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Network Working Group S. Kent Request for Comments: 1114 BBNCC

                                                               J. Linn
                                                IAB Privacy Task Force
                                                           August 1989
         Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
            Part II -- Certificate-Based Key Management


 This RFC suggests a draft standard elective protocol for the Internet
 community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
 Distribution of this memo is unlimited.


 This RFC is the outgrowth of a series of IAB Privacy Task Force
 meetings and of internal working papers distributed for those
 meetings.  We would like to thank the members of the Privacy Task
 Force for their comments and contributions at the meetings which led
 to the preparation of this RFC: David Balenson, Curt Barker, Matt
 Bishop, Morrie Gasser, Russ Housley, Dan Nessett, Mike Padlipsky, Rob
 Shirey, and Steve Wilbur.

Table of Contents

 1.  Executive Summary                                               2
 2.  Overview of Approach                                            3
 3.  Architecture                                                    4
 3.1  Scope and Restrictions                                         4
 3.2  Relation to X.509 Architecture                                 7
 3.3  Entities' Roles and Responsibilities                           7
 3.3.1  Users and User Agents                                        8
 3.3.2  Organizational Notaries                                      9
 3.3.3  Certification Authorities                                   11  Interoperation Across Certification Hierarchy Boundaries  14  Certificate Revocation                                    15
 3.4  Certificate Definition and Usage                              17
 3.4.1  Contents and Use                                            17  Version Number                                            18  Serial Number                                             18  Subject Name                                              18  Issuer Name                                               19  Validity Period                                           19  Subject Public Component                                  20

Kent & Linn [Page 1] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989  Certificate Signature                                     20
 3.4.2  Validation Conventions                                      20
 3.4.3  Relation with X.509 Certificate Specification               22
 NOTES                                                              24

1. Executive Summary

 This is one of a series of RFCs defining privacy enhancement
 mechanisms for electronic mail transferred using Internet mail
 protocols.  RFC-1113 (the successor to RFC 1040) prescribes protocol
 extensions and processing procedures for RFC-822 mail messages, given
 that suitable cryptographic keys are held by originators and
 recipients as a necessary precondition.  RFC-1115 specifies
 algorithms for use in processing privacy-enhanced messages, as called
 for in RFC-1113.  This RFC defines a supporting key management
 architecture and infrastructure, based on public-key certificate
 techniques, to provide keying information to message originators and
 recipients.  A subsequent RFC, the fourth in this series, will
 provide detailed specifications, paper and electronic application
 forms, etc. for the key management infrastructure described herein.
 The key management architecture described in this RFC is compatible
 with the authentication framework described in X.509.  The major
 contributions of this RFC lie not in the specification of computer
 communication protocols or algorithms but rather in procedures and
 conventions for the key management infrastructure.  This RFC
 incorporates numerous conventions to facilitate near term
 implementation.  Some of these conventions may be superceded in time
 as the motivations for them no longer apply, e.g., when X.500 or
 similar directory servers become well established.
 The RSA cryptographic algorithm, covered in the U.S. by patents
 administered through RSA Data Security, Inc. (hereafter abbreviated
 RSADSI) has been selected for use in this key management system.
 This algorithm has been selected because it provides all the
 necessary algorithmic facilities, is "time tested" and is relatively
 efficient to implement in either software or hardware.  It is also
 the primary algorithm identified (at this time) for use in
 international standards where an asymmetric encryption algorithm is
 required.  Protocol facilities (e.g., algorithm identifiers) exist to
 permit use of other asymmetric algorithms if, in the future, it
 becomes appropriate to employ a different algorithm for key
 management.  However, the infrastructure described herein is specific
 to use of the RSA algorithm in many respects and thus might be
 different if the underlying algorithm were to change.
 Current plans call for RSADSI to act in concert with subscriber
 organizations as a "certifying authority" in a fashion described

Kent & Linn [Page 2] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 later in this RFC.  RSADSI will offer a service in which it will sign
 a certificate which has been generated by a user and vouched for
 either by an organization or by a Notary Public.  This service will
 carry a $25 biennial fee which includes an associated license to use
 the RSA algorithm in conjunction with privacy protection of
 electronic mail.  Users who do not come under the purview of the RSA
 patent, e.g., users affiliated with the U.S. government or users
 outside of the U.S., may make use of different certifying authorities
 and will not require a license from RSADSI.  Procedures for
 interacting with these other certification authorities, maintenance
 and distribution of revoked certificate lists from such authorities,
 etc. are outside the scope of this RFC.  However, techniques for
 validating certificates issued by other authorities are contained
 within the RFC to ensure interoperability across the resulting
 jurisdictional boundaries.

2. Overview of Approach

 This RFC defines a key management architecture based on the use of
 public-key certificates, in support of the message encipherment and
 authentication procedures defined in RFC-1113.  In the proposed
 architecture, a "certification authority" representing an
 organization applies a digital signature to a collection of data
 consisting of a user's public component, various information that
 serves to identify the user, and the identity of the organization
 whose signature is affixed.  (Throughout this RFC we have adopted the
 terms "private component" and "public component" to refer to the
 quantities which are, respectively, kept secret and made publically
 available in asymmetric cryptosystems.  This convention is adopted to
 avoid possible confusion arising from use of the term "secret key" to
 refer to either the former quantity or to a key in a symmetric
 cryptosystem.)  This establishes a binding between these user
 credentials, the user's public component and the organization which
 vouches for this binding.  The resulting signed, data item is called
 a certificate.  The organization identified as the certifying
 authority for the certificate is the "issuer" of that certificate.
 In signing the certificate, the certification authority vouches for
 the user's identification, especially as it relates to the user's
 affiliation with the organization.  The digital signature is affixed
 on behalf of that organization and is in a form which can be
 recognized by all members of the privacy-enhanced electronic mail
 community.  Once generated, certificates can be stored in directory
 servers, transmitted via unsecure message exchanges, or distributed
 via any other means that make certificates easily accessible to
 message originators, without regard for the security of the
 transmission medium.

