expire keys so this is not a
 guarantee.
 The resolver KEY RR MUST be authenticated, through the authentication
 of this query with a TSIG or SIG(0) or the signing of the resolver
 KEY with a SIG(KEY).  Otherwise, an attacker can forge a resolver KEY
 for which they know the private key, and thereby the attacker could
 obtain a valid shared secret key from the server.

4.5 Query for Resolver Assigned Keying

 Optionally, a server can accept resolver assigned keys.  The keying
 material MUST be encrypted under a server key for protection in
 transmission as described in Section 6.
 The resolver sends a TKEY query with a TKEY RR that specifies the
 encrypted keying material and a KEY RR specifying the server public
 key used to encrypt the data, both in the additional information
 section.  The name of the key and the keying data are completely
 controlled by the sending resolver so a globally unique key name
 SHOULD be used.  The KEY RR used MUST be one for which the server has
 the corresponding private key, or it will not be able to decrypt the
 keying material and will return a FORMERR. It is also important that
 no untrusted party (preferably no other party than the server) has
 the private key corresponding to the KEY RR because, if they do, they
 can capture the messages to the server, learn the shared secret, and
 spoof valid TSIGs.
 The query TKEY RR inception and expiry give the time period the
 querier intends to consider the keying material valid.  The server
 can return a lesser time interval to advise that it will not maintain
 state for that long and can pre-expire keys in any case.
 This mode of query MUST be authenticated with a TSIG or SIG(0).
 Otherwise, an attacker can forge a resolver assigned TKEY query, and
 thereby the attacker could specify a shared secret key that would be
 accepted, used, and honored by the server.

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

5. Spontaneous Server Inclusion

 A DNS server may include a TKEY RR spontaneously as additional
 information in responses.  This SHOULD only be done if the server
 knows the querier understands TKEY and has this option implemented.
 This technique can be used to delete a key and may be specified for
 modes defined in the future.  A disadvantage of this technique is
 that there is no way for the server to get any error or success
 indication back and, in the case of UDP, no way to even know if the
 DNS response reached the resolver.

5.1 Spontaneous Server Key Deletion

 A server can optionally tell a client that it has deleted a secret
 key by spontaneously including a TKEY RR in the additional
 information section of a response with the key's name and specifying
 the key deletion mode.  Such a response SHOULD be authenticated.  If
 authenticated, it "deletes" the key with the given name.  The
 inception and expiry times of the delete TKEY RR are ignored. Failure
 by a client to receive or properly process such additional
 information in a response would mean that the client might use a key
 that the server had discarded and would then get an error indication.
 For server assigned and Diffie-Hellman keys, the client MUST
 "discard" active state associated with the key.  For querier assigned
 keys, the querier MAY simply mark the key as no longer retained by
 the server and may re-send it in a future query specifying querier
 assigned keying material.

6. Methods of Encryption

 For the server assigned and resolver assigned key agreement modes,
 the keying material is sent within the key data field of a TKEY RR
 encrypted under the public key in an accompanying KEY RR [RFC 2535].
 This KEY RR MUST be for a public key algorithm where the public and
 private keys can be used for encryption and the corresponding
 decryption which recovers the originally encrypted data.  The KEY RR
 SHOULD correspond to a name for the decrypting resolver/server such
 that the decrypting process has access to the corresponding private
 key to decrypt the data.  The secret keying material being sent will
 generally be fairly short, usually less than 256 bits, because that
 is adequate for very strong protection with modern keyed hash or
 symmetric algorithms.
 If the KEY RR specifies the RSA algorithm, then the keying material
 is encrypted as per the description of RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 encryption in
 PKCS#1 [RFC 2437].  (Note, the secret keying material being sent is
 directly RSA encrypted in PKCS#1 format. It is not "enveloped" under

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

 some other symmetric algorithm.)  In the unlikely event that the
 keying material will not fit within one RSA modulus of the chosen
 public key, additional RSA encryption blocks are included.  The
 length of each block is clear from the public RSA key specified and
 the RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 padding makes it clear what part of the
 encrypted data is actually keying material and what part is
 formatting or the required at least eight bytes of random [RFC 1750]
 padding.

7. IANA Considerations

 This section is to be interpreted as provided in [RFC 2434].
 Mode field values 0x0000 and 0xFFFF are reserved.
 Mode field values 0x0001 through 0x00FF, and 0XFF00 through 0XFFFE
 can only be assigned by an IETF Standards Action.
 Mode field values 0x0100 through 0x0FFF and 0xF0000 through 0xFEFF
 are allocated by IESG approval or IETF consensus.
 Mode field values 0x1000 through 0xEFFF are allocated based on
 Specification Required as defined in [RFC 2434].
 Mode values should not be changed when the status of their use
 changes.  For example, a mode value assigned based just on providing
 a specification should not be changed later just because that use's
 status is changed to standards track.
 The following assignments are documented herein:
    RR Type 249 for TKEY.
    TKEY Modes 1 through 5 as listed in section 2.5.
    Extended RCODE Error values of 19, 20, and 21 as listed in section
    2.6.

8. Security Considerations

 The entirety of this specification is concerned with the secure
 establishment of a shared secret between DNS clients and servers in
 support of TSIG [RFC 2845].
 Protection against denial of service via the use of TKEY is not
 provided.

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

References

 [Schneier] Bruce Schneier, "Applied Cryptography: Protocols,
            Algorithms, and Source Code in C", 1996, John Wiley and
            Sons
 [RFC 1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Concepts and Facilities",
            STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
 [RFC 1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain Names - Implementation and
            Specifications", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
 [RFC 1750] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness
            Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
 [RFC 1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982,
            September 1996.
 [RFC 1995] Ohta, M., "Incremental Zone Transfer in DNS", RFC 1995,
            August 1996.
 [RFC 2030] Mills, D., "Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) Version 4
            for IPv4, IPv6 and OSI", RFC 2030, October 1996.
 [RFC 2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:  Keyed-
            Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February
            1997.
 [RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
 [RFC 2136] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y. and J. Bound, "Dynamic
            Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)", RFC 2136,
            April 1997.
 [RFC 2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
            IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
            October 1998.
 [RFC 2437] Kaliski, B. and J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
            Specifications Version 2.0", RFC 2437, October 1998.
 [RFC 2535] Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
            RFC 2535, March 1999.
 [RFC 2539] Eastlake, D., "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the
            Domain Name System (DNS)", RFC 2539, March 1999.

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

 [RFC 2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B.
            Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
            (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.
 [RFC 2931] Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
            (SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, September 2000.

Author's Address

 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd
 Motorola
 140 Forest Avenue
 Hudson, MA 01749 USA
 Phone: +1 978-562-2827 (h)
        +1 508-261-5434 (w)
 Fax:   +1 508-261-4447 (w)
 EMail: Donald.Eastlake@motorola.com

Eastlake Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 2930 The DNS TKEY RR September 2000

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000).  All Rights Reserved.
 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
 included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
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Eastlake Standards Track [Page 16]

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