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rfc:rfc2475

Network Working Group S. Blake Request for Comments: 2475 Torrent Networking Technologies Category: Informational D. Black

                                                    EMC Corporation
                                                         M. Carlson
                                                   Sun Microsystems
                                                          E. Davies
                                                          Nortel UK
                                                            Z. Wang
                                      Bell Labs Lucent Technologies
                                                           W. Weiss
                                                Lucent Technologies
                                                      December 1998
            An Architecture for Differentiated Services

Status of this Memo

 This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
 not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
 memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

 This document defines an architecture for implementing scalable
 service differentiation in the Internet.  This architecture achieves
 scalability by aggregating traffic classification state which is
 conveyed by means of IP-layer packet marking using the DS field
 [DSFIELD].  Packets are classified and marked to receive a particular
 per-hop forwarding behavior on nodes along their path.  Sophisticated
 classification, marking, policing, and shaping operations need only
 be implemented at network boundaries or hosts.  Network resources are
 allocated to traffic streams by service provisioning policies which
 govern how traffic is marked and conditioned upon entry to a
 differentiated services-capable network, and how that traffic is
 forwarded within that network.  A wide variety of services can be
 implemented on top of these building blocks.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 1] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction .................................................  2
   1.1  Overview  .................................................  2
   1.2  Terminology ...............................................  4
   1.3  Requirements ..............................................  8
   1.4  Comparisons with Other Approaches .........................  9
 2.  Differentiated Services Architectural Model .................. 12
   2.1  Differentiated Services Domain ............................ 12
     2.1.1  DS Boundary Nodes and Interior Nodes .................. 12
     2.1.2  DS Ingress Node and Egress Node ....................... 13
   2.2  Differentiated Services Region ............................ 13
   2.3  Traffic Classification and Conditioning ................... 14
     2.3.1  Classifiers ........................................... 14
     2.3.2  Traffic Profiles ...................................... 15
     2.3.3  Traffic Conditioners .................................. 15
       2.3.3.1  Meters ............................................ 16
       2.3.3.2  Markers ........................................... 16
       2.3.3.3  Shapers ........................................... 17
       2.3.3.4  Droppers .......................................... 17
     2.3.4  Location of Traffic Conditioners and MF Classifiers ... 17
       2.3.4.1  Within the Source Domain .......................... 17
       2.3.4.2  At the Boundary of a DS Domain .................... 18
       2.3.4.3  In non-DS-Capable Domains ......................... 18
       2.3.4.4  In Interior DS Nodes .............................. 19
   2.4  Per-Hop Behaviors ......................................... 19
   2.5  Network Resource Allocation ............................... 20
 3.  Per-Hop Behavior Specification Guidelines .................... 21
 4.  Interoperability with Non-Differentiated Services-Compliant
     Nodes ........................................................ 25
 5.  Multicast Considerations ..................................... 26
 6.  Security and Tunneling Considerations ........................ 27
   6.1  Theft and Denial of Service ............................... 28
   6.2  IPsec and Tunneling Interactions .......................... 30
   6.3  Auditing .................................................. 32
 7.  Acknowledgements ............................................. 32
 8.  References ................................................... 33
 Authors' Addresses ............................................... 34
 Full Copyright Statement ......................................... 36

1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

 This document defines an architecture for implementing scalable
 service differentiation in the Internet.  A "Service" defines some
 significant characteristics of packet transmission in one direction
 across a set of one or more paths within a network.  These

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 2] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 characteristics may be specified in quantitative or statistical terms
 of throughput, delay, jitter, and/or loss, or may otherwise be
 specified in terms of some relative priority of access to network
 resources.  Service differentiation is desired to accommodate
 heterogeneous application requirements and user expectations, and to
 permit differentiated pricing of Internet service.
 This architecture is composed of a number of functional elements
 implemented in network nodes, including a small set of per-hop
 forwarding behaviors, packet classification functions, and traffic
 conditioning functions including metering, marking, shaping, and
 policing.  This architecture achieves scalability by implementing
 complex classification and conditioning functions only at network
 boundary nodes, and by applying per-hop behaviors to aggregates of
 traffic which have been appropriately marked using the DS field in
 the IPv4 or IPv6 headers [DSFIELD].  Per-hop behaviors are defined to
 permit a reasonably granular means of allocating buffer and bandwidth
 resources at each node among competing traffic streams.  Per-
 application flow or per-customer forwarding state need not be
 maintained within the core of the network.  A distinction is
 maintained between:
 o  the service provided to a traffic aggregate,
 o  the conditioning functions and per-hop behaviors used to realize
    services,
 o  the DS field value (DS codepoint) used to mark packets to select a
    per-hop behavior, and
 o  the particular node implementation mechanisms which realize a
    per-hop behavior.
 Service provisioning and traffic conditioning policies are
 sufficiently decoupled from the forwarding behaviors within the
 network interior to permit implementation of a wide variety of
 service behaviors, with room for future expansion.
 This architecture only provides service differentiation in one
 direction of traffic flow and is therefore asymmetric.  Development
 of a complementary symmetric architecture is a topic of current
 research but is outside the scope of this document; see for example
 [EXPLICIT].
 Sect. 1.2 is a glossary of terms used within this document.  Sec. 1.3
 lists requirements addressed by this architecture, and Sec. 1.4
 provides a brief comparison to other approaches for service
 differentiation.  Sec. 2 discusses the components of the architecture

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 3] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 in detail.  Sec. 3 proposes guidelines for per-hop behavior
 specifications.  Sec. 4 discusses interoperability issues with nodes
 and networks which do not implement differentiated services as
 defined in this document and in [DSFIELD].  Sec. 5 discusses issues
 with multicast service delivery.  Sec. 6 addresses security and
 tunnel considerations.

