GENWiki

Premier IT Outsourcing and Support Services within the UK

User Tools

Site Tools


rfc:rfc2344

Network Working Group G. Montenegro, Editor Request for Comments: 2344 Sun Microsystems, Inc. Category: Standards Track May 1998

                  Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP

Status of this Memo

 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
 improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
 and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

 Mobile IP uses tunneling from the home agent to the mobile node's
 care-of address, but rarely in the reverse direction.  Usually, a
 mobile node sends its packets through a router on the foreign
 network, and assumes that routing is independent of source address.
 When this assumption is not true, it is convenient to establish a
 topologically correct reverse tunnel from the care-of address to the
 home agent.
 This document proposes backwards-compatible extensions to Mobile IP
 in order to support topologically correct reverse tunnels.  This
 document does not attempt to solve the problems posed by firewalls
 located between the home agent and the mobile node's care-of address.

Table of Contents

 1. Introduction ................................................   2
 1.1. Terminology ...............................................   3
 1.2. Assumptions ...............................................   4
 1.3. Justification .............................................   4
 2. Overview ....................................................   4
 3. New Packet Formats ..........................................   5
 3.1. Mobility Agent Advertisement Extension ....................   5
 3.2. Registration Request ......................................   5
 3.3. Encapsulating Delivery Style Extension ....................   6
 3.4. New Registration Reply Codes ..............................   7
 4. Changes in Protocol Behavior ................................   8
 4.1. Mobile Node Considerations ................................   8

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

 4.1.1. Sending Registration Requests to the Foreign Agent ......   8
 4.1.2. Receiving Registration Replies from the Foreign Agent ...   9
 4.2. Foreign Agent Considerations ..............................   9
 4.2.1. Receiving Registration Requests from the Mobile Node ...   10
 4.2.2. Relaying Registration Requests to the Home Agent .......   10
 4.3. Home Agent Considerations ................................   10
 4.3.1. Receiving Registration Requests from the Foreign Agent .   11
 4.3.2. Sending Registration Replies to the Foreign Agent ......   11
 5. Mobile Node to Foreign Agent Delivery Styles ...............   12
 5.1. Direct Delivery Style ....................................   12
 5.1.1. Packet Processing ......................................   12
 5.1.2. Packet Header Format and Fields ........................   12
 5.2. Encapsulating Delivery Style .............................   13
 5.2.1 Packet Processing .......................................   13
 5.2.2. Packet Header Format and Fields ........................   14
 5.3. Support for Broadcast and Multicast Datagrams ............   15
 5.4. Selective Reverse Tunneling ..............................   15
 6. Security Considerations ....................................   16
 6.1. Reverse-tunnel Hijacking and Denial-of-Service Attacks ...   16
 6.2. Ingress Filtering ........................................   17
 7. Acknowledgements ...........................................   17
 References ....................................................   17
 Editor and Chair Addresses ....................................   18
 Full Copyright Statement ......................................   19

1. Introduction

 Section 1.3 of the Mobile IP specification [1] lists the following
 assumption:
    It is assumed that IP unicast datagrams are routed based on the
    destination address in the datagram header (i.e., not by source
    address).
 Because of security concerns (for example, IP spoofing attacks), and
 in accordance with RFC 2267 [8] and CERT [3] advisories to this
 effect, routers that break this assumption are increasingly more
 common.
 In the presence of such routers, the source and destination IP
 address in a packet must be topologically correct. The forward tunnel
 complies with this, as its endpoints (home agent address and care-of
 address) are properly assigned addresses for their respective
 locations. On the other hand, the source IP address of a packet
 transmitted by the mobile node does not correspond to the network
 prefix from where it emanates.
 This document discusses topologically correct reverse tunnels.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

 Mobile IP does dictate the use of reverse tunnels in the context of
 multicast datagram routing and mobile routers. However, the source IP
 address is set to the mobile node's home address, so these tunnels
 are not topologically correct.
 Notice that there are several uses for reverse tunnels regardless of
 their topological correctness:
  1. Mobile routers: reverse tunnels obviate the need for recursive

tunneling [1].

