rfc:rfc9189
Independent Submission S. Smyshlyaev, Ed. Request for Comments: 9189 CryptoPro Category: Informational D. Belyavskiy ISSN: 2070-1721 Cryptocom
E. Alekseev
CryptoPro
March 2022
GOST Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
1.2
Abstract
This document specifies three new cipher suites, two new signature algorithms, seven new supported groups, and two new certificate types for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.2 to support the Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (called "GOST" algorithms). This document specifies a profile of TLS 1.2 with GOST algorithms so that implementers can produce interoperable implementations.
This specification facilitates implementations that aim to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply IETF endorsement of the cipher suites, signature algorithms, supported groups, and certificate types.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at its discretion and makes no statement about its value for implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9189.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Conventions Used in This Document
3. Basic Terms and Definitions
4. Cipher Suite Definitions
4.1. Record Payload Protection
4.1.1. CTR_OMAC
4.1.2. CNT_IMIT
4.2. Key Exchange and Authentication
4.2.1. Hello Messages
4.2.2. Server Certificate
4.2.3. CertificateRequest
4.2.4. ClientKeyExchange
4.2.4.1. CTR_OMAC
4.2.4.2. CNT_IMIT
4.2.5. CertificateVerify
4.2.6. Finished
4.3. Cryptographic Algorithms
4.3.1. Block Cipher
4.3.2. MAC Algorithm
4.3.3. Encryption Algorithm
4.3.4. PRF and HASH Algorithms
4.3.5. SNMAX Parameter
5. New Values for the TLS SignatureAlgorithm Registry
6. New Values for the TLS Supported Groups Registry
7. New Values for the TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers
Registry
8. Additional Algorithms
8.1. TLSTREE
8.1.1. Key Tree Parameters
8.2. Key Export and Key Import Algorithms
8.2.1. KExp15 and KImp15 Algorithms
8.2.2. KExp28147 and KImp28147 Algorithms
8.3. Key Exchange Generation Algorithms
8.3.1. KEG Algorithm
8.3.2. KEG_28147 Algorithm
8.4. gostIMIT28147
9. IANA Considerations
10. Historical Considerations
11. Security Considerations
12. References
12.1. Normative References
12.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Test Examples
A.1. Test Examples for CTR_OMAC Cipher Suites
A.1.1. TLSTREE Examples
A.1.1.1. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC Cipher
Suite
A.1.1.2. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC Cipher
Suite
A.1.2. Record Examples
A.1.2.1. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC Cipher
Suite
A.1.2.2. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC Cipher
Suite
A.1.3. Handshake Examples
A.1.3.1. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC Cipher
Suite
A.1.3.2. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC Cipher
Suite
A.2. Test Examples for CNT_IMIT Cipher Suites
A.2.1. Record Examples
A.2.2. Handshake Examples
Contributors
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
This document specifies three new cipher suites, two new signature algorithms, seven new supported groups, and two new certificate types for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.2 [RFC5246] (note that [RFC5246] has been obsoleted by [RFC8446] ) to support the set of Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (called "GOST" algorithms). This document specifies a profile of TLS 1.2 with GOST algorithms so that implementers can produce interoperable implementations. The profile of TLS 1.2 with GOST algorithms uses the hash algorithm GOST R 34.11-2012 [RFC6986], the signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2012 [RFC7091], and two types of cipher suites: the CTR_OMAC and the CNT_IMIT.
The CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the GOST R 34.12-2015 (see [RFC7801] and [RFC8891]) block ciphers.
The CNT_IMIT cipher suite uses the GOST 28147-89 [RFC5830] block cipher.
This document specifies the profile of the TLS protocol version 1.2 with GOST algorithms. The profile of the TLS protocol version 1.3 [RFC8446] with GOST algorithms is specified in a separate document [DraftGostTLS13].
This specification facilitates implementations that aim to support the GOST algorithms. This document does not imply IETF endorsement of the cipher suites, signature algorithms, supported groups, and certificate types.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
3. Basic Terms and Definitions
This document follows the terminology from [RFC8446bis] for "preliminary secret" and "extended_main_secret".
This document uses the following terms and definitions for the sets and operations on the elements of these sets:
B_t the set of byte strings of length t, t >= 0. For t = 0,
the B_t set consists of a single empty string of zero
length. If A is an element of B_t, then A = (a_1, a_2,
... , a_t), where a_1, a_2, ... , a_t are in {0, ... ,
255}.
B* the set of all byte strings of a finite length (hereinafter
referred to as "strings"), including the empty string.
A[i..j] the string A[i..j] = (a_i, a_{i+1}, ... , a_j) in
B_{j-i+1}, where A = (a_1, ... , a_t) in B_t and
1<=i<=j<=t.
L(A) the length of the byte string A in bytes.
A | C concatenation of strings A and C both belonging to B*,
i.e., a string in B_{L(A)+L(C)}, where the left substring
in B_L(A) is equal to A and the right substring in B_L(C)
is equal to C.
A XOR C bitwise exclusive-or of byte strings A and C both belonging
to B_t (both are of length t bytes), i.e., a string in B_t
such that if A = (a_1, a_2, ... , a_t) and C = (c_1, c_2,
... , c_t), then A XOR C = (a_1 (xor) c_1, a_2 (xor) c_2,
... , a_t (xor) c_t), where (xor) is bitwise exclusive-or
of bytes.
i & j bitwise AND of unsigned integers i and j.
STR_t the transformation that maps an integer i = 256^(t-1) * i_1
+ ... + 256 * i_{t-1} + i_t into the byte string STR_t(i) =
(i_1, ... , i_t) in B_t (the interpretation of the integer
as a byte string in big-endian format).
str_t the transformation that maps an integer i = 256^(t-1) * i_t
+ ... + 256 * i_2 + i_1 into the byte string str_t(i) =
(i_1, ... , i_t) in B_t (the interpretation of the integer
as a byte string in little-endian format).
INT the transformation that maps a string a = (a_1, ... , a_t)
in B_t into the integer INT(a) = 256^(t-1) * a_1 + ... +
256 * a_{t-1} + a_t (the interpretation of the byte string
in big-endian format as an integer).
int the transformation that maps a string a = (a_1, ... , a_t)
in B_t into the integer int(a) = 256^(t-1) * a_t + ... +
256 * a_2 + a_1 (the interpretation of the byte string in
little-endian format as an integer).
k the length of the block cipher key in bytes.
n the length of the block cipher block in bytes.
Q_c the public key stored in the client's certificate.
d_c the private key that corresponds to the Q_c key.
Q_s the public key stored in the server's certificate.
d_s the private key that corresponds to the Q_s key.
q_s an order of a cyclic subgroup of the elliptic curve points
group containing point Q_s.
P_s the distinguished generator of the subgroup of order q_s
that belongs to the same curve as Q_s.
r_c the random string contained in the ClientHello.random field
(see [RFC5246]).
r_s the random string contained in the ServerHello.random field
(see [RFC5246]).
4. Cipher Suite Definitions
This document specifies the CTR_OMAC cipher suites and the CNT_IMIT cipher suite.
The CTR_OMAC cipher suites have the following values:
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC = {0xC1, 0x00};
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC = {0xC1, 0x01}.
The CNT_IMIT cipher suite has the following value:
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT = {0xC1, 0x02}.
4.1. Record Payload Protection
The profile of TLS 1.2 with GOST algorithms requires that the compression not be used.
All of the cipher suites described in this document use such modes of operation (see Section 4.3.3) that protect the records in the same way as if they were protected by a stream cipher. The TLSCiphertext structure for the CTR_OMAC and CNT_IMIT cipher suites is specified in accordance with the standard stream cipher case (see Section 6.2.3.1 of [RFC5246]):
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 length;
GenericStreamCipher fragment;
} TLSCiphertext;
where TLSCiphertext.fragment is generated in accordance with Section 4.1.1 when the CTR_OMAC cipher suites are used and Section 4.1.2 when the CNT_IMIT cipher suite is used.
The connection key material is a key material that consists of the sender_write_key (either the client_write_key or the server_write_key), the sender_write_MAC_key (either the client_write_MAC_key or the server_write_MAC_key), and the sender_write_IV (either the client_write_IV or the server_write_IV) parameters that are generated in accordance with Section 6.3 of [RFC5246].
The record key material is a key material that is generated from the connection key material and is used to protect a record with a certain sequence number. Note that with some cipher suites defined in this document, the record key material can be equal to the connection key material.
In this section, the TLSCiphertext.fragment generation is described for one particular endpoint (server or client) with the corresponding connection key material and record key material.
4.1.1. CTR_OMAC
In the CTR_OMAC cipher suites, the record key material differs from the connection key material, and for the seqnum sequence number consists of:
K_ENC_seqnum in B_k;
K_MAC_seqnum in B_k; and
IV_seqnum in B_{n/2}.
The K_ENC_seqnum and K_MAC_seqnum values are calculated using the TLSTREE function defined in Section 8.1, the connection key material, and the seqnum sequence number . IV_seqnum is calculated by adding the seqnum value to sender_write_IV modulo 2^((n/2)*8):
K_ENC_seqnum = TLSTREE(sender_write_key, seqnum);
K_MAC_seqnum = TLSTREE(sender_write_MAC_key, seqnum); and
IV_seqnum = STR_{n/2}((INT(sender_write_IV) + seqnum)
mod 2^({(n/2)*8}).
The TLSCiphertext.fragment that corresponds to the seqnum sequence number is calculated as follows:
1. The MACValue_seqnum value is generated using the Message
Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm (see Section 4.3.2) similar
to Section 6.2.3.1 of [RFC5246], except the sender_write_MAC_key
is replaced by the K_MAC_seqnum key:
MACValue_seqnum = MAC(K_MAC_seqnum, STR_8(seqnum) | type_seqnum |
version_seqnum | length_seqnum | fragment_seqnum),
where type_seqnum, version_seqnum, length_seqnum, and
fragment_seqnum are the TLSCompressed.type,
TLSCompressed.version, TLSCompressed.length, and
TLSCompressed.fragment values of the record with the seqnum
sequence number.
2. The entire data with the MACValue is encrypted with the ENC
stream cipher (see Section 4.3.3):
ENCValue_seqnum = ENC(K_ENC_seqnum, IV_seqnum, fragment_seqnum |
MACValue_seqnum),
where fragment_seqnum is the TLSCompressed.fragment value of the
record with the seqnum sequence number.
3. The fields of the GenericStreamCipher structure (see
Section 6.2.3.1 of [RFC5246]) for the TLSCiphertext.fragment
value are defined by the ENCValue_seqnum value:
TLSCiphertext.fragment.content =
ENCValue_seqnum[1..length_seqnum],
TLSCiphertext.fragment.MAC = ENCValue_seqnum[length_seqnum +
1..length_seqnum + mac_length],
where length_seqnum is the TLSCompressed.length value of the
record with the seqnum sequence number and mac_length is equal to
16 for the TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC cipher
suite and 8 for the TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC
cipher suite.
Note that the CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the authenticate-then- encrypt method (see Appendix F.4 of [RFC5246]). Since these ciphers are functioning as stream ciphers, the authenticate-then-encrypt method is secure, and as specified by [RFC7366], the server that selects the CTR_OMAC ciphers MUST NOT send an encrypt_then_mac extension to the client.
4.1.2. CNT_IMIT
In the CNT_IMIT cipher suite, the record key material is equal to the connection key material and consists of:
sender_write_key in B_k;
sender_write_MAC_key in B_k; and
sender_write_IV in B_n.
The TLSCiphertext.fragment that corresponds to the seqnum sequence number is calculated as follows:
1. The MACValue_seqnum value is generated by the MAC algorithm (see
Section 4.3.2) as follows:
MACValue_seqnum = MAC(sender_write_MAC_key, STR_8(0) | type_0 |
version_0 | length_0 | fragment_0 | ... | STR_8(seqnum) |
type_seqnum | version_seqnum | length_seqnum | fragment_seqnum),
where type_i, version_i, length_i, fragment_i, and i in {0, ... ,
seqnum} are the TLSCompressed.type, TLSCompressed.version,
TLSCompressed.length, and TLSCompressed.fragment values of the
record with the i sequence number.
Due to the use of the mode based on Cipher Block Chaining MAC
(CBC-MAC) (see Section 4.3.2), producing the MACValue_seqnum
value does not mean processing all previous records. It is
enough to store only an intermediate internal state of the MAC
algorithm.
2. The entire data with the MACValue is encrypted with the ENC
stream cipher (see Section 4.3.3):
ENCValue_0 | ... | ENCValue_seqnum = ENC(sender_write_key,
sender_write_IV, fragment_0 | MACValue_0 | ... | fragment_seqnum |
MACValue_seqnum),
where the length of the byte string ENCValue_i in bytes is equal
to the length of the byte string (fragment_i | MACValue_i) in
bytes and i in {0, ... , seqnum}.
Due to the use of the stream cipher (see Section 4.3.3),
producing the ENCValue_seqnum value does not mean processing all
previous records. It is enough to store only an intermediate
internal state of the ENC stream cipher.
3. The fields of the GenericStreamCipher structure (see
Section 6.2.3.1 of [RFC5246]) for the TLSCiphertext.fragment
value are defined by the ENCValue_seqnum value:
TLSCiphertext.fragment.content =
ENCValue_seqnum[1..length_seqnum],
TLSCiphertext.fragment.MAC = ENCValue_seqnum[length_seqnum +
1..length_seqnum + mac_length],
where length_seqnum is the TLSCompressed.length value of the
record with the seqnum sequence number, and mac_length is equal
to 4.
Note that the CNT_IMIT cipher suite uses the authenticate-then- encrypt method (see Appendix F.4 of [RFC5246]). Since this cipher is functioning as a stream cipher, the authenticate-then-encrypt method is secure, and as specified by [RFC7366], the server that selects the CNT_IMIT cipher MUST NOT send an encrypt_then_mac extension to the client.
4.2. Key Exchange and Authentication
The cipher suites defined in this document use a key encapsulation mechanism based on Diffie-Hellman to share the TLS preliminary secret.
Client Server
ClientHello -------->
ServerHello
Certificate
CertificateRequest*
<-------- ServerHelloDone
Certificate*
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify*
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->
[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished
Application Data <-------> Application Data
Figure 1: Message Flow for a Full Handshake
Notes for Figure 1:
1. "*" indicates optional messages that are sent for the client
authentication.
2. To help avoid pipeline stalls, ChangeCipherSpec is an independent
TLS protocol content type and is not actually a TLS handshake
message.
Figure 1 shows all messages involved in the TLS key establishment protocol (full handshake). A ServerKeyExchange MUST NOT be sent (the server's certificate contains enough data to allow the client to exchange the preliminary secret).
The server side of the channel is always authenticated; the client side is optionally authenticated. The server is authenticated by proving that it knows the preliminary secret that is encrypted with the public key Q_s from the server's certificate. The client is authenticated via its signature over the handshake transcript.
In general, the key exchange process for both the CTR_OMAC and CNT_IMIT cipher suites consists of the following steps:
1. The client generates the ephemeral key pair (d_eph, Q_eph) that
corresponds to the server's public key Q_s stored in its
certificate.
2. The client generates the preliminary secret PS. The PS value is
chosen from B_32 at random.
3. Using d_eph and Q_s, the client generates the export key material
(see Sections 4.2.4.1 and 4.2.4.2) for the particular key export
algorithm (see Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2) to generate the export
representation PSExp of the PS value.
4. The client sends its ephemeral public key Q_eph and PSExp value
in the ClientKeyExchange message.
5. Using its private key d_s, the server generates the import key
material (see Sections 4.2.4.1 and 4.2.4.2) for the particular
key import algorithm (see Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2) to extract
the preliminary secret PS from the export representation PSExp.
This section specifies the data structures and computations used by the profile of TLS 1.2 with GOST algorithms. The specifications for the ClientHello, ServerHello, Server Certificate, CertificateRequest, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify, and Finished handshake messages are described in further detail below.
4.2.1. Hello Messages
The ClientHello message is generated in accordance with Section 7.4.1.2 of [RFC5246] and must meet the following requirements:
- The ClientHello.compression_methods field MUST contain exactly one
byte, set to zero, which corresponds to the "null" compression
method.
- The ClientHello.extensions field MUST contain the
signature_algorithms extension (see [RFC5246]).
If the negotiated cipher suite is one of CTR_OMAC/CTR_IMIT and the
signature_algorithms extension in the ClientHello message does not
contain the values defined in Section 5, the server MUST either
abort the connection or ignore this extension and behave as if the
client had sent the signature_algorithms extension with the values
{8, 64} and {8, 65}.
The ServerHello message is generated in accordance with Section 7.4.1.3 of [RFC5246] and must meet the following requirements:
- The ServerHello.compression_method field MUST contain exactly one
byte, set to zero, which corresponds to the "null" compression
method.
- The ServerHello.extensions field MUST NOT contain the
encrypt_then_mac extension (see [RFC7366]).
4.2.2. Server Certificate
This message is used to authentically convey the server's public key Q_s to the client and is generated in accordance with Section 7.4.2 of [RFC5246].
Upon receiving this message, the client validates the certificate chain, extracts the server's public key, and checks that the key type is appropriate for the negotiated key exchange algorithm. (A possible reason for a fatal handshake failure is that the client's capabilities for handling elliptic curves and point formats are exceeded).
4.2.3. CertificateRequest
This message is sent by the server when requesting client authentication and is generated in accordance with Section 7.4.4 of [RFC5246].
If the CTR_OMAC or CNT_IMIT cipher suite is negotiated, the CertificateRequest message MUST meet the following requirements:
- the CertificateRequest.supported_signature_algorithm field MUST
contain only signature/hash algorithm pairs with the values {8,
64} or {8, 65} defined in Section 5;
- the CertificateRequest.certificate_types field MUST contain only
the gost_sign256 (67) or gost_sign512 (68) values defined in
Section 7.
4.2.4. ClientKeyExchange
The ClientKeyExchange message is defined as follows:
enum { vko_kdf_gost, vko_gost } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;
struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case vko_kdf_gost: GostKeyTransport;
case vko_gost: TLSGostKeyTransportBlob;
} exchange_keys;
} ClientKeyExchange;
The body of the ClientKeyExchange message consists of a GostKeyTransport/TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure that contains an export representation of the preliminary secret PS.