Kent & Linn [Page 3] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 Prior to sending an encrypted message, an originator must acquire a
 certificate for each recipient and must validate these certificates.
 Briefly, validation is performed by checking the digital signature in
 the certificate, using the public component of the issuer whose
 private component was used to sign the certificate.  The issuer's
 public component is made available via some out of band means
 (described later) or is itself distributed in a certificate to which
 this validation procedure is applied recursively.
 Once a certificate for a recipient is validated, the public component
 contained in the certificate is extracted and used to encrypt the
 data encryption key (DEK) that is used to encrypt the message itself.
 The resulting encrypted DEK is incorporated into the X-Key-Info field
 of the message header.  Upon receipt of an encrypted message, a
 recipient employs his secret component to decrypt this field,
 extracting the DEK, and then uses this DEK to decrypt the message.
 In order to provide message integrity and data origin authentication,
 the originator generates a message integrity code (MIC), signs
 (encrypts) the MIC using the secret component of his public-key pair,
 and includes the resulting value in the message header in the X-MIC-
 Info field.  The certificate of the originator is also included in
 the header in the X-Certificate field as described in RFC-1113, in
 order to facilitate validation in the absence of ubiquitous directory
 services.  Upon receipt of a privacy enhanced message, a recipient
 validates the originator's certificate, extracts the public component
 from the certificate, and uses that value to recover (decrypt) the
 MIC.  The recovered MIC is compared against the locally calculated
 MIC to verify the integrity and data origin authenticity of the

3. Architecture

3.1 Scope and Restrictions

 The architecture described below is intended to provide a basis for
 managing public-key cryptosystem values in support of privacy
 enhanced electronic mail (see RFC-1113) in the Internet environment.
 The architecture describes procedures for ordering certificates from
 issuers, for generating and distributing certificates, and for "hot
 listing" of revoked certificates.  Concurrent with the issuance of
 this RFC, RFC 1040 has been updated and reissued as RFC-1113 to
 describe the syntax and semantics of new or revised header fields
 used to transfer certificates, represent the DEK and MIC in this
 public-key context, and to segregate algorithm definitions into a
 separate RFC to facilitate the addition of other algorithms in the
 future.  This RFC focuses on the management aspects of certificate-

Kent & Linn [Page 4] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 based, public-key cryptography for privacy enhanced mail while RFC-
 1113 addresses representation and processing aspects of such mail,
 including changes required by this key management technology.
 The proposed architecture imposes conventions for certification paths
 which are not strictly required by the X.509 recommendation nor by
 the technology itself.  The decision to impose these conventions is
 based in part on constraints imposed by the status of the RSA
 cryptosystem within the U.S. as a patented algorithm, and in part on
 the need for an organization to assume operational responsibility for
 certificate management in the current (minimal) directory system
 infrastructure for electronic mail.  Over time, we anticipate that
 some of these constraints, e.g., directory service availability, will
 change and the procedures specified in the RFC will be reviewed and
 modified as appropriate.
 At this time, we propose a system in which user certificates
 represent the leaves in a shallow (usually two tier) certification
 hierarchy (tree).  Organizations which act as issuers are represented
 by certificates higher in the tree.  This convention minimizes the
 complexity of validating user certificates by limiting the length of
 "certification paths" and by making very explicit the relationship
 between a certificate issuer and a user.  Note that only
 organizations may act as issuers in the proposed architecture; a user
 certificate may not appear in a certification path, except as the
 terminal node in the path.  These conventions result in a
 certification hierarchy which is a compatible subset of that
 permitted under X.509, with respect to both syntax and semantics.
 The RFC proposes that RSADSI act as a "co-issuer" of certificates on
 behalf of most organizations.  This can be effected in a fashion
 which is "transparent" so that the organizations appear to be the
 issuers with regard to certificate formats and validation procedures.
 This is effected by having RSADSI generate and hold the secret
 components used to sign certificates on behalf of organizations.  The
 motivation for RSADSI's role in certificate signing is twofold.
 First, it simplifies accounting controls in support of licensing,
 ensuring that RSADSI is paid for each certificate.  Second, it
 contributes to the overall integrity of the system by establishing a
 uniform, high level of protection for the private-components used to
 sign certificates.  If an organization were to sign certificates
 directly on behalf of its affiliated users, the organization would
 have to establish very stringent security and accounting mechanisms
 and enter into (elaborate) legal agreements with RSADSI in order to
 provide a comparable level of assurance.  Requests by organizations
 to perform direct certificate signing will be considered on a case-
 by-case basis, but organizations are strongly urged to make use of
 the facilities proposed by this RFC.

Kent & Linn [Page 5] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 Note that the risks associated with disclosure of an organization's
 secret component are different from those associated with disclosure
 of a user's secret component.  The former component is used only to
 sign certificates, never to encrypt message traffic.  Thus the
 exposure of an organization's secret component could result in the
 generation of forged certificates for users affiliated with that
 organization, but it would not affect privacy-enhanced messages which
 are protected using legitimate certificates.  Also note that any
 certificates generated as a result of such a disclosure are readily
 traceable to the issuing authority which holds this component, e.g.,
 RSADSI, due to the non-repudiation feature of the digital signature.
 The certificate registration and signing procedures established in
 this RFC would provide non-repudiable evidence of disclosure of an
 organization's secret component by RSADSI.  Thus this RFC advocates
 use of RSADSI as a co-issuer for certificates until such time as
 technical security mechanisms are available to provide a similar,
 system-wide level of assurance for (distributed) certificate signing
 by organizations.
 We identify two classes of exceptions to this certificate signing
 paradigm.  First, the RSA algorithm is patented only within the U.S.,
 and thus it is very likely that certificate signing by issuers will
 arise outside of the U.S., independent of RSADSI.  Second, the
 research that led to the RSA algorithm was sponsored by the National
 Science Foundation, and thus the U.S. government retains royalty-free
 license rights to the algorithm.  Thus the U.S. government may
 establish a certificate generation facilities for its affiliated
 users.  A number of the procedures described in this document apply
 only to the use of RSADSI as a certificate co-issuer; all other
 certificate generation practices lie outside the scope of this RFC.
 This RFC specifies procedures by which users order certificates
 either directly from RSADSI or via a representative in an
 organization with which the user holds some affiliation (e.g., the
 user's employer or educational institution).  Syntactic provisions
 are made which allow a recipient to determine, to some granularity,
 which identifying information contained in the certificate is vouched
 for by the certificate issuer.  In particular, organizations will
 usually be vouching for the affiliation of a user with that
 organization and perhaps a user's role within the organization, in
 addition to the user's name.  In other circumstances, as discussed in
 section 3.3.3, a certificate may indicate that an issuer vouches only
 for the user's name, implying that any other identifying information
 contained in the certificate may not have been validated by the
 issuer.  These semantics are beyond the scope of X.509, but are not
 incompatible with that recommendation.
 The key management architecture described in this RFC has been