1.2 Terminology

 This section gives a general conceptual overview of the terms used in
 this document.  Some of these terms are more precisely defined in
 later sections of this document.
 Behavior Aggregate (BA)   a DS behavior aggregate.
 BA classifier             a classifier that selects packets based
                           only on the contents of the DS field.
 Boundary link             a link connecting the edge nodes of two
                           domains.
 Classifier                an entity which selects packets based on
                           the content of packet headers according to
                           defined rules.
 DS behavior aggregate     a collection of packets with the same DS
                           codepoint crossing a link in a particular
                           direction.
 DS boundary node          a DS node that connects one DS domain to a
                           node either in another DS domain or in a
                           domain that is not DS-capable.
 DS-capable                capable of implementing differentiated
                           services as described in this architecture;
                           usually used in reference to a domain
                           consisting of DS-compliant nodes.
 DS codepoint              a specific value of the DSCP portion of the
                           DS field, used to select a PHB.
 DS-compliant              enabled to support differentiated services
                           functions and behaviors as defined in
                           [DSFIELD], this document, and other
                           differentiated services documents; usually
                           used in reference to a node or device.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 4] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 DS domain                 a DS-capable domain; a contiguous set of
                           nodes which operate with a common set of
                           service provisioning policies and PHB
                           definitions.
 DS egress node            a DS boundary node in its role in handling
                           traffic as it leaves a DS domain.
 DS ingress node           a DS boundary node in its role in handling
                           traffic as it enters a DS domain.
 DS interior node          a DS node that is not a DS boundary node.
 DS field                  the IPv4 header TOS octet or the IPv6
                           Traffic Class octet when interpreted in
                           conformance with the definition given in
                           [DSFIELD].  The bits of the DSCP field
                           encode the DS codepoint, while the
                           remaining bits are currently unused.
 DS node                   a DS-compliant node.
 DS region                 a set of contiguous DS domains which can
                           offer differentiated services over paths
                           across those DS domains.
 Downstream DS domain      the DS domain downstream of traffic flow on
                           a boundary link.
 Dropper                   a device that performs dropping.
 Dropping                  the process of discarding packets based on
                           specified rules; policing.
 Legacy node               a node which implements IPv4 Precedence as
                           defined in [RFC791,RFC1812] but which is
                           otherwise not DS-compliant.
 Marker                    a device that performs marking.
 Marking                   the process of setting the DS codepoint in
                           a packet based on defined rules; pre-
                           marking, re-marking.
 Mechanism                 a specific algorithm or operation (e.g.,
                           queueing discipline) that is implemented in
                           a node to realize a set of one or more per-
                           hop behaviors.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 5] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 Meter                     a device that performs metering.
 Metering                  the process of measuring the temporal
                           properties (e.g., rate) of a traffic stream
                           selected by a classifier.  The
                           instantaneous state of this process may be
                           used to affect the operation of a marker,
                           shaper, or dropper, and/or may be used for
                           accounting and measurement purposes.
 Microflow                 a single instance of an application-to-
                           application flow of packets which is
                           identified by source address, source port,
                           destination address, destination port and
                           protocol id.
 MF Classifier             a multi-field (MF) classifier which selects
                           packets based on the content of some
                           arbitrary number of header fields;
                           typically some combination of source
                           address, destination address, DS field,
                           protocol ID, source port and destination
                           port.
 Per-Hop-Behavior (PHB)    the externally observable forwarding
                           behavior applied at a DS-compliant node to
                           a DS behavior aggregate.
 PHB group                 a set of one or more PHBs that can only be
                           meaningfully specified and implemented
                           simultaneously, due to a common constraint
                           applying to all PHBs in the set such as a
                           queue servicing or queue management policy.
                           A PHB group provides a service building
                           block that allows a set of related
                           forwarding behaviors to be specified
                           together (e.g., four dropping priorities).
                           A single PHB is a special case of a PHB
                           group.
 Policing                  the process of discarding packets (by a
                           dropper) within a traffic stream in
                           accordance with the state of a
                           corresponding meter enforcing a traffic
                           profile.
 Pre-mark                  to set the DS codepoint of a packet prior
                           to entry into a downstream DS domain.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 6] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 Provider DS domain        the DS-capable provider of services to a
                           source domain.
 Re-mark                   to change the DS codepoint of a packet,
                           usually performed by a marker in accordance
                           with a TCA.
 Service                   the overall treatment of a defined subset
                           of a customer's traffic within a DS domain
                           or end-to-end.
 Service Level Agreement   a service contract between a customer and a
 (SLA)                     service provider that specifies the
                           forwarding service a customer should
                           receive.  A customer may be a user
                           organization (source domain) or another DS
                           domain (upstream domain).  A SLA may
                           include traffic conditioning rules which
                           constitute a TCA in whole or in part.
 Service Provisioning      a policy which defines how traffic
 Policy                    conditioners are configured on DS boundary
                           nodes and how traffic streams are mapped to
                           DS behavior aggregates to achieve a range
                           of services.
 Shaper                    a device that performs shaping.
 Shaping                   the process of delaying packets within a
                           traffic stream to cause it to conform to
                           some defined traffic profile.
 Source domain             a domain which contains the node(s)
                           originating the traffic receiving a
                           particular service.
 Traffic conditioner       an entity which performs traffic
                           conditioning functions and which may
                           contain meters, markers, droppers, and
                           shapers. Traffic conditioners are typically
                           deployed in DS boundary nodes only.  A
                           traffic conditioner may re-mark a traffic
                           stream or may discard or shape packets to
                           alter the temporal characteristics of the
                           stream and bring it into compliance with a
                           traffic profile.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 7] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 Traffic conditioning      control functions performed to enforce
                           rules specified in a TCA, including
                           metering, marking, shaping, and policing.
 Traffic Conditioning      an agreement specifying classifier rules
 Agreement (TCA)           and any corresponding traffic profiles and
                           metering, marking, discarding and/or
                           shaping rules which are to apply to the
                           traffic streams selected by the classifier.
                           A TCA encompasses all of the traffic
                           conditioning rules explicitly specified
                           within a SLA along with all of the rules
                           implicit from the relevant service
                           requirements and/or from a DS domain's
                           service provisioning policy.
 Traffic profile           a description of the temporal properties
                           of a traffic stream such as rate and burst
                           size.
 Traffic stream            an administratively significant set of one
                           or more microflows which traverse a path
                           segment.  A traffic stream may consist of
                           the set of active microflows which are
                           selected by a particular classifier.
 Upstream DS domain        the DS domain upstream of traffic flow on a
                           boundary link.

1.3 Requirements

 The history of the Internet has been one of continuous growth in the
 number of hosts, the number and variety of applications, and the
 capacity of the network infrastructure, and this growth is expected
 to continue for the foreseeable future.  A scalable architecture for
 service differentiation must be able to accommodate this continued
 growth.
 The following requirements were identified and are addressed in this
 architecture:
 o  should accommodate a wide variety of services and provisioning
    policies, extending end-to-end or within a particular (set of)
    network(s),
 o  should allow decoupling of the service from the particular
    application in use,

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 8] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 o  should work with existing applications without the need for
    application programming interface changes or host software
    modifications (assuming suitable deployment of classifiers,
    markers, and other traffic conditioning functions),
 o  should decouple traffic conditioning and service provisioning
    functions from forwarding behaviors implemented within the core
    network nodes,
 o  should not depend on hop-by-hop application signaling,
 o  should require only a small set of forwarding behaviors whose
    implementation complexity does not dominate the cost of a network
    device, and which will not introduce bottlenecks for future high-
    speed system implementations,
 o  should avoid per-microflow or per-customer state within core
    network nodes,
 o  should utilize only aggregated classification state within the
    network core,
 o  should permit simple packet classification implementations in core
    network nodes (BA classifier),
 o  should permit reasonable interoperability with non-DS-compliant
    network nodes,
 o  should accommodate incremental deployment.

1.4 Comparisons with Other Approaches

 The differentiated services architecture specified in this document
 can be contrasted with other existing models of service
 differentiation.  We classify these alternative models into the
 following categories: relative priority marking, service marking,
 label switching, Integrated Services/RSVP, and static per-hop
 classification.
 Examples of the relative priority marking model include IPv4
 Precedence marking as defined in [RFC791], 802.5 Token Ring priority
 [TR], and the default interpretation of 802.1p traffic classes
 [802.1p].  In this model the application, host, or proxy node selects
 a relative priority or "precedence" for a packet (e.g., delay or
 discard priority), and the network nodes along the transit path apply
 the appropriate priority forwarding behavior corresponding to the
 priority value within the packet's header.  Our architecture can be
 considered as a refinement to this model, since we more clearly

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 9] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 specify the role and importance of boundary nodes and traffic
 conditioners, and since our per-hop behavior model permits more
 general forwarding behaviors than relative delay or discard priority.
 An example of a service marking model is IPv4 TOS as defined in
 [RFC1349].  In this example each packet is marked with a request for
 a "type of service", which may include "minimize delay", "maximize
 throughput", "maximize reliability", or "minimize cost".  Network
 nodes may select routing paths or forwarding behaviors which are
 suitably engineered to satisfy the service request.  This model is
 subtly different from our architecture.  Note that we do not describe
 the use of the DS field as an input to route selection.  The TOS
 markings defined in [RFC1349] are very generic and do not span the
 range of possible service semantics.  Furthermore, the service
 request is associated with each individual packet, whereas some
 service semantics may depend on the aggregate forwarding behavior of
 a sequence of packets.  The service marking model does not easily
 accommodate growth in the number and range of future services (since
 the codepoint space is small) and involves configuration of the
 "TOS->forwarding behavior" association in each core network node.
 Standardizing service markings implies standardizing service
 offerings, which is outside the scope of the IETF.  Note that
 provisions are made in the allocation of the DS codepoint space to
 allow for locally significant codepoints which may be used by a
 provider to support service marking semantics [DSFIELD].
 Examples of the label switching (or virtual circuit) model include
 Frame Relay, ATM, and MPLS [FRELAY, ATM].  In this model path
 forwarding state and traffic management or QoS state is established
 for traffic streams on each hop along a network path.  Traffic
 aggregates of varying granularity are associated with a label
 switched path at an ingress node, and packets/cells within each label
 switched path are marked with a forwarding label that is used to
 lookup the next-hop node, the per-hop forwarding behavior, and the
 replacement label at each hop.  This model permits finer granularity
 resource allocation to traffic streams, since label values are not
 globally significant but are only significant on a single link;
 therefore resources can be reserved for the aggregate of packets/
 cells received on a link with a particular label, and the label
 switching semantics govern the next-hop selection, allowing a traffic
 stream to follow a specially engineered path through the network.
 This improved granularity comes at the cost of additional management
 and configuration requirements to establish and maintain the label
 switched paths.  In addition, the amount of forwarding state
 maintained at each node scales in proportion to the number of edge
 nodes of the network in the best case (assuming multipoint-to-point