  1. Multicast: reverse tunnels enable a mobile node away from home

to (1) join multicast groups in its home network, and (2)

      transmit multicast packets such that they emanate from its home
      network [1].
  1. The TTL of packets sent by the mobile node (for example, when

sending packets to other hosts in its home network) may be so

      low that they might expire before reaching their destination.  A
      reverse tunnel solves the problem as it represents a TTL
      decrement of one [5].

1.1. Terminology

 The discussion below uses terms defined in the Mobile IP
 specification.  Additionally, it uses the following terms:
    Forward Tunnel
       A tunnel that shuttles packets towards the mobile node. It
       starts at the home agent, and ends at the mobile node's care-of
       address.
    Reverse Tunnel
       A tunnel that starts at the mobile node's care-of address and
       terminates at the home agent.
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [9].

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

1.2. Assumptions

 Mobility is constrained to a common IP address space (that is, the
 routing fabric between, say, the mobile node and the home agent is
 not partitioned into a "private" and a "public" network).
 This document does not attempt to solve the firewall traversal
 problem. Rather, it assumes one of the following is true:
  1. There are no intervening firewalls along the path of the

tunneled packets.

  1. Any intervening firewalls share the security association

necessary to process any authentication [6] or encryption [7]

      headers which may have been added to the tunneled packets.
 The reverse tunnels considered here are symmetric, that is, they use
 the same configuration (encapsulation method, IP address endpoints)
 as the forward tunnel. IP in IP encapsulation [2] is assumed unless
 stated otherwise.
 Route optimization [4] introduces forward tunnels initiated at a
 correspondent host.  Since a mobile node may not know if the
 correspondent host can decapsulate packets, reverse tunnels in that
 context are not discussed here.

1.3. Justification

 Why not let the mobile node itself initiate the tunnel to the home
 agent?  This is indeed what it should do if it is already operating
 with a topologically correct co-located care-of address.
 However, one of the primary objectives of the Mobile IP specification
 is not to require this mode of operation.
 The mechanisms outlined in this document are primarily intended for
 use by mobile nodes that rely on the foreign agent for forward tunnel
 support. It is desirable to continue supporting these mobile nodes,
 even in the presence of filtering routers.

2. Overview

 A mobile node arrives at a foreign network, listens for agent
 advertisements and selects a foreign agent that supports reverse
 tunnels.  It requests this service when it registers through the
 selected foreign agent.  At this time, and depending on how the

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

 mobile node wishes to deliver packets to the foreign agent, it also
 requests either the Direct or the Encapsulating Delivery Style
 (section 5).
 In the Direct Delivery Style, the mobile node designates the foreign
 agent as its default router and proceeds to send packets directly to
 the foreign agent, that is, without encapsulation.  The foreign agent
 intercepts them, and tunnels them to the home agent.
 In the Encapsulating Delivery Style, the mobile node encapsulates all
 its outgoing packets to the foreign agent.  The foreign agent
 decapsulates and re-tunnels them to the home agent, using the foreign
 agent's care-of address as the entry-point of this new tunnel.

3. New Packet Formats

3.1. Mobility Agent Advertisement Extension

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |     Type      |    Length     |        Sequence Number        |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |           Lifetime            |R|B|H|F|M|G|V|T|  reserved     |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                  zero or more Care-of Addresses               |
 |                              ...                              |
 The only change to the Mobility Agent Advertisement Extension [1] is
 the additional 'T' bit:
    T        Agent offers reverse tunneling service.
 A foreign agent that sets the 'T' bit MUST support the two delivery
 styles currently supported: Direct and Encapsulating Delivery Style
 (section 5).
 Using this information, a mobile node is able to choose a foreign
 agent that supports reverse tunnels. Notice that if a mobile node
 does not understand this bit, it simply ignores it as per [1].

3.2. Registration Request

 Reverse tunneling support is added directly into the Registration
 Request by using one of the "rsvd" bits.  If a foreign or home agent
 that does not support reverse tunnels receives a request with the 'T'
 bit set, the Registration Request fails. This results in a
 registration denial (failure codes are specified in section 3.4).

