GENWiki

Premier IT Outsourcing and Support Services within the UK

User Tools

Site Tools


rfc:rfc8910



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. Kumari Request for Comments: 8910 Google Obsoletes: 7710 E. Kline Updates: 3679 Loon Category: Standards Track September 2020 ISSN: 2070-1721

Captive-Portal Identification in DHCP and Router Advertisements (RAs)

Abstract

 In many environments offering short-term or temporary Internet access
 (such as coffee shops), it is common to start new connections in a
 captive portal mode.  This highly restricts what the user can do
 until the user has satisfied the captive portal conditions.
 This document describes a DHCPv4 and DHCPv6 option and a Router
 Advertisement (RA) option to inform clients that they are behind some
 sort of captive portal enforcement device, and that they will need to
 satisfy the Captive Portal conditions to get Internet access.  It is
 not a full solution to address all of the issues that clients may
 have with captive portals; it is designed to be one component of a
 standardized approach for hosts to interact with such portals.  While
 this document defines how the network operator may convey the captive
 portal API endpoint to hosts, the specific methods of satisfying and
 interacting with the captive portal are out of scope of this
 document.
 This document replaces RFC 7710, which used DHCP code point 160.  Due
 to a conflict, this document specifies 114.  Consequently, this
 document also updates RFC 3679.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8910.

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction
   1.1.  Requirements Notation
 2.  The Captive-Portal Option
   2.1.  IPv4 DHCP Option
   2.2.  IPv6 DHCP Option
   2.3.  The Captive-Portal IPv6 RA Option
 3.  Precedence of API URIs
 4.  IANA Considerations
   4.1.  Captive Portal Unrestricted Identifier
   4.2.  BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options Code Change
   4.3.  Update DHCPv6 and IPv6 ND Options Registries
 5.  Security Considerations
 6.  References
   6.1.  Normative References
   6.2.  Informative References
 Appendix A.  Changes from RFC 7710
 Appendix B.  Observations from IETF 106 Network Experiment
 Acknowledgements
 Authors' Addresses

1. Introduction

 In many environments, users need to connect to a captive portal
 device and agree to an Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) and/or provide
 billing information before they can access the Internet.  Regardless
 of how that mechanism operates, this document provides functionality
 to allow the client to know when it is behind a captive portal and
 how to contact it.
 In order to present users with the payment or AUP pages, a captive
 portal enforcement device presently has to intercept the user's
 connections and redirect the user to a captive portal server, using
 methods that are very similar to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.
 As increasing focus is placed on security, and end nodes adopt a more
 secure stance, these interception techniques will become less
 effective and/or more intrusive.
 This document describes a DHCPv4 [RFC2131] and DHCPv6 [RFC8415]
 option (Captive-Portal) and an IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA)
 [RFC4861] option that informs clients that they are behind a captive
 portal enforcement device and the API endpoint that the host can
 contact for more information.
 This document replaces RFC 7710 [RFC7710], which used DHCP code point
 160.  Due to a conflict, this document specifies 114.  Consequently,
 this document also updates [RFC3679].

1.1. Requirements Notation

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
 capitals, as shown here.