The GostKeyTransport structure corresponds to the CTR_OMAC cipher suites and is described in Section 4.2.4.1, and the TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure corresponds to the CNT_IMIT cipher suite and is described in Section 4.2.4.2.
The DER encoding rules are used to encode the GostKeyTransport and the TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structures.
4.2.4.1. CTR_OMAC
In the CTR_OMAC cipher suites, the body of the ClientKeyExchange message consists of the GostKeyTransport structure that is defined below.
The client generates the ClientKeyExchange message in accordance with the following steps:
1. Generates the ephemeral key pair (Q_eph, d_eph), where:
d_eph is chosen from {1, ... , q_s - 1} at random;
Q_eph = d_eph * P_s.
2. Generates the preliminary secret PS, where PS is chosen from B_32
at random.
3. Generates export keys (K_EXP_MAC and K_EXP_ENC) using the KEG
algorithm defined in Section 8.3.1:
H = HASH(r_c | r_s);
K_EXP_MAC | K_EXP_ENC = KEG(d_eph, Q_s, H).
4. Generates an export representation PSExp of the preliminary
secret PS using the KExp15 algorithm defined in Section 8.2.1:
IV = H[25..24 + n / 2];
PSExp = KExp15(PS, K_EXP_MAC, K_EXP_ENC, IV).
5. Generates the ClientKeyExchange message using the
GostKeyTransport structure that is defined as follows:
GostKeyTransport ::= SEQUENCE {
keyExp OCTET STRING,
ephemeralPublicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
ukm OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
}
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING
}
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY OPTIONAL
}
where the keyExp field contains the PSExp value, the
ephemeralPublicKey field contains the Q_eph value, and the ukm
field MUST be ignored by the server.
Upon receiving the ClientKeyExchange message, the server process is as follows.
1. The following three conditions are checked. If any of these
checks fail, then the server MUST abort the handshake with an
alert.
- Q_eph belongs to the same curve as server public key Q_s;
- Q_eph is not equal to zero point;
- q_s * Q_eph is equal to zero point.
2. The export keys (K_EXP_MAC and K_EXP_ENC) are generated using the
KEG algorithm defined in Section 8.3.1:
H = HASH(r_c | r_s);
K_EXP_MAC | K_EXP_ENC = KEG(d_s, Q_eph, H).
3. The preliminary secret PS is extracted from the export
representation PSExp using the KImp15 algorithm defined in
Section 8.2.1:
IV = H[25..24 + n / 2];
PS = KImp15(PSExp, K_EXP_MAC, K_EXP_ENC, IV).
4.2.4.2. CNT_IMIT
In the CNT_IMIT cipher suite, the body of the ClientKeyExchange message consists of a TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure that is defined below.
The client generates the ClientKeyExchange message in accordance with the following steps:
1. The ephemeral key pair (Q_eph, d_eph) is generated, where:
d_eph is chosen from {1, ... , q_s - 1} at random;
Q_eph = d_eph * P_s.
2. The preliminary secret PS is generated, where PS is chosen from
B_32 at random.
3. The export key (K_EXP) is generated using the KEG_28147 algorithm
defined in Section 8.3.2:
H = HASH(r_c | r_s);
K_EXP = KEG_28147(d_eph, Q_s, H).
4. An export representation PSExp of the preliminary secret PS using
the KExp28147 algorithm defined in Section 8.2.2 is generated:
PSExp = IV | CEK_ENC | CEK_MAC = KExp28147(PS, K_EXP, H[1..8]).
5. The ClientKeyExchange message is generated using the
TLSGostKeyTransportBlob structure that is defined as follows:
TLSGostKeyTransportBlob ::= SEQUENCE {
keyBlob GostR3410-KeyTransport
}
GostR3410-KeyTransport ::= SEQUENCE {
sessionEncryptedKey Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey,
transportParameters [0] IMPLICIT GostR3410-
TransportParameters OPTIONAL
}
Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
encryptedKey Gost28147-89-Key,
maskKey [0] IMPLICIT Gost28147-89-Key OPTIONAL,
macKey Gost28147-89-MAC
}
GostR3410-TransportParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
encryptionParamSet OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
ephemeralPublicKey [0] IMPLICIT SubjectPublicKeyInfo
OPTIONAL,
ukm OCTET STRING
}
where GostR3410-KeyTransport, Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey, and
GostR3410-TransportParameters are defined according to
Section 4.2.1 of [RFC4490].
In the context of this document, the GostR3410-KeyTransport.transportParameters field is always used, the Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey.maskKey field is omitted, and the GostR3410-KeyTransport.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey field is always used.
The Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey.encryptedKey field contains the CEK_ENC value, the Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey.macKey field contains the CEK_MAC value, and the GostR3410-TransportParameters.ukm field contains the initialization vector (IV) value.
The keyBlob.transportParameters.ephemeralPublicKey field contains the client ephemeral public key Q_eph. The encryptionParamSet contains the value 1.2.643.7.1.2.5.1.1, which corresponds to the id-tc26-gost- 28147-param-Z parameters set defined in [RFC7836].
Upon receiving the ClientKeyExchange message, the server process is as follows.
1. The following three conditions are checked. If either of these
checks fails, then the server MUST abort the handshake with an
alert.
- Q_eph belongs to the same curve as server public key Q_s;
- Q_eph is not equal to zero point;
- q_s * Q_eph is equal to zero point.
2. The export key (K_EXP) is generated using the KEG_28147 algorithm
defined in Section 8.3.2:
H = HASH(r_c | r_s);
K_EXP = KEG_28147(d_s, Q_eph, H).
3. The preliminary secret PS is extracted from the export
representation PSExp using the KImp28147 algorithm defined in
Section 8.2.2:
PS = KImp28147(PSExp, K_EXP, H[1..8]).
4.2.5. CertificateVerify
The client generates the value sgn as follows:
sgn = SIGN_{d_c}(handshake_messages) = str_l(r) | str_l(s)
where SIGN_{d_c} is the GOST R 34.10-2012 [RFC7091] signature
algorithm, d_c is a client long-term private key that corresponds to
the client long-term public key Q_c from the client's certificate, l
= 32 for the gostr34102012_256 value of the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
field, and l = 64 for the gostr34102012_512 value of the
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm field.
Here, "handshake_messages" refers to all handshake messages sent or received, starting at ClientHello and up to CertificateVerify without the last message; it includes the type and length fields of the handshake messages.
The TLS CertificateVerify message is specified as follows:
struct {
SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm;
opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
} CertificateVerify;
where the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm structure is specified in Section 5, and the CertificateVerify.signature field contains the sgn value.
4.2.6. Finished
The TLS Finished message is generated in accordance with Section 7.4.9 of [RFC5246].
The verify_data_length value is equal to 32 for the CTR_OMAC cipher suites and is equal to 12 for the CNT_IMIT cipher suite. The pseudorandom function (PRF) is defined in Section 4.3.4.
4.3. Cryptographic Algorithms
4.3.1. Block Cipher
The cipher suite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC MUST use Kuznyechik [RFC7801] as a base block cipher for the encryption and MAC algorithm. The block length n is 16 bytes, and the key length k is 32 bytes.
The cipher suite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC MUST use Magma [RFC8891] as a base block cipher for the encryption and MAC algorithm. The block length n is 8 bytes, and the key length k is 32 bytes.
The cipher suite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT MUST use GOST 28147-89 as a base block cipher [RFC5830] with the set of parameters id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z defined in [RFC7836]. The block length n is 8 bytes, and the key length k is 32 bytes.
4.3.2. MAC Algorithm
The CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the One-Key MAC (OMAC) construction defined in [GOST3413-2015], which is the same as the Cipher-Based MAC (CMAC) mode defined in [CMAC] where the Kuznyechik or Magma block cipher (see Section 4.3.1) is used instead of the AES block cipher (see [IK2003] for more detail) as the MAC function. The resulting MAC length is equal to the block length, and the MAC key length is 32 bytes.
The CNT_IMIT cipher suite uses the MAC function gostIMIT28147 defined in Section 8.4 with the initialization vector IV = IV0, where IV0 in B_8 is a string of all zeros, with the CryptoPro Key Meshing algorithm defined in [RFC4357]. The resulting MAC length is 4 bytes, and the MAC key length is 32 bytes.
4.3.3. Encryption Algorithm
The CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the block cipher in the CTR-ACPKM encryption mode defined in [RFC8645] as the ENC function. The section size N is 4 KB for the TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC cipher suite and 1 KB for the TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC cipher suite.
The CNT_IMIT cipher suite uses the block cipher in counter encryption mode (CNT) defined in Section 6 of [RFC5830], with the CryptoPro key meshing algorithm defined in [RFC4357] as the ENC function.
Note that the counter modes used in cipher suites described in this document act as stream ciphers.
4.3.4. PRF and HASH Algorithms
The PRF for all the cipher suites defined in this document is the PRF_TLS_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function defined in [RFC7836].
The hash function HASH for all the cipher suites defined in this document is the GOST R 34.11-2012 [RFC6986] hash algorithm with a 32-byte (256-bit) hash code.
4.3.5. SNMAX Parameter
The SNMAX parameter defines the maximal value of the seqnum sequence number during one TLS 1.2 connection and is defined as follows:
+=================================================+==========+
| Cipher Suites | SNMAX |
+=================================================+==========+
| TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC | SNMAX = |
| TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT | 2^64 - 1 |
+-------------------------------------------------+----------+
| TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC | SNMAX = |
| | 2^32 - 1 |
+-------------------------------------------------+----------+
Table 1
5. New Values for the TLS SignatureAlgorithm Registry
The signature/hash algorithm pairs are used to indicate to the server/client which algorithms can be used in digital signatures and are defined by the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm structure (see Section 7.4.1.4.1 of [RFC5246]).
This document defines new values for the "TLS SignatureAlgorithm" registry that can be used in the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.signature field for the particular signature/hash algorithm pair:
enum {
gostr34102012_256(64),
gostr34102012_512(65),
} SignatureAlgorithm;
where the gostr34102012_256 and gostr34102012_512 values correspond to the GOST R 34.10-2012 [RFC7091] signature algorithm with a 32-byte (256-bit) and 64-byte (512-bit) key length, respectively.
According to [RFC7091], the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm with a 32-byte (256-bit) or 64-byte (512-bit) key length uses the GOST R 34.11-2012 [RFC6986] hash algorithm with a 32-byte (256-bit) or 64-byte (512-bit) hash code, respectively (the hash algorithm is intrinsic to the signature algorithm). Therefore, if the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.signature field of a particular hash/ signature pair listed in the Signature Algorithms Extension is equal to the 64 (gostr34102012_256) or 65 (gostr34102012_512) value, the SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.hash field of this pair MUST contain the "Intrinsic" value 8 (see [RFC8422]).
So, to represent gostr34102012_256 and gostr34102012_512 in the signature_algorithms extension, the value shall be (8,64) and (8,65), respectively.
6. New Values for the TLS Supported Groups Registry
The Supported Groups Extension indicates the set of elliptic curves supported by the client and is defined in [RFC8422] and [RFC7919].
This document defines new values for the "TLS Supported Groups" registry:
enum {
GC256A(34), GC256B(35), GC256C(36), GC256D(37),
GC512A(38), GC512B(39), GC512C(40),
} NamedGroup;
where the values correspond to the following curves:
+=============+========================================+===========+ | Description | Curve Identifier Value | Reference | +=============+========================================+===========+ | GC256A | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA | [RFC7836] | +-------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+ | GC256B | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet | [RFC4357] | +-------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+ | GC256C | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet | [RFC4357] | +-------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+ | GC256D | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet | [RFC4357] | +-------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+ | GC512A | id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA | [RFC7836] | +-------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+ | GC512B | id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB | [RFC7836] | +-------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+ | GC512C | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC | [RFC7836] | +-------------+----------------------------------------+-----------+
Table 2
7. New Values for the TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers Registry
The ClientCertificateType field of the CertificateRequest message contains a list of certificate types that the client may offer and is defined in Section 7.4.4 of [RFC5246].
This document defines new values for the "TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registry:
enum {
gost_sign256(67),
gost_sign512(68),
} ClientCertificateType;
To use the gost_sign256 or gost_sign512 authentication mechanism, the client MUST possess a certificate containing a GOST R 34.10-2012-capable public key that corresponds to the 32-byte (256-bit) or 64-byte (512-bit) signature key, respectively.
The client proves possession of the private key corresponding to the certified key by including a signature in the CertificateVerify message as described in Section 4.2.5.
8. Additional Algorithms
The cipher suites specified in this document rely on some additional algorithms, specified below; the use of these algorithms is not confined to the use in TLS specified in this document.
8.1. TLSTREE
The TLSTREE function is defined as follows:
TLSTREE(K_root, i) = KDF_3(KDF_2(KDF_1(K_root, STR_8(i & C_1)), STR_8(i & C_2)), STR_8(i & C_3)),
where
- K_root in B_32;
- i in {0, 1, … , 2^64 - 1};
- C_1, C_2, C_3 are constants defined by the particular cipher suite
(see Section 8.1.1);
- KDF_j(K, D), j = 1, 2, 3, K in B_32, D in B_8, is the key
derivation function based on the KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function
defined in [RFC7836]:
KDF_1(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level1", D);
KDF_2(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level2", D); and
KDF_3(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level3", D).
8.1.1. Key Tree Parameters
The CTR_OMAC cipher suites use the TLSTREE function for the rekeying approach. The constants for it are defined as in the table below.
+============================================+======================+ |Cipher Suites |C_1, C_2, C_3 | +============================================+======================+ |TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC|C_1=0xFFFFFFFF00000000| | |C_2=0xFFFFFFFFFFF80000| | |C_3=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC0| +--------------------------------------------+----------------------+ |TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC |C_1=0xFFFFFFC000000000| | |C_2=0xFFFFFFFFFE000000| | |C_3=0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF000| +--------------------------------------------+----------------------+
Table 3
8.2. Key Export and Key Import Algorithms
8.2.1. KExp15 and KImp15 Algorithms
Algorithms KExp15 and KImp15 use the block cipher determined by the particular cipher suite.
The KExp15 key export algorithm is defined as follows:
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| KExp15(S, K_Exp_MAC, K_Exp_ENC, IV) |
|------------------------------------------------------------|
| Input: |
| - secret S to be exported, S in B*, |
| - key K_Exp_MAC in B_k, |
| - key K_Exp_ENC in B_k, |
| - IV in B_{n/2} |
| Output: |
| - export representation SExp in B_{L(S)+n} |
|------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. CEK_MAC = OMAC(K_Exp_MAC, IV | S), CEK_MAC in B_n |
| 2. SExp = CTR-Encrypt(K_Exp_ENC, IV, S | CEK_MAC) |
| 3. return SExp |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
where the OMAC function is defined in [MODES] and the CTR-Encrypt(K, IV, S) function denotes the encryption of message S on key K and nonce IV in the CTR mode with s = n (see [MODES]).
The KImp15 key import algorithm is defined as follows:
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| KImp15(SExp, K_Exp_MAC, K_Exp_ENC, IV) |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Input: |
| - export representation SExp in B* |
| - key K_Exp_MAC in B_k, |
| - key K_Exp_ENC in B_k, |
| - IV in B_{n/2} |
| Output: |
| - secret S in B_{L(SExp)-n} or FAIL |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. S | CEK_MAC = CTR-Decrypt(K_Exp_ENC, IV, SExp), CEK_MAC in B_n|
| 2. If CEK_MAC = OMAC(K_Exp_MAC, IV | S) |
| then return S; else return FAIL |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
where the OMAC function is defined in [MODES] and the CTR-Decrypt(K, IV, S) function denotes the decryption of message S on key K and nonce IV in the CTR mode (see [MODES]).
The keys K_Exp_MAC and K_Exp_ENC MUST be independent. For every pair of keys (K_Exp_ENC, K_Exp_MAC), the IV values MUST be unique. For the import of a key with the KImp15 algorithm, the IV value may be sent with the export key representation.
8.2.2. KExp28147 and KImp28147 Algorithms
The KExp28147 key export algorithm is defined as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------------+ | KExp28147(S, K, IV) | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - secret S to be exported, S in B_32, | | - key K in B_32, | | - IV in B_8. | | Output: | | - export representation SExp in B_44 | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. CEK_MAC = gost28147IMIT(IV, K, S), CEK_MAC in B_4 | | 2. CEK_ENC = ECB-Encrypt(K, S), CEK_ENC in B_32 | | 3. return SExp = IV | CEK_ENC | CEK_MAC | +----------------------------------------------------------------+
where the gost28147IMIT function is defined in Section 8.4 and the ECB-Encrypt(K, S) function denotes the encryption of message S on key K with the block cipher GOST 28147-89 in the electronic codebook (ECB) mode (see [RFC5830]).
The KImp28147 key import algorithm is defined as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------------+ | KImp28147(SExp, K, IV) | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - export representation SExp in B_44, | | - key K in B_32, | | - IV in B_8. | | Output: | | - imported secret S in B_32 or FAIL | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. extract from SExp | | IV' = SExp[1..8], | | CEK_ENC = SExp[9..40], | | CEK_MAC = SExp[41..44] | | 2. if IV' != IV then return FAIL; else | | 3. S = ECB-Decrypt(K, CEK_ENC), S in B_32 | | 4. If CEK_MAC = gost28147IMIT(IV, K, S) | | then return S; else return FAIL | +----------------------------------------------------------------+
where the gost28147IMIT function is defined in Section 8.4 and the ECB-Decrypt(CEK_ENC, M) function denotes the decryption of ciphertext CEK_ENC on key K with a block cipher GOST 28147-89 in the ECB mode (see [RFC5830]).
8.3. Key Exchange Generation Algorithms
8.3.1. KEG Algorithm
The KEG algorithm is defined as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------------+ | KEG(d, Q, H) | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - private key d, | | - public key Q, | | - H in B_32. | | Output: | | - key material K in B_64. | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. If q * Q is not equal to zero point | | return FAIL | | 2. If 2^254 < q < 2^256 | | return KEG_256(d, Q, H) | | 3. If 2^508 < q < 2^512 | | return KEG_512(d, Q, H) | | 4. return FAIL | +----------------------------------------------------------------+
where q is an order of a cyclic subgroup of elliptic curve points
group containing point Q, d in {1, ... , q - 1}.