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

 Most home agents would not object to providing reverse tunnel
 support, because they "SHOULD be able to decapsulate and further
 deliver packets addressed to themselves, sent by a mobile node" [1].
 In the case of topologically correct reverse tunnels, the packets are
 not sent by the mobile node as distinguished by its home address.
 Rather, the outermost (encapsulating) IP source address on such
 datagrams is the care-of address of the mobile node.  Nevertheless,
 home agents  probably already support the required decapsulation and
 further forwarding.
 In Registration Requests sent by a mobile node, the Time to Live
 field in the IP header MUST be set to 255.  This limits a denial of
 service attack in which malicious hosts send false Registration
 Requests (see Section 6).
  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |     Type      |S|B|D|M|G|V|T|-|          Lifetime             |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                          Home Address                         |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                           Home Agent                          |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                        Care-of Address                        |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                         Identification                        |
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 | Extensions ...
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
 The only change to the Registration Request packet is the additional
 'T' bit:
    T        If the 'T' bit is set, the mobile node asks its home
             agent to accept a reverse tunnel from the care-of
             address. Mobile nodes using a foreign agent care-of
             address ask the foreign agent to reverse-tunnel its
             packets.

3.3. Encapsulating Delivery Style Extension

 The Encapsulating Delivery Style Extension MAY be included by the
 mobile node in registration requests to further specify reverse
 tunneling behavior. It is expected to be used only by the foreign
 agent.  Accordingly, the foreign agent MUST consume this extension
 (that is, it must not relay it to the home agent or include it in

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

 replies to the mobile node).  As per Section 3.6.1.3 of [1], the
 mobile node MUST include the Encapsulating Delivery Style Extension
 after the Mobile-Home Authentication Extension, and before the
 Mobile-Foreign Authentication Extension, if present.
 The Encapsulating Delivery Style Extension MUST NOT be included if
 the 'T' bit is not set in the Registration Request.
 If this extension is absent, Direct Delivery is assumed.
 Encapsulation is done according to what was negotiated for the
 forward tunnel (that is, IP in IP is assumed unless specified
 otherwise). For more details on the delivery styles, please refer to
 section 5.
  0                   1
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |     Type      |     Length    |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    Type
      130
    Length

3.4. New Registration Reply Codes

 Foreign and home agent registration replies MUST convey if the
 reverse tunnel request failed.  These new reply codes are defined:
    Service denied by the foreign agent:
    74 requested reverse tunnel unavailable
    75 reverse tunnel is mandatory and 'T' bit not set
    76 mobile node too distant
 and
    Service denied by the home agent:
    137 requested reverse tunnel unavailable
    138 reverse tunnel is mandatory and 'T' bit not set
    139 requested encapsulation unavailable

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 7] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

 In response to a Registration Request with the 'T' bit set, mobile
 nodes may receive (and MUST accept) code 70 (poorly formed request)
 from foreign agents and code 134 (poorly formed request) from home
 agents. However, foreign and home agents that support reverse
 tunneling MUST use codes 74 and 137, respectively.
 Absence of the 'T' bit in a Registration Request MAY elicit denials
 with codes 75 and 138 at the foreign agent and the home agent,
 respectively.
 Forward and reverse tunnels are symmetric, that is, both are able to
 use the same tunneling options negotiated at registration.  This
 implies that the home agent MUST deny registrations if an unsupported
 form of tunneling is requested (code 139).  Notice that Mobile IP [1]
 already defines the analogous failure code 72 for use by the foreign
 agent.

4. Changes in Protocol Behavior

 Unless otherwise specified, behavior specified by Mobile IP [1] is
 assumed. In particular, if any two entities share a mobility security
 association, they MUST use the appropriate Authentication Extension
 (Mobile-Foreign, Foreign-Home or Mobile-Home Authentication
 Extension) when exchanging registration protocol datagrams. The
 Mobile-Home Authentication Extension MUST always be present.
 Reverse tunneling imposes additional protocol processing requirements
 on mobile entities.  Differences in protocol behavior with respect to
 Mobile IP [1] are specified in the subsequent sections.