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 10] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 label switched paths), and it scales in proportion with the square of
 the number of edge nodes in the worst case, when edge-edge label
 switched paths with provisioned resources are employed.
 The Integrated Services/RSVP model relies upon traditional datagram
 forwarding in the default case, but allows sources and receivers to
 exchange signaling messages which establish additional packet
 classification and forwarding state on each node along the path
 between them [RFC1633, RSVP].  In the absence of state aggregation,
 the amount of state on each node scales in proportion to the number
 of concurrent reservations, which can be potentially large on high-
 speed links.  This model also requires application support for the
 RSVP signaling protocol.  Differentiated services mechanisms can be
 utilized to aggregate Integrated Services/RSVP state in the core of
 the network [Bernet].
 A variant of the Integrated Services/RSVP model eliminates the
 requirement for hop-by-hop signaling by utilizing only "static"
 classification and forwarding policies which are implemented in each
 node along a network path.  These policies are updated on
 administrative timescales and not in response to the instantaneous
 mix of microflows active in the network.  The state requirements for
 this variant are potentially worse than those encountered when RSVP
 is used, especially in backbone nodes, since the number of static
 policies that might be applicable at a node over time may be larger
 than the number of active sender-receiver sessions that might have
 installed reservation state on a node.  Although the support of large
 numbers of classifier rules and forwarding policies may be
 computationally feasible, the management burden associated with
 installing and maintaining these rules on each node within a backbone
 network which might be traversed by a traffic stream is substantial.
 Although we contrast our architecture with these alternative models
 of service differentiation, it should be noted that links and nodes
 employing these techniques may be utilized to extend differentiated
 services behaviors and semantics across a layer-2 switched
 infrastructure (e.g., 802.1p LANs, Frame Relay/ATM backbones)
 interconnecting DS nodes, and in the case of MPLS may be used as an
 alternative intra-domain implementation technology.  The constraints
 imposed by the use of a specific link-layer technology in particular
 regions of a DS domain (or in a network providing access to DS
 domains) may imply the differentiation of traffic on a coarser grain
 basis.  Depending on the mapping of PHBs to different link-layer
 services and the way in which packets are scheduled over a restricted
 set of priority classes (or virtual circuits of different category
 and capacity), all or a subset of the PHBs in use may be supportable
 (or may be indistinguishable).

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 11] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

2. Differentiated Services Architectural Model

 The differentiated services architecture is based on a simple model
 where traffic entering a network is classified and possibly
 conditioned at the boundaries of the network, and assigned to
 different behavior aggregates.  Each behavior aggregate is identified
 by a single DS codepoint.  Within the core of the network, packets
 are forwarded according to the per-hop behavior associated with the
 DS codepoint.  In this section, we discuss the key components within
 a differentiated services region, traffic classification and
 conditioning functions, and how differentiated services are achieved
 through the combination of traffic conditioning and PHB-based
 forwarding.

2.1 Differentiated Services Domain

 A DS domain is a contiguous set of DS nodes which operate with a
 common service provisioning policy and set of PHB groups implemented
 on each node.  A DS domain has a well-defined boundary consisting of
 DS boundary nodes which classify and possibly condition ingress
 traffic to ensure that packets which transit the domain are
 appropriately marked to select a PHB from one of the PHB groups
 supported within the domain.  Nodes within the DS domain select the
 forwarding behavior for packets based on their DS codepoint, mapping
 that value to one of the supported PHBs using either the recommended
 codepoint->PHB mapping or a locally customized mapping [DSFIELD].
 Inclusion of non-DS-compliant nodes within a DS domain may result in
 unpredictable performance and may impede the ability to satisfy
 service level agreements (SLAs).
 A DS domain normally consists of one or more networks under the same
 administration; for example, an organization's intranet or an ISP.
 The administration of the domain is responsible for ensuring that
 adequate resources are provisioned and/or reserved to support the
 SLAs offered by the domain.

2.1.1 DS Boundary Nodes and Interior Nodes

 A DS domain consists of DS boundary nodes and DS interior nodes.  DS
 boundary nodes interconnect the DS domain to other DS or non-DS-
 capable domains, whilst DS interior nodes only connect to other DS
 interior or boundary nodes within the same DS domain.
 Both DS boundary nodes and interior nodes must be able to apply the
 appropriate PHB to packets based on the DS codepoint; otherwise
 unpredictable behavior may result.  In addition, DS boundary nodes
 may be required to perform traffic conditioning functions as defined
 by a traffic conditioning agreement (TCA) between their DS domain and

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 12] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 the peering domain which they connect to (see Sec. 2.3.3).
 Interior nodes may be able to perform limited traffic conditioning
 functions such as DS codepoint re-marking.  Interior nodes which
 implement more complex classification and traffic conditioning
 functions are analogous to DS boundary nodes (see Sec. 2.3.4.4).
 A host in a network containing a DS domain may act as a DS boundary
 node for traffic from applications running on that host; we therefore
 say that the host is within the DS domain.  If a host does not act as
 a boundary node, then the DS node topologically closest to that host
 acts as the DS boundary node for that host's traffic.

2.1.2 DS Ingress Node and Egress Node

 DS boundary nodes act both as a DS ingress node and as a DS egress
 node for different directions of traffic.  Traffic enters a DS domain
 at a DS ingress node and leaves a DS domain at a DS egress node.  A
 DS ingress node is responsible for ensuring that the traffic entering
 the DS domain conforms to any TCA between it and the other domain to
 which the ingress node is connected.  A DS egress node may perform
 traffic conditioning functions on traffic forwarded to a directly
 connected peering domain, depending on the details of the TCA between
 the two domains.  Note that a DS boundary node may act as a DS
 interior node for some set of interfaces.

2.2 Differentiated Services Region

 A differentiated services region (DS Region) is a set of one or more
 contiguous DS domains.  DS regions are capable of supporting
 differentiated services along paths which span the domains within the
 region.
 The DS domains in a DS region may support different PHB groups
 internally and different codepoint->PHB mappings.  However, to permit
 services which span across the domains, the peering DS domains must
 each establish a peering SLA which defines (either explicitly or
 implicitly) a TCA which specifies how transit traffic from one DS
 domain to another is conditioned at the boundary between the two DS
 domains.
 It is possible that several DS domains within a DS region may adopt a
 common service provisioning policy and may support a common set of
 PHB groups and codepoint mappings, thus eliminating the need for
 traffic conditioning between those DS domains.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 13] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

2.3 Traffic Classification and Conditioning

 Differentiated services are extended across a DS domain boundary by
 establishing a SLA between an upstream network and a downstream DS
 domain.  The SLA may specify packet classification and re-marking
 rules and may also specify traffic profiles and actions to traffic
 streams which are in- or out-of-profile (see Sec. 2.3.2).  The TCA
 between the domains is derived (explicitly or implicitly) from this
 SLA.
 The packet classification policy identifies the subset of traffic
 which may receive a differentiated service by being conditioned and/
 or mapped to one or more behavior aggregates (by DS codepoint re-
 marking) within the DS domain.
 Traffic conditioning performs metering, shaping, policing and/or re-
 marking to ensure that the traffic entering the DS domain conforms to
 the rules specified in the TCA, in accordance with the domain's
 service provisioning policy.  The extent of traffic conditioning
 required is dependent on the specifics of the service offering, and
 may range from simple codepoint re-marking to complex policing and
 shaping operations.  The details of traffic conditioning policies
 which are negotiated between networks is outside the scope of this
 document.

2.3.1 Classifiers

 Packet classifiers select packets in a traffic stream based on the
 content of some portion of the packet header.  We define two types of
 classifiers.  The BA (Behavior Aggregate) Classifier classifies
 packets based on the DS codepoint only.  The MF (Multi-Field)
 classifier selects packets based on the value of a combination of one
 or more header fields, such as source address, destination address,
 DS field, protocol ID, source port and destination port numbers, and
 other information such as incoming interface.
 Classifiers are used to "steer" packets matching some specified rule
 to an element of a traffic conditioner for further processing.
 Classifiers must be configured by some management procedure in
 accordance with the appropriate TCA.
 The classifier should authenticate the information which it uses to
 classify the packet (see Sec. 6).
 Note that in the event of upstream packet fragmentation, MF
 classifiers which examine the contents of transport-layer header
 fields may incorrectly classify packet fragments subsequent to the
 first.  A possible solution to this problem is to maintain

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 14] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 fragmentation state; however, this is not a general solution due to
 the possibility of upstream fragment re-ordering or divergent routing
 paths.  The policy to apply to packet fragments is outside the scope
 of this document.