2. The Captive-Portal Option

 The Captive-Portal DHCP/RA Option informs the client that it may be
 behind a captive portal and provides the URI to access an API as
 defined by [RFC8908].  This is primarily intended to improve the user
 experience by showing the user the captive portal information faster
 and more reliably.  Note that, for the foreseeable future, captive
 portals will still need to implement interception techniques to serve
 legacy clients, and clients will need to perform probing to detect
 captive portals; nonetheless, the mechanism provided by this document
 provides a more reliable and performant way to do so, and is
 therefore the preferred mechanism for captive portal detection.
 Clients that support the Captive Portal DHCP option SHOULD include
 the option in the Parameter Request List in DHCPREQUEST messages.
 DHCP servers MAY send the Captive Portal option without any explicit
 request.
 In order to support multiple "classes" of clients (e.g., IPv4 only,
 IPv6 only with DHCPv6 ([RFC8415]), and IPv6 only with RA), the
 captive network can provision the client with the URI via multiple
 methods (IPv4 DHCP, IPv6 DHCP, and IPv6 RA).  The captive portal
 operator SHOULD ensure that the URIs provisioned by each method are
 identical to reduce the chance of operational problems.  As the
 maximum length of the URI that can be carried in IPv4 DHCP is 255
 bytes, URIs longer than this SHOULD NOT be provisioned by any of the
 IPv6 options described in this document.  In IPv6-only environments,
 this restriction can be relaxed.
 In all variants of this option, the URI MUST be that of the captive
 portal API endpoint ([RFC8908]).
 A captive portal MAY do content negotiation (Section 3.4 of
 [RFC7231]) and attempt to redirect clients querying without an
 explicit indication of support for the captive portal API content
 type (i.e., without application/capport+json listed explicitly
 anywhere within an Accept header field as described in Section 5.3 of
 [RFC7231]).  In so doing, the captive portal SHOULD redirect the
 client to the value associated with the "user-portal-url" API key.
 When performing such content negotiation (Section 3.4 of [RFC7231]),
 implementors of captive portals need to keep in mind that such
 responses might be cached, and therefore SHOULD include an
 appropriate Vary header field (Section 7.1.4 of [RFC7231]) or set the
 Cache-Control header field in any responses to "private" or a more
 restrictive value such as "no-store" (Section 5.2.2.3 of [RFC7234]).
 The URI SHOULD NOT contain an IP address literal.  Exceptions to this
 might include networks with only one operational IP address family
 where DNS is either not available or not fully functional until the
 captive portal has been satisfied.  Use of IP Address certificates
 ([RFC3779]) adds considerations that are out of scope for this
 document.
 Networks with no captive portals may explicitly indicate this
 condition by using this option with the IANA-assigned URI for this
 purpose.  Clients observing the URI value
 "urn:ietf:params:capport:unrestricted" may forego time-consuming
 forms of captive portal detection.

2.1. IPv4 DHCP Option

 The format of the IPv4 Captive-Portal DHCP option is shown below.
     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    | Code          | Len           | URI (variable length) ...     |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    .                   ...URI continued...                         .
    |                              ...                              |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
             Figure 1: Captive-Portal DHCPv4 Option Format
    Code:  The Captive-Portal DHCPv4 Option (114) (one octet).
    Len:  The length (one octet), in octets, of the URI.
    URI:  The URI for the captive portal API endpoint to which the
       user should connect (encoded following the rules in [RFC3986]).
 See Section 2 of [RFC2132] for more on the format of IPv4 DHCP
 options.
 Note that the URI parameter is not null terminated.

2.2. IPv6 DHCP Option

 The format of the IPv6 Captive-Portal DHCP option is shown below.
     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |          option-code          |          option-len           |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    .                      URI (variable length)                    .
    |                              ...                              |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
             Figure 2: Captive-Portal DHCPv6 Option Format
    option-code:  The Captive-Portal DHCPv6 Option (103) (two octets).
    option-len:  The unsigned 16-bit length, in octets, of the URI.
    URI:  The URI for the captive portal API endpoint to which the
       user should connect (encoded following the rules in [RFC3986]).
 See Section 5.7 of [RFC7227] for more examples of DHCP Options with
 URIs.  See Section 21.1 of [RFC8415] for more on the format of IPv6
 DHCP options.
 Note that the URI parameter is not null terminated.
 As the maximum length of the URI that can be carried in IPv4 DHCP is
 255 bytes, URIs longer than this SHOULD NOT be provisioned via IPv6
 DHCP options.

2.3. The Captive-Portal IPv6 RA Option

 This section describes the Captive-Portal Router Advertisement
 option.
     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |     Type      |     Length    |              URI              .
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               .
    .                                                               .
    .                                                               .
    .                                                               .
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
               Figure 3: Captive-Portal RA Option Format
    Type:  37
    Length:  8-bit unsigned integer.  The length of the option
       (including the Type and Length fields) in units of 8 bytes.
    URI:  The URI for the captive portal API endpoint to which the
       user should connect.  This MUST be padded with NUL (0x00) to
       make the total option length (including the Type and Length
       fields) a multiple of 8 bytes.
 Note that the URI parameter is not guaranteed to be null terminated.
 As the maximum length of the URI that can be carried in IPv4 DHCP is
 255 bytes, URIs longer than this SHOULD NOT be provisioned via IPv6
 RA options.