4.1. Mobile Node Considerations

 This section describes how the mobile node handles registrations that
 request a reverse tunnel.

4.1.1. Sending Registration Requests to the Foreign Agent

 In addition to the considerations in [1], a mobile node sets the 'T'
 bit in its Registration Request to petition a reverse tunnel.
 The mobile node MUST set the TTL field of the IP header to 255. This
 is meant to limit the reverse tunnel hijacking attack (Section 6).
 The mobile node MAY optionally include an Encapsulating Delivery
 Style Extension.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 8] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

4.1.2. Receiving Registration Replies from the Foreign Agent

 Possible valid responses are:
  1. A registration denial issued by either the home agent or the

foreign agent:

       a. The mobile node follows the error checking guidelines in
          [1], and depending on the reply code, MAY try modifying the
          registration request (for example, by eliminating the
          request for alternate forms of encapsulation), and issuing a
          new registration.
       b. Depending on the reply code, the mobile node MAY try
          zeroing the 'T' bit, eliminating the Encapsulating Delivery
          Style Extension (if one was present), and issuing a new
          registration. Notice that after doing so the registration
          may succeed, but due to the lack of a reverse tunnel data
          transfer may not be possible.
  1. The home agent returns a Registration Reply indicating that the

service will be provided.

 In this last case, the mobile node has succeeded in establishing a
 reverse tunnel between its care-of address and its home agent.  If
 the mobile node is operating with a co-located care-of address, it
 MAY encapsulate outgoing data such that the destination address of
 the outer header is the home agent. This ability to selectively
 reverse-tunnel packets is discussed further in section 5.4.
 If the care-of address belongs to a separate foreign agent, the
 mobile node MUST employ whatever delivery style was requested (Direct
 or Encapsulating) and proceed as specified in section 5.
 A successful registration reply is an assurance that both the foreign
 agent and the home agent support whatever alternate forms of
 encapsulation (other than IP in IP) were requested. Accordingly, the
 mobile node MAY use them at its discretion.

4.2. Foreign Agent Considerations

 This section describes how the foreign agent handles registrations
 that request a reverse tunnel.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 9] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

4.2.1. Receiving Registration Requests from the Mobile Node

 A foreign agent that receives a Registration Request with the 'T' bit
 set processes the packet as specified in the Mobile IP specification
 [1], and determines whether it can accomodate the forward tunnel
 request. If it cannot, it returns an appropriate code. In particular,
 if the foreign agent is unable to support the requested form of
 encapsulation it MUST return code 72.
 The foreign agent MAY reject Registration Requests without the 'T'
 bit set by denying them with code 75 (reverse tunnel is mandatory and
 'T' bit not set).
 The foreign agent MUST verify that the TTL field of the IP header is
 set to 255. Otherwise, it MUST reject the registration with code 76
 (mobile node too distant). The foreign agent MUST limit the rate at
 which it sends these registration replies to a maximum of one per
 second.
 As a last check, the foreign agent verifies that it can support a
 reverse tunnel with the same configuration. If it cannot, it MUST
 return a Registration Reply denying the request with code 74
 (requested reverse tunnel unavailable).

4.2.2. Relaying Registration Requests to the Home Agent

 Otherwise, the foreign agent MUST relay the Registration Request to
 the home agent.
 Upon receipt of a Registration Reply that satisfies validity checks,
 the foreign agent MUST update its visitor list, including indication
 that this mobile node has been granted a reverse tunnel and the
 delivery style expected (section 5).
 While this visitor list entry is in effect, the foreign agent MUST
 process incoming traffic according to the delivery style, encapsulate
 it and tunnel it from the care-of address to the home agent's
 address.