Kent & Linn [Page 6] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 designed to support privacy enhanced mail as defined in this RFC,
 RFC-1113, and their successors.  Note that this infrastructure also
 supports X.400 mail security facilities (as per X.411) and thus paves
 the way for transition to the OSI/CCITT Message Handling System
 paradigm in the Internet in the future.  The certificate issued to a
 user for the $25 biennial fee will grant to the user identified by
 that certificate a license from RSADSI to employ the RSA algorithm
 for certificate validation and for encryption and decryption
 operations in this electronic mail context.  No use of the algorithm
 outside the scope defined in this RFC is authorized by this license
 as of this time.  Expansion of the license to other Internet security
 applications is possible but not yet authorized.  The license granted
 by this fee does not authorize the sale of software or hardware
 incorporating the RSA algorithm; it is an end-user license, not a
 developer's license.

3.2 Relation to X.509 Architecture

 CCITT 1988 Recommendation X.509, "The Directory - Authentication
 Framework", defines a framework for authentication of entities
 involved in a distributed directory service.  Strong authentication,
 as defined in X.509, is accomplished with the use of public-key
 cryptosystems.  Unforgeable certificates are generated by
 certification authorities; these authorities may be organized
 hierarchically, though such organization is not required by X.509.
 There is no implied mapping between a certification hierarchy and the
 naming hierarchy imposed by directory system naming attributes.  The
 public-key certificate approach defined in X.509 has also been
 adopted in CCITT 1988 X.411 in support of the message handling
 This RFC interprets the X.509 certificate mechanism to serve the
 needs of privacy-enhanced mail in the Internet environment.  The
 certification hierarchy proposed in this RFC in support of privacy
 enhanced mail is intentionally a subset of that allowed under X.509.
 In large part constraints have been levied in order to simplify
 certificate validation in the absence of a widely available, user-
 level directory service.  The certification hierarchy proposed here
 also embodies semantics which are not explicitly addressed by X.509,
 but which are consistent with X.509 precepts.  The additional
 semantic constraints have been adopted to explicitly address
 questions of issuer "authority" which we feel are not well defined in

3.3 Entities' Roles and Responsibilities

 One way to explain the architecture proposed by this RFC is to
 examine the various roles which are defined for various entities in

Kent & Linn [Page 7] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 the architecture and to describe what is required of each entity in
 order for the proposed system to work properly.  The following
 sections identify three different types of entities within this
 architecture: users and user agents, organizational notaries, and
 certification authorities.  For each class of entity we describe the
 (electronic and paper) procedures which the entity must execute as
 part of the architecture and what responsibilities the entity assumes
 as a function of its role in the architecture.  Note that the
 infrastructure described here applies to the situation wherein RSADSI
 acts as a co-issuer of certificates, sharing the role of
 certification authority as described later.  Other certifying
 authority arrangements may employ different procedures and are not
 addressed by this RFC.

3.3.1 Users and User Agents

 The term User Agent (UA) is taken from CCITT X.400 Message Handling
 Systems (MHS) Recommendations, which define it as follows: "In the
 context of message handling, the functional object, a component of
 MHS, by means of which a single direct user engages in message
 handling."  UAs exchange messages by calling on a supporting Message
 Transfer Service (MTS).
 A UA process supporting privacy-enhanced mail processing must protect
 the private component of its associated entity (ordinarily, a human
 user) from disclosure.  We anticipate that a user will employ
 ancillary software (not otherwise associated with the UA) to generate
 his public/private component pair and to compute the (one-way)
 message hash required by the registration procedure.  The public
 component, along with information that identifies the user, will be
 transferred to an organizational notary (see below) for inclusion in
 an order to an issuer.  The process of generating public and private
 components is a local matter, but we anticipate Internet-wide
 distribution of software suitable for component-pair generation to
 facilitate the process.  The mechanisms used to transfer the public
 component and the user identification information must preserve the
 integrity of both quantities and bind the two during this transfer.
 This proposal establishes two ways in which a user may order a
 certificate, i.e., through the user's affiliation with an
 organization or directly through RSADSI.  In either case, a user will
 be required to send a paper order to RSADSI on a form described in a
 subsequent RFC and containing the following information:
    1.  Distinguished Name elements (e.g., full legal name,
        organization name, etc.)
    2.  Postal address

Kent & Linn [Page 8] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

    3.  Internet electronic mail address
    4.  A message hash function, binding the above information to the
        user's public component
 Note that the user's public component is NOT transmitted via this
 paper path.  In part the rationale here is that the public component
 consists of many (>100) digits and thus is prone to error if it is
 copied to and from a piece of paper.  Instead, a message hash is
 computed on the identifying information and the public component and
 this (smaller) message hash value is transmitted along with the
 identifying information.  Thus the public component is transferred
 only via an electronic path, as described below.
 If the user is not affiliated with an organization which has
 established its own "electronic notary" capability (an organization
 notary or "ON" as discussed in the next section), then this paper
 registration form must be notarized by a Notary Public.  If the user
 is affiliated with an organization which has established one or more
 ONs, the paper registration form need not carry the endorsement of a
 Notary Public.  Concurrent with the paper registration, the user must
 send the information outlined above, plus his public component,
 either to his ON, or directly to RSADSI if no appropriate ON is
 available to the user.  Direct transmission to RSADSI of this
 information will be via electronic mail, using a representation
 described in a subsequent RFC.  The paper registration must be
 accompanied by a check or money order for $25 or an organization may
 establish some other billing arrangement with RSADSI.  The maximum
 (and default) lifetime of a certificate ordered through this process
 is two years.
 The transmission of ID information and public component from a user
 to his ON is a local matter, but we expect electronic mail will also
 be the preferred approach in many circumstances and we anticipate
 general distribution of software to support this process.  Note that
 it is the responsibility of the user and his organization to ensure
 the integrity of this transfer by some means deemed adequately secure
 for the local computing and communication environment.  There is no
 requirement for secrecy in conjunction with this information
 transfer, but the integrity of the information must be ensured.