2.3.2 Traffic Profiles

 A traffic profile specifies the temporal properties of a traffic
 stream selected by a classifier.  It provides rules for determining
 whether a particular packet is in-profile or out-of-profile.  For
 example, a profile based on a token bucket may look like:
   codepoint=X, use token-bucket r, b
 The above profile indicates that all packets marked with DS codepoint
 X should be measured against a token bucket meter with rate r and
 burst size b.  In this example out-of-profile packets are those
 packets in the traffic stream which arrive when insufficient tokens
 are available in the bucket.  The concept of in- and out-of-profile
 can be extended to more than two levels, e.g., multiple levels of
 conformance with a profile may be defined and enforced.
 Different conditioning actions may be applied to the in-profile
 packets and out-of-profile packets, or different accounting actions
 may be triggered.  In-profile packets may be allowed to enter the DS
 domain without further conditioning; or, alternatively, their DS
 codepoint may be changed.  The latter happens when the DS codepoint
 is set to a non-Default value for the first time [DSFIELD], or when
 the packets enter a DS domain that uses a different PHB group or
 codepoint->PHB mapping policy for this traffic stream.  Out-of-
 profile packets may be queued until they are in-profile (shaped),
 discarded (policed), marked with a new codepoint (re-marked), or
 forwarded unchanged while triggering some accounting procedure.
 Out-of-profile packets may be mapped to one or more behavior
 aggregates that are "inferior" in some dimension of forwarding
 performance to the BA into which in-profile packets are mapped.
 Note that a traffic profile is an optional component of a TCA and its
 use is dependent on the specifics of the service offering and the
 domain's service provisioning policy.

2.3.3 Traffic Conditioners

 A traffic conditioner may contain the following elements: meter,
 marker, shaper, and dropper.  A traffic stream is selected by a
 classifier, which steers the packets to a logical instance of a
 traffic conditioner.  A meter is used (where appropriate) to measure
 the traffic stream against a traffic profile.  The state of the meter

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 15] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 with respect to a particular packet (e.g., whether it is in- or out-
 of-profile) may be used to affect a marking, dropping, or shaping
 action.
 When packets exit the traffic conditioner of a DS boundary node the
 DS codepoint of each packet must be set to an appropriate value.
 Fig. 1 shows the block diagram of a classifier and traffic
 conditioner.  Note that a traffic conditioner may not necessarily
 contain all four elements.  For example, in the case where no traffic
 profile is in effect, packets may only pass through a classifier and
 a marker.
                             +-------+
                             |       |-------------------+
                      +----->| Meter |                   |
                      |      |       |--+                |
                      |      +-------+  |                |
                      |                 V                V
                +------------+      +--------+      +---------+
                |            |      |        |      | Shaper/ |
  packets =====>| Classifier |=====>| Marker |=====>| Dropper |=====>
                |            |      |        |      |         |
                +------------+      +--------+      +---------+
 Fig. 1: Logical View of a Packet Classifier and Traffic Conditioner

2.3.3.1 Meters

 Traffic meters measure the temporal properties of the stream of
 packets selected by a classifier against a traffic profile specified
 in a TCA.  A meter passes state information to other conditioning
 functions to trigger a particular action for each packet which is
 either in- or out-of-profile (to some extent).

2.3.3.2 Markers

 Packet markers set the DS field of a packet to a particular
 codepoint, adding the marked packet to a particular DS behavior
 aggregate.  The marker may be configured to mark all packets which
 are steered to it to a single codepoint, or may be configured to mark
 a packet to one of a set of codepoints used to select a PHB in a PHB
 group, according to the state of a meter.  When the marker changes
 the codepoint in a packet it is said to have "re-marked" the packet.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 16] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

2.3.3.3 Shapers

 Shapers delay some or all of the packets in a traffic stream in order
 to bring the stream into compliance with a traffic profile.  A shaper
 usually has a finite-size buffer, and packets may be discarded if
 there is not sufficient buffer space to hold the delayed packets.

2.3.3.4 Droppers

 Droppers discard some or all of the packets in a traffic stream in
 order to bring the stream into compliance with a traffic profile.
 This process is know as "policing" the stream.  Note that a dropper
 can be implemented as a special case of a shaper by setting the
 shaper buffer size to zero (or a few) packets.

2.3.4 Location of Traffic Conditioners and MF Classifiers

 Traffic conditioners are usually located within DS ingress and egress
 boundary nodes, but may also be located in nodes within the interior
 of a DS domain, or within a non-DS-capable domain.

2.3.4.1 Within the Source Domain

 We define the source domain as the domain containing the node(s)
 which originate the traffic receiving a particular service.  Traffic
 sources and intermediate nodes within a source domain may perform
 traffic classification and conditioning functions.  The traffic
 originating from the source domain across a boundary may be marked by
 the traffic sources directly or by intermediate nodes before leaving
 the source domain.  This is referred to as initial marking or "pre-
 marking".
 Consider the example of a company that has the policy that its CEO's
 packets should have higher priority.  The CEO's host may mark the DS
 field of all outgoing packets with a DS codepoint that indicates
 "higher priority".  Alternatively, the first-hop router directly
 connected to the CEO's host may classify the traffic and mark the
 CEO's packets with the correct DS codepoint.  Such high priority
 traffic may also be conditioned near the source so that there is a
 limit on the amount of high priority traffic forwarded from a
 particular source.
 There are some advantages to marking packets close to the traffic
 source.  First, a traffic source can more easily take an
 application's preferences into account when deciding which packets
 should receive better forwarding treatment.  Also, classification of

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 17] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 packets is much simpler before the traffic has been aggregated with
 packets from other sources, since the number of classification rules
 which need to be applied within a single node is reduced.
 Since packet marking may be distributed across multiple nodes, the
 source DS domain is responsible for ensuring that the aggregated
 traffic towards its provider DS domain conforms to the appropriate
 TCA.  Additional allocation mechanisms such as bandwidth brokers or
 RSVP may be used to dynamically allocate resources for a particular
 DS behavior aggregate within the provider's network [2BIT, Bernet].
 The boundary node of the source domain should also monitor
 conformance to the TCA, and may police, shape, or re-mark packets as
 necessary.

2.3.4.2 At the Boundary of a DS Domain

 Traffic streams may be classified, marked, and otherwise conditioned
 on either end of a boundary link (the DS egress node of the upstream
 domain or the DS ingress node of the downstream domain).  The SLA
 between the domains should specify which domain has responsibility
 for mapping traffic streams to DS behavior aggregates and
 conditioning those aggregates in conformance with the appropriate
 TCA.  However, a DS ingress node must assume that the incoming
 traffic may not conform to the TCA and must be prepared to enforce
 the TCA in accordance with local policy.
 When packets are pre-marked and conditioned in the upstream domain,
 potentially fewer classification and traffic conditioning rules need
 to be supported in the downstream DS domain.  In this circumstance
 the downstream DS domain may only need to re-mark or police the
 incoming behavior aggregates to enforce the TCA.  However, more
 sophisticated services which are path- or source-dependent may
 require MF classification in the downstream DS domain's ingress
 nodes.
 If a DS ingress node is connected to an upstream non-DS-capable
 domain, the DS ingress node must be able to perform all necessary
 traffic conditioning functions on the incoming traffic.

2.3.4.3 In non-DS-Capable Domains

 Traffic sources or intermediate nodes in a non-DS-capable domain may
 employ traffic conditioners to pre-mark traffic before it reaches the
 ingress of a downstream DS domain.  In this way the local policies
 for classification and marking may be concealed.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 18] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

2.3.4.4 In Interior DS Nodes

 Although the basic architecture assumes that complex classification
 and traffic conditioning functions are located only in a network's
 ingress and egress boundary nodes, deployment of these functions in
 the interior of the network is not precluded.  For example, more
 restrictive access policies may be enforced on a transoceanic link,
 requiring MF classification and traffic conditioning functionality in
 the upstream node on the link.  This approach may have scaling
 limits, due to the potentially large number of classification and
 conditioning rules that might need to be maintained.