4.3. Home Agent Considerations

 This section describes how the home agent handles registrations that
 request a reverse tunnel.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 10] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

4.3.1. Receiving Registration Requests from the Foreign Agent

 A home agent that receives a Registration Request with the 'T' bit
 set processes the packet as specified in the Mobile IP specification
 [1] and determines whether it can accomodate the forward tunnel
 request.  If it cannot, it returns an appropriate code. In
 particular, if the home agent is unable to support the requested form
 of encapsulation it MUST return code 139 (requested encapsulation
 unavailable).
 The home agent MAY reject registration requests without the 'T' bit
 set by denying them with code 138 (reverse tunnel is mandatory and '
 T' bit not set).
 As a last check, the home agent determines whether it can support a
 reverse tunnel with the same configuration as the forward tunnel. If
 it cannot, it MUST send back a registration denial with code 137
 (requested reverse tunnel unavailable).
 Upon receipt of a Registration Reply that satisfies validity checks,
 the home agent MUST update its mobility bindings list to indicate
 that this mobile node has been granted a reverse tunnel and the type
 of encapsulation expected.

4.3.2. Sending Registration Replies to the Foreign Agent

 In response to a valid Registration Request, a home agent MUST issue
 a Registration Reply to the mobile node.
 After a successful registration, the home agent may receive
 encapsulated packets addressed to itself. Decapsulating such packets
 and blindly injecting them into the network is a potential security
 weakness (section 6.1). Accordingly, the home agent MUST implement,
 and, by default, SHOULD enable the following check for encapsulated
 packets addressed to itself:
    The home agent searches for a mobility binding whose care-of
    address is the source of the outer header, and whose mobile node
    address is the source of the inner header.
 If no such binding is found, or if the packet uses an encapsulation
 mechanism that was not negotiated at registration the home agent MUST
 silently discard the packet and SHOULD log the event as a security
 exception.
 Home agents that terminate tunnels unrelated to Mobile IP (for
 example, multicast tunnels) MAY turn off the above check, but this
 practice is discouraged for the aforementioned reasons.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 11] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

 While the registration is in effect, a home agent MUST process each
 valid reverse tunneled packet (as determined by checks like the
 above) by decapsulating it, recovering the original packet, and then
 forwarding it on behalf of its sender (the mobile node) to the
 destination address (the correspondent host).

5. Mobile Node to Foreign Agent Delivery Styles

 This section specifies how the mobile node sends its data traffic via
 the foreign agent. In all cases, the mobile node learns the foreign
 agent's link-layer address from the link-layer header in the agent
 advertisement.

5.1. Direct Delivery Style

 This delivery mechanism is very simple to implement at the mobile
 node, and uses small (non-encapsulated) packets on the link between
 the mobile node and the foreign agent (potentially a very slow link).
 However, it only supports reverse-tunneling of unicast packets, and
 does not allow selective reverse tunneling (section 5.4).

5.1.1. Packet Processing

 The mobile node MUST designate the foreign agent as its default
 router. Not doing so will not guarantee encapsulation of all the
 mobile node's outgoing traffic, and defeats the purpose of the
 reverse tunnel. The foreign agent MUST:
  1. detect packets sent by the mobile node, and
  1. modify its forwarding function to encapsulate them before

forwarding.

5.1.2. Packet Header Format and Fields

 This section shows the format of the packet headers used by the
 Direct Delivery style. The formats shown assume IP in IP
 encapsulation [2].
 Packet format received by the foreign agent (Direct Delivery Style):
     IP fields:
       Source Address = mobile node's home address Destination Address
       = correspondent host's address
     Upper Layer Protocol
 Packet format forwarded by the foreign agent (Direct Delivery Style):

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 12] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

     IP fields (encapsulating header):
       Source Address = foreign agent's care-of address
       Destination Address = home agent's address
       Protocol field: 4 (IP in IP)
     IP fields (original header):
       Source Address = mobile node's home address
       Destination Address = correspondent host's address
     Upper Layer Protocol
 These fields of the encapsulating header MUST be chosen as follows:
    IP Source Address
       Copied from the Care-of Address field within the Registration
       Request.
    IP Destination Address
       Copied from the Home Agent field within the Registration
       Request.
    IP Protocol Field
       Default is 4 (IP in IP [2]), but other methods of encapsulation
       MAY be used as negotiated at registration time.

5.2. Encapsulating Delivery Style

 This mechanism requires that the mobile node implement encapsulation,
 and explicitly directs packets at the foreign agent by designating it
 as the destination address in a new outermost header.  Mobile nodes
 that wish to send either broadcast or multicast packets MUST use the
 Encapsulating Delivery Style.