3.3.2 Organizational Notaries

 An organizational notary is an individual who acts as a clearinghouse
 for certificate orders originating within an administrative domain
 such as a corporation or a university.  An ON represents an
 organization or organizational unit (in X.500 naming terms), and is
 assumed to have some independence from the users on whose behalf

Kent & Linn [Page 9] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 certificates are ordered.  An ON will be restricted through
 mechanisms implemented by the issuing authority, e.g., RSADSI, to
 ordering certificates properly associated with the domain of that ON.
 For example, an ON for BBN should not be able to order certificates
 for users affiliated with MIT or MITRE, nor vice versa.  Similarly,
 if a corporation such as BBN were to establish ONs on a per-
 subsidiary basis (corresponding to organization units in X.500 naming
 parlance), then an ON for the BBN Communications subsidiary should
 not be allowed to order a certificate for a user who claims
 affiliation with the BBN Software Products subsidiary.
 It can be assumed that the set of ONs changes relatively slowly and
 that the number of ONs is relatively small in comparison with the
 number of users.  Thus a more extensive, higher assurance process may
 reasonably be associated with ON accreditation than with per-user
 certificate ordering.  Restrictions on the range of information which
 an ON is authorized to certify are established as part of this more
 elaborate registration process.  The procedures by which
 organizations and organizational units are established in the RSADSI
 database, and by which ONs are registered, will be described in a
 subsequent RFC.
 An ON is responsible for establishing the correctness and integrity
 of information incorporated in an order, and will generally vouch for
 (certify) the accuracy of identity information at a granularity finer
 than that provided by a Notary Public.  We do not believe that it is
 feasible to enforce uniform standards for the user certification
 process across all ONs, but we anticipate that organizations will
 endeavor to maintain high standards in this process in recognition of
 the "visibility" associated with the identification data contained in
 certificates.  An ON also may constrain the validity period of an
 ordered certificate, restricting it to less than the default two year
 interval imposed by the RSADSI license agreement.
 An ON participates in the certificate ordering process by accepting
 and validating identification information from a user and forwarding
 this information to RSADSI.  The ON accepts the electronic ordering
 information described above (Distinguished Name elements, mailing
 address, public component, and message hash computed on all of this
 data) from a user.  (The representation for user-to-ON transmission
 of this data is a local matter, but we anticipate that the encoding
 specified for ON-to-RSADSI representation of this data will often be
 employed.)  The ON sends an integrity-protected (as described in
 RFC-1113) electronic message to RSADSI, vouching for the correctness
 of the binding between the public component and the identification
 data.  Thus, to support this function, each ON will hold a
 certificate as an individual user within the organization which he
 represents.  RSADSI will maintain a database which identifies the

Kent & Linn [Page 10] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 users who also act as ONs and the database will specify constraints
 on credentials which each ON is authorized to certify.  The
 electronic mail representation for a user's certificate data in an ON
 message to RSADSI will be specified in a subsequent RFC.

3.3.3 Certification Authorities

 In X.509 the term "certification authority" is defined as "an
 authority trusted by one or more users to create and assign
 certificates".  This alternate expansion for the acronym "CA" is
 roughly equivalent to that contemplated as a "central authority" in
 RFC-1040 and RFC-1113.  The only difference is that in X.509 there is
 no requirement that a CA be a distinguished entity or that a CA serve
 a large number of users, as envisioned in these RFCs.  Rather, any
 user who holds a certificate can, in the X.509 context, act as a CA
 for any other user.  As noted above, we have chosen to restrict the
 role of CA in this electronic mail environment to organizational
 entities, to simplify the certificate validation process, to impose
 semantics which support organizational affiliation as a basis for
 certification, and to facilitate license accountability.
 In the proposed architecture, individuals who are affiliated with
 (registered) organizations will go through the process described
 above, in which they forward their certificate information to their
 ON for certification.  The ON will, based on local procedures, verify
 the accuracy of the user's credentials and forward this information
 to RSADSI using privacy-enhanced mail to ensure the integrity and
 authenticity of the information.  RSADSI will carry out the actual
 certificate generation process on behalf of the organization
 represented by the ON.  Recall that it is the identity of the
 organization which the ON represents, not the ON's identity, which
 appears in the issuer field of the user certificate.  Therefore it is
 the private component of the organization, not the ON, which is used
 to sign the user certificate.
 In order to carry out this procedure RSADSI will serve as the
 repository for the private components associated with certificates
 representing organizations or organizational units (but not
 individuals).  In effect the role of CA will be shared between the
 organizational notaries and RSADSI.  This shared role will not be
 visible in the syntax of the certificates issued under this
 arrangement nor is it apparent from the validation procedure one
 applies to these certificates.  In this sense, the role of RSADSI as
 the actual signer of certificates on behalf of organizations is
 transparent to this aspect of system operation.
 If an organization were to carry out the certificate signing process
 locally, and thus hold the private component associated with its

Kent & Linn [Page 11] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 organization certificate, it would need to contact RSADSI to discuss
 security safeguards, special legal agreements, etc.  A number of
 requirements would be imposed on an organization if such an approach
 were persued.  The organization would be required to execute
 additional legal instruments with RSADSI, e.g., to ensure proper
 accounting for certificates generated by the organization.  Special
 software will be required to support the certificate signing process,
 distinct from the software required for an ON.  Stringent procedural,
 physical, personnel and computer security safeguards would be
 required to support this process, to maintain a relatively high level
 of security for the system as a whole.  Thus, at this time, it is not
 recommended that organizations pursue this approach although local
 certificate generation is not expressly precluded by the proposed
 RSADSI has offered to operate a service in which it serves as a CA
 for users who are not affiliated with any organization or who are
 affiliated with an organization which has not opted to establish an
 organizational notary.  To distinguish certificates issued to such
 "non-affiliated" users the distinguished string "Notary" will appear
 as the organizational unit name of the issuer of the certificate.
 This convention will be employed throughout the system.  Thus not
 only RSADSI but any other organization which elects to provide this
 type of service to non-affiliated users may do so in a standard
 fashion.  Hence a corporation might issue a certificate with the
 "Notary" designation to students hired for the summer, to
 differentiate them from full-time employees.  At least in the case of
 RSADSI, the standards for verifying user credentials that carry this
 designation will be well known and widely recognized (e.g., Notary
 Public endorsement).
 To illustrate this convention, consider the following examples.
 Employees of RSADSI will hold certificates which indicate "RSADSI" as
 the organization in both the issuer field and the subject field,
 perhaps with no organizational unit specified.  Certificates obtained
 directly from RSADSI, by user's who are not affiliated with any ON,
 will also indicate "RSADSI" as the organization and will specify
 "Notary" as an organizational unit in the issuer field.  However,
 these latter certificates will carry some other designation for
 organization (and, optionally, organizational unit) in the subject
 field.  Moreover, an organization designated in the subject field for
 such a certificate will not match any for which RSADSI has an ON
 registered (to avoid possible confusion).
 In all cases described above, when a certificate is generated RSADSI
 will send a paper reply to the ordering user, including two message
 hash functions:

Kent & Linn [Page 12] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

    1.  a message hash computed on the user's identifying information
        and public component (and sent to RSADSI in the registration
        process), to guarantee its integrity across the ordering
        process, and
    2.  a message hash computed on the public component of RSADSI, to
        provide independent authentication for this public component
        which is transmitted to the user via email (see below).
 RSADSI will send to the user via electronic mail (not privacy
 enhanced) a copy of his certificate, a copy of the organization
 certificate identified in the issuer field of the user's certificate,
 and the public component used to validate certificates signed by
 RSADSI.  The "issuer" certificate is included to simplify the
 validation process in the absence of a user-level directory system;
 its distribution via this procedure will probably be phased out in
 the future.  Thus, as described in RFC-1113, the originator of a
 message is encouraged, though not required, to include his
 certificate, and that of its issuer, in the privacy enhanced message
 header (X-Issuer-Certificate) to ensure that each recipient can
 process the message using only the information contained in this
 header.  The organization (organizational unit) identified in the
 subject field of the issuer certificate should correspond to that
 which the user claims affiliation (as declared in the subject field
 of his certificate).  If there is no appropriate correspondence
 between these fields, recipients ought to be suspicious of the
 implied certification path.  This relationship should hold except in
 the case of "non-affiliated" users for whom the "Notary" convention
 is employed.
 In contrast, the issuer field of the issuer's certificate will
 specify "RSADSI" as the organization, i.e., RSADSI will certify all
 organizational certificates.  This convention allows a recipient to
 validate any originator's certificate (within the RSADSI
 certification hierarchy) in just two steps.  Even if an organization
 establishes a certification hierarchy involving organizational units,
 certificates corresponding to each unit can be certified both by
 RSADSI and by the organizational entity immediately superior to the
 unit in the hierarchy, so as to preserve this short certification
 path feature.  First, the public component of RSADSI is employed to
 validate the issuer's certificate.  Then the issuer's public
 component is extracted from that certificate and is used to validate
 the originator's certificate.  The recipient then extracts the
 originator's public component for use in processing the X-Mic-Info
 field of the message (see and RFC-1113).
 The electronic representation used for transmission of the data items
 described above (between an ON and RSADSI) will be contained in a

Kent & Linn [Page 13] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 subsequent RFC.  To verify that the registration process has been
 successfully completed and to prepare for exchange of privacy-
 enhanced electronic mail, the user should perform the following
    1.  extract the RSADSI public component, the issuer's certificate
        and the user's certificate from the message
    2.  compute the message hash on the RSADSI public component and
        compare the result to the corresponding message hash that was
        included in the paper receipt
    3.  use the RSADSI public component to validate the signature on
        the issuer's certificate (RSADSI will be the issuer of this
    4.  extract the organization public component from the validated
        issuer's certificate and use this public component to
        validate the user certificate
    5.  extract the identification information and public component
        from the user's certificate, compute the message hash on it
        and compare the result to the corresponding message hash
        value transmitted via the paper receipt
 For a user whose order was processed via an ON, successful completion
 of these steps demonstrates that the certificate issued to him
 matches that which he requested and which was certified by his ON.
 It also demonstrates that he possesses the (correct) public component
 for RSADSI and for the issuer of his certificate.  For a user whose
 order was placed directly with RSADSI, this process demonstrates that
 his certificate order was properly processed by RSADSI and that he
 possesses the valid issuer certificate for the RSADSI Notary.  The
 user can use the RSADSI public component to validate organizational
 certificates for organizations other than his own.  He can employ the
 public component associated with his own organization to validate
 certificates issued to other users in his organization. Interoperation Across Certification Hierarchy Boundaries

 In order to accommodate interoperation with other certification
 authorities, e.g., foreign or U.S. government CAs, two conventions
 will be adopted.  First, all certifying authorities must agree to
 "cross-certify" one another, i.e., each must be willing to sign a
 certificate in which the issuer is that certifying authority and the
 subject is another certifying authority.  Thus, RSADSI might generate
 a certificate in which it is identified as the issuer and a
 certifying authority for the U.S. government is indentified as the

Kent & Linn [Page 14] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 subject.  Conversely, that U.S. government certifying authority would
 generate a certificate in which it is the issuer and RSADSI is the
 subject.  This cross-certification of certificates for "top-level"
 CAs establishes a basis for "lower level" (e.g., organization and
 user) certificate validation across the hierarchy boundaries.  This
 avoids the need for users in one certification hierarchy to engage in
 some "out-of-band" procedure to acquire a public-key for use in
 validating certificates from a different certification hierarchy.
 The second convention is that more than one X-Issuer-Certificate
 field may appear in a privacy-enhanced mail header.  Multiple issuer
 certificates can be included so that a recipient can more easily
 validate an originator's certificate when originator and recipient
 are not part of a common CA hierarchy.  Thus, for example, if an
 originator served by the RSADSI certification hierarchy sends a
 message to a recipient served by a U.S. government hierarchy, the
 originator could (optionally) include an X-Issuer-Certificate field
 containing a certificate issued by the U.S. government CA for RSADSI.
 In this fashion the recipient could employ his public component for
 the U.S. government CA to validate this certificate for RSADSI, from
 which he would extract the RSADSI public component to validate the
 certificate for the originator's organization, from which he would
 extract the public component required to validate the originator's
 certificate.  Thus, more steps can be required to validate
 certificates when certification hierarchy boundaries are crossed, but
 the same basic procedure is employed.  Remember that caching of
 certificates by UAs can significantly reduce the effort required to
 process messages and so these examples should be viewed as "worse
 case" scenarios. Certificate Revocation