3. Precedence of API URIs

 A device may learn about Captive Portal API URIs through more than
 one of (or indeed all of) the above options.  Implementations can
 select their own precedence order (e.g., prefer one of the IPv6
 options before the DHCPv4 option, or vice versa, et cetera).
 If the URIs learned via more than one option described in Section 2
 are not all identical, this condition should be logged for the device
 owner or administrator; it is a network configuration error if the
 learned URIs are not all identical.

4. IANA Considerations

 IANA has registered a new IETF URN protocol parameter ([RFC3553]).
 IANA has also reallocated two DHCPv4 option codes (see Appendix B for
 background) and updated the references for previously registered
 DHCPv6 and IPv6 ND options.

4.1. Captive Portal Unrestricted Identifier

 IANA has registered a new entry in the "IETF URN Sub-namespace for
 Registered Protocol Parameter Identifiers" registry defined in
 [RFC3553]:
 Registered Parameter Identifier:  capport:unrestricted
 Reference:  RFC 8910
 IANA Registry Reference:  RFC 8910
 Only one value is defined (see URN above).  No hierarchy is defined
 and, therefore, no sub-namespace registrations are possible.

4.2. BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options Code Change

 IANA has updated the "BOOTP Vendor Extensions and DHCP Options"
 registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters) as
 follows.
 Tag:  114
 Name:  DHCP Captive-Portal
 Data Length:  N
 Meaning:  DHCP Captive-Portal
 Reference:  RFC 8910
 Tag:  160
 Name:  Unassigned
 Data Length:
 Meaning:  Previously assigned by [RFC7710]; known to also be used by
    Polycom.
 Reference:  [RFC7710] RFC 8910

4.3. Update DHCPv6 and IPv6 ND Options Registries

 IANA has updated the DHCPv6 (103 - DHCP Captive-Portal) and IPv6 ND
 (37 - DHCP Captive-Portal) options previously registered in [RFC7710]
 to reference this document.

5. Security Considerations

 By removing or reducing the need for captive portals to perform MITM
 hijacking, this mechanism improves security by making the portal and
 its actions visible, rather than hidden, and reduces the likelihood
 that users will disable useful security safeguards like DNSSEC
 validation, VPNs, etc. in order to interact with the captive portal.
 In addition, because the system knows that it is behind a captive
 portal, it can know not to send cookies, credentials, etc.  By
 handing out a URI that is protected with TLS, the captive portal
 operator can attempt to reassure the user that the captive portal is
 not malicious.
 Clients processing these options SHOULD validate that the option's
 contents conform to the validation requirements for URIs, including
 those described in [RFC3986].
 Each of the options described in this document is presented to a node
 using the same protocols used to provision other information critical
 to the node's successful configuration on a network.  The security
 considerations applicable to each of these provisioning mechanisms
 also apply when the node is attempting to learn the information
 conveyed in these options.  In the absence of security measures like
 RA-Guard ([RFC6105], [RFC7113]) or DHCPv6-Shield [RFC7610], an
 attacker could inject, modify, or block DHCP messages or RAs.
 An attacker with the ability to inject DHCP messages or RAs could
 include an option from this document to force users to contact an
 address of the attacker's choosing.  An attacker with this capability
 could simply list themselves as the default gateway (and so intercept
 all the victim's traffic); this does not provide them with
 significantly more capabilities, but because this document removes
 the need for interception, the attacker may have an easier time
 performing the attack.
 However, as the operating systems and application(s) that make use of
 this information know that they are connecting to a captive portal
 device (as opposed to intercepted connections where the OS/
 application may not know that they are connecting to a captive portal
 or hostile device), they can render the page in a sandboxed
 environment and take other precautions such as clearly labeling the
 page as untrusted.  The means of sandboxing and a user interface
 presenting this information is not covered in this document; by its
 nature, it is implementation specific and best left to the
 application and user interface designers.
 Devices and systems that automatically connect to an open network
 could potentially be tracked using the techniques described in this
 document (forcing the user to continually resatisfy the Captive
 Portal conditions or exposing their browser fingerprint).  However,
 similar tracking can already be performed with the presently common
 captive portal mechanisms, so this technique does not give the
 attackers more capabilities.
 Captive portals are increasingly hijacking TLS connections to force
 browsers to talk to the portal.  Providing the portal's URI via a
 DHCP or RA option is a cleaner technique, and reduces user
 expectations of being hijacked; this may improve security by making
 users more reluctant to accept TLS hijacking, which can be performed
 from beyond the network associated with the captive portal.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
            RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.
 [RFC2132]  Alexander, S. and R. Droms, "DHCP Options and BOOTP Vendor
            Extensions", RFC 2132, DOI 10.17487/RFC2132, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2132>.
 [RFC3553]  Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
            IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
            Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, DOI 10.17487/RFC3553, June
            2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3553>.
 [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
            Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
            RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
 [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
            "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
 [RFC7227]  Hankins, D., Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Jiang, S., and
            S. Krishnan, "Guidelines for Creating New DHCPv6 Options",
            BCP 187, RFC 7227, DOI 10.17487/RFC7227, May 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7227>.
 [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
            Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
 [RFC7234]  Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
            Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching",
            RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7234>.
 [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
            2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
            May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
 [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
            Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
            "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
            RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