2.4 Per-Hop Behaviors

 A per-hop behavior (PHB) is a description of the externally
 observable forwarding behavior of a DS node applied to a particular
 DS behavior aggregate.  "Forwarding behavior" is a general concept in
 this context.  For example, in the event that only one behavior
 aggregate occupies a link, the observable forwarding behavior (i.e.,
 loss, delay, jitter) will often depend only on the relative loading
 of the link (i.e., in the event that the behavior assumes a work-
 conserving scheduling discipline).  Useful behavioral distinctions
 are mainly observed when multiple behavior aggregates compete for
 buffer and bandwidth resources on a node.  The PHB is the means by
 which a node allocates resources to behavior aggregates, and it is on
 top of this basic hop-by-hop resource allocation mechanism that
 useful differentiated services may be constructed.
 The most simple example of a PHB is one which guarantees a minimal
 bandwidth allocation of X% of a link (over some reasonable time
 interval) to a behavior aggregate.  This PHB can be fairly easily
 measured under a variety of competing traffic conditions.  A slightly
 more complex PHB would guarantee a minimal bandwidth allocation of X%
 of a link, with proportional fair sharing of any excess link
 capacity.  In general, the observable behavior of a PHB may depend on
 certain constraints on the traffic characteristics of the associated
 behavior aggregate, or the characteristics of other behavior
 aggregates.
 PHBs may be specified in terms of their resource (e.g., buffer,
 bandwidth) priority relative to other PHBs, or in terms of their
 relative observable traffic characteristics (e.g., delay, loss).
 These PHBs may be used as building blocks to allocate resources and
 should be specified as a group (PHB group) for consistency.  PHB
 groups will usually share a common constraint applying to each PHB
 within the group, such as a packet scheduling or buffer management
 policy.  The relationship between PHBs in a group may be in terms of
 absolute or relative priority (e.g., discard priority by means of

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 19] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 deterministic or stochastic thresholds), but this is not required
 (e.g., N equal link shares).  A single PHB defined in isolation is a
 special case of a PHB group.
 PHBs are implemented in nodes by means of some buffer management and
 packet scheduling mechanisms.  PHBs are defined in terms of behavior
 characteristics relevant to service provisioning policies, and not in
 terms of particular implementation mechanisms.  In general, a variety
 of implementation mechanisms may be suitable for implementing a
 particular PHB group.  Furthermore, it is likely that more than one
 PHB group may be implemented on a node and utilized within a domain.
 PHB groups should be defined such that the proper resource allocation
 between groups can be inferred, and integrated mechanisms can be
 implemented which can simultaneously support two or more groups.  A
 PHB group definition should indicate possible conflicts with
 previously documented PHB groups which might prevent simultaneous
 operation.
 As described in [DSFIELD], a PHB is selected at a node by a mapping
 of the DS codepoint in a received packet.  Standardized PHBs have a
 recommended codepoint.  However, the total space of codepoints is
 larger than the space available for recommended codepoints for
 standardized PHBs, and [DSFIELD] leaves provisions for locally
 configurable mappings.  A codepoint->PHB mapping table may contain
 both 1->1 and N->1 mappings.  All codepoints must be mapped to some
 PHB; in the absence of some local policy, codepoints which are not
 mapped to a standardized PHB in accordance with that PHB's
 specification should be mapped to the Default PHB.

2.5 Network Resource Allocation

 The implementation, configuration, operation and administration of
 the supported PHB groups in the nodes of a DS Domain should
 effectively partition the resources of those nodes and the inter-node
 links between behavior aggregates, in accordance with the domain's
 service provisioning policy.  Traffic conditioners can further
 control the usage of these resources through enforcement of TCAs and
 possibly through operational feedback from the nodes and traffic
 conditioners in the domain.  Although a range of services can be
 deployed in the absence of complex traffic conditioning functions
 (e.g., using only static marking policies), functions such as
 policing, shaping, and dynamic re-marking enable the deployment of
 services providing quantitative performance metrics.
 The configuration of and interaction between traffic conditioners and
 interior nodes should be managed by the administrative control of the
 domain and may require operational control through protocols and a
 control entity.  There is a wide range of possible control models.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 20] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 The precise nature and implementation of the interaction between
 these components is outside the scope of this architecture.  However,
 scalability requires that the control of the domain does not require
 micro-management of the network resources.  The most scalable control
 model would operate nodes in open-loop in the operational timeframe,
 and would only require administrative-timescale management as SLAs
 are varied.  This simple model may be unsuitable in some
 circumstances, and some automated but slowly varying operational
 control (minutes rather than seconds) may be desirable to balance the
 utilization of the network against the recent load profile.

3. Per-Hop Behavior Specification Guidelines

 Basic requirements for per-hop behavior standardization are given in
 [DSFIELD].  This section elaborates on that text by describing
 additional guidelines for PHB (group) specifications.  This is
 intended to help foster implementation consistency.  Before a PHB
 group is proposed for standardization it should satisfy these
 guidelines, as appropriate, to preserve the integrity of this
 architecture.
 G.1:  A PHB standard must specify a recommended DS codepoint selected
 from the codepoint space reserved for standard mappings [DSFIELD].
 Recommended codepoints will be assigned by the IANA.  A PHB proposal
 may recommend a temporary codepoint from the EXP/LU space to
 facilitate inter-domain experimentation.  Determination of a packet's
 PHB must not require inspection of additional packet header fields
 beyond the DS field.
 G.2:  The specification of each newly proposed PHB group should
 include an overview of the behavior and the purpose of the behavior
 being proposed.  The overview should include a problem or problems
 statement for which the PHB group is targeted.  The overview should
 include the basic concepts behind the PHB group.  These concepts
 should include, but are not restricted to, queueing behavior, discard
 behavior, and output link selection behavior.  Lastly, the overview
 should specify the method by which the PHB group solves the problem
 or problems specified in the problem statement.
 G.3:  A PHB group specification should indicate the number of
 individual PHBs specified.  In the event that multiple PHBs are
 specified, the interactions between these PHBs and constraints that
 must be respected globally by all the PHBs within the group should be
 clearly specified.  As an example, the specification must indicate
 whether the probability of packet reordering within a microflow is
 increased if different packets in that microflow are marked for
 different PHBs within the group.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 21] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 G.4:  When proper functioning of a PHB group is dependent on
 constraints such as a provisioning restriction, then the PHB
 definition should describe the behavior when these constraints are
 violated.  Further, if actions such as packet discard or re-marking
 are required when these constraints are violated, then these actions
 should be specifically stipulated.
 G.5:  A PHB group may be specified for local use within a domain in
 order to provide some domain-specific functionality or domain-
 specific services.  In this event, the PHB specification is useful
 for providing vendors with a consistent definition of the PHB group.
 However, any PHB group which is defined for local use should not be
 considered for standardization, but may be published as an
 Informational RFC.  In contrast, a PHB group which is intended for
 general use will follow a stricter standardization process.
 Therefore all PHB proposals should specifically state whether they
 are to be considered for general or local use.
 It is recognized that PHB groups can be designed with the intent of
 providing host-to-host, WAN edge-to-WAN edge, and/or domain edge-to-
 domain edge services.  Use of the term "end-to-end" in a PHB
 definition should be interpreted to mean "host-to-host" for
 consistency.
 Other PHB groups may be defined and deployed locally within domains,
 for experimental or operational purposes.  There is no requirement
 that these PHB groups must be publicly documented, but they should
 utilize DS codepoints from one of the EXP/LU pools as defined in
 [DSFIELD].
 G.6:  It may be possible or appropriate for a packet marked for a PHB
 within a PHB group to be re-marked to select another PHB within the
 group; either within a domain or across a domain boundary.  Typically
 there are three reasons for such PHB modification:
 a. The codepoints associated with the PHB group are collectively
    intended to carry state about the network,
 b. Conditions exist which require PHB promotion or demotion of a
    packet (this assumes that PHBs within the group can be ranked in
    some order),
 c. The boundary between two domains is not covered by a SLA.  In this
    case the codepoint/PHB to select when crossing the boundary link
    will be determined by the local policy of the upstream domain.
 A PHB specification should clearly state the circumstances under
 which packets marked for a PHB within a PHB group may, or should be
 modified (e.g., promoted or demoted) to another PHB within the group.
 If it is undesirable for a packet's PHB to be modified, the