The KEG_256 algorithm is defined as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------------+ | KEG_256(d, Q, H) | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - private key d, | | - public key Q, | | - H in B_32. | | Output: | | - key material K in B_64. | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. r = INT(H[1..16]) | | 2. If r = 0 | | UKM = 1; else UKM = r | | 3. K_EXP = VKO_256(d, Q, UKM) | | 4. seed = H[17..24] | | 5. return KDFTREE_256(K_EXP, "kdf tree", seed, 1) | +----------------------------------------------------------------+
where VKO_256 is the function VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256 defined in [RFC7836] and KDFTREE_256 is the KDF_TREE_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function defined in [RFC7836] with the parameter L equal to 512.
The KEG_512 algorithm is defined as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------------+ | KEG_512(d, Q, H) | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - private key d, | | - public key Q, | | - H in B_32. | | Output: | | - key material K in B_64. | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. r = INT(H[1..16]) | | 2. If r = 0 | | UKM = 1; else UKM = r | | 3. return VKO_512(d, Q, UKM) | +----------------------------------------------------------------+
where VKO_512 is the VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_512 function defined in [RFC7836].
8.3.2. KEG_28147 Algorithm
The KEG_28147 algorithm is defined as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------------+ | KEG_28147(d, Q, H) | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - private key d, | | - public key Q, | | - H in B_32. | | Output: | | - key material K in B_32. | |----------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. If q * Q is not equal to zero point | | return FAIL | | 2. UKM = H[1..8] | | 3. R = VKO_256(d, Q, int(UKM)) | | 4. return K = CPDivers(UKM, R) | +----------------------------------------------------------------+
where the VKO_256 function is equal to the VKO_GOSTR3410_2012_256 function defined in [RFC7836] and the CPDivers function corresponds to the CryptoPro KEK Diversification Algorithm defined in [RFC4357], which takes as input the User Keying Material (UKM) value and the key value.
8.4. gostIMIT28147
gost28147IMIT(IV, K, M) is a MAC algorithm with a 4-byte output and is defined as follows:
+----------------------------------------------------------------+
| gost28147IMIT(IV, K, M) |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| Input: |
| - initial value IV in B_8, |
| - key K in B_32, |
| - message M in B*. |
| Output: |
| - MAC value T in B_4. |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. M' = PAD(M) |
| 2. M' = M'_0 | ... | M'_r, L(M'_i) = 8, i in {0, ... , r} |
| 3. M'' = (M'_0 XOR IV) | M'_1 | ... | M'_r |
| 4. return T = MAC28147(K, M'') |
+----------------------------------------------------------------+
where the PAD function is the padding function that adds m zero bytes to the end of the message, m is the smallest, non-negative solution to the equation (L(M) + m) mod 8 = 0, and the MAC28147 function corresponds to the MAC generation mode defined in [RFC5830] with a 4-byte length output.
9. IANA Considerations
IANA has added the following values to the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry:
+=========+==========================+=======+============+=========+ |Value | Description |DTLS-OK|Recommended |Reference| +=========+==========================+=======+============+=========+ |0xC1,0x00| TLS_GOSTR341112_256_ |N |N |RFC 9189 | | | WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC | | | | +---------+--------------------------+-------+------------+---------+ |0xC1,0x01| TLS_GOSTR341112_256_ |N |N |RFC 9189 | | | WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC | | | | +---------+--------------------------+-------+------------+---------+ |0xC1,0x02| TLS_GOSTR341112_256_ |N |N |RFC 9189 | | | WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT | | | | +---------+--------------------------+-------+------------+---------+
Table 4
IANA has added the following values to the "TLS SignatureAlgorithm" registry:
+=======+===================+=========+===========+
| Value | Description | DTLS-OK | Reference |
+=======+===================+=========+===========+
| 64 | gostr34102012_256 | Y | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------------+---------+-----------+
| 65 | gostr34102012_512 | Y | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------------+---------+-----------+
Table 5
IANA has added the following values to the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry:
+========+=======================+=============+===========+
| Value | Description | Recommended | Reference |
+========+=======================+=============+===========+
| 0x0840 | Reserved for backward | N | RFC 9189 |
| | compatibility | | |
+--------+-----------------------+-------------+-----------+
| 0x0841 | Reserved for backward | N | RFC 9189 |
| | compatibility | | |
+--------+-----------------------+-------------+-----------+
Table 6
IANA has also added the following footnote to values 64 and 65 in the "TLS SignatureAlgorithm" registry:
| These values were allocated from the Reserved state due to a | misunderstanding of the difference between Reserved and | Unallocated that went undetected for a long time. Additional | allocations from the Reserved state are not expected, and the TLS | SignatureScheme registry is suitable for use for new allocations | instead of this registry.
IANA has added the following values to the "TLS Supported Groups" registry:
+=======+=============+=========+=============+===========+
| Value | Description | DTLS-OK | Recommended | Reference |
+=======+=============+=========+=============+===========+
| 34 | GC256A | Y | N | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
| 35 | GC256B | Y | N | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
| 36 | GC256C | Y | N | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
| 37 | GC256D | Y | N | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
| 38 | GC512A | Y | N | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
| 39 | GC512B | Y | N | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
| 40 | GC512C | Y | N | RFC 9189 |
+-------+-------------+---------+-------------+-----------+
Table 7
IANA has added the following values to the "TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers" registry:
+-------+--------------+---------+-----------+
| Value | Description | DTLS-OK | Reference |
+-------+--------------+---------+-----------+
| 67 | gost_sign256 | Y | RFC 9189 |
+-------+--------------+---------+-----------+
| 68 | gost_sign512 | Y | RFC 9189 |
+-------+--------------+---------+-----------+
Table 8
10. Historical Considerations
Note that prior to the existence of this document, implementations
could use only the values from the "Private Use" space in order to
use the GOST-based algorithms. So some old implementations can still
use the old value {0xFF, 0x85} instead of the {0xC1, 0x02} value to
indicate the TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT cipher suite;
the old value 0xEE instead of the values 64, 8, and 67 (to indicate
the gostr34102012_256 signature algorithm, the Intrinsic hash
algorithm, and the gost_sign256 certificate type, respectively); the
old value 0xEF instead of the values 65, 8, and 68 (to indicate the
gostr34102012_512 signature algorithm, the Intrinsic hash algorithm,
and the gost_sign512 certificate type, respectively).
Due to historical reasons, in addition to the curve identifier values listed in Table 2, there exist some extra identifier values that correspond to the curves GC256B, GC256C, and GC256D as follows (see [RFC4357] and [R-1323565.1.024-2019]).
+=============+==============================================+
| Description | Curve Identifier Values |
+=============+==============================================+
| GC256B | id-GostR3410_2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet |
| | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| GC256C | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
| GC256D | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet |
| | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD |
+-------------+----------------------------------------------+
Table 9
The client should be prepared to handle any of these correctly if the corresponding group is included in the supported_groups extension (see [RFC8422] and [RFC7919]).
11. Security Considerations
The cipher suites defined in this document do not provide Perfect Forward Secrecy.
The authenticate-then-encrypt method is crucial for the CNT_IMIT cipher suite. Encryption of the MAC value is conducted to reduce the possibility of forgery to guessing. Here, the probability of a guess is approximately equal to 2^-32, which is acceptable in some practical cases.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4357] Popov, V., Kurepkin, I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89, GOST
R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
Algorithms", RFC 4357, DOI 10.17487/RFC4357, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4357>.
[RFC4490] Leontiev, S., Ed. and G. Chudov, Ed., "Using the GOST
28147-89, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R
34.10-2001 Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS)", RFC 4490, DOI 10.17487/RFC4490, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4490>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
[RFC5830] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST 28147-89: Encryption, Decryption,
and Message Authentication Code (MAC) Algorithms",
RFC 5830, DOI 10.17487/RFC5830, March 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5830>.
[RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012:
Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>.
[RFC7091] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.10-2012:
Digital Signature Algorithm", RFC 7091,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7091, December 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7091>.
[RFC7366] Gutmann, P., "Encrypt-then-MAC for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", RFC 7366, DOI 10.17487/RFC7366, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7366>.
[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
[RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher
"Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>.
[RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V.,
Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines
on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of
Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012",
RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>.
[RFC7919] Gillmor, D., "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 7919, DOI 10.17487/RFC7919, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7919>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric
Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>.
[RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015:
Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891,
September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>.
12.2. Informative References
[CMAC] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication", NIST Special
Publication 800-38B, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38B, October
2016, <https://www.nist.gov/publications/recommendation-
block-cipher-modes-operation-cmac-mode-authentication-0>.
[DraftGostTLS13]
Smyshlyaev, S., Alekseev, E., Griboedova, E., Babueva, A.,
and L. Nikiforova, "GOST Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-smyshlyaev-tls13-gost-suites-05, 10
December 2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-smyshlyaev-tls13-gost-suites-05>.
[GOST3413-2015]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Modes of operation for block ciphers", GOST R 34.13-2015,
2015.
[IK2003] Iwata, T. and K. Kurosawa, "OMAC: One-Key CBC MAC", FSE
2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2887,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-39887-5_11, 2003,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-39887-5_11>.
[MODES] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods and Techniques", NIST Special
Publication 800-38A, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38A, December
2001, <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-
38a/final>.
[R-1323565.1.024-2019]
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology,
"Information technology. Cryptographic data security.
Elliptic curve parameters for the cryptographic algorithms
and protocols", R 1323565.1.024-2019, January 2019.
[RFC8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-04, 7 March 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-04>.
Appendix A. Test Examples
A.1. Test Examples for CTR_OMAC Cipher Suites
A.1.1. TLSTREE Examples
A.1.1.1. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC Cipher Suite
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC
***********************************************
Root Key K_root:
00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A
11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00
seqnum = 0
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4
The resulting key from Divers_3:
19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
seqnum = 4095
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4
The resulting key from Divers_3:
19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
seqnum = 4096
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4
The resulting key from Divers_3:
FB 30 EE 53 CF CF 89 D7 48 FC 0C 72 EF 16 0B 8B
53 CB BB FD 03 12 82 B0 26 21 4A B2 E0 77 58 FF
seqnum = 33554431
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4
The resulting key from Divers_3:
B8 5B 36 DC 22 82 32 6B C0 35 C5 72 DC 93 F1 8D
83 AA 01 74 F3 94 20 9A 51 3B B3 74 DC 09 35 AE
seqnum = 33554432
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
3F EA 59 38 DA 2B F8 DD C4 7E C1 DC 55 61 89 66
79 02 BE 42 0D F4 C3 7D AF 21 75 3B CB 1D C7 F3
The resulting key from Divers_3:
0F D7 C0 9E FD F8 E8 15 73 EE CC F8 6E 4B 95 E3
AF 7F 34 DA B1 17 7C FD 7D B9 7B 6D A9 06 40 8A
seqnum = 274877906943
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
AB F3 A5 37 98 3A 1B 98 40 06 6D E6 8A 49 BF 25
97 7E E5 C3 F5 2D 33 3E 3C 22 0F 1D 15 C5 08 93
The resulting key from Divers_3:
48 0F 99 72 BA F2 5D 4C 36 9A 96 AF 91 BC A4 55
3F 79 D8 F0 C5 61 8B 19 FD 44 CF DC 57 FA 37 33
seqnum = 274877906944
First-level key from Divers_1:
15 60 0D 9E 8F A6 85 54 CF 15 2D C7 4F BC 42 51
17 B0 3E 09 76 BB 28 EA 98 24 C3 B7 0F 28 CB D8
Second-level key from Divers_2:
6C C2 8E B0 93 24 72 12 5C 7A D3 F8 09 73 B3 C8
C4 13 7D A5 73 BC 17 1A 24 ED D4 A3 71 F1 F8 73
The resulting key from Divers_3:
25 28 C1 C6 A8 F0 92 7B F2 BE 27 BB 78 D2 7F 21
46 D6 55 93 B0 C7 17 3A 06 CB 9D 88 DF 92 32 65
A.1.1.2. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC Cipher Suite
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC
***********************************************
Root Key K_root:
00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A
11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00
seqnum = 0
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4
The resulting key from Divers_3:
19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
seqnum = 63
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4
The resulting key from Divers_3:
19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38
17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
seqnum = 64
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4
The resulting key from Divers_3:
AE BE 1E F4 18 71 3B F0 44 B9 FC D9 E5 72 D4 37
FB 38 B5 D8 29 56 7A 6F 79 18 39 6D 9F 4E 09 6B
seqnum = 524287
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
51 37 D5 C4 A6 E6 BE 42 C4 40 D1 0A 95 EE A0 7F
08 9E 74 0D 38 90 EB 52 65 2C 0C B9 3F 20 7B B4
The resulting key from Divers_3:
6F 18 D4 00 3E A2 CB 30 F5 FE C1 93 A2 34 F0 7D
7C 43 94 98 7F 50 75 8D E2 2B 22 0D 8A 10 51 06
seqnum = 524288
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
F6 59 EB 85 EE BD 2A 8D CC 1B B3 F7 C6 00 57 FF
6D 33 B6 0F 74 65 DD 42 B5 11 2C F3 A6 B1 AB 66
The resulting key from Divers_3:
E5 4B 16 41 5B 3B 66 3E 78 0B 06 2D 24 F7 36 C4
49 54 63 C3 A8 91 E1 FA 46 F7 AE 99 FF F9 F3 78
seqnum = 4294967295
First-level key from Divers_1:
F3 55 89 F0 9B F8 01 B1 CA 11 42 73 B9 5F D6 C1
39 2E 78 F9 FB 81 4D A0 5A 7C CA 08 9E C8 65 42
Second-level key from Divers_2:
F4 BC 10 1A BB 68 86 2A 8C E3 1E A0 0D DF A7 FE
B8 29 10 F1 24 F4 B1 E2 9E A8 3B E0 06 C2 26 8D
The resulting key from Divers_3:
CF 60 09 04 C7 1E 7B 88 A4 9A C8 E2 45 77 4B 3D
BE ED FB 81 DE 9A 0E 2F 4E 46 C3 56 07 BC 2F 04
seqnum = 4294967296
First-level key from Divers_1:
55 CC 95 E0 D1 FB 54 85 AF 8E F6 9A CD 72 B2 32
79 7C D2 E8 5D 86 CD FD 1D E5 5B D1 FA 14 37 78
Second-level key from Divers_2:
72 16 91 E1 01 C4 28 96 A6 40 AE 18 3F BB 44 5B
76 37 9C 57 E1 FD 8A 7D 49 A6 23 E4 23 8C 0E 1D
The resulting key from Divers_3:
16 18 0B 24 64 54 00 B8 36 14 38 37 D8 6A AC 93
95 2A E3 EB 82 44 D5 EC 2A B0 2C FF 30 78 11 38
A.1.2. Record Examples
A.1.2.1. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC Cipher Suite
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC ******************************************************** It is assumed that the following keys were established during handshake:
- MAC key:
00000: 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A
00010: 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 - Encryption key: 00000: 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 11 00010: 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 11 22 - IV: 00000: 00 00 00 00 --------------------------------------------------------- seqnum = 0
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
TLSPlaintext: 00000: 17 03 03 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
K_MAC_0: 00000: 19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38 00010: 17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
MAC value: 00000: F3 3E B6 89 6F EC E2 86
K_ENC_0: 00000: 58 AF BE 9A 4C 31 98 AA AB AA 26 92 C4 19 F1 79 00010: 7C 9B 92 DE B3 CC 74 46 B3 63 57 71 13 F0 FB 56
IV_0: 00000: 00 00 00 00
TLSCiphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 00 0F 9B 42 0D A8 6F AF 36 7F 05 14 43 00010: CE 9C 10 72 --------------------------------------------------------- seqnum = 4095
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . . 003D0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 003E0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
TLSPlaintext: 00000: 17 03 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . . 003D0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 003E0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00400: 00 00 00 00 00
K_MAC_4095: 00000: 19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38 00010: 17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
MAC value: 00000: 58 D3 BB 60 8F BC 98 B8
K_ENC_4095: 00000: 58 AF BE 9A 4C 31 98 AA AB AA 26 92 C4 19 F1 79 00010: 7C 9B 92 DE B3 CC 74 46 B3 63 57 71 13 F0 FB 56
IV_4095: 00000: 00 00 0F FF
TLSCiphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 04 08 B7 11 43 8B 16 20 1F 3C 49 33 95 00010: 21 C9 C8 CA 75 66 D4 C2 0F D3 3E 58 1F 80 07 DC 00020: 76 04 3E 2B 35 C8 E8 4B B2 55 08 27 66 13 59 6F . . . 003D0: E7 77 70 BF 45 17 E1 F8 DD 1B 2C 05 64 AD 68 FC 003E0: 4A 88 9A 48 B8 B1 FF 0E A4 E1 BB 70 4D 56 A4 75 003F0: 2F 51 A5 82 CC 54 1A 80 8F 8C 8B 62 97 68 88 C8 00400: 10 59 DE 41 27 63 A3 E0 99 9A CD DA 77
- ——————————————————–
seqnum = 4096
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . . 007D0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 007E0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 007F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
TLSPlaintext: 00000: 17 03 03 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . . 007D0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 007E0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 007F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00800: 00 00 00 00 00
K_MAC_4096: 00000: FB 30 EE 53 CF CF 89 D7 48 FC 0C 72 EF 16 0B 8B 00010: 53 CB BB FD 03 12 82 B0 26 21 4A B2 E0 77 58 FF
MAC value: 00000: 50 55 A2 6A BE 19 63 81
K_ENC_4096: 00000: ED F2 FD 02 47 71 60 23 83 09 00 2D 1D 57 DF 9F 00010: D2 ED 18 D6 45 66 C7 6F 4B F0 3D 3A BF 7B BB 1E
IV_4096: 00000: 00 00 10 00
TLSCiphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 08 08 99 95 26 07 03 47 1D ED A2 E6 55 00010: B6 B3 93 83 5E 33 8B 1E D0 0E DD 22 47 A2 FB 88 00020: FB B7 A8 94 80 62 08 8A F3 2C AE B6 AA 2C 4F 2A . . . 007D0: 7F 0B 24 61 E7 5F E1 06 34 B8 4D C5 70 35 72 5A 007E0: CA 4F 0C BC A9 B0 6C B9 F7 6F BD 2F 80 46 2B 8D 007F0: 77 5E BD 41 6F 63 41 39 AC 89 C2 ED 3D F1 9F E2 00800: 4E F8 C0 5A A8 90 93 1B 01 86 FD 7D DF
A.1.2.2. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC Cipher Suite
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC *********************************************** It is assumed that the following keys were established during handshake:
- MAC key:
00000: 00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A
00010: 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 - Encryption key: 00000: 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 11 00010: 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 AA BB CC EE FF 0A 00 11 22 - IV: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
- ——————————————————–
seqnum = 0
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
TLSPlaintext: 00000: 17 03 03 00 0F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00
K_MAC_0: 00000: 19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38 00010: 17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
MAC value: 00000: FD 17 19 DD 95 08 37 EB 7C 7B B8 F5 00 37 99 81
K_ENC_0: 00000: 58 AF BE 9A 4C 31 98 AA AB AA 26 92 C4 19 F1 79 00010: 7C 9B 92 DE B3 CC 74 46 B3 63 57 71 13 F0 FB 56
IV_0: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
TLSCiphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 00 1F 4D 1A 30 52 36 57 3B FF C1 4E 46 00010: DC BE 74 6D B6 C9 9A 17 5A 81 C4 71 1E 2F 84 C3 00020: 92 C5 40 7C
- ——————————————————–
seqnum = 63
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . . 00FD0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00FE0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00FF0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
TLSPlaintext: 00000: 17 03 03 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . . 00FD0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00FE0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00FF0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01000: 00 00 00 00 00
K_MAC_63: 00000: 19 A7 6E D3 0F 4D 6D 1F 5B 72 63 EC 49 1A D8 38 00010: 17 C0 B5 7D 8A 03 56 12 71 40 FB 4F 74 25 49 4D
MAC value: 00000: 98 46 27 61 D0 26 24 4A 2C 0B 7D 1B CC CB E7 B0
K_ENC_63: 00000: 58 AF BE 9A 4C 31 98 AA AB AA 26 92 C4 19 F1 79 00010: 7C 9B 92 DE B3 CC 74 46 B3 63 57 71 13 F0 FB 56
IV_63: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 3F
TLSCiphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 10 10 12 93 51 D2 6E 14 07 13 A2 1B 37 00010: 68 24 A2 23 17 CD C0 D8 8E 01 CF A3 FE 21 41 5F 00020: 5C 5E 05 86 9C CF 38 A5 1B C2 E0 ED 68 94 46 A8 . . . 00FE0: 19 AD 99 8C 06 25 21 E6 7B 63 59 A4 F5 C8 16 F9 00FF0: 47 6B A7 13 26 82 BB A8 CE 0B ED AD 65 E4 20 A2 01000: 97 B6 E2 C6 1F A4 06 D9 B8 CA 36 FD 9F CD 3A EE 01010: 24 78 F4 D1 96
- ——————————————————–
seqnum = 64
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . . 01FD0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01FE0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01FF0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
TLSPlaintext: 00000: 17 03 03 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . . . 01FD0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01FE0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01FF0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02000: 00 00 00 00 00
K_MAC_64: 00000: AE BE 1E F4 18 71 3B F0 44 B9 FC D9 E5 72 D4 37 00010: FB 38 B5 D8 29 56 7A 6F 79 18 39 6D 9F 4E 09 6B
MAC value: 00000: EA C3 97 87 84 2B 1D BD 60 80 CC 3F BF AE 5C 2F
K_ENC_64: 00000: 64 F5 5A FC 37 A1 74 D9 53 3E 70 8B CD 14 FA 4A 00010: EE C3 7B C0 E3 2B A4 99 01 B4 66 9E 96 A6 3D 96
IV_64: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40
TLSCiphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 20 10 E6 66 BB 98 AC 5B 0F 39 31 D8 55 00010: 1B 93 36 85 96 EE F0 EB A8 26 9C B8 BD AA E7 EB 00020: 80 C8 30 D7 5A B7 D4 6C 25 06 DC 8B 83 E1 F2 D3 . . . 01FE0: B3 02 67 2C CB 02 86 CD 40 48 FB D5 38 1A 65 55 01FF0: 26 11 25 51 01 4F A8 ED F5 C2 1B 7D 1D B3 9D 6B 02000: AD EC 0D 7C 07 05 34 8B 5C 55 6C 4D 50 81 69 1A 02010: A9 EC 36 F8 B5
A.1.3. Handshake Examples
The ClientHello.extensions and the ServerHello.extensions fields contain the extended_main_secret extension (see [RFC7627]) and the renegotiation_info extension (see [RFC5746]) in the following examples.