 X.509 states that it is a CA's responsibility to maintain:
    1.  a time-stamped list of the certificates it issued which have
        been revoked
    2.  a time-stamped list of revoked certificates representing
        other CAs
 There are two primary reasons for a CA to revoke a certificate, i.e.,
 suspected compromise of a secret component (invalidating the
 corresponding public component) or change of user affiliation
 (invalidating the Distinguished Name).  As described in X.509, "hot
 listing" is one means of propagating information relative to
 certificate revocation, though it is not a perfect mechanism.  In
 particular, an X.509 Revoked Certificate List (RCL) indicates only
 the age of the information contained in it; it does not provide any

Kent & Linn [Page 15] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 basis for determining if the list is the most current RCL available
 from a given CA.  To help address this concern, the proposed
 architecture establishes a format for an RCL in which not only the
 date of issue, but also the next scheduled date of issue is
 specified.  This is a deviation from the format specified in X.509.
 Adopting this convention, when the next scheduled issue date arrives
 a CA must issue a new RCL, even if there are no changes in the list
 of entries.  In this fashion each CA can independently establish and
 advertise the frequency with which RCLs are issued by that CA.  Note
 that this does not preclude RCL issuance on a more frequent basis,
 e.g., in case of some emergency, but no Internet-wide mechanisms are
 architected for alerting users that such an unscheduled issuance has
 taken place.  This scheduled RCL issuance convention allows users
 (UAs) to determine whether a given RCL is "out of date," a facility
 not available from the standard RCL format.
 A recent (draft) version of the X.509 recommendation calls for each
 RCL to contain the serial numbers of certificates which have been
 revoked by the CA administering that list, i.e., the CA that is
 identified as the issuer for the corresponding revoked certificates.
 Upon receipt of a RCL, a UA should compare the entries against any
 cached certificate information, deleting cache entries which match
 RCL entries.  (Recall that the certificate serial numbers are unique
 only for each issuer, so care must be exercised in effecting this
 cache search.)  The UA should also retain the RCL to screen incoming
 messages to detect use of revoked certificates carried in these
 message headers.  More specific details for processing RCL are beyond
 the scope of this RFC as they are a function of local certificate
 management techniques.
 In the architecture defined by this RFC, a RCL will be maintained for
 each CA (organization or organizational unit), signed using the
 private component of that organization (and thus verifiable using the
 public component of that organization as extracted from its
 certificate).  The RSADSI Notary organizational unit is included in
 this collection of RCLs.  CAs operated under the auspices of the U.S.
 government or foreign CAs are requested to provide RCLs conforming to
 these conventions, at least until such time as X.509 RCLs provide
 equivalent functionality, in support of interoperability with the
 Internet community.  An additional, "top level" RCL, will be
 maintained by RSAD-SI, and should be maintained by other "top level"
 CAs, for revoked organizational certificates.
 The hot listing procedure (expect for this top level RCL) will be
 effected by having an ON from each organization transmit to RSADSI a
 list of the serial numbers of users within his organization, to be
 hot listed.  This list will be transmitted using privacy-enhanced

Kent & Linn [Page 16] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 mail to ensure authenticity and integrity and will employ
 representation conventions to be provided in a subsequent RFC.
 RSADSI will format the RCL, sign it using the private component of
 the organization, and transmit it to the ON for dissemination, using
 a representation defined in a subsequent RFC.  Means for
 dissemination of RCLs, both within the administrative domain of a CA
 and across domain boundaries, are not specified by this proposal.
 However, it is anticipated that each hot list will also be available
 via network information center databases, directory servers, etc.
 The following ASN.1 syntax, derived from X.509, defines the format of
 RCLs for use in the Internet privacy enhanced email environment.  See
 the ASN.1 definition of certificates (later in this RFC or in X.509,
 Annex G) for comparison.
    revokedCertificateList  ::=     SIGNED SEQUENCE {
            signature       AlgorithmIdentifier,
            issuer          Name,
            list            SEQUENCE RCLEntry,
            lastUpdate      UTCTime,
            nextUpdate      UTCTime}
    RCLEntry        ::=     SEQUENCE {
            subject         CertificateSerialNumber,
            revocationDate  UTCTime}

3.4 Certificate Definition and Usage

3.4.1 Contents and Use

 A certificate contains the following contents:
    1.  version
    2.  serial number
    3.  certificate signature (and associated algorithm identifier)
    4.  issuer name
    5.  validity period
    6.  subject name
    7.  subject public component (and associated algorithm identifier)
 This section discusses the interpretation and use of each of these
 certificate elements.

Kent & Linn [Page 17] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989 Version Number

 The version number field is intended to facilitate orderly changes in
 certificate formats over time.  The initial version number for
 certificates is zero (0). Serial Number

 The serial number field provides a short form, unique identifier for
 each certificate generated by an issuer.  The serial number is used
 in RCLs to identify revoked certificates instead of including entire
 certificates.  Thus each certificate generated by an issuer must
 contain a unique serial number.  It is suggested that these numbers
 be issued as a compact, monotonic increasing sequence. Subject Name

 A certificate provides a representation of its subject's identity and
 organizational affiliation in the form of a Distinguished Name.  The
 fundamental binding ensured by the privacy enhancement mechanisms is
 that between public-key and the user identity.  CCITT Recommendation
 X.500 defines the concept of Distinguished Name.
 Version 2 of the U.S. Government Open Systems Interconnection Profile
 (GOSIP) specifies maximum sizes for O/R Name attributes.  Since most
 of these attributes also appear in Distinguished Names, we have
 adopted the O/R Name attribute size constraints specified in GOSIP
 and noted below.  Using these size constraints yields a maximum
 Distinguished Name length (exclusive of ASN encoding) of two-hundred
 fifty-nine (259) characters, based on the required and optional
 attributes described below for subject names.  The following
 attributes are required in subject Distinguished Names for purposes
 of this RFC:
    1.  Country Name in standard encoding (e.g., the two-character
        Printable String "US" assigned by ISO 3166 as the identifier
        for the United States of America, the string "GB" assigned as
        the identifier for the United Kingdom, or the string "NQ"
        assigned as the identifier for Dronning Maud Land).  Maximum
        ASCII character length of three (3).
    2.  Organizational Name (e.g., the Printable String "Bolt Beranek
        and Newman, Inc.").  Maximum ASCII character length of
        sixty-four (64).
    3.  Personal Name (e.g., the X.402/X.411 structured Printable
        String encoding for the name John Linn).  Maximum ASCII
        character length of sixty-four (64).