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 22] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 specification should clearly state the consequent risks when the PHB
 is modified.   A possible risk to changing a packet's PHB, either
 within or outside a PHB group, is a higher probability of packet re-
 ordering within a microflow.  PHBs within a group may carry some
 host-to-host, WAN edge-to-WAN edge, and/or domain edge-to-domain edge
 semantics which may be difficult to duplicate if packets are re-
 marked to select another PHB from the group (or otherwise).
 For certain PHB groups, it may be appropriate to reflect a state
 change in the node by re-marking packets to specify another PHB from
 within the group.  If a PHB group is designed to reflect the state of
 a network, the PHB definition must adequately describe the
 relationship between the PHBs and the states they reflect.  Further,
 if these PHBs limit the forwarding actions a node can perform in some
 way, these constraints may be specified as actions the node should,
 or must perform.
 G.7:  A PHB group specification should include a section defining the
 implications of tunneling on the utility of the PHB group.  This
 section should specify the implications for the utility of the PHB
 group of a newly created outer header when the original DS field of
 the inner header is encapsulated in a tunnel.  This section should
 also discuss what possible changes should be applied to the inner
 header at the egress of the tunnel, when both the codepoints from the
 inner header and the outer header are accessible (see Sec. 6.2).
 G.8:  The process of specifying PHB groups is likely to be
 incremental in nature.  When new PHB groups are proposed, their known
 interactions with previously specified PHB groups should be
 documented.  When a new PHB group is created, it can be entirely new
 in scope or it can be an extension to an existing PHB group.  If the
 PHB group is entirely independent of some or all of the existing PHB
 specifications, a section should be included in the PHB specification
 which details how the new PHB group can co-exist with those PHB
 groups already standardized.  For example, this section might
 indicate the possibility of packet re-ordering within a microflow for
 packets marked by codepoints associated with two separate PHB groups.
 If concurrent operation of two (or more) different PHB groups in the
 same node is impossible or detrimental this should be stated.  If the
 concurrent operation of two (or more) different PHB groups requires
 some specific behaviors by the node when packets marked for PHBs from
 these different PHB groups are being processed by the node at the
 same time, these behaviors should be stated.
 Care should be taken to avoid circularity in the definitions of PHB
 groups.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 23] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 If the proposed PHB group is an extension to an existing PHB group, a
 section should be included in the PHB group specification which
 details how this extension interoperates with the behavior being
 extended.  Further, if the extension alters or more narrowly defines
 the existing behavior in some way, this should also be clearly
 indicated.
 G.9:  Each PHB specification should include a section specifying
 minimal conformance requirements for implementations of the PHB
 group.  This conformance section is intended to provide a means for
 specifying the details of a behavior while allowing for
 implementation variation to the extent permitted by the PHB
 specification.  This conformance section can take the form of rules,
 tables, pseudo-code, or tests.
 G.10:  A PHB specification should include a section detailing the
 security implications of the behavior.  This section should include a
 discussion of the re-marking of the inner header's codepoint at the
 egress of a tunnel and its effect on the desired forwarding behavior.
 Further, this section should also discuss how the proposed PHB group
 could be used in denial-of-service attacks, reduction of service
 contract attacks, and service contract violation attacks.  Lastly,
 this section should discuss possible means for detecting such attacks
 as they are relevant to the proposed behavior.
 G.11:  A PHB specification should include a section detailing
 configuration and management issues which may affect the operation of
 the PHB and which may impact candidate services that might utilize
 the PHB.
 G.12:  It is strongly recommended that an appendix be provided with
 each PHB specification that considers the implications of the
 proposed behavior on current and potential services.  These services
 could include but are not restricted to be user-specific, device-
 specific, domain-specific or end-to-end services.  It is also
 strongly recommended that the appendix include a section describing
 how the services are verified by users, devices, and/or domains.
 G.13:  It is recommended that an appendix be provided with each PHB
 specification that is targeted for local use within a domain,
 providing guidance for PHB selection for packets which are forwarded
 into a peer domain which does not support the PHB group.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 24] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 G.14:  It is recommended that an appendix be provided with each PHB
 specification which considers the impact of the proposed PHB group on
 existing higher-layer protocols.  Under some circumstances PHBs may
 allow for possible changes to higher-layer protocols which may
 increase or decrease the utility of the proposed PHB group.
 G.15:  It is recommended that an appendix be provided with each PHB
 specification which recommends mappings to link-layer QoS mechanisms
 to support the intended behavior of the PHB across a shared-medium or
 switched link-layer.  The determination of the most appropriate
 mapping between a PHB and a link-layer QoS mechanism is dependent on
 many factors and is outside the scope of this document; however, the
 specification should attempt to offer some guidance.

4. Interoperability with Non-Differentiated Services-Compliant Nodes

 We define a non-differentiated services-compliant node (non-DS-
 compliant node) as any node which does not interpret the DS field as
 specified in [DSFIELD] and/or does not implement some or all of the
 standardized PHBs (or those in use within a particular DS domain).
 This may be due to the capabilities or configuration of the node.  We
 define a legacy node as a special case of a non-DS-compliant node
 which implements IPv4 Precedence classification and forwarding as
 defined in [RFC791, RFC1812], but which is otherwise not DS-
 compliant.  The precedence values in the IPv4 TOS octet are
 compatible by intention with the Class Selector Codepoints defined in
 [DSFIELD], and the precedence forwarding behaviors defined in
 [RFC791, RFC1812] comply with the Class Selector PHB Requirements
 also defined in [DSFIELD].  A key distinction between a legacy node
 and a DS-compliant node is that the legacy node may or may not
 interpret bits 3-6 of the TOS octet as defined in [RFC1349] (the
 "DTRC" bits); in practice it will not interpret these bit as
 specified in [DSFIELD].  We assume that the use of the TOS markings
 defined in [RFC1349] is deprecated.  Nodes which are non-DS-compliant
 and which are not legacy nodes may exhibit unpredictable forwarding
 behaviors for packets with non-zero DS codepoints.
 Differentiated services depend on the resource allocation mechanisms
 provided by per-hop behavior implementations in nodes.  The quality
 or statistical assurance level of a service may break down in the
 event that traffic transits a non-DS-compliant node, or a non-DS-
 capable domain.
 We will examine two separate cases.  The first case concerns the use
 of non-DS-compliant nodes within a DS domain.  Note that PHB
 forwarding is primarily useful for allocating scarce node and link
 resources in a controlled manner.  On high-speed, lightly loaded
 links, the worst-case packet delay, jitter, and loss may be

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 25] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 negligible, and the use of a non-DS-compliant node on the upstream
 end of such a link may not result in service degradation.  In more
 realistic circumstances, the lack of PHB forwarding in a node may
 make it impossible to offer low-delay, low-loss, or provisioned
 bandwidth services across paths which traverse the node.  However,
 use of a legacy node may be an acceptable alternative, assuming that
 the DS domain restricts itself to using only the Class Selector
 Codepoints defined in [DSFIELD], and assuming that the particular
 precedence implementation in the legacy node provides forwarding
 behaviors which are compatible with the services offered along paths
 which traverse that node.  Note that it is important to restrict the
 codepoints in use to the Class Selector Codepoints, since the legacy
 node may or may not interpret bits 3-5 in accordance with [RFC1349],
 thereby resulting in unpredictable forwarding results.
 The second case concerns the behavior of services which traverse
 non-DS-capable domains.  We assume for the sake of argument that a
 non-DS-capable domain does not deploy traffic conditioning functions
 on domain boundary nodes; therefore, even in the event that the
 domain consists of legacy or DS-compliant interior nodes, the lack of
 traffic enforcement at the boundaries will limit the ability to
 consistently deliver some types of services across the domain.  A DS
 domain and a non-DS-capable domain may negotiate an agreement which
 governs how egress traffic from the DS-domain should be marked before
 entry into the non-DS-capable domain.  This agreement might be
 monitored for compliance by traffic sampling instead of by rigorous
 traffic conditioning.  Alternatively, where there is knowledge that
 the non-DS-capable domain consists of legacy nodes, the upstream DS
 domain may opportunistically re-mark differentiated services traffic
 to one or more of the Class Selector Codepoints.  Where there is no
 knowledge of the traffic management capabilities of the downstream
 domain, and no agreement in place, a DS domain egress node may choose
 to re-mark DS codepoints to zero, under the assumption that the non-
 DS-capable domain will treat the traffic uniformly with best-effort
 service.
 In the event that a non-DS-capable domain peers with a DS domain,
 traffic flowing from the non-DS-capable domain should be conditioned
 at the DS ingress node of the DS domain according to the appropriate
 SLA or policy.

5. Multicast Considerations

 Use of differentiated services by multicast traffic introduces a
 number of issues for service provisioning.  First, multicast packets
 which enter a DS domain at an ingress node may simultaneously take
 multiple paths through some segments of the domain due to multicast
 packet replication.  In this way they consume more network resources

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 26] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 than unicast packets.  Where multicast group membership is dynamic,
 it is difficult to predict in advance the amount of network resources
 that may be consumed by multicast traffic originating from an
 upstream network for a particular group.  A consequence of this
 uncertainty is that it may be difficult to provide quantitative
 service guarantees to multicast senders.  Further, it may be
 necessary to reserve codepoints and PHBs for exclusive use by unicast
 traffic, to provide resource isolation from multicast traffic.
 The second issue is the selection of the DS codepoint for a multicast
 packet arriving at a DS ingress node.  Because that packet may exit
 the DS domain at multiple DS egress nodes which peer with multiple
 downstream domains, the DS codepoint used should not result in the
 request for a service from a downstream DS domain which is in
 violation of a peering SLA.  When establishing classifier and traffic
 conditioner state at an DS ingress node for an aggregate of traffic
 receiving a differentiated service which spans across the egress
 boundary of the domain, the identity of the adjacent downstream
 transit domain and the specifics of the corresponding peering SLA can
 be factored into the configuration decision (subject to routing
 policy and the stability of the routing infrastructure).  In this way
 peering SLAs with downstream DS domains can be partially enforced at
 the ingress of the upstream domain, reducing the classification and
 traffic conditioning burden at the egress node of the upstream
 domain.  This is not so easily performed in the case of multicast
 traffic, due to the possibility of dynamic group membership.  The
 result is that the service guarantees for unicast traffic may be
 impacted.  One means of addressing this problem is to establish a
 separate peering SLA for multicast traffic, and to either utilize a
 particular set of codepoints for multicast packets, or to implement
 the necessary classification and traffic conditioning mechanisms in
 the DS egress nodes to provide preferential isolation for unicast
 traffic in conformance with the peering SLA with the downstream
 domain.