A.1.3.1. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_CTR_OMAC Cipher Suite
Server certificate curve OID: id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet, "1.2.643.2.2.35.1"
Server public key Q_s:
x = 0x6531D4A72E655BFC9DFB94293B260702
82FABF10D5C49B7366148C60E0BF8167
y = 0x37F8CC71DC5D917FC4A66F7826E72750
8270B4FFC266C26CD4363E77B553A5B8
Server private key d_s: 0x5F308355DFD6A8ACAEE0837B100A3B1F 6D63FB29B78EF27D3967757F0527144C
- ————————–Client—————————
ClientHello message:
msg_type: 01
length: 000040
body:
client_version:
major: 03
minor: 03
random: 933EA21EC3802A561550EC78D6ED51AC
2439D7E749C31BC3A3456165889684CA
session_id:
length: 00
vector: --
cipher_suites:
length: 0004
vector:
CipherSuite: C100
CipherSuite: C101
compression_methods:
length: 01
vector:
CompressionMethod: 00
extensions:
length: 0013
vector:
Extension: /* signature_algorithms */
extension_type: 000D
extension_data:
length: 0006
vector:
supported_signature_algorithms:
length: 0004
vector:
/* 1 pair of algorithms */
hash: 08
signature:
40
/* 2 pair of algorithms */
hash: 08
signature:
41
Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
extension_type: FF01
extension_data:
length: 0001
vector:
renegotiated_connection:
length: 00
vector: --
Extension: /* extended_main_secret */
extension_type: 0017
extension_data:
length: 0000
vector: --
00000: 01 00 00 40 03 03 93 3E A2 1E C3 80 2A 56 15 50 00010: EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 49 C3 1B C3 A3 45 00020: 61 65 88 96 84 CA 00 00 04 C1 00 C1 01 01 00 00 00030: 13 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 40 08 41 FF 01 00 01 00 00040: 00 17 00 00
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0044
fragment: 010000400303933EA21EC3802A561550
EC78D6ED51AC2439D7E749C31BC3A345
6165889684CA000004C100C101010000
13000D0006000408400841FF01000100
00170000
00000: 16 03 03 00 44 01 00 00 40 03 03 93 3E A2 1E C3 00010: 80 2A 56 15 50 EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 49 00020: C3 1B C3 A3 45 61 65 88 96 84 CA 00 00 04 C1 00 00030: C1 01 01 00 00 13 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 40 08 41 00040: FF 01 00 01 00 00 17 00 00
- ————————–Server—————————
ServerHello message:
msg_type: 02
length: 000041
body:
server_version:
major: 03
minor: 03
random: 933EA21E49C31BC3A3456165889684CA
A5576CE7924A24F58113808DBD9EF856
session_id:
length: 10
vector: C3802A561550EC78D6ED51AC2439D7E7
cipher_suite:
CipherSuite: C101
compression_method:
CompressionMethod: 00
extensions:
length: 0009
vector:
Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
extension_type: FF01
extension_data:
length: 0001
vector:
renegotiated_connection:
length: 00
vector: --
Extension: /* extended_main_secret */
extension_type: 0017
extension_data:
length: 0000
vector: --
00000: 02 00 00 41 03 03 93 3E A2 1E 49 C3 1B C3 A3 45 00010: 61 65 88 96 84 CA A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 00020: 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 10 C3 80 2A 56 15 50 EC 78 D6 00030: ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 C1 01 00 00 09 FF 01 00 01 00040: 00 00 17 00 00
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0045
fragment: 020000410303933EA21E49C31BC3A345
6165889684CAA5576CE7924A24F58113
808DBD9EF85610C3802A561550EC78D6
ED51AC2439D7E7C101000009FF010001
0000170000
00000: 16 03 03 00 45 02 00 00 41 03 03 93 3E A2 1E 49 00010: C3 1B C3 A3 45 61 65 88 96 84 CA A5 57 6C E7 92 00020: 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 10 C3 80 2A 56 00030: 15 50 EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 C1 01 00 00 00040: 09 FF 01 00 01 00 00 17 00 00
- ————————–Server—————————
Certificate message:
msg_type: 0B
length: 0001DB
body:
certificate_list:
length: 0001D8
vector:
ASN.1Cert:
length: 0001D5
vector: 308201D13082017EA003020102020833
FBB2C0E9575A46300A06082A85030701
010302301F311D301B06035504030C14
. . .
797990E4B5452CF82FE1F19EE237B754
CBCD5078D752A28013DFFC8224AD114B
BD7C1BB71E480AD6EEF9857A8C99C595
9053EEDFE9
00000: 0B 00 01 DB 00 01 D8 00 01 D5 30 82 01 D1 30 82 00010: 01 7E A0 03 02 01 02 02 08 33 FB B2 C0 E9 57 5A 00020: 46 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 1F 31 00030: 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 74 65 73 74 5F 73 00040: 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 63 65 72 74 30 1E 00050: 17 0D 31 39 30 36 32 37 31 35 32 34 30 38 5A 17 00060: 0D 32 30 31 32 31 38 31 35 33 34 30 38 5A 30 1F 00070: 31 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 74 65 73 74 5F 00080: 73 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 63 65 72 74 30 00090: 66 30 1F 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 13 06 000A0: 07 2A 85 03 02 02 23 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 000B0: 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 67 81 BF E0 60 8C 14 66 73 000C0: 9B C4 D5 10 BF FA 82 02 07 26 3B 29 94 FB 9D FC 000D0: 5B 65 2E A7 D4 31 65 B8 A5 53 B5 77 3E 36 D4 6C 000E0: C2 66 C2 FF B4 70 82 50 27 E7 26 78 6F A6 C4 7F 000F0: 91 5D DC 71 CC F8 37 A3 81 96 30 81 93 30 1D 06 00100: 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 E7 D0 0B B8 4D 8D 24 18 00110: 29 3E 05 C1 7C E7 77 98 D4 8D 30 16 30 0E 06 03 00120: 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 01 C6 30 12 06 03 00130: 55 1D 13 01 01 FF 04 08 30 06 01 01 FF 02 01 01 00140: 30 4E 06 03 55 1D 23 04 47 30 45 80 14 E7 D0 0B 00150: B8 4D 8D 24 18 29 3E 05 C1 7C E7 77 98 D4 8D 30 00160: 16 A1 23 A4 21 30 1F 31 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 00170: 0C 14 74 65 73 74 5F 73 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 00180: 64 5F 63 65 72 74 82 08 33 FB B2 C0 E9 57 5A 46 00190: 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 03 41 00 E2 001A0: 88 44 F9 F1 C8 55 E2 DB 5B 19 79 79 90 E4 B5 45 001B0: 2C F8 2F E1 F1 9E E2 37 B7 54 CB CD 50 78 D7 52 001C0: A2 80 13 DF FC 82 24 AD 11 4B BD 7C 1B B7 1E 48 001D0: 0A D6 EE F9 85 7A 8C 99 C5 95 90 53 EE DF E9
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 01DF
fragment: 0B0001DB0001D80001D5308201D13082
017EA003020102020833FBB2C0E9575A
46300A06082A85030701010302301F31
. . .
8844F9F1C855E2DB5B19797990E4B545
2CF82FE1F19EE237B754CBCD5078D752
A28013DFFC8224AD114BBD7C1BB71E48
0AD6EEF9857A8C99C5959053EEDFE9
00000: 16 03 03 01 DF 0B 00 01 DB 00 01 D8 00 01 D5 30 00010: 82 01 D1 30 82 01 7E A0 03 02 01 02 02 08 33 FB 00020: B2 C0 E9 57 5A 46 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 00030: 03 02 30 1F 31 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 74 00040: 65 73 74 5F 73 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 63 00050: 65 72 74 30 1E 17 0D 31 39 30 36 32 37 31 35 32 00060: 34 30 38 5A 17 0D 32 30 31 32 31 38 31 35 33 34 00070: 30 38 5A 30 1F 31 1D 30 1B 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 00080: 74 65 73 74 5F 73 65 6C 66 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 00090: 63 65 72 74 30 66 30 1F 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 000A0: 01 01 30 13 06 07 2A 85 03 02 02 23 01 06 08 2A 000B0: 85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 67 81 BF E0 000C0: 60 8C 14 66 73 9B C4 D5 10 BF FA 82 02 07 26 3B 000D0: 29 94 FB 9D FC 5B 65 2E A7 D4 31 65 B8 A5 53 B5 000E0: 77 3E 36 D4 6C C2 66 C2 FF B4 70 82 50 27 E7 26 000F0: 78 6F A6 C4 7F 91 5D DC 71 CC F8 37 A3 81 96 30 00100: 81 93 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 E7 D0 0B 00110: B8 4D 8D 24 18 29 3E 05 C1 7C E7 77 98 D4 8D 30 00120: 16 30 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 01 00130: C6 30 12 06 03 55 1D 13 01 01 FF 04 08 30 06 01 00140: 01 FF 02 01 01 30 4E 06 03 55 1D 23 04 47 30 45 00150: 80 14 E7 D0 0B B8 4D 8D 24 18 29 3E 05 C1 7C E7 00160: 77 98 D4 8D 30 16 A1 23 A4 21 30 1F 31 1D 30 1B 00170: 06 03 55 04 03 0C 14 74 65 73 74 5F 73 65 6C 66 00180: 73 69 67 6E 65 64 5F 63 65 72 74 82 08 33 FB B2 00190: C0 E9 57 5A 46 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 001A0: 02 03 41 00 E2 88 44 F9 F1 C8 55 E2 DB 5B 19 79 001B0: 79 90 E4 B5 45 2C F8 2F E1 F1 9E E2 37 B7 54 CB 001C0: CD 50 78 D7 52 A2 80 13 DF FC 82 24 AD 11 4B BD 001D0: 7C 1B B7 1E 48 0A D6 EE F9 85 7A 8C 99 C5 95 90 001E0: 53 EE DF E9
- ————————–Server—————————
ServerHelloDone message: msg_type: 0E length: 000000 body: --
00000: 0E 00 00 00
Record layer message:: type: 16 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0004 fragment: 0E000000
00000: 16 03 03 00 04 0E 00 00 00
- ————————–Client—————————
PMS: 00000: A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 00010: F5 BD C3 B1 83 CE 5D AD CA 36 A5 3A A0 77 65 1D
Random d_eph value: 0xA5C77C7482373DE16CE4A6F73CCE7F78 471493FF2C0709B8B706C9E8A25E6C1E
Q_eph ephemeral key:
x = 0xA8F36D63D262A203978F1B3B6795CDBB
F1AE7FB8EF7F47F1F18871C198E00793
y = 0x34CA5D6B4485640EA195435993BEB1F8
B016ED610496B5CC175AC2EA1F14F887
HASH (r_c | r_s): 00000: C3 EF 04 28 D4 B7 A1 F4 C5 02 5F 2E 65 DD 2B 2E 00010: A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
Export key generation. r value: 0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
Export key generation. UKM value: 0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
seed: 00000: A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4
K_EXP: 00000: 1E 58 54 90 E8 65 FF D1 8F 18 D7 C0 A0 4D 0E E8 00010: 4F 1A 5D 79 7C EF AD A0 1B 1E 3B 7F DB 90 E0 29
Export keys K_Exp_MAC | K_Exp_ENC used in KExp15 algorithm: 00000: 2D 8B A8 C8 4C B2 32 FF 41 F1 0C 3A D9 24 13 42 00010: 23 25 4F 71 E5 69 6D 3D 29 C3 E4 C9 DA A6 B2 93 00020: 84 9E B6 34 0B FF AE 69 28 A3 C3 E4 FF 92 EC CB 00030: 1E 8F 0C F7 A1 88 36 8E 6B 74 8E 52 EA 37 8B 0C
IV: 00000: 21 4A 6A 29
PMSEXP: 00000: D7 F0 F0 42 23 67 86 7B 25 FA 42 33 A9 54 F5 8B 00010: DE 92 E9 C9 BB FB 88 16 C9 9F 15 E6 39 87 22 A0 00020: B2 B7 BF E8 49 3E 9A 5C
- ————————–Client—————————
ClientKeyExchange message:
msg_type: 10
length: 000095
body:
exchange_keys: 3081920428D7F0F0422367867B25FA42
33A954F58BDE92E9C9BBFB8816C99F15
E6398722A0B2B7BFE8493E9A5C306630
. . .
EFB87FAEF1BBCD95673B1B8F9703A262
D2636DF3A887F8141FEAC25A17CCB596
0461ED16B0F8B1BE93594395A10E6485
446B5DCA34
00000: 10 00 00 95 30 81 92 04 28 D7 F0 F0 42 23 67 86 00010: 7B 25 FA 42 33 A9 54 F5 8B DE 92 E9 C9 BB FB 88 00020: 16 C9 9F 15 E6 39 87 22 A0 B2 B7 BF E8 49 3E 9A 00030: 5C 30 66 30 1F 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 00040: 13 06 07 2A 85 03 02 02 23 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 00050: 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 93 07 E0 98 C1 71 88 00060: F1 F1 47 7F EF B8 7F AE F1 BB CD 95 67 3B 1B 8F 00070: 97 03 A2 62 D2 63 6D F3 A8 87 F8 14 1F EA C2 5A 00080: 17 CC B5 96 04 61 ED 16 B0 F8 B1 BE 93 59 43 95 00090: A1 0E 64 85 44 6B 5D CA 34
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0099
fragment: 100000953081920428D7F0F042236786
7B25FA4233A954F58BDE92E9C9BBFB88
16C99F15E6398722A0B2B7BFE8493E9A
. . .