5.2.1 Packet Processing

 The foreign agent does not modify its forwarding function.  Rather,
 it receives an encapsulated packet and after verifying that it was
 sent by the mobile node, it:
  1. decapsulates to recover the inner packet,
  1. re-encapsulates, and sends it to the home agent.
 If a foreign agent receives an un-encapsulated packet from a mobile
 node which had explicitly requested the Encapsulated Delivery Style,
 then the foreign agent MUST NOT reverse tunnel such a packet and
 rather MUST forward it using standard, IP routing mechanisms.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 13] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

5.2.2. Packet Header Format and Fields

 This section shows the format of the packet headers used by the
 Encapsulating Delivery style. The formats shown assume IP in IP
 encapsulation [2].
 Packet format received by the foreign agent (Encapsulating Delivery
 Style):
     IP fields (encapsulating header):
       Source Address = mobile node's home address
       Destination Address = foreign agent's address
       Protocol field: 4 (IP in IP)
     IP fields (original header):
       Source Address = mobile node's home address
       Destination Address = correspondent host's address
     Upper Layer Protocol
 The fields of the encapsulating IP header MUST be chosen as follows:
    IP Source Address
       The mobile node's home address.
    IP Destination Address
       The address of the agent as learned from the IP source address
       of the agent's most recent registration reply.
    IP Protocol Field
       Default is 4 (IP in IP [2]), but other methods of encapsulation
       MAY be used as negotiated at registration time.
 Packet format forwarded by the foreign agent (Encapsulating Delivery
 Style):
     IP fields (encapsulating header):
       Source Address = foreign agent's care-of address
       Destination Address = home agent's address
       Protocol field: 4 (IP in IP)
     IP fields (original header):
       Source Address = mobile node's home address
       Destination Address = correspondent host's address
     Upper Layer Protocol
 These fields of the encapsulating IP header MUST be chosen as
 follows:

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 14] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

    IP Source Address
       Copied from the Care-of Address field within the Registration
       Request.
    IP Destination Address
       Copied from the Home Agent field within the Registration
       Request.
    IP Protocol Field
       Default is 4 (IP in IP [2]), but other methods of encapsulation
       MAY be used as negotiated at registration time.

5.3. Support for Broadcast and Multicast Datagrams

 If a mobile node is operating with a co-located care-of address,
 broadcast and multicast datagrams are handled according to Sections
 4.3 and 4.4 of the Mobile IP specification [1]. Mobile nodes using a
 foreign agent care-of address MAY have their broadcast and multicast
 datagrams reverse-tunneled by the foreign agent.  However, any mobile
 nodes doing so MUST use the encapsulating delivery style.
 This delivers the datagram only to the foreign agent.  The latter
 decapsulates it and then processes it as any other packet from the
 mobile node, namely, by reverse tunneling it to the home agent.

5.4. Selective Reverse Tunneling

 Packets destined to local resources (for example, a nearby printer)
 might be unaffected by ingress filtering. A mobile node with a co-
 located care-of address MAY optimize delivery of these packets by not
 reverse tunneling them.  On the other hand, a mobile node using a
 foreign agent care-of address MAY use this selective reverse
 tunneling capability by requesting the Encapsulating Delivery Style,
 and following these guidelines:
    Packets NOT meant to be reversed tunneled:
       Sent using the Direct Delivery style. The foreign agent MUST
       process these packets as regular traffic:  they MAY be
       forwarded but MUST NOT be reverse tunneled to the home agent.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 15] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

    Packets meant to be reverse tunneled:
       Sent using the Encapsulating Delivery style. The foreign agent
       MUST process these packets as specified in section 5.2: they
       MUST be reverse tunneled to the home agent.

6. Security Considerations

 The extensions outlined in this document are subject to the security
 considerations outlined in the Mobile IP specification [1].
 Essentially, creation of both forward and reverse tunnels involves an
 authentication procedure, which reduces the risk for attack.