Kent & Linn [Page 18] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 The following attributes are optional in subject Distinguished Names
 for purposes of this RFC:
    1.  Organizational Unit Name(s) (e.g., the Printable String "BBN
        Communications Corporation")  A hierarchy of up to four
        organizational unit names may be provided; the least
        significant member of the hierarchy is represented first.
        Each of these attributes has a maximum ASCII character length of
        thirty-two (32), for a total of one-hundred and twenty-eight
        (128) characters if all four are present. Issuer Name

 A certificate provides a representation of its issuer's identity, in
 the form of a Distinguished Name.  The issuer identification is
 needed in order to determine the appropriate issuer public component
 to use in performing certificate validation.  The following
 attributes are required in issuer Distinguished Names for purposes of
 this RFC:
    1.  Country Name (e.g., encoding for "US")
    2.  Organizational Name
 The following attributes are optional in issuer Distinguished Names
 for purposes of this RFC:
    1.  Organizational Unit Name(s).  (A hierarchy of up to four
        organizational unit names may be provided; the least significant
        member of the hierarchy is represented first.)  If the
        issuer is vouching for the user identity in the Notary capacity
        described above, then exactly one instance of this field
        must be present and it must consist of the string "Notary".
 As noted earlier, only organizations are allowed as issuers in the
 proposed authentication hierarchy.  Hence the Distinguished Name for
 an issuer should always be that of an organization, not a user, and
 thus no Personal Name field may be included in the Distinguished Name
 of an issuer. Validity Period

 A certificate carries a pair of time specifiers, indicating the start
 and end of the time period over which a certificate is intended to be
 used.  No message should ever be prepared for transmission with a
 non-current certificate, but recipients should be prepared to receive
 messages processed using recently-expired certificates.  This fact
 results from the unpredictable (and sometimes substantial)

Kent & Linn [Page 19] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 transmission delay of the staged-delivery electronic mail
 environment.  The default and maximum validity period for
 certificates issued in this system will be two years. Subject Public Component

 A certificate carries the public component of its associated entity,
 as well as an indication of the algorithm with which the public
 component is to be used.  For purposes of this RFC, the algorithm
 identifier will indicate use of the RSA algorithm, as specified in
 RFC-1115.  Note that in this context, a user's public component is
 actually the modulus employed in RSA algorithm calculations.  A
 "universal" (public) exponent is employed in conjunction with the
 modulus to complete the system.  Two choices of exponents are
 recommended for use in this context and are described in section
 3.4.3.  Modulus size will be permitted to vary between 320 and 632
 bits. Certificate Signature

 A certificate carries a signature algorithm identifier and a
 signature, applied to the certificate by its issuer.  The signature
 is validated by the user of a certificate, in order to determine that
 the integrity of its contents have not been compromised subsequent to
 generation by a CA.  An encrypted, one-way hash will be employed as
 the signature algorithm.  Hash functions suitable for use in this
 context are notoriously difficult to design and tend to be
 computationally intensive.  Initially we have adopted a hash function
 developed by RSADSI and which exhibits performance roughly equivalent
 to the DES (in software).  This same function has been selected for
 use in other contexts in this system where a hash function (message
 hash algorithm) is required, e.g., MIC for multicast messages.  In
 the future we expect other one-way hash functions will be added to
 the list of algorithms designated for this purpose.

3.4.2 Validation Conventions

 Validating a certificate involves verifying that the signature
 affixed to the certificate is valid, i.e., that the hash value
 computed on the certificate contents matches the value that results
 from decrypting the signature field using the public component of the
 issuer.  In order to perform this operation the user must possess the
 public component of the issuer, either via some integrity-assured
 channel, or by extracting it from another (validated) certificate.
 In the proposed architecture this recursive operation is terminated
 quickly by adopting the convention that RSADSI will certify the
 certificates of all organizations or organizational units which act
 as issuers for end users.  (Additional validation steps may be

Kent & Linn [Page 20] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 required for certificates issued by other CAs as described in section
 Certification means that RSADSI will sign certificates in which the
 subject is the organization or organizational unit and for which
 RSADSI is the issuer, thus implying that RSADSI vouches for the
 credentials of the subject.  This is an appropriate construct since
 each ON representing an organization or organizational unit must have
 registered with RSADSI via a procedure more rigorous than individual
 user registration.  This does not preclude an organizational unit
 from also holding a certificate in which the "parent" organization
 (or organizational unit) is the issuer.  Both certificates are
 appropriate and permitted in the X.509 framework.  However, in order
 to facilitate the validation process in an environment where user-
 level directory services are generally not available, we will (at
 this time) adopt this certification convention.
 The public component needed to validate certificates signed by RSADSI
 (in its role as a CA for issuers) is transmitted to each user as part
 of the registration process (using electronic mail with independent,
 postal confirmation via a message hash).  Thus a user will be able to
 validate any user certificate (from the RSADSI hierarchy) in at most
 two steps.  Consider the situation in which a user receives a privacy
 enhanced message from an originator with whom the recipient has never
 previously corresponded.  Based on the certification convention
 described above, the recipient can use the RSADSI public component to
 validate the issuer's certificate contained in the X-Issuer-
 Certificate field.  (We recommend that, initially, the originator
 include his organization's certificate in this optional field so that
 the recipient need not access a server or cache for this public
 component.)  Using the issuer's public component (extracted from this
 certificate), the recipient can validate the originator's certificate
 contained in the X-Certificate field of the header.
 Having performed this certificate validation process, the recipient
 can extract the originator's public component and use it to decrypt
 the content of the X-MIC-Info field and thus verify the data origin
 authenticity and integrity of the message.  Of course,
 implementations of privacy enhanced mail should cache validated
 public components (acquired from incoming mail or via the message
 from a user registration process) to speed up this process.  If a
 message arrives from an originator whose public component is held in
 the recipient's cache, the recipient can immediately employ that
 public component without the need for the certificate validation
 process described here.  Also note that the arithmetic required for
 certificate validation is considerably faster than that involved in
 digitally signing a certificate, so as to minimize the computational
 burden on users.