F1F1477FEFB87FAEF1BBCD95673B1B8F
9703A262D2636DF3A887F8141FEAC25A
17CCB5960461ED16B0F8B1BE93594395
A10E6485446B5DCA34
00000: 16 03 03 00 99 10 00 00 95 30 81 92 04 28 D7 F0 00010: F0 42 23 67 86 7B 25 FA 42 33 A9 54 F5 8B DE 92 00020: E9 C9 BB FB 88 16 C9 9F 15 E6 39 87 22 A0 B2 B7 00030: BF E8 49 3E 9A 5C 30 66 30 1F 06 08 2A 85 03 07 00040: 01 01 01 01 30 13 06 07 2A 85 03 02 02 23 01 06 00050: 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 93 07 00060: E0 98 C1 71 88 F1 F1 47 7F EF B8 7F AE F1 BB CD 00070: 95 67 3B 1B 8F 97 03 A2 62 D2 63 6D F3 A8 87 F8 00080: 14 1F EA C2 5A 17 CC B5 96 04 61 ED 16 B0 F8 B1 00090: BE 93 59 43 95 A1 0E 64 85 44 6B 5D CA 34
- ————————–Server—————————
PMSEXP extracted: 00000: D7 F0 F0 42 23 67 86 7B 25 FA 42 33 A9 54 F5 8B 00010: DE 92 E9 C9 BB FB 88 16 C9 9F 15 E6 39 87 22 A0 00020: B2 B7 BF E8 49 3E 9A 5C
HASH(r_c | r_s): 00000: C3 EF 04 28 D4 B7 A1 F4 C5 02 5F 2E 65 DD 2B 2E 00010: A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
Export key generation. r value: 0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
Export key generation. UKM value: 0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
seed: 00000: A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4
K_EXP: 00000: 1E 58 54 90 E8 65 FF D1 8F 18 D7 C0 A0 4D 0E E8 00010: 4F 1A 5D 79 7C EF AD A0 1B 1E 3B 7F DB 90 E0 29
Import keys K_Imp_MAC | K_Imp_ENC used in KImp15 algorithm: 00000: 2D 8B A8 C8 4C B2 32 FF 41 F1 0C 3A D9 24 13 42 00010: 23 25 4F 71 E5 69 6D 3D 29 C3 E4 C9 DA A6 B2 93 00020: 84 9E B6 34 0B FF AE 69 28 A3 C3 E4 FF 92 EC CB 00030: 1E 8F 0C F7 A1 88 36 8E 6B 74 8E 52 EA 37 8B 0C
IV: 00000: 21 4A 6A 29
PMS: 00000: A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 00010: F5 BD C3 B1 83 CE 5D AD CA 36 A5 3A A0 77 65 1D
- ————————–Client—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: 7E 1F 59 D3 64 9D B6 09 00 EA 4F 8A 58 5A 65 7A 00010: 92 77 B3 04 50 58 4C F5 43 51 19 8C DE A3 0C 49
MS: 00000: FD D2 7C B4 04 AD 4E 44 49 68 4F 7C 55 90 E9 E7 00010: 02 EF 41 01 93 3B 52 77 A4 A9 6D F5 00 B0 7C C3 00020: 32 4F D8 A6 D9 07 CB B0 3D F3 FB 33 1F 1C 4D 0C
Client connection key material K_write_MAC|K_read_MAC|K_write_ENC|K_read_ENC|IV_write|IV_read: 00000: DD 4E 10 17 E3 09 1F FD 86 75 65 8A 78 00 90 09 00010: 3B BE 69 EC A6 93 31 5C A8 5B E0 A6 14 3D C9 F8 00020: 1D 64 D0 23 46 5F 8B EA 17 F8 12 F8 C2 D8 BF C0 00030: D9 BB AB A7 B4 DF D3 A1 7C E0 E1 3B 2D 63 65 F3 00040: FC 8B 34 59 CF 54 FE 44 9A 04 07 64 53 73 08 00 00050: 75 10 32 55 9D 07 B6 C4 EA C6 75 48 71 BC 97 8A 00060: B9 0E 2A EE 98 77 14 BB D8 F7 57 AE F7 84 FF 24 00070: 47 B3 94 2E B4 3E 26 35 73 1C 4C 28 22 D0 2D 79 00080: 2B 6A 81 3F 93 ED A6 FA
- ————————–Server—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: 7E 1F 59 D3 64 9D B6 09 00 EA 4F 8A 58 5A 65 7A 00010: 92 77 B3 04 50 58 4C F5 43 51 19 8C DE A3 0C 49
MS: 00000: FD D2 7C B4 04 AD 4E 44 49 68 4F 7C 55 90 E9 E7 00010: 02 EF 41 01 93 3B 52 77 A4 A9 6D F5 00 B0 7C C3 00020: 32 4F D8 A6 D9 07 CB B0 3D F3 FB 33 1F 1C 4D 0C
Server connection key material K_read_MAC|K_write_MAC|K_read_ENC|K_write_ENC|IV_read|IV_write: 00000: DD 4E 10 17 E3 09 1F FD 86 75 65 8A 78 00 90 09 00010: 3B BE 69 EC A6 93 31 5C A8 5B E0 A6 14 3D C9 F8 00020: 1D 64 D0 23 46 5F 8B EA 17 F8 12 F8 C2 D8 BF C0 00030: D9 BB AB A7 B4 DF D3 A1 7C E0 E1 3B 2D 63 65 F3 00040: FC 8B 34 59 CF 54 FE 44 9A 04 07 64 53 73 08 00 00050: 75 10 32 55 9D 07 B6 C4 EA C6 75 48 71 BC 97 8A 00060: B9 0E 2A EE 98 77 14 BB D8 F7 57 AE F7 84 FF 24 00070: 47 B3 94 2E B4 3E 26 35 73 1C 4C 28 22 D0 2D 79 00080: 2B 6A 81 3F 93 ED A6 FA
- ————————–Client—————————
ChangeCipherSpec message: type: 01
00000: 01
Record layer message: type: 14 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0001 fragment: 01
00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01
- ————————–Client—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: 7E 1F 59 D3 64 9D B6 09 00 EA 4F 8A 58 5A 65 7A 00010: 92 77 B3 04 50 58 4C F5 43 51 19 8C DE A3 0C 49
client_verify_data: 00000: B4 61 C5 AD 25 EA 1E 62 B3 70 BD 1F 1B CB 16 91 00010: FC CC BA 37 8B BC 13 43 BE 54 B3 8D F5 53 B7 A5
- ————————–Client—————————
Finished message:
msg_type: 14
length: 000020
body:
verify_data: B461C5AD25EA1E62B370BD1F1BCB1691
FCCCBA378BBC1343BE54B38DF553B7A5
00000: 14 00 00 20 B4 61 C5 AD 25 EA 1E 62 B3 70 BD 1F 00010: 1B CB 16 91 FC CC BA 37 8B BC 13 43 BE 54 B3 8D 00020: F5 53 B7 A5
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 002C
fragment: 0C630271D4DA39DD8D6BD040302D9B8F
33D5F7B967EED155F7D65592892C03C7
885C249B1225B184AB4D5DBF
00000: 16 03 03 00 2C 0C 63 02 71 D4 DA 39 DD 8D 6B D0 00010: 40 30 2D 9B 8F 33 D5 F7 B9 67 EE D1 55 F7 D6 55 00020: 92 89 2C 03 C7 88 5C 24 9B 12 25 B1 84 AB 4D 5D 00030: BF
- ————————–Server—————————
ChangeCipherSpec message: type: 01
00000: 01
Record layer message: type: 14 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0001 fragment: 01
00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01
- ————————–Server—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: DB D7 D8 93 82 4A ED FD D5 FB 7B 75 4B 47 E1 E6 00010: AF E0 77 DA E6 D1 13 63 42 07 C7 EE 0F C6 F3 B1
server_verify_data: 00000: 45 39 EC 8D 0A F7 B1 A6 20 41 AB 43 4A 43 77 71 00010: D3 4C 47 19 D8 6E BB FD 0F 28 C3 E9 53 55 0C D0
- ————————–Server—————————
Finished message:
msg_type: 14
length: 000020
body:
verify_data: 4539EC8D0AF7B1A62041AB434A437771
D34C4719D86EBBFD0F28C3E953550CD0
00000: 14 00 00 20 45 39 EC 8D 0A F7 B1 A6 20 41 AB 43 00010: 4A 43 77 71 D3 4C 47 19 D8 6E BB FD 0F 28 C3 E9 00020: 53 55 0C D0
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 002C
fragment: E6A94A4BF70886566A2316811E57B483
BB1E47950A1FF820A80DCA77A4DF9954
2DAB6953F3ED03D95CCA4748
00000: 16 03 03 00 2C E6 A9 4A 4B F7 08 86 56 6A 23 16 00010: 81 1E 57 B4 83 BB 1E 47 95 0A 1F F8 20 A8 0D CA 00020: 77 A4 DF 99 54 2D AB 69 53 F3 ED 03 D9 5C CA 47 00030: 48
- ————————–Client—————————
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Record layer message:
type: 17
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0028
fragment: 38807B6E5E0C3F4F7E0DBF7758031BF0
7F100C4B63ADBC75F49BCBF428572D37
7CAED097336DB203
00000: 17 03 03 00 28 38 80 7B 6E 5E 0C 3F 4F 7E 0D BF 00010: 77 58 03 1B F0 7F 10 0C 4B 63 AD BC 75 F4 9B CB 00020: F4 28 57 2D 37 7C AE D0 97 33 6D B2 03
- ————————–Server—————————
Application data: 00000: FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 00010: FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Record layer message:
type: 17
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0028
fragment: 05B869E5C979C3B9D4837B8E39D9BBEE
1BBD0052D3D48340D0CDE082B33BC07F
4E742D1113249AD8
00000: 17 03 03 00 28 05 B8 69 E5 C9 79 C3 B9 D4 83 7B 00010: 8E 39 D9 BB EE 1B BD 00 52 D3 D4 83 40 D0 CD E0 00020: 82 B3 3B C0 7F 4E 74 2D 11 13 24 9A D8
- ————————–Client—————————
close_notify alert: Alert: level: 01 description: 00
00000: 01 00
Record layer message: type: 15 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 000A fragment: 4F2A0807A0374E28C632
00000: 15 03 03 00 0A 4F 2A 08 07 A0 37 4E 28 C6 32
- ————————–Server—————————
close_notify alert: Alert: level: 01 description: 00
00000: 01 00
Record layer message: type: 15 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 000A fragment: 999468B49AC5B0DE512C
00000: 15 03 03 00 0A 99 94 68 B4 9A C5 B0 DE 51 2C
A.1.3.2. TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_CTR_OMAC Cipher Suite
Server certificate curve OID: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC, "1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.3"
Server public key Q_s:
x = 0xF14589DA479AD972C66563669B3FF580
92E6A30A288BF447CD9FF6C3133E9724
7A9706B267703C9B4E239F0D7C7E3310
C22D2752B35BD2E4FD39B8F11DEB833A
y = 0xF305E95B36502D4E60A1059FB20AB30B
FC7C95727F3A2C04B1DFDDB53B0413F2
99F2DFE66A5E1CCB4101A7A01D612BE6
BD78E1E3B3D567EBB16ABE587A11F4EA
Server private key d_s: 0x12FD7A70067479A0F66C59F9A25534AD FBC7ABFD3CC72D79806F8B402601644B 3005ED365A2D8989A8CCAE640D5FC08D D27DFBBFE137CF528E1AC6D445192E01
Client certificate curve OID: id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA, "1.2.643.7.1.2.1.1.1"
Client public key Q_c:
x = 0x0F5DB18A9E15F324B778676025BFD7B5
DF066566EABAA1C51CD879F87B0B4975
y = 0x9EE5BBF18361F842D3F087DEC2943939
E0FA2BFB4EDEC25A8D10ABB22C48F386
Client private key d_c: 0x0918AD3F7D209ABF89F1E8505DA894CE E10DA09D32E72E815D9C0ADA30B5A103
- ————————–Client—————————
ClientHello message:
msg_type: 01
length: 000040
body:
client_version:
major: 03
minor: 03
random: 933EA21EC3802A561550EC78D6ED51AC
2439D7E749C31BC3A3456165889684CA
session_id:
length: 00
vector: --
cipher_suites:
length: 0004
vector:
CipherSuite: C100
CipherSuite: C101
compression_methods:
length: 01
vector:
CompressionMethod: 00
extensions:
length: 0013
vector:
Extension: /* signature_algorithms */
extension_type: 000D
extension_data:
length: 0006
vector:
supported_signature_algorithms:
length: 0004
vector:
/* 1 pair of algorithms */
hash: 08
signature:
40
/* 2 pair of algorithms */
hash: 08
signature:
41
Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
extension_type: FF01
extension_data:
length: 0001
vector:
renegotiated_connection:
length: 00
vector: --
Extension: /* extended_main_secret */
extension_type: 0017
extension_data:
length: 0000
vector: --
00000: 01 00 00 40 03 03 93 3E A2 1E C3 80 2A 56 15 50 00010: EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 49 C3 1B C3 A3 45 00020: 61 65 88 96 84 CA 00 00 04 C1 00 C1 01 01 00 00 00030: 13 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 40 08 41 FF 01 00 01 00 00040: 00 17 00 00
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0044
fragment: 010000400303933EA21EC3802A561550
EC78D6ED51AC2439D7E749C31BC3A345
6165889684CA000004C100C101010000
13000D0006000408400841FF01000100
00170000
00000: 16 03 03 00 44 01 00 00 40 03 03 93 3E A2 1E C3 00010: 80 2A 56 15 50 EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 49 00020: C3 1B C3 A3 45 61 65 88 96 84 CA 00 00 04 C1 00 00030: C1 01 01 00 00 13 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 40 08 41 00040: FF 01 00 01 00 00 17 00 00
- ————————–Server—————————
ServerHello message:
msg_type: 02
length: 000041
body:
server_version:
major: 03
minor: 03
random: 933EA21E49C31BC3A3456165889684CA
A5576CE7924A24F58113808DBD9EF856
session_id:
length: 10
vector: C3802A561550EC78D6ED51AC2439D7E7
cipher_suite:
CipherSuite: C100
compression_method:
CompressionMethod: 00
extensions:
length: 0009
vector:
Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
extension_type: FF01
extension_data:
length: 0001
vector:
renegotiated_connection:
length: 00
vector: --
Extension: /* extended_main_secret */
extension_type: 0017
extension_data:
length: 0000
vector: --
00000: 02 00 00 41 03 03 93 3E A2 1E 49 C3 1B C3 A3 45 00010: 61 65 88 96 84 CA A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 00020: 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 10 C3 80 2A 56 15 50 EC 78 D6 00030: ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 C1 00 00 00 09 FF 01 00 01 00040: 00 00 17 00 00
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0045
fragment: 020000410303933EA21E49C31BC3A345
6165889684CAA5576CE7924A24F58113
808DBD9EF85610C3802A561550EC78D6
ED51AC2439D7E7C100000009FF010001
0000170000
00000: 16 03 03 00 45 02 00 00 41 03 03 93 3E A2 1E 49 00010: C3 1B C3 A3 45 61 65 88 96 84 CA A5 57 6C E7 92 00020: 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 10 C3 80 2A 56 00030: 15 50 EC 78 D6 ED 51 AC 24 39 D7 E7 C1 00 00 00 00040: 09 FF 01 00 01 00 00 17 00 00
- ————————–Server—————————
Certificate message:
msg_type: 0B
length: 00024C
body:
certificate_list:
length: 000249
vector:
ASN.1Cert:
length: 000246
vector: 30820242308201AEA003020102020101
300A06082A850307010103033042312C
302A06092A864886F70D010901161D74
. . .
371AF83C5BC58B366DFEFA7345D50317
867C177AC84AC07EE8612164629AB7BD
C48AA0F64A741FE7298E82C5BFCE8672
029F875391F7
00000: 0B 00 02 4C 00 02 49 00 02 46 30 82 02 42 30 82 00010: 01 AE A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 01 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 00020: 03 07 01 01 03 03 30 42 31 2C 30 2A 06 09 2A 86 00030: 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1D 74 6C 73 31 32 5F 73 00040: 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 43 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 00050: 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 03 13 00060: 09 53 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 30 1E 17 0D 31 37 00070: 30 35 32 35 30 39 32 35 31 38 5A 17 0D 33 30 30 00080: 35 30 31 30 39 32 35 31 38 5A 30 42 31 2C 30 2A 00090: 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1D 74 6C 73 000A0: 31 32 5F 73 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 43 40 63 72 000B0: 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 12 30 10 06 03 000C0: 55 04 03 13 09 53 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 30 81 000D0: AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 000E0: 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 03 06 08 2A 85 03 07 000F0: 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 3A 83 EB 1D F1 00100: B8 39 FD E4 D2 5B B3 52 27 2D C2 10 33 7E 7C 0D 00110: 9F 23 4E 9B 3C 70 67 B2 06 97 7A 24 97 3E 13 C3 00120: F6 9F CD 47 F4 8B 28 0A A3 E6 92 80 F5 3F 9B 66 00130: 63 65 C6 72 D9 9A 47 DA 89 45 F1 EA F4 11 7A 58 00140: BE 6A B1 EB 67 D5 B3 E3 E1 78 BD E6 2B 61 1D A0 00150: A7 01 41 CB 1C 5E 6A E6 DF F2 99 F2 13 04 3B B5 00160: DD DF B1 04 2C 3A 7F 72 95 7C FC 0B B3 0A B2 9F 00170: 05 A1 60 4E 2D 50 36 5B E9 05 F3 A3 43 30 41 30 00180: 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 87 9C C6 5A 0F 4A 00190: 89 CB 4A 58 49 DF 05 61 56 9B AA DC 11 69 30 0B 001A0: 06 03 55 1D 0F 04 04 03 02 03 28 30 13 06 03 55 001B0: 1D 25 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 001C0: 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 03 81 81 00 001D0: 35 BE 38 51 EC B6 E9 2D 32 40 01 81 0F 8C 89 03 001E0: 52 42 F4 05 46 9F 4C 4E CB 05 02 7C 57 E2 71 52 001F0: 12 AF D7 CD BB 0C ED 7A 8B 4D 33 42 CC 50 1A BD 00200: 99 99 75 A5 8A DE 0E 58 4F CA 35 F5 2E 45 58 B7 00210: 31 1D 49 D0 A0 51 32 79 F7 39 37 1A F8 3C 5B C5 00220: 8B 36 6D FE FA 73 45 D5 03 17 86 7C 17 7A C8 4A 00230: C0 7E E8 61 21 64 62 9A B7 BD C4 8A A0 F6 4A 74 00240: 1F E7 29 8E 82 C5 BF CE 86 72 02 9F 87 53 91 F7
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0250
fragment: 0B00024C000249000246308202423082
01AEA003020102020101300A06082A85
0307010103033042312C302A06092A86
. . .