6.2. Informative References

 [RFC3679]  Droms, R., "Unused Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
            (DHCP) Option Codes", RFC 3679, DOI 10.17487/RFC3679,
            January 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3679>.
 [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
            Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
 [RFC6105]  Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
            Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6105>.
 [RFC7113]  Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
            Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC7113, February 2014,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7113>.
 [RFC7610]  Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
            Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
            RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7610>.
 [RFC7710]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., Ebersman, P., and S. Sheng,
            "Captive-Portal Identification Using DHCP or Router
            Advertisements (RAs)", RFC 7710, DOI 10.17487/RFC7710,
            December 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7710>.
 [RFC8908]  Pauly, T., Ed. and D. Thakore, Ed., "Captive Portal API",
            RFC 8908, DOI 10.17487/RFC8908, September 2020,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8908>.

Appendix A. Changes from RFC 7710

 This document incorporates the following changes from [RFC7710].
 1.  Clarified that IP string literals are NOT RECOMMENDED.
 2.  Clarified that the option URI MUST be that of the captive portal
     API endpoint.
 3.  Clarified that captive portals MAY do content negotiation.
 4.  Added text about Captive Portal API URI precedence in the event
     of a network configuration error.
 5.  Added urn:ietf:params:capport:unrestricted URN.
 6.  Noted that the DHCPv4 Option Code changed from 160 to 114.

Appendix B. Observations from IETF 106 Network Experiment

 During IETF 106 in Singapore, an experiment
 (https://tickets.meeting.ietf.org/wiki/IETF106network#Experiments)
 enabling clients compatible with the Captive Portal API to discover a
 venue-info-url (see experiment description
 (https://tickets.meeting.ietf.org/wiki/CAPPORT) for more detail)
 revealed that some Polycom devices on the same network made use of
 DHCPv4 option code 160 for other purposes
 (https://community.polycom.com/t5/VoIP-SIP-Phones/DHCP-
 Standardization-160-vs-66/td-p/72577).
 The presence of DHCPv4 Option code 160 holding a value indicating the
 Captive Portal API URL caused these devices to not function as
 desired.  For this reason, IANA has deprecated option code 160 and
 allocated a different value to be used for the Captive Portal API
 URL.

Acknowledgements

 This document is a -bis of RFC 7710.  Thanks to all of the original
 authors (Warren Kumari, Olafur Gudmundsson, Paul Ebersman, and Steve
 Sheng) and original contributors.
 Also thanks to the CAPPORT WG for all of the discussion and
 improvements, including contributions and review from Joe Clarke,
 Lorenzo Colitti, Dave Dolson, Hans Kuhn, Kyle Larose, Clemens
 Schimpe, Martin Thomson, Michael Richardson, Remi Nguyen Van, Subash
 Tirupachur Comerica, Bernie Volz, and Tommy Pauly.

Authors' Addresses

 Warren Kumari
 Google
 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
 Mountain View, CA 94043
 United States of America
 Email: warren@kumari.net
 Erik Kline
 Loon
 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
 Mountain View, CA 94043
 United States of America
 Email: ek@loon.com
/home/gen.uk/domains/wiki.gen.uk/public_html/data/pages/rfc/rfc8910.txt · Last modified: 2020/09/22 03:57 by 127.0.0.1

Donate Powered by PHP Valid HTML5 Valid CSS Driven by DokuWiki