6. Security and Tunneling Considerations

 This section addresses security issues raised by the introduction of
 differentiated services, primarily the potential for denial-of-
 service attacks, and the related potential for theft of service by
 unauthorized traffic (Sec. 6.1).  In addition, the operation of
 differentiated services in the presence of IPsec and its interaction
 with IPsec are also discussed (Sec. 6.2), as well as auditing
 requirements (Sec. 6.3).  This section considers issues introduced by
 the use of both IPsec and non-IPsec tunnels.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 27] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

6.1 Theft and Denial of Service

 The primary goal of differentiated services is to allow different
 levels of service to be provided for traffic streams on a common
 network infrastructure.  A variety of resource management techniques
 may be used to achieve this, but the end result will be that some
 packets receive different (e.g., better) service than others.  The
 mapping of network traffic to the specific behaviors that result in
 different (e.g., better or worse) service is indicated primarily by
 the DS field, and hence an adversary may be able to obtain better
 service by modifying the DS field to codepoints indicating behaviors
 used for enhanced services or by injecting packets with the DS field
 set to such codepoints.  Taken to its limits, this theft of service
 becomes a denial-of-service attack when the modified or injected
 traffic depletes the resources available to forward it and other
 traffic streams.  The defense against such theft- and denial-of-
 service attacks consists of the combination of traffic conditioning
 at DS boundary nodes along with security and integrity of the network
 infrastructure within a DS domain.
 As described in Sec. 2, DS ingress nodes must condition all traffic
 entering a DS domain to ensure that it has acceptable DS codepoints.
 This means that the codepoints must conform to the applicable TCA(s)
 and the domain's service provisioning policy.  Hence, the ingress
 nodes are the primary line of defense against theft- and denial-of-
 service attacks based on modified DS codepoints (e.g., codepoints to
 which the traffic is not entitled), as success of any such attack
 constitutes a violation of the applicable TCA(s) and/or service
 provisioning policy.  An important instance of an ingress node is
 that any traffic-originating node in a DS domain is the ingress node
 for that traffic, and must ensure that all originated traffic carries
 acceptable DS codepoints.
 Both a domain's service provisioning policy and TCAs may require the
 ingress nodes to change the DS codepoint on some entering packets
 (e.g., an ingress router may set the DS codepoint of a customer's
 traffic in accordance with the appropriate SLA).  Ingress nodes must
 condition all other inbound traffic to ensure that the DS codepoints
 are acceptable; packets found to have unacceptable codepoints must
 either be discarded or must have their DS codepoints modified to
 acceptable values before being forwarded.  For example, an ingress
 node receiving traffic from a domain with which no enhanced service
 agreement exists may reset the DS codepoint to the Default PHB
 codepoint [DSFIELD].  Traffic authentication may be required to
 validate the use of some DS codepoints (e.g., those corresponding to
 enhanced services), and such authentication may be performed by
 technical means (e.g., IPsec) and/or non-technical means (e.g., the
 inbound link is known to be connected to exactly one customer site).

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 28] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 An inter-domain agreement may reduce or eliminate the need for
 ingress node traffic conditioning by making the upstream domain
 partly or completely responsible for ensuring that traffic has DS
 codepoints acceptable to the downstream domain.  In this case, the
 ingress node may still perform redundant traffic conditioning checks
 to reduce the dependence on the upstream domain (e.g., such checks
 can prevent theft-of-service attacks from propagating across the
 domain boundary).  If such a check fails because the upstream domain
 is not fulfilling its responsibilities, that failure is an auditable
 event; the generated audit log entry should include the date/time the
 packet was received, the source and destination IP addresses, and the
 DS codepoint that caused the failure.  In practice, the limited gains
 from such checks need to be weighed against their potential
 performance impact in determining what, if any, checks to perform
 under these circumstances.
 Interior nodes in a DS domain may rely on the DS field to associate
 differentiated services traffic with the behaviors used to implement
 enhanced services.  Any node doing so depends on the correct
 operation of the DS domain to prevent the arrival of traffic with
 unacceptable DS codepoints.  Robustness concerns dictate that the
 arrival of packets with unacceptable DS codepoints must not cause the
 failure (e.g., crash) of network nodes.  Interior nodes are not
 responsible for enforcing the service provisioning policy (or
 individual SLAs) and hence are not required to check DS codepoints
 before using them.  Interior nodes may perform some traffic
 conditioning checks on DS codepoints (e.g., check for DS codepoints
 that are never used for traffic on a specific link) to improve
 security and robustness (e.g., resistance to theft-of-service attacks
 based on DS codepoint modifications).  Any detected failure of such a
 check is an auditable event and the generated audit log entry should
 include the date/time the packet was received, the source and
 destination IP addresses, and the DS codepoint that caused the
 failure.  In practice, the limited gains from such checks need to be
 weighed against their potential performance impact in determining
 what, if any, checks to perform at interior nodes.
 Any link that cannot be adequately secured against modification of DS
 codepoints or traffic injection by adversaries should be treated as a
 boundary link (and hence any arriving traffic on that link is treated
 as if it were entering the domain at an ingress node).  Local
 security policy provides the definition of "adequately secured," and
 such a definition may include a determination that the risks and
 consequences of DS codepoint modification and/or traffic injection do
 not justify any additional security measures for a link.  Link
 security can be enhanced via physical access controls and/or software
 means such as tunnels that ensure packet integrity.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 29] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

6.2 IPsec and Tunneling Interactions

 The IPsec protocol, as defined in [ESP, AH], does not include the IP
 header's DS field in any of its cryptographic calculations (in the
 case of tunnel mode, it is the outer IP header's DS field that is not
 included).  Hence modification of the DS field by a network node has
 no effect on IPsec's end-to-end security, because it cannot cause any
 IPsec integrity check to fail.  As a consequence, IPsec does not
 provide any defense against an adversary's modification of the DS
 field (i.e., a man-in-the-middle attack), as the adversary's
 modification will also have no effect on IPsec's end-to-end security.
 In some environments, the ability to modify the DS field without
 affecting IPsec integrity checks may constitute a covert channel; if
 it is necessary to eliminate such a channel or reduce its bandwidth,
 the DS domains should be configured so that the required processing
 (e.g., set all DS fields on sensitive traffic to a single value) can
 be performed at DS egress nodes where traffic exits higher security
 domains.
 IPsec's tunnel mode provides security for the encapsulated IP
 header's DS field.  A tunnel mode IPsec packet contains two IP
 headers: an outer header supplied by the tunnel ingress node and an
 encapsulated inner header supplied by the original source of the
 packet.  When an IPsec tunnel is hosted (in whole or in part) on a
 differentiated services network, the intermediate network nodes
 operate on the DS field in the outer header.  At the tunnel egress
 node, IPsec processing includes stripping the outer header and
 forwarding the packet (if required) using the inner header.     If
 the inner IP header has not been processed by a DS ingress node for
 the tunnel egress node's DS domain, the tunnel egress node is the DS
 ingress node for traffic exiting the tunnel, and hence must carry out
 the corresponding traffic conditioning responsibilities (see Sec.
 6.1).  If the IPsec processing includes a sufficiently strong
 cryptographic integrity check of the encapsulated packet (where
 sufficiency is determined by local security policy), the tunnel
 egress node can safely assume that the DS field in the inner header
 has the same value as it had at the tunnel ingress node.  This allows
 a tunnel egress node in the same DS domain as the tunnel ingress
 node, to safely treat a packet passing such an integrity check as if
 it had arrived from another node within the same DS domain, omitting
 the DS ingress node traffic conditioning that would otherwise be
 required.  An important consequence is that otherwise insecure links
 internal to a DS domain can be secured by a sufficiently strong IPsec
 tunnel.
 This analysis and its implications apply to any tunneling protocol
 that performs integrity checks, but the level of assurance of the
 inner header's DS field depends on the strength of the integrity