8B366DFEFA7345D50317867C177AC84A
C07EE8612164629AB7BDC48AA0F64A74
1FE7298E82C5BFCE8672029F875391F7
00000: 16 03 03 02 50 0B 00 02 4C 00 02 49 00 02 46 30 00010: 82 02 42 30 82 01 AE A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 01 30 00020: 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 30 42 31 2C 30 00030: 2A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1D 74 6C 00040: 73 31 32 5F 73 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 43 40 63 00050: 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 12 30 10 06 00060: 03 55 04 03 13 09 53 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 32 30 00070: 1E 17 0D 31 37 30 35 32 35 30 39 32 35 31 38 5A 00080: 17 0D 33 30 30 35 30 31 30 39 32 35 31 38 5A 30 00090: 42 31 2C 30 2A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 000A0: 16 1D 74 6C 73 31 32 5F 73 65 72 76 65 72 35 31 000B0: 32 43 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 000C0: 12 30 10 06 03 55 04 03 13 09 53 65 72 76 65 72 000D0: 35 31 32 30 81 AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 000E0: 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 03 06 000F0: 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 00100: 3A 83 EB 1D F1 B8 39 FD E4 D2 5B B3 52 27 2D C2 00110: 10 33 7E 7C 0D 9F 23 4E 9B 3C 70 67 B2 06 97 7A 00120: 24 97 3E 13 C3 F6 9F CD 47 F4 8B 28 0A A3 E6 92 00130: 80 F5 3F 9B 66 63 65 C6 72 D9 9A 47 DA 89 45 F1 00140: EA F4 11 7A 58 BE 6A B1 EB 67 D5 B3 E3 E1 78 BD 00150: E6 2B 61 1D A0 A7 01 41 CB 1C 5E 6A E6 DF F2 99 00160: F2 13 04 3B B5 DD DF B1 04 2C 3A 7F 72 95 7C FC 00170: 0B B3 0A B2 9F 05 A1 60 4E 2D 50 36 5B E9 05 F3 00180: A3 43 30 41 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 87 00190: 9C C6 5A 0F 4A 89 CB 4A 58 49 DF 05 61 56 9B AA 001A0: DC 11 69 30 0B 06 03 55 1D 0F 04 04 03 02 03 28 001B0: 30 13 06 03 55 1D 25 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 001C0: 05 05 07 03 01 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 001D0: 03 03 81 81 00 35 BE 38 51 EC B6 E9 2D 32 40 01 001E0: 81 0F 8C 89 03 52 42 F4 05 46 9F 4C 4E CB 05 02 001F0: 7C 57 E2 71 52 12 AF D7 CD BB 0C ED 7A 8B 4D 33 00200: 42 CC 50 1A BD 99 99 75 A5 8A DE 0E 58 4F CA 35 00210: F5 2E 45 58 B7 31 1D 49 D0 A0 51 32 79 F7 39 37 00220: 1A F8 3C 5B C5 8B 36 6D FE FA 73 45 D5 03 17 86 00230: 7C 17 7A C8 4A C0 7E E8 61 21 64 62 9A B7 BD C4 00240: 8A A0 F6 4A 74 1F E7 29 8E 82 C5 BF CE 86 72 02 00250: 9F 87 53 91 F7
- ————————–Server—————————
CertificateRequest message:
msg_type: 0D
length: 00000B
body:
certificate_types:
length: 02
vector:
/* gost_sign256 */
43
/* gost_sign512 */
44
supported_signature_algorithms:
length: 0004
vector:
/* 1 pair of algorithms */
hash: 08
signature: 40
/* 2 pair of algorithms */
hash: 08
signature: 41
certificate_authorities:
length: 0000
vector: --
00000: 0D 00 00 0B 02 43 44 00 04 08 40 08 41 00 00
Record layer message: type: 16 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 000F fragment: 0D00000B0243440004084008410000
00000: 16 03 03 00 0F 0D 00 00 0B 02 43 44 00 04 08 40 00010: 08 41 00 00
- ————————–Server—————————
ServerHelloDone message: msg_type: 0E length: 000000 body: --
00000: 0E 00 00 00
Record layer message: type: 16 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0004 fragment: 0E000000
00000: 16 03 03 00 04 0E 00 00 00
- ————————–Client—————————
Certificate message:
msg_type: 0B
length: 0001EA
body:
certificate_list:
length: 0001E7
vector:
ASN.1Cert:
length: 0001E4
vector: 308201E03082018DA003020102020101
300A06082A850307010103023053312E
302C06092A864886F70D010901161F74
. . .
C1CAB43AC01AFB0F3451BDC2DB188BBC
B77884251CDF6037BA830F4B31D5E96F
DC9BC1C95ABE658266C48402E070DE1F
292724E8
00000: 0B 00 01 EA 00 01 E7 00 01 E4 30 82 01 E0 30 82 00010: 01 8D A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 01 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 00020: 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 53 31 2E 30 2C 06 09 2A 86 00030: 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1F 74 6C 73 31 32 5F 63 00040: 6C 69 65 6E 74 32 35 36 41 5F 45 40 63 72 79 70 00050: 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 21 30 1F 06 03 55 04 00060: 03 1E 18 00 43 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00 00070: 32 00 35 00 36 00 41 00 5F 00 45 30 1E 17 0D 31 00080: 37 30 35 32 35 30 39 33 31 31 38 5A 17 0D 33 30 00090: 30 35 30 31 30 39 33 31 31 38 5A 30 53 31 2E 30 000A0: 2C 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1F 74 6C 000B0: 73 31 32 5F 63 6C 69 65 6E 74 32 35 36 41 5F 45 000C0: 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 21 30 000D0: 1F 06 03 55 04 03 1E 18 00 43 00 6C 00 69 00 65 000E0: 00 6E 00 74 00 32 00 35 00 36 00 41 00 5F 00 45 000F0: 30 68 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 15 00100: 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 01 01 06 08 2A 85 03 00110: 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 75 49 0B 7B F8 79 00120: D8 1C C5 A1 BA EA 66 65 06 DF B5 D7 BF 25 60 67 00130: 78 B7 24 F3 15 9E 8A B1 5D 0F 86 F3 48 2C B2 AB 00140: 10 8D 5A C2 DE 4E FB 2B FA E0 39 39 94 C2 DE 87 00150: F0 D3 42 F8 61 83 F1 BB E5 9E A3 43 30 41 30 1D 00160: 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 74 49 1E 77 30 D3 42 00170: A6 28 0E 72 A1 13 9D D9 90 8B FA F1 03 30 0B 06 00180: 03 55 1D 0F 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 13 06 03 55 1D 00190: 25 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 001A0: 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 03 41 00 1C 2D 001B0: 35 22 B4 11 02 D6 20 1F 23 50 C1 CA B4 3A C0 1A 001C0: FB 0F 34 51 BD C2 DB 18 8B BC B7 78 84 25 1C DF 001D0: 60 37 BA 83 0F 4B 31 D5 E9 6F DC 9B C1 C9 5A BE 001E0: 65 82 66 C4 84 02 E0 70 DE 1F 29 27 24 E8
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 01EE
fragment: 0B0001EA0001E70001E4308201E03082
018DA003020102020101300A06082A85
0307010103023053312E302C06092A86
. . .
3522B41102D6201F2350C1CAB43AC01A
FB0F3451BDC2DB188BBCB77884251CDF
6037BA830F4B31D5E96FDC9BC1C95ABE
658266C48402E070DE1F292724E8
00000: 16 03 03 01 EE 0B 00 01 EA 00 01 E7 00 01 E4 30 00010: 82 01 E0 30 82 01 8D A0 03 02 01 02 02 01 01 30 00020: 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 53 31 2E 30 00030: 2C 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 16 1F 74 6C 00040: 73 31 32 5F 63 6C 69 65 6E 74 32 35 36 41 5F 45 00050: 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 72 75 31 21 30 00060: 1F 06 03 55 04 03 1E 18 00 43 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00070: 00 6E 00 74 00 32 00 35 00 36 00 41 00 5F 00 45 00080: 30 1E 17 0D 31 37 30 35 32 35 30 39 33 31 31 38 00090: 5A 17 0D 33 30 30 35 30 31 30 39 33 31 31 38 5A 000A0: 30 53 31 2E 30 2C 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 000B0: 01 16 1F 74 6C 73 31 32 5F 63 6C 69 65 6E 74 32 000C0: 35 36 41 5F 45 40 63 72 79 70 74 6F 70 72 6F 2E 000D0: 72 75 31 21 30 1F 06 03 55 04 03 1E 18 00 43 00 000E0: 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00 32 00 35 00 36 00 000F0: 41 00 5F 00 45 30 68 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 00100: 01 01 01 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 01 01 00110: 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 02 03 43 00 04 40 75 00120: 49 0B 7B F8 79 D8 1C C5 A1 BA EA 66 65 06 DF B5 00130: D7 BF 25 60 67 78 B7 24 F3 15 9E 8A B1 5D 0F 86 00140: F3 48 2C B2 AB 10 8D 5A C2 DE 4E FB 2B FA E0 39 00150: 39 94 C2 DE 87 F0 D3 42 F8 61 83 F1 BB E5 9E A3 00160: 43 30 41 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 74 49 00170: 1E 77 30 D3 42 A6 28 0E 72 A1 13 9D D9 90 8B FA 00180: F1 03 30 0B 06 03 55 1D 0F 04 04 03 02 07 80 30 00190: 13 06 03 55 1D 25 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 001A0: 05 07 03 02 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 001B0: 03 41 00 1C 2D 35 22 B4 11 02 D6 20 1F 23 50 C1 001C0: CA B4 3A C0 1A FB 0F 34 51 BD C2 DB 18 8B BC B7 001D0: 78 84 25 1C DF 60 37 BA 83 0F 4B 31 D5 E9 6F DC 001E0: 9B C1 C9 5A BE 65 82 66 C4 84 02 E0 70 DE 1F 29 001F0: 27 24 E8
- ————————–Client—————————
PMS value: 00000: A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 00010: F5 BD C3 B1 83 CE 5D AD CA 36 A5 3A A0 77 65 1D
Random d_eph value: 0x150ACD11B66DD695AD18418FA7A2DC63 6B7E29DCA24536AABC826EE3175BB1FA DC3AA0D01D3092E120B0FCF7EB872F4B 7E26EA17849D689222A48CF95A6E4831
Q_eph ephemeral key:
x = 0xC941BE5193189B476D5A0334114A3E04
BBE5B37C738AE40F150B334135288664
FEBFC5622818894A07B1F7AD60E28480
B4B637B90EA7D4BA980186B605D75BC6
y = 0xA154F7B93E8148652011F4FD52C9A06A
6471ADB28D0A949AE26BC786DE874153
ABC00B35164F3214A8A83C00ECE27831
B093528456234EFE766224FC2A7E9ABE
HASH (r_c | r_s): 00000: C3 EF 04 28 D4 B7 A1 F4 C5 02 5F 2E 65 DD 2B 2E 00010: A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
Export key generation. r value: 0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
Export key generation. UKM value: 0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
Export keys K_Exp_MAC | K_Exp_ENC used in KExp15 algorithm: 00000: 7D AC 56 E4 8A 4D C1 70 FA A8 FC BA E2 0D B8 45 00010: 45 0C CC C4 C6 32 8B DC 8D 01 15 7C EF A2 A5 F1 00020: 1F 1C BA D8 86 61 66 F0 1F FA AB 01 52 E2 4B F4 00030: 60 9D 5F 46 A5 C8 99 C7 87 90 0D 08 B9 FC AD 24
IV: 00000: 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
PMSEXP: 00000: 25 0D 1B 67 A2 70 AB 04 D3 F6 54 18 E1 D3 80 B4 00010: CB 94 5F 0A 3D CA 51 50 0C F3 A1 BE F3 7F 76 C0 00020: 73 41 A9 83 9C CF 6C BA 71 89 DA 61 EB 67 17 6C
- ————————–Client—————————
ClientKeyExchange message:
msg_type: 10
length: 0000E2
body:
exchange_keys: 3081DF0430250D1B67A270AB04D3F654
18E1D380B4CB945F0A3DCA51500CF3A1
BEF37F76C07341A9839CCF6CBA7189DA
. . .
93B03178E2EC003CA8A814324F16350B
C0AB534187DE86C76BE29A940A8DB2AD
71646AA0C952FDF411206548813EB9F7
54A1
00000: 10 00 00 E2 30 81 DF 04 30 25 0D 1B 67 A2 70 AB 00010: 04 D3 F6 54 18 E1 D3 80 B4 CB 94 5F 0A 3D CA 51 00020: 50 0C F3 A1 BE F3 7F 76 C0 73 41 A9 83 9C CF 6C 00030: BA 71 89 DA 61 EB 67 17 6C 30 81 AA 30 21 06 08 00040: 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 00050: 01 02 01 02 03 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 00060: 81 84 00 04 81 80 C6 5B D7 05 B6 86 01 98 BA D4 00070: A7 0E B9 37 B6 B4 80 84 E2 60 AD F7 B1 07 4A 89 00080: 18 28 62 C5 BF FE 64 86 28 35 41 33 0B 15 0F E4 00090: 8A 73 7C B3 E5 BB 04 3E 4A 11 34 03 5A 6D 47 9B 000A0: 18 93 51 BE 41 C9 BE 9A 7E 2A FC 24 62 76 FE 4E 000B0: 23 56 84 52 93 B0 31 78 E2 EC 00 3C A8 A8 14 32 000C0: 4F 16 35 0B C0 AB 53 41 87 DE 86 C7 6B E2 9A 94 000D0: 0A 8D B2 AD 71 64 6A A0 C9 52 FD F4 11 20 65 48 000E0: 81 3E B9 F7 54 A1
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 00E6
fragment: 100000E23081DF0430250D1B67A270AB
04D3F65418E1D380B4CB945F0A3DCA51
500CF3A1BEF37F76C07341A9839CCF6C
. . .