6.1. Reverse-tunnel Hijacking and Denial-of-Service Attacks

 Once the tunnel is set up, a malicious node could hijack it to inject
 packets into the network. Reverse tunnels might exacerbate this
 problem, because upon reaching the tunnel exit point packets are
 forwarded beyond the local network. This concern is also present in
 the Mobile IP specification, as it already dictates the use of
 reverse tunnels for certain applications.
 Unauthenticated exchanges involving the foreign agent allow a
 malicious node to pose as a valid mobile node and re-direct an
 existing reverse tunnel to another home agent, perhaps another
 malicious node. The best way to protect against these attacks is by
 employing the Mobile-Foreign and Foreign-Home Authentication
 Extensions defined in [1].
 If the necessary mobility security associations are not available,
 this document introduces a mechanism to reduce the range and
 effectiveness of the attacks. The mobile node MUST set to 255 the TTL
 value in the IP headers of Registration Requests sent to the foreign
 agent.  This prevents malicious nodes more than one hop away from
 posing as valid mobile nodes. Additional codes for use in
 registration denials make those attacks that do occur easier to
 track.
 With the goal of further reducing the attacks the Mobile IP Working
 Group considered other mechanisms involving the use of
 unauthenticated state. However, these introduce the possibilities of
 denial-of-service attacks.  The consensus was that this was too much
 of a trade-off for mechanisms that guarantee no more than weak (non-
 cryptographic) protection against attacks.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 16] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

6.2. Ingress Filtering

 There has been some concern regarding the long-term effectiveness of
 reverse-tunneling in the presence of ingress filtering. The
 conjecture is that network administrators will target reverse-
 tunneled packets (IP in IP encapsulated packets) for filtering. The
 ingress filtering recommendation spells out why this is not the case
 [8]:
    Tracking the source of an attack is simplified when the source is
    more likely to be "valid."

7. Acknowledgements

 The encapsulating style of delivery was proposed by Charlie Perkins.
 Jim Solomon has been instrumental in shaping this document into its
 present form.

References

 [1] Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support", RFC 2002, October 1996.
 [2] Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation within IP", RFC 2003, October
     1996.
 [3] Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), "IP Spoofing Attacks
     and Hijacked Terminal Connections", CA-95:01, January 1995.
     Available via anonymous ftp from info.cert.org
     in/pub/cert_advisories.
 [4] Johnson, D., and C. Perkins, "Route Optimization in Mobile IP",
     Work in Progress.
 [5] Manuel Rodriguez, private communication, August 1995.
 [6] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 1826, August 1995.
 [7] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload", RFC 1827,
     August 1995.
 [8] Ferguson, P., and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating
     Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address
     Spoofing", RFC 2267, January 1998.
 [9] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
     Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 17] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

Editor and Chair Addresses

 Questions about this document may be directed at:
 Gabriel E. Montenegro
 Sun Microsystems, Inc.
 901 San Antonio Road
 Mailstop UMPK 15-214
 Mountain View, California 94303
 Voice:  +1-415-786-6288
 Fax:    +1-415-786-6445
 EMail: gabriel.montenegro@eng.sun.com
 The working group can be contacted via the current chairs:
 Jim Solomon
 Motorola, Inc.
 1301 E. Algonquin Rd. - Rm 2240
 Schaumburg, IL  60196
 Voice:  +1-847-576-2753
 Fax:    +1-847-576-3240
 EMail: solomon@comm.mot.com
 Erik Nordmark
 Sun Microsystems, Inc.
 901 San Antonio Road
 Mailstop UMPK17-202
 Mountain View, California 94303
 Voice:  +1-415-786-5166
 EMail: erik.nordmark@eng.sun.com

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 18] RFC 2344 Reverse Tunneling for Mobile IP May 1998

Full Copyright Statement

 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998).  All Rights Reserved.
 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
 included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
 English.
 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Montenegro Standards Track [Page 19]

/data/webs/external/dokuwiki/data/pages/rfc/rfc2344.txt · Last modified: 1998/05/12 23:59 by 127.0.0.1

Donate Powered by PHP Valid HTML5 Valid CSS Driven by DokuWiki