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 30] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 check performed by the tunneling protocol.  In the absence of
 sufficient assurance for a tunnel that may transit nodes outside the
 current DS domain (or is otherwise vulnerable), the encapsulated
 packet must be treated as if it had arrived at a DS ingress node from
 outside the domain.
 The IPsec protocol currently requires that the inner header's DS
 field not be changed by IPsec decapsulation processing at a tunnel
 egress node.  This ensures that an adversary's modifications to the
 DS field cannot be used to launch theft- or denial-of-service attacks
 across an IPsec tunnel endpoint, as any such modifications will be
 discarded at the tunnel endpoint.  This document makes no change to
 that IPsec requirement.
 If the IPsec specifications are modified in the future to permit a
 tunnel egress node to modify the DS field in an inner IP header based
 on the DS field value in the outer header (e.g., copying part or all
 of the outer DS field to the inner DS field), then additional
 considerations would apply.  For a tunnel contained entirely within a
 single DS domain and for which the links are adequately secured
 against modifications of the outer DS field, the only limits on inner
 DS field modifications would be those imposed by the domain's service
 provisioning policy.  Otherwise, the tunnel egress node performing
 such modifications would be acting as a DS ingress node for traffic
 exiting the tunnel and must carry out the traffic conditioning
 responsibilities of an ingress node, including defense against theft-
 and denial-of-service attacks (See Sec. 6.1).  If the tunnel enters
 the DS domain at a node different from the tunnel egress node, the
 tunnel egress node may depend on the upstream DS ingress node having
 ensured that the outer DS field values are acceptable.  Even in this
 case, there are some checks that can only be performed by the tunnel
 egress node (e.g., a consistency check between the inner and outer DS
 codepoints for an encrypted tunnel).  Any detected failure of such a
 check is an auditable event and the generated audit log entry should
 include the date/time the packet was received, the source and
 destination IP addresses, and the DS codepoint that was unacceptable.
 An IPsec tunnel can be viewed in at least two different ways from an
 architectural perspective.  If the tunnel is viewed as a logical
 single hop "virtual wire", the actions of intermediate nodes in
 forwarding the tunneled traffic should not be visible beyond the ends
 of the tunnel and hence the DS field should not be modified as part
 of decapsulation processing.  In contrast, if the tunnel is viewed as
 a multi-hop participant in forwarding traffic, then modification of
 the DS field as part of tunnel decapsulation processing may be
 desirable.  A specific example of the latter situation occurs when a
 tunnel terminates at an interior node of a DS domain at which the
 domain administrator does not wish to deploy traffic conditioning

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 31] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 logic (e.g., to simplify traffic management).  This could be
 supported by using the DS codepoint in the outer IP header (which was
 subject to traffic conditioning at the DS ingress node) to reset the
 DS codepoint in the inner IP header, effectively moving DS ingress
 traffic conditioning responsibilities from the IPsec tunnel egress
 node to the appropriate upstream DS ingress node (which must already
 perform that function for unencapsulated traffic).

6.3 Auditing

 Not all systems that support differentiated services will implement
 auditing.  However, if differentiated services support is
 incorporated into a system that supports auditing, then the
 differentiated services implementation should also support auditing.
 If such support is present the implementation must allow a system
 administrator to enable or disable auditing for differentiated
 services as a whole, and may allow such auditing to be enabled or
 disabled in part.
 For the most part, the granularity of auditing is a local matter.
 However, several auditable events are identified in this document and
 for each of these events a minimum set of information that should be
 included in an audit log is defined.  Additional information (e.g.,
 packets related to the one that triggered the auditable event) may
 also be included in the audit log for each of these events, and
 additional events, not explicitly called out in this specification,
 also may result in audit log entries.  There is no requirement for
 the receiver to transmit any message to the purported sender in
 response to the detection of an auditable event, because of the
 potential to induce denial of service via such action.

7. Acknowledgements

 This document has benefitted from earlier drafts by Steven Blake,
 David Clark, Ed Ellesson, Paul Ferguson, Juha Heinanen, Van Jacobson,
 Kalevi Kilkki, Kathleen Nichols, Walter Weiss, John Wroclawski, and
 Lixia Zhang.
 The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
 their helpful comments and suggestions: Kathleen Nichols, Brian
 Carpenter, Konstantinos Dovrolis, Shivkumar Kalyana, Wu-chang Feng,
 Marty Borden, Yoram Bernet, Ronald Bonica, James Binder, Borje
 Ohlman, Alessio Casati, Scott Brim, Curtis Villamizar, Hamid Ould-
 Brahi, Andrew Smith, John Renwick, Werner Almesberger, Alan O'Neill,
 James Fu, and Bob Braden.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 32] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

8. References

 [802.1p]    ISO/IEC Final CD 15802-3 Information technology - Tele-
             communications and information exchange between systems -
             Local and metropolitan area networks - Common
             specifications - Part 3: Media Access Control (MAC)
             bridges, (current draft available as IEEE P802.1D/D15).
 [AH]        Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", RFC
             2402, November 1998.
 [ATM]       ATM Traffic Management Specification Version 4.0 <af-tm-
             0056.000>, ATM Forum, April 1996.
 [Bernet]    Y. Bernet, R. Yavatkar, P. Ford, F. Baker, L. Zhang, K.
             Nichols, and M. Speer, "A Framework for Use of RSVP with
             Diff-serv Networks", Work in Progress.
 [DSFIELD]   Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F. and D. Black,
             "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
             Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", RFC 2474, December
             1998.
 [EXPLICIT]  D. Clark and W. Fang, "Explicit Allocation of Best Effort
             Packet Delivery Service", IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking,
             vol. 6, no. 4, August 1998, pp. 362-373.
 [ESP]       Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
             Payload (ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
 [FRELAY]    ANSI T1S1, "DSSI Core Aspects of Frame Rely", March 1990.
 [RFC791]    Postel, J., Editor, "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
             September 1981.
 [RFC1349]   Almquist, P., "Type of Service in the Internet Protocol
             Suite", RFC 1349, July 1992.
 [RFC1633]   Braden, R., Clark, D. and S. Shenker, "Integrated
             Services in the Internet Architecture: An Overview", RFC
             1633, July 1994.
 [RFC1812]   Baker, F., Editor, "Requirements for IP Version 4
             Routers", RFC 1812, June 1995.
 [RSVP]      Braden, B., Zhang, L., Berson S., Herzog, S. and S.
             Jamin, "Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) -- Version 1
             Functional Specification", RFC 2205, September 1997.

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 33] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 [2BIT]      K. Nichols, V. Jacobson, and L. Zhang, "A Two-bit
             Differentiated Services Architecture for the Internet",
             ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/papers/dsarch.pdf, November 1997.
 [TR]        ISO/IEC 8802-5 Information technology -
             Telecommunications and information exchange between
             systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Common
             specifications - Part 5: Token Ring Access Method and
             Physical Layer Specifications, (also ANSI/IEEE Std 802.5-
             1995), 1995.

Authors' Addresses

 Steven Blake
 Torrent Networking Technologies
 3000 Aerial Center, Suite 140
 Morrisville, NC  27560
 Phone:  +1-919-468-8466 x232
 EMail: slblake@torrentnet.com
 David L. Black
 EMC Corporation
 35 Parkwood Drive
 Hopkinton, MA  01748
 Phone:  +1-508-435-1000 x76140
 EMail: black_david@emc.com
 Mark A. Carlson
 Sun Microsystems, Inc.
 2990 Center Green Court South
 Boulder, CO  80301
 Phone:  +1-303-448-0048 x115
 EMail: mark.carlson@sun.com
 Elwyn Davies
 Nortel UK
 London Road
 Harlow, Essex  CM17 9NA, UK
 Phone:  +44-1279-405498
 EMail: elwynd@nortel.co.uk

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 34] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

 Zheng Wang
 Bell Labs Lucent Technologies
 101 Crawfords Corner Road
 Holmdel, NJ  07733
 EMail: zhwang@bell-labs.com
 Walter Weiss
 Lucent Technologies
 300 Baker Avenue, Suite 100
 Concord, MA  01742-2168
 EMail: wweiss@lucent.com

Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 35] RFC 2475 Architecture for Differentiated Services December 1998

Full Copyright Statement

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 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
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Blake, et. al. Informational [Page 36]

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