2356845293B03178E2EC003CA8A81432
4F16350BC0AB534187DE86C76BE29A94
0A8DB2AD71646AA0C952FDF411206548
813EB9F754A1
00000: 16 03 03 00 E6 10 00 00 E2 30 81 DF 04 30 25 0D 00010: 1B 67 A2 70 AB 04 D3 F6 54 18 E1 D3 80 B4 CB 94 00020: 5F 0A 3D CA 51 50 0C F3 A1 BE F3 7F 76 C0 73 41 00030: A9 83 9C CF 6C BA 71 89 DA 61 EB 67 17 6C 30 81 00040: AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 00050: 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 03 06 08 2A 85 03 07 00060: 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 C6 5B D7 05 B6 00070: 86 01 98 BA D4 A7 0E B9 37 B6 B4 80 84 E2 60 AD 00080: F7 B1 07 4A 89 18 28 62 C5 BF FE 64 86 28 35 41 00090: 33 0B 15 0F E4 8A 73 7C B3 E5 BB 04 3E 4A 11 34 000A0: 03 5A 6D 47 9B 18 93 51 BE 41 C9 BE 9A 7E 2A FC 000B0: 24 62 76 FE 4E 23 56 84 52 93 B0 31 78 E2 EC 00 000C0: 3C A8 A8 14 32 4F 16 35 0B C0 AB 53 41 87 DE 86 000D0: C7 6B E2 9A 94 0A 8D B2 AD 71 64 6A A0 C9 52 FD 000E0: F4 11 20 65 48 81 3E B9 F7 54 A1
- ————————–Server—————————
PMSEXP extracted: 00000: 25 0D 1B 67 A2 70 AB 04 D3 F6 54 18 E1 D3 80 B4 00010: CB 94 5F 0A 3D CA 51 50 0C F3 A1 BE F3 7F 76 C0 00020: 73 41 A9 83 9C CF 6C BA 71 89 DA 61 EB 67 17 6C
HASH(r_c | r_s): 00000: C3 EF 04 28 D4 B7 A1 F4 C5 02 5F 2E 65 DD 2B 2E 00010: A5 83 AE EF DB 67 C7 F4 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
Export key generation. r value: 0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
Export key generation. UKM value: 0xC3EF0428D4B7A1F4C5025F2E65DD2B2E
Export keys K_Exp_MAC | K_Exp_ENC used in KImp15 algorithm: 00000: 7D AC 56 E4 8A 4D C1 70 FA A8 FC BA E2 0D B8 45 00010: 45 0C CC C4 C6 32 8B DC 8D 01 15 7C EF A2 A5 F1 00020: 1F 1C BA D8 86 61 66 F0 1F FA AB 01 52 E2 4B F4 00030: 60 9D 5F 46 A5 C8 99 C7 87 90 0D 08 B9 FC AD 24
IV: 00000: 21 4A 6A 29 8E 99 E3 25
PMS: 00000: A5 57 6C E7 92 4A 24 F5 81 13 80 8D BD 9E F8 56 00010: F5 BD C3 B1 83 CE 5D AD CA 36 A5 3A A0 77 65 1D
- ————————–Client—————————
Random value k used in signature generation: 0x163962EEA268203E7C6B3F70BF8D4A36 34CE6E2CFC424687951D70ACE0B4292A
Signature value sgn_c = SIGN_d_c(HM): 00000: F7 1F 43 62 45 5B C5 5B A8 9A 8F AF 01 82 88 EC 00010: 00 B3 27 17 48 2E 76 24 B2 57 D9 79 7C 8F F6 02 00020: E3 15 FD BD 8D E5 6D 08 54 18 04 0E 1B 61 BB F6 00030: B3 01 AC 26 3D 50 03 8B 30 31 13 DB 36 17 50 3A
- ————————–Client—————————
CertificateVerify message:
msg_type: 0F
length: 000044
body:
algorithm:
hash: 08
signature: 40
signature:
length: 0040
vector: F71F4362455BC55BA89A8FAF018288EC
00B32717482E7624B257D9797C8FF602
E315FDBD8DE56D085418040E1B61BBF6
B301AC263D50038B303113DB3617503A
00000: 0F 00 00 44 08 40 00 40 F7 1F 43 62 45 5B C5 5B 00010: A8 9A 8F AF 01 82 88 EC 00 B3 27 17 48 2E 76 24 00020: B2 57 D9 79 7C 8F F6 02 E3 15 FD BD 8D E5 6D 08 00030: 54 18 04 0E 1B 61 BB F6 B3 01 AC 26 3D 50 03 8B 00040: 30 31 13 DB 36 17 50 3A
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0048
fragment: 0F00004408400040F71F4362455BC55B
A89A8FAF018288EC00B32717482E7624
B257D9797C8FF602E315FDBD8DE56D08
5418040E1B61BBF6B301AC263D50038B
303113DB3617503A
00000: 16 03 03 00 48 0F 00 00 44 08 40 00 40 F7 1F 43 00010: 62 45 5B C5 5B A8 9A 8F AF 01 82 88 EC 00 B3 27 00020: 17 48 2E 76 24 B2 57 D9 79 7C 8F F6 02 E3 15 FD 00030: BD 8D E5 6D 08 54 18 04 0E 1B 61 BB F6 B3 01 AC 00040: 26 3D 50 03 8B 30 31 13 DB 36 17 50 3A
- ————————–Client—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: 9D 64 0D D8 B2 54 6B 87 05 CC 3E 67 F3 BB 83 2F 00010: 89 2A 5B D5 D4 5C A0 44 85 01 14 C2 E6 56 02 69
MS: 00000: E3 18 17 B0 EC 7F 3B C9 4A 8B C4 5F 89 12 DE C5 00010: 71 2A 7A 34 78 56 31 C0 4B AE 81 43 EE 17 90 B4 00020: C9 D3 68 0F 6C 9D E1 70 74 58 C8 75 62 4D B6 ED
Client connection key material K_write_MAC|K_read_MAC|K_write_ENC|K_read_ENC|IV_write|IV_read: 00000: 50 52 5D 33 4E F7 00 6C 1D ED B8 B8 08 EA 03 CC 00010: CF 1F CB 3D 33 65 F9 72 E1 7C 7C 31 4E DD 97 90 00020: 6C 74 35 22 0A A1 B0 C6 DE 6A 1B 0F AC 29 B6 17 00030: 9E B3 23 86 62 25 E0 7F 30 4C A1 D1 27 75 86 29 00040: 7B 97 20 5D 7A 08 C2 CD 7F 60 3C 09 46 75 E6 C4 00050: CC 15 F2 84 0D 9A EC 63 F0 2A FF 51 DB D5 74 D2 00060: 76 6C 77 2B 83 2F CE 58 CB 4D E5 49 88 77 A6 7A 00070: A4 51 40 B2 ED 52 6E 61 65 0A 28 1B 32 56 35 BC 00080: CB 8E F9 4C 5B DF 5B 9F 47 48 B9 5B F1 B0 E0 BF
- ————————–Server—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: 9D 64 0D D8 B2 54 6B 87 05 CC 3E 67 F3 BB 83 2F 00010: 89 2A 5B D5 D4 5C A0 44 85 01 14 C2 E6 56 02 69
MS: 00000: E3 18 17 B0 EC 7F 3B C9 4A 8B C4 5F 89 12 DE C5 00010: 71 2A 7A 34 78 56 31 C0 4B AE 81 43 EE 17 90 B4 00020: C9 D3 68 0F 6C 9D E1 70 74 58 C8 75 62 4D B6 ED
Server connection key material K_read_MAC|K_write_MAC|K_read_ENC|K_write_ENC|IV_read|IV_write: 00000: 50 52 5D 33 4E F7 00 6C 1D ED B8 B8 08 EA 03 CC 00010: CF 1F CB 3D 33 65 F9 72 E1 7C 7C 31 4E DD 97 90 00020: 6C 74 35 22 0A A1 B0 C6 DE 6A 1B 0F AC 29 B6 17 00030: 9E B3 23 86 62 25 E0 7F 30 4C A1 D1 27 75 86 29 00040: 7B 97 20 5D 7A 08 C2 CD 7F 60 3C 09 46 75 E6 C4 00050: CC 15 F2 84 0D 9A EC 63 F0 2A FF 51 DB D5 74 D2 00060: 76 6C 77 2B 83 2F CE 58 CB 4D E5 49 88 77 A6 7A 00070: A4 51 40 B2 ED 52 6E 61 65 0A 28 1B 32 56 35 BC 00080: CB 8E F9 4C 5B DF 5B 9F 47 48 B9 5B F1 B0 E0 BF
- ————————–Client—————————
ChangeCipherSpec message: type: 01
00000: 01
Record layer message: type: 14 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0001 fragment: 01
00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01
- ————————–Client—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: C9 A4 80 DA 29 6C DD 12 3E 9A EB 26 88 8B 86 19 00010: EA 67 78 B7 23 FA A8 B2 DC 70 6A CB A5 AB AF 11
client_verify_data: 00000: 98 7C 13 E6 FA 16 F3 D5 10 AE 83 00 23 58 72 27 00010: 32 90 09 4C 8F C7 B5 F0 C7 D7 47 C4 27 35 F8 F1
- ————————–Client—————————
Finished message:
msg_type: 14
length: 000020
body:
verify_data: 987C13E6FA16F3D510AE830023587227
3290094C8FC7B5F0C7D747C42735F8F1
00000: 14 00 00 20 98 7C 13 E6 FA 16 F3 D5 10 AE 83 00 00010: 23 58 72 27 32 90 09 4C 8F C7 B5 F0 C7 D7 47 C4 00020: 27 35 F8 F1
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0034
fragment: 4DC53D655EDFD1843AF69ADBDE989C0B
1F0C0A1A0FD1B3F458029D8F9989FBF9
6C5C42971063A9B70714F412E4F6280F
7C21601B
00000: 16 03 03 00 34 4D C5 3D 65 5E DF D1 84 3A F6 9A 00010: DB DE 98 9C 0B 1F 0C 0A 1A 0F D1 B3 F4 58 02 9D 00020: 8F 99 89 FB F9 6C 5C 42 97 10 63 A9 B7 07 14 F4 00030: 12 E4 F6 28 0F 7C 21 60 1B
- ————————–Server—————————
ChangeCipherSpec message: type: 01
00000: 01
Record layer message: type: 14 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0001 fragment: 01
00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01
- ————————–Server—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: 4A 41 4C AD 20 F8 46 D8 F5 D1 05 26 10 A5 9D ED 00010: 6D 2B 1B B2 A8 9E 13 51 01 FC 9E 49 ED A8 0F B4
server_verify_data: 00000: 1E 93 7D A4 77 EE 1F 23 0A 41 D6 E9 D4 14 46 B7 00010: F2 1C A1 B2 E2 32 4A 55 2D 52 B3 25 5E B4 3D DF
- ————————–Server—————————
Finished message:
msg_type: 14
length: 000020
body:
verify_data: 1E937DA477EE1F230A41D6E9D41446B7
F21CA1B2E2324A552D52B3255EB43DDF
00000: 14 00 00 20 1E 93 7D A4 77 EE 1F 23 0A 41 D6 E9 00010: D4 14 46 B7 F2 1C A1 B2 E2 32 4A 55 2D 52 B3 25 00020: 5E B4 3D DF
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0034
fragment: F9887C3654B6CCC6AE7D7B18A46C663F
3D1DAF30C9A853A9871077FDD5CA063B
2C81BCC9D59FA6E3F5FAD9B2599BB586
854A2D76
00000: 16 03 03 00 34 F9 88 7C 36 54 B6 CC C6 AE 7D 7B 00010: 18 A4 6C 66 3F 3D 1D AF 30 C9 A8 53 A9 87 10 77 00020: FD D5 CA 06 3B 2C 81 BC C9 D5 9F A6 E3 F5 FA D9 00030: B2 59 9B B5 86 85 4A 2D 76
- ————————–Client—————————
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Record layer message:
type: 17
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0030
fragment: F14F06FB8557408846080690E7A5525D
1C6E9C901D24025486AB79728BF63D06
5C09C27233006D65CFF0B5BA87504969
00000: 17 03 03 00 30 F1 4F 06 FB 85 57 40 88 46 08 06 00010: 90 E7 A5 52 5D 1C 6E 9C 90 1D 24 02 54 86 AB 79 00020: 72 8B F6 3D 06 5C 09 C2 72 33 00 6D 65 CF F0 B5 00030: BA 87 50 49 69
- ————————–Server—————————
Application data: 00000: FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 00010: FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
Record layer message:
type: 17
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0030
fragment: 1561E52A8B6DB258746FFE18F3CDCB11
1D0173AF2E5C13741C99BFF13B47CD32
B3CED856A9506E706A2340D5841AB114
00000: 17 03 03 00 30 15 61 E5 2A 8B 6D B2 58 74 6F FE 00010: 18 F3 CD CB 11 1D 01 73 AF 2E 5C 13 74 1C 99 BF 00020: F1 3B 47 CD 32 B3 CE D8 56 A9 50 6E 70 6A 23 40 00030: D5 84 1A B1 14
- ————————–Client—————————
close_notify alert: Alert: level: 01 description: 00
00000: 01 00
Record layer message:
type: 15
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0012
fragment: E530C164642A078CEF528CB465E9DA7E
AD4D
00000: 15 03 03 00 12 E5 30 C1 64 64 2A 07 8C EF 52 8C 00010: B4 65 E9 DA 7E AD 4D
- ————————–Server—————————
close_notify alert: Alert: level: 01 description: 00
00000: 01 00
Record layer message:
type: 15
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0012
fragment: EB62E5AB78BF2A4B678920A11027EC43
0C3F
00000: 15 03 03 00 12 EB 62 E5 AB 78 BF 2A 4B 67 89 20 00010: A1 10 27 EC 43 0C 3F
A.2. Test Examples for CNT_IMIT Cipher Suites
A.2.1. Record Examples
It is assumed that the following keys were established during handshake:
- MAC key:
00000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
00010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff - Encryption key: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 - IV: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
- ——————————————————–
seqnum = 0
Application data: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Plaintext: 00000: 17 03 03 00 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
MAC: 00000: 30 01 34 a1
Ciphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 00 0b 86 71 cd bf 3c 1a ae 0f 62 4b 04
- ——————————————————–
seqnum = 1
Application data:
00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .... 007f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Plaintext: 00000: 17 03 03 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .... 007f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00804: 00 00 00 00 00
MAC: 00000: f7 c3 8b 8a
Ciphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 08 04 cf aa 0c b4 2f a5 a4 7a 13 3d 73 00010: b9 f2 c0 b0 4f 8c a2 55 52 f8 56 bc be 6a 58 fa .... 007f0: 3e e2 c7 6f a2 30 a0 44 be 21 dc 8e 1a 96 f9 a8 00804: 88 1f ad 83 45 96 96 84 47
A.2.2. Handshake Examples
The ClientHello.extensions and the ServerHello.extensions fields contain the renegotiation_info extension (see [RFC5746]) in the following examples.
Server certificate curve OID: id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA, "1.2.643.7.1.2.1.2.1"
Server public key Q_s:
x = 0x16DB0566C0278AC8204143994824236D
97F36A13D5433E990B2EAC859D2E9B7A
E054794655389158B8242923E3841B14
24FD89F221701C89D9A3BF6A9F946795
y = 0xD01E80DEC5BD23C8BC6B85F12BBB1635
A5AE7AD50DE24FB8FD02CB285A4AE65A
7D6FBB99AAFFDA80629826F2F7F73282
220444761615A06D082077C4A00FD4CF
Server private key d_s: 0x5F1E83AFA2C4CB2C5633C51380E84E37 4B013EE7C238330709080CE914B442D4 34EB016D23FB63FEDC18B62D9DA93D26 B3B9CE6F663B383303BD5930ED41608B
- ————————–Client—————————
ClientHello message:
msg_type: 01
length: 00003a
body:
client_version:
major: 03
minor: 03
random: 6A523D6880DCC2DC75CCC43CFD04B616
F5C3757B8077B76A9B504949FD3BFDB8
session_id:
length: 00
vector: --
cipher_suites:
length: 0002
vector:
CipherSuite: C102
compression_methods:
length: 01
vector:
CompressionMethod: 00
extensions:
length: 000F
Extension: /* signature_algorithms */
extension_type: 000D
extension_data:
length: 0006
vector:
supported_signature_algorithms:
length: 0004
vector:
/* 1 pair of algorithms */
hash: 08
signature:
41
/* 2 pair of algorithms */
hash: 08
signature:
40
Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
extension_type: FF01
extension_data:
length: 0001
vector:
renegotiated_connection:
length: 00
vector: --
00000: 01 00 00 3A 03 03 6A 52 3D 68 80 DC C2 DC 75 CC 00010: C4 3C FD 04 B6 16 F5 C3 75 7B 80 77 B7 6A 9B 50 00020: 49 49 FD 3B FD B8 00 00 02 C1 02 01 00 00 0F 00 00030: 0D 00 06 00 04 08 41 08 40 FF 01 00 01 00
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 003e
fragment: 0100003A03036A523D6880DCC2DC75CC
C43CFD04B616F5C3757B8077B76A9B50
4949FD3BFDB8000002C1020100000F00
0D0006000408410840FF01000100
00000: 16 03 03 00 3E 01 00 00 3A 03 03 6A 52 3D 68 80 00010: DC C2 DC 75 CC C4 3C FD 04 B6 16 F5 C3 75 7B 80 00020: 77 B7 6A 9B 50 49 49 FD 3B FD B8 00 00 02 C1 02 00030: 01 00 00 0F 00 0D 00 06 00 04 08 41 08 40 FF 01 00040: 00 01 00
- ————————–Server—————————
ServerHello message:
msg_type: 02
length: 00004D
body:
client_version:
major: 03
minor: 03
random: FE92C9516D0E1A67A04C33CD7F2C90B1
5E76DCC30815C19F92A6D100915AF2DB
session_id:
length: 20
vector: 12AAA5E5779014711CCD6D265BDEE519
1026431C83768EE5EB5A157F940BE9FB
cipher_suite:
CipherSuite: C102
compression_method:
CompressionMethod: 00
extensions:
length: 0005
Extension: /* renegotiation_info */
extension_type: FF01
extension_data:
length: 0001
vector:
renegotiated_connection:
length: 00
vector: --
00000: 02 00 00 4D 03 03 FE 92 C9 51 6D 0E 1A 67 A0 4C 00010: 33 CD 7F 2C 90 B1 5E 76 DC C3 08 15 C1 9F 92 A6 00020: D1 00 91 5A F2 DB 20 12 AA A5 E5 77 90 14 71 1C 00030: CD 6D 26 5B DE E5 19 10 26 43 1C 83 76 8E E5 EB 00040: 5A 15 7F 94 0B E9 FB C1 02 00 00 05 FF 01 00 01 00050: 00
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0051
fragment: 0200004D0303FE92C9516D0E1A67A04C
33CD7F2C90B15E76DCC30815C19F92A6
D100915AF2DB2012AAA5E5779014711C
CD6D265BDEE5191026431C83768EE5EB
5A157F940BE9FBC102000005FF010001
00
00000: 16 03 03 00 51 02 00 00 4D 03 03 FE 92 C9 51 6D 00010: 0E 1A 67 A0 4C 33 CD 7F 2C 90 B1 5E 76 DC C3 08 00020: 15 C1 9F 92 A6 D1 00 91 5A F2 DB 20 12 AA A5 E5 00030: 77 90 14 71 1C CD 6D 26 5B DE E5 19 10 26 43 1C 00040: 83 76 8E E5 EB 5A 15 7F 94 0B E9 FB C1 02 00 00 00050: 05 FF 01 00 01 00
- ————————–Server—————————
Certificate message:
msg_type: 0B
length: 000266
body:
certificate_list:
length: 000263
vector:
ASN.1Cert:
length: 000260
vector: 3082025C308201C8A003020102021478
94DC9D920977809191642F1DAEDC26BA
3B5104300A06082A8503070101030330
. . .
6C12D51F99C98A4A9904F0EA5486FED7
FF66AB8EB2425E1ACEAE8A758BDF843B
E1A8F6FEBF673015FED7AB86533DBF20
00000: 0B 00 02 66 00 02 63 00 02 60 30 82 02 5C 30 82 00010: 01 C8 A0 03 02 01 02 02 14 78 94 DC 9D 92 09 77 00020: 80 91 91 64 2F 1D AE DC 26 BA 3B 51 04 30 0A 06 00030: 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 30 19 31 17 30 15 06 00040: 03 55 04 03 13 0E 43 41 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 00050: 63 61 74 65 30 1E 17 0D 31 38 30 31 30 32 30 30 00060: 30 30 31 31 5A 17 0D 32 32 30 31 30 32 30 30 30 00070: 30 32 31 5A 30 21 31 1F 30 1D 06 03 55 04 03 13 00080: 16 53 65 72 76 65 72 20 35 31 32 20 43 65 72 74 00090: 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 30 81 AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 000a0: 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 000b0: 01 02 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 000c0: 00 04 81 80 95 67 94 9F 6A BF A3 D9 89 1C 70 21 000d0: F2 89 FD 24 14 1B 84 E3 23 29 24 B8 58 91 38 55 000e0: 46 79 54 E0 7A 9B 2E 9D 85 AC 2E 0B 99 3E 43 D5 000f0: 13 6A F3 97 6D 23 24 48 99 43 41 20 C8 8A 27 C0 00100: 66 05 DB 16 CF D4 0F A0 C4 77 20 08 6D A0 15 16 00110: 76 44 04 22 82 32 F7 F7 F2 26 98 62 80 DA FF AA 00120: 99 BB 6F 7D 5A E6 4A 5A 28 CB 02 FD B8 4F E2 0D 00130: D5 7A AE A5 35 16 BB 2B F1 85 6B BC C8 23 BD C5 00140: DE 80 1E D0 A3 81 93 30 81 90 30 0C 06 03 55 1D 00150: 13 01 01 FF 04 02 30 00 30 1A 06 03 55 1D 11 04 00160: 13 30 11 82 09 6C 6F 63 61 6C 68 6F 73 74 87 04 00170: 7F 00 00 01 30 13 06 03 55 1D 25 04 0C 30 0A 06 00180: 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 30 0F 06 03 55 1D 0F 00190: 01 01 FF 04 05 03 03 07 B0 00 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 001a0: 0E 04 16 04 14 AE 46 41 1B FD B3 08 C3 39 03 47 001b0: 57 57 2B 0F BF A3 6F 9A 99 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 001c0: 04 18 30 16 80 14 7F 7B 7A 15 61 A6 F2 18 A2 E3 001d0: 48 3B C6 39 D9 7F 42 DB 6D AF 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 001e0: 03 07 01 01 03 03 03 81 81 00 9C 49 78 F7 1B AB 001f0: 54 8A 25 6D 2A 18 7C A8 4D 72 4F E1 EF A7 E5 36 00200: 67 2E 79 1F 8A 0C B6 74 1E B1 63 E2 96 37 8C 5B 00210: 82 83 EE DA B4 1B A4 22 1E BC E2 05 F6 F8 79 CF 00220: EB F0 AD E9 36 07 0F B2 40 E5 0D 04 37 03 7F 2A 00230: EC 99 C7 CD 23 9F 6F 20 25 A8 6C 12 D5 1F 99 C9 00240: 8A 4A 99 04 F0 EA 54 86 FE D7 FF 66 AB 8E B2 42 00250: 5E 1A CE AE 8A 75 8B DF 84 3B E1 A8 F6 FE BF 67 00260: 30 15 FE D7 AB 86 53 3D BF 20
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 026A
fragment: 0B0002660002630002603082025C3082
01C8A00302010202147894DC9D920977
809191642F1DAEDC26BA3B5104300A06
. . .