Kent & Linn [Page 21] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 A separate issue associated with validation of certificates is a
 semantic one, i.e., is the entity identified in the issuer field
 appropriate to vouch for the identifying information in the subject
 field.  This is a topic outside the scope of X.509, but one which
 must be addressed in any viable system.  The hierarchy proposed in
 this RFC is designed to address this issue.  In most cases a user
 will claim, as part of his identifying information, affiliation with
 some organization and that organization will have the means and
 responsibility for verifying this identifying information.  In such
 circumstances one should expect an obvious relationship between the
 Distinguished Name components in the issuer and subject fields.
 For example, if the subject field of a certificate identified an
 individual as affiliated with the "Widget Systems Division"
 (Organizational Unit Name) of "Compudigicorp" (Organizational Name),
 one would expect the issuer field to specify "Compudigicorp" as the
 Organizational Name and, if an Organizational Unit Name were present,
 it should be "Widget Systems Division."  If the issuer's certificate
 indicated "Compudigicorp" as the subject (with no Organizational Unit
 specified), then the issuer should be "RSADSI."  If the issuer's
 certificate indicated "Widget Systems Division" as Organizational
 Unit and "Compudigicorp" as Organization in the subject field, then
 the issuer could be either "RSADSI" (due to the direct certification
 convention described earlier) or "Compudigicorp" (if the organization
 elected to distribute this intermediate level certificate).  In the
 later case, the certificate path would involve an additional step
 using the certificate in which "Compudigicorp" is the subject and
 "RSADSI" is the issuer.  One should be suspicious if the validation
 path does not indicate a subset relationship for the subject and
 issuer Distinguished Names in the certification path, expect where
 cross-certification is employed to cross CA boundaries.
 It is a local matter whether the message system presents a human user
 with the certification path used to validate a certificate associated
 with incoming, privacy-enhanced mail.  We note that a visual display
 of the Distinguished Names involved in that path is one means of
 providing the user with the necessary information.  We recommend,
 however, that certificate validation software incorporate checks and
 alert the user whenever the expected certification path relationships
 are not present.  The rationale here is that regular display of
 certification path data will likely be ignored by users, whereas
 automated checking with a warning provision is a more effective means
 of alerting users to possible certification path anomalies.  We urge
 developers to provide facilities of this sort.

3.4.3 Relation with X.509 Certificate Specification

 An X.509 certificate can be viewed as two components: contents and an

Kent & Linn [Page 22] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

 encrypted hash.  The encrypted hash is formed and processed as
    1.  X, the hash, is computed as a function of the certificate
    2.  the hash is signed by raising X to the power e (modulo n)
    3.  the hash's signature is validated by raising the result of
        step 2 to the power d (modulo n), yielding X, which is
        compared with the result computed as a function of certificate
 Annex C to X.509 suggests the use of Fermat number F4 (65537 decimal,
 1 + 2 **16 ) as a fixed value for e which allows relatively efficient
 authentication processing, i.e., at most seventeen (17)
 multiplications are required to effect exponentiation).  As an
 alternative one can employ three (3) as the value for e, yielding
 even faster exponentiation, but some precautions must be observed
 (see RFC-1115).  Users of the algorithm select values for d (a secret
 quantity) and n (a non-secret quantity) given this fixed value for e.
 As noted earlier, this RFC proposes that either three (3) or F4 be
 employed as universal encryption exponents, with the choice specified
 in the algorithm identifier.  In particular, use of an exponent value
 of three (3) for certificate validation is encouraged, to permit
 rapid certificate validation.  Given these conventions, a user's
 public component, and thus the quantity represented in his
 certificate, is actually the modulus (n) employed in this computation
 (and in the computations used to protect the DEK and MSGHASH, as
 described in RFC-1113).  A user's private component is the exponent
 (d) cited above.
 The X.509 certificate format is defined (in X.509, Annex G) by the
 following ASN.1 syntax:
       Certificate ::= SIGNED SEQUENCE{
               version [0]     Version DEFAULT v1988,
               serialNumber    CertificateSerialNumber,
               signature       AlgorithmIdentifier,
               issuer          Name,
               validity        Validity,
               subject         Name,
               subjectPublicKeyInfo    SubjectPublicKeyInfo}
       Version ::=     INTEGER {v1988(0)}
       CertificateSerialNumber ::=     INTEGER

Kent & Linn [Page 23] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

       Validity ::=    SEQUENCE{
               notBefore       UTCTime,
               notAfter        UTCTime}
       SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::=        SEQUENCE{
               algorithm               AlgorithmIdentifier,
               subjectPublicKey        BIT STRING}
       AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE{
               algorithm       OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
               parameters      ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL}
 All components of this structure are well defined by ASN.1 syntax
 defined in the 1988 X.400 and X.500 Series Recommendations, except
 for the AlgorithmIdentifier.  An algorithm identifier for RSA is
 contained in Annex H of X.509 but is unofficial.  RFC-1115 will
 provide detailed syntax and values for this field.


[1]  CCITT Recommendation X.411 (1988), "Message Handling Systems:
     Message Transfer System: Abstract Service Definition and
[2]  CCITT Recommendation X.509 (1988), "The Directory Authentication

Kent & Linn [Page 24] RFC 1114 Mail Privacy: Key Management August 1989

Authors' Addresses

     Steve Kent
     BBN Communications
     50 Moulton Street
     Cambridge, MA 02138
     Phone: (617) 873-3988
     EMail: kent@BBN.COM
     John Linn
     Secure Systems
     Digital Equipment Corporation
     85 Swanson Road, BXB1-2/D04
     Boxborough, MA  01719-1326
     Phone: 508-264-5491

Kent & Linn [Page 25]

/data/webs/external/dokuwiki/data/pages/rfc/rfc1114.txt · Last modified: 1989/08/25 00:12 (external edit)