EC99C7CD239F6F2025A86C12D51F99C9
8A4A9904F0EA5486FED7FF66AB8EB242
5E1ACEAE8A758BDF843BE1A8F6FEBF67
3015FED7AB86533DBF20
00000: 16 03 03 02 6A 0B 00 02 66 00 02 63 00 02 60 30 00010: 82 02 5C 30 82 01 C8 A0 03 02 01 02 02 14 78 94 00020: DC 9D 92 09 77 80 91 91 64 2F 1D AE DC 26 BA 3B 00030: 51 04 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 30 19 00040: 31 17 30 15 06 03 55 04 03 13 0E 43 41 20 43 65 00050: 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 30 1E 17 0D 31 38 30 00060: 31 30 32 30 30 30 30 31 31 5A 17 0D 32 32 30 31 00070: 30 32 30 30 30 30 32 31 5A 30 21 31 1F 30 1D 06 00080: 03 55 04 03 13 16 53 65 72 76 65 72 20 35 31 32 00090: 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 30 81 AA 30 000a0: 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 000b0: 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 000c0: 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 95 67 94 9F 6A BF A3 000d0: D9 89 1C 70 21 F2 89 FD 24 14 1B 84 E3 23 29 24 000e0: B8 58 91 38 55 46 79 54 E0 7A 9B 2E 9D 85 AC 2E 000f0: 0B 99 3E 43 D5 13 6A F3 97 6D 23 24 48 99 43 41 00100: 20 C8 8A 27 C0 66 05 DB 16 CF D4 0F A0 C4 77 20 00110: 08 6D A0 15 16 76 44 04 22 82 32 F7 F7 F2 26 98 00120: 62 80 DA FF AA 99 BB 6F 7D 5A E6 4A 5A 28 CB 02 00130: FD B8 4F E2 0D D5 7A AE A5 35 16 BB 2B F1 85 6B 00140: BC C8 23 BD C5 DE 80 1E D0 A3 81 93 30 81 90 30 00150: 0C 06 03 55 1D 13 01 01 FF 04 02 30 00 30 1A 06 00160: 03 55 1D 11 04 13 30 11 82 09 6C 6F 63 61 6C 68 00170: 6F 73 74 87 04 7F 00 00 01 30 13 06 03 55 1D 25 00180: 04 0C 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 30 0F 00190: 06 03 55 1D 0F 01 01 FF 04 05 03 03 07 B0 00 30 001a0: 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 AE 46 41 1B FD B3 001b0: 08 C3 39 03 47 57 57 2B 0F BF A3 6F 9A 99 30 1F 001c0: 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 7F 7B 7A 15 61 001d0: A6 F2 18 A2 E3 48 3B C6 39 D9 7F 42 DB 6D AF 30 001e0: 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 03 03 81 81 00 9C 001f0: 49 78 F7 1B AB 54 8A 25 6D 2A 18 7C A8 4D 72 4F 00200: E1 EF A7 E5 36 67 2E 79 1F 8A 0C B6 74 1E B1 63 00210: E2 96 37 8C 5B 82 83 EE DA B4 1B A4 22 1E BC E2 00220: 05 F6 F8 79 CF EB F0 AD E9 36 07 0F B2 40 E5 0D 00230: 04 37 03 7F 2A EC 99 C7 CD 23 9F 6F 20 25 A8 6C 00240: 12 D5 1F 99 C9 8A 4A 99 04 F0 EA 54 86 FE D7 FF 00250: 66 AB 8E B2 42 5E 1A CE AE 8A 75 8B DF 84 3B E1 00260: A8 F6 FE BF 67 30 15 FE D7 AB 86 53 3D BF 20
- ————————–Server—————————
ServerHelloDone message: msg_type: 0E length: 000000 body: --
00000: 0E 00 00 00
Record layer message:: type: 16 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0004 fragment: 0E000000
00000: 16 03 03 00 04 0E 00 00 00
- ————————–Client—————————
PMS: 00000: CE 0D D6 B6 70 42 12 15 2B E4 69 5A 7E 89 F6 4C 00010: 89 29 A4 0D BF 0A 5A 55 C2 CE 00 2B 06 BA B6 2F
Random d_eph value: 0xC96486B1A3732389A162F5AD0145D537 43C9AC27D42ACF1091CE7EF67E6C3CCA 0F6C879B2DA3C1607648BAEB96471BD2 078DF5CAAA4FA83ECC0FFD6D3C8E5D56
Q_eph ephemeral key:
x = 0x4B9CB381BCC737E493E43B2D7FD95BFE
2AEF6BE8F6224882E5E559ADA08170DC
49A815B3A1B3B323D2B50195153CFC60
DD6139C3770C5762A6A7719FABF84BFB
y = 0x95CEF28392C846A5EEFCB51C84E4960A
77B77D0D85EBD22061BFDA0013C5AB6C
42DDD04973F65D2AEB8A5427A53D6872
CF2D68F5F722C4640D7AAF2E0194FBD0
HASH(r_c | r_s): 00000: FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70 E7 AA 22 C1 10 DA 94 A9 00010: 9A 58 98 D8 45 27 C7 CB DE C1 1E 53 39 90 6A 1A
K_EXP: 00000: 3F D9 99 D1 68 4A 15 CC 9B DD 5A 35 06 7A F6 98 00010: 17 15 00 22 E0 95 54 AC 79 1A 60 F1 61 F5 53 49
IV: 00000: FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70
CEK_ENC: 00000: D6 22 D1 67 A5 64 2E 29 52 5A 29 5C B9 F2 8F 96 00010: F2 8B 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE E1 49 B0 11 78 C2 DF D5
CEK_MAC: 00000: 4C 93 36 57
PMSEXP: 00000: FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70 D6 22 D1 67 A5 64 2E 29 00010: 52 5A 29 5C B9 F2 8F 96 F2 8B 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE 00020: E1 49 B0 11 78 C2 DF D5 4C 93 36 57
- ————————–Client—————————
ClientKeyExchange message:
msg_type: 10
length: 0000F5
body:
exchange_keys: 3081F23081EF30280420D622D167A564
2E29525A295CB9F28F96F28B0EFAA7D3
A2BEE149B01178C2DFD504044C933657
. . .
DABF6120D2EB850D7DB7770A96E4841C
B5FCEEA546C89283F2CE950408FBF39D
10E800AF70
00000: 10 00 00 F5 30 81 F2 30 81 EF 30 28 04 20 D6 22 00010: D1 67 A5 64 2E 29 52 5A 29 5C B9 F2 8F 96 F2 8B 00020: 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE E1 49 B0 11 78 C2 DF D5 04 04 00030: 4C 93 36 57 A0 81 C2 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 05 00040: 01 01 A0 81 AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 00050: 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 02 01 06 08 00060: 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00 04 81 80 FB 00070: 4B F8 AB 9F 71 A7 A6 62 57 0C 77 C3 39 61 DD 60 00080: FC 3C 15 95 01 B5 D2 23 B3 B3 A1 B3 15 A8 49 DC 00090: 70 81 A0 AD 59 E5 E5 82 48 22 F6 E8 6B EF 2A FE 000A0: 5B D9 7F 2D 3B E4 93 E4 37 C7 BC 81 B3 9C 4B D0 000B0: FB 94 01 2E AF 7A 0D 64 C4 22 F7 F5 68 2D CF 72 000C0: 68 3D A5 27 54 8A EB 2A 5D F6 73 49 D0 DD 42 6C 000D0: AB C5 13 00 DA BF 61 20 D2 EB 85 0D 7D B7 77 0A 000E0: 96 E4 84 1C B5 FC EE A5 46 C8 92 83 F2 CE 95 04 000F0: 08 FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 00F9
fragment: 100000F53081F23081EF30280420D622
D167A5642E29525A295CB9F28F96F28B
0EFAA7D3A2BEE149B01178C2DFD50404
. . .
ABC51300DABF6120D2EB850D7DB7770A
96E4841CB5FCEEA546C89283F2CE9504
08FBF39D10E800AF70
00000: 16 03 03 00 F9 10 00 00 F5 30 81 F2 30 81 EF 30 00010: 28 04 20 D6 22 D1 67 A5 64 2E 29 52 5A 29 5C B9 00020: F2 8F 96 F2 8B 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE E1 49 B0 11 78 00030: C2 DF D5 04 04 4C 93 36 57 A0 81 C2 06 09 2A 85 00040: 03 07 01 02 05 01 01 A0 81 AA 30 21 06 08 2A 85 00050: 03 07 01 01 01 02 30 15 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 00060: 01 02 01 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 02 03 03 81 84 00070: 00 04 81 80 FB 4B F8 AB 9F 71 A7 A6 62 57 0C 77 00080: C3 39 61 DD 60 FC 3C 15 95 01 B5 D2 23 B3 B3 A1 00090: B3 15 A8 49 DC 70 81 A0 AD 59 E5 E5 82 48 22 F6 000A0: E8 6B EF 2A FE 5B D9 7F 2D 3B E4 93 E4 37 C7 BC 000B0: 81 B3 9C 4B D0 FB 94 01 2E AF 7A 0D 64 C4 22 F7 000C0: F5 68 2D CF 72 68 3D A5 27 54 8A EB 2A 5D F6 73 000D0: 49 D0 DD 42 6C AB C5 13 00 DA BF 61 20 D2 EB 85 000E0: 0D 7D B7 77 0A 96 E4 84 1C B5 FC EE A5 46 C8 92 000F0: 83 F2 CE 95 04 08 FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70
- ————————–Client—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: F8 D6 FE EB 17 64 4D 17 B0 38 36 A6 51 EB 87 69 00010: BD EA A2 D3 EB 18 47 F6 91 91 42 7C 30 D0 17 8E
MS: 00000: BE 57 46 C8 BB B7 84 7E 97 8F D4 C9 4F 52 34 52 00010: 44 2C 8E B1 72 FD E6 28 1C 18 C5 44 63 B1 F9 4C 00020: 2B D9 81 40 05 41 6D BB 0F 90 A5 7E A4 E0 6B 50
Client connection key material K_write_MAC|K_read_MAC|K_write_ENC|K_read_ENC|IV_write|IV_read: 00000: F3 37 F6 A8 6F F3 1F CA 52 EA 64 7C DE E3 B7 83 00010: 34 AB 77 B5 7F E0 DB 2F C0 C8 71 EC DC AC A5 A8 00020: FB A0 4C 21 32 82 3A 24 96 EF 93 6F 0E BC F3 0E 00030: A0 CB 7E AF 6C A7 94 75 4F 1F 45 B1 77 22 DE B4 00040: 4E 5B C3 2D 44 30 AF 58 93 11 6A CF 81 A3 BE 0C 00050: 90 D2 EA 8E 76 E0 84 07 28 BA F5 E2 B2 F9 40 C0 00060: AE 18 26 7B B6 34 C1 6A 1D 1A C1 24 73 50 95 4B 00070: 2F EE 9B 77 F3 0D 18 D5 54 01 2B 43 78 60 87 0A 00080: D9 21 A8 4B 07 FF 98 AF 8C 82 38 6B 91 FB BA 64
- ————————–Server—————————
PMSEXP extracted: 00000: FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70 D6 22 D1 67 A5 64 2E 29 00010: 52 5A 29 5C B9 F2 8F 96 F2 8B 0E FA A7 D3 A2 BE 00020: E1 49 B0 11 78 C2 DF D5 4C 93 36 57
HASH(r_c | r_s): 00000: FB F3 9D 10 E8 00 AF 70 E7 AA 22 C1 10 DA 94 A9 00010: 9A 58 98 D8 45 27 C7 CB DE C1 1E 53 39 90 6A 1A
K_EXP: 00000: 3F D9 99 D1 68 4A 15 CC 9B DD 5A 35 06 7A F6 98 00010: 17 15 00 22 E0 95 54 AC 79 1A 60 F1 61 F5 53 49
PMS: 00000: CE 0D D6 B6 70 42 12 15 2B E4 69 5A 7E 89 F6 4C 00010: 89 29 A4 0D BF 0A 5A 55 C2 CE 00 2B 06 BA B6 2F
- ————————–Server—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: F8 D6 FE EB 17 64 4D 17 B0 38 36 A6 51 EB 87 69 00010: BD EA A2 D3 EB 18 47 F6 91 91 42 7C 30 D0 17 8E
MS: 00000: BE 57 46 C8 BB B7 84 7E 97 8F D4 C9 4F 52 34 52 00010: 44 2C 8E B1 72 FD E6 28 1C 18 C5 44 63 B1 F9 4C 00020: 2B D9 81 40 05 41 6D BB 0F 90 A5 7E A4 E0 6B 50
Client connection key material K_read_MAC|K_write_MAC|K_read_ENC|K_write_ENC|IV_read|IV_write: 00000: F3 37 F6 A8 6F F3 1F CA 52 EA 64 7C DE E3 B7 83 00010: 34 AB 77 B5 7F E0 DB 2F C0 C8 71 EC DC AC A5 A8 00020: FB A0 4C 21 32 82 3A 24 96 EF 93 6F 0E BC F3 0E 00030: A0 CB 7E AF 6C A7 94 75 4F 1F 45 B1 77 22 DE B4 00040: 4E 5B C3 2D 44 30 AF 58 93 11 6A CF 81 A3 BE 0C 00050: 90 D2 EA 8E 76 E0 84 07 28 BA F5 E2 B2 F9 40 C0 00060: AE 18 26 7B B6 34 C1 6A 1D 1A C1 24 73 50 95 4B 00070: 2F EE 9B 77 F3 0D 18 D5 54 01 2B 43 78 60 87 0A 00080: D9 21 A8 4B 07 FF 98 AF 8C 82 38 6B 91 FB BA 64
- ————————–Client—————————
ChangeCipherSpec message: type: 01
00000: 01
Record layer message: type: 14 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0001 fragment: 01
00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01
- ————————–Client—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: F8 D6 FE EB 17 64 4D 17 B0 38 36 A6 51 EB 87 69 00010: BD EA A2 D3 EB 18 47 F6 91 91 42 7C 30 D0 17 8E
Finished message: msg_type: 14 length: 00000C body: verify_data: D3EE1DEA725CD7080C744311
00000: 14 00 00 0C D3 EE 1D EA 72 5C D7 08 0C 74 43 11
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0014
fragment: 8854A0ED0CCBDAE076FA7D22D763A8D1
AF701BBB
00000: 16 03 03 00 14 88 54 A0 ED 0C CB DA E0 76 FA 7D 00010: 22 D7 63 A8 D1 AF 70 1B BB
- ————————–Server—————————
ChangeCipherSpec message: type: 01
00000: 01
Record layer message: type: 14 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0001 fragment: 01
00000: 14 03 03 00 01 01
- ————————–Server—————————
HASH(HM): 00000: 9C 9F C4 E3 32 5B 5F B3 70 B9 94 2A 71 D2 6E F0 00010: 10 71 D8 A5 A1 8F 69 E8 C2 0B 70 CC 90 E9 A9 46
Finished message: msg_type: 14 length: 00000C body: verify_data: D6A2A697E9F23DB0F9017A79
00000: 14 00 00 0C D6 A2 A6 97 E9 F2 3D B0 F9 01 7A 79
Record layer message:
type: 16
version:
major: 03
minor: 03
length: 0014
fragment: 7BDDBB3C0A6A4A9E302B468CCD5CF786
665FFEBC
00000: 16 03 03 00 14 7B DD BB 3C 0A 6A 4A 9E 30 2B 46 00010: 8C CD 5C F7 86 66 5F FE BC
- ————————–Client—————————
Application data: 00000: 48 45 4C 4F 0A
Record layer message: type: 17 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0009 fragment: A8951D9389D1AEFE3B
00000: 17 03 03 00 09 A8 95 1D 93 89 D1 AE FE 3B
- ————————–Server—————————
Application data: 00000: 48 45 4C 4F 0A
Record layer message: type: 17 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0009 fragment: 0F368E5CEC86B4F8D7
00000: 17 03 03 00 09 0F 36 8E 5C EC 86 B4 F8 D7
- ————————–Client—————————
close_notify alert: Alert: level: 01 description: 00
00000: 01 00
Record layer message: type: 15 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0006 fragment: F91FCD98F309
00000: 15 03 03 00 06 F9 1F CD 98 F3 09
- ————————–Server—————————
close_notify alert: Alert: level: 01 description: 00
00000: 01 00
Record layer message: type: 15 version: major: 03 minor: 03 length: 0006 fragment: 117B57AD5FED
00000: 15 03 03 00 06 11 7B 57 AD 5F ED
Contributors
Ekaterina Griboedova CryptoPro Email: griboedova.e.s@gmail.com
Grigory Sedov CryptoPro Email: sedovgk@cryptopro.ru
Dmitry Eremin-Solenikov Auriga Email: dbaryshkov@gmail.com
Lidiia Nikiforova CryptoPro Email: nikiforova@cryptopro.ru
Authors' Addresses
Stanislav Smyshlyaev (editor) CryptoPro 18, Suschevsky val Moscow 127018 Russian Federation Phone: +7 (495) 995-48-20 Email: svs@cryptopro.ru
Dmitry Belyavskiy Cryptocom 14/2, Kedrova St. Moscow 117218 Russian Federation Email: beldmit@gmail.com
Evgeny Alekseev CryptoPro 18, Suschevsky val Moscow 127018 Russian Federation Email: alekseev@cryptopro.ru
/home/gen.uk/domains/wiki.gen.uk/public_html/data/pages/rfc/rfc9189.txt · Last modified: 2022/03/14 18:52 by 127.0.0.1