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rfc:rfc8642

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Borkenhagen Request for Comments: 8642 AT&T Updates: 1997 R. Bush Category: Standards Track IIJ & Arrcus ISSN: 2070-1721 R. Bonica

                                                      Juniper Networks
                                                          S. Bayraktar
                                                         Cisco Systems
                                                           August 2019
           Policy Behavior for Well-Known BGP Communities

Abstract

 Well-known BGP communities are manipulated differently across various
 current implementations, resulting in difficulties for operators.
 Network operators should deploy consistent community handling across
 their networks while taking the inconsistent behaviors from the
 various BGP implementations into consideration.  This document
 recommends specific actions to limit future inconsistency: namely,
 BGP implementors must not create further inconsistencies from this
 point forward.  These behavioral changes, though subtle, actually
 update RFC 1997.

Status of This Memo

 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
 (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
 Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
 https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8642.

Borkenhagen, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8642 Policy Behavior for Well-Known BGP Communities August 2019

Copyright Notice

 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
 document authors.  All rights reserved.
 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
 publication of this document.  Please review these documents
 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
 to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
 described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

 1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
 2.  Manipulation of Communities by Policy . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
 3.  Community Manipulation Policy Differences . . . . . . . . . .   3
 4.  Documentation of Vendor Implementations . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.1.  Note on an Inconsistency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
 5.  Note for Those Writing RFCs for New Community-Like Attributes   5
 6.  Action Items  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
 7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
 8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
 9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
 Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1. Introduction

 The BGP Communities attribute was specified in [RFC1997], which
 introduced the concept of well-known communities.  In hindsight,
 [RFC1997] did not prescribe as fully as it should have how well-known
 communities may be manipulated by policies applied by operators.
 Currently, implementations differ in this regard, and these
 differences can result in inconsistent behaviors that operators find
 difficult to identify and resolve.
 This document describes the current behavioral differences in order
 to assist operators in generating consistent community-manipulation
 policies in a multi-vendor environment and to prevent the
 introduction of additional divergence in implementations.
 This document recommends specific actions to limit future
 inconsistency: namely, BGP implementors MUST NOT create further
 inconsistencies from this point forward.

Borkenhagen, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 8642 Policy Behavior for Well-Known BGP Communities August 2019

 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
 BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
 capitals, as shown here.

2. Manipulation of Communities by Policy

 [RFC1997] says:
    A BGP speaker receiving a route with the COMMUNITIES path
    attribute may modify this attribute according to the local policy.
 One basic operational need is to add or remove one or more
 communities to or from the set.  The focus of this document is
 another common operational need: to replace all communities with a
 new set.  To simplify this second case, most BGP policy
 implementations provide a syntax to "set" a community that operators
 use to mean "remove any/all communities present on the route and
 apply this set of communities instead".
 Some operators prefer to write explicit policy to delete unwanted
 communities rather than use "set", i.e., using "delete community *:*"
 and then "add community x:y ..." configuration statements in an
 attempt to replace all communities.  The same community-manipulation
 policy differences described in the following section exist in the
 syntax for both "set" and "delete community *:*".  For simplicity,
 the remainder of this document refers only to the "set" behaviors,
 which we refer to collectively as each implementation's '"set"
 directive'.

3. Community Manipulation Policy Differences

 Vendor implementations differ in the treatment of certain well-known
 communities when modified using the syntax to "set" the community.
 Some replace all communities, including the well-known ones, with the
 new set; others replace all non-well-known communities but do not
 modify any well-known communities that are present.
 These differences result in what would appear to be identical policy
 configurations having very different results on different platforms.

Borkenhagen, et al. Standards Track [Page 3] RFC 8642 Policy Behavior for Well-Known BGP Communities August 2019

4. Documentation of Vendor Implementations

 In this section, we document the syntax and observed behavior of the
 "set" directive in several popular BGP implementations to illustrate
 the severity of the problem operators face.
 In Juniper Networks' Junos OS, "community set" removes all
 communities, well-known or otherwise.
 In Cisco IOS XR, "set community" removes all communities except for
 the following:
          +-------------+-----------------------------------+
          | Numeric     | Common Name                       |
          +-------------+-----------------------------------+
          | 0:0         | internet                          |
          | 65535:0     | graceful-shutdown                 |
          | 65535:1     | accept-own rfc7611                |
          | 65535:65281 | NO_EXPORT                         |
          | 65535:65282 | NO_ADVERTISE                      |
          | 65535:65283 | NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED (or local-AS) |
          +-------------+-----------------------------------+
          Table 1: Communities Not Removed by Cisco's IOS XR
 Cisco IOS XR allows well-known communities to be removed only by
 explicitly enumerating one at a time and not in the aggregate -- for
 example, "delete community accept-own".  Operators are advised to
 consult Cisco IOS XR documentation and/or Cisco support for full
 details.
 On Extreme networks' Brocade NetIron, "set community X" removes all
 communities and sets X.
 In Huawei's VRP product, "community set" removes all communities,
 well-known or otherwise.
 In OpenBGPD, "set community" does not remove any communities, well-
 known or otherwise.
 Nokia's SR OS has several directives that operate on communities.
 Its "set" directive is called using the "replace" keyword, replacing
 all communities, well-known or otherwise, with the specified
 communities.

Borkenhagen, et al. Standards Track [Page 4] RFC 8642 Policy Behavior for Well-Known BGP Communities August 2019

4.1. Note on an Inconsistency

 IANA publishes a list of well-known communities [IANA-WKC].
 Cisco IOS XR's set of well-known communities that "set community"
 will not overwrite diverges from the IANA's list of well-known
 communities.  Quite a few well-known communities from IANA's list do
 not receive special treatment in Cisco IOS XR, and at least one
 community on Cisco IOS XR's special treatment list, internet == 0:0,
 is not formally a well-known community as it is not in [IANA-WKC] (it
 is taken from the Reserved range [0x00000000-0x0000FFFF]).
 This merely notes an inconsistency.  It is not a plea to protect the
 entire IANA list from "set community".

5. Note for Those Writing RFCs for New Community-Like Attributes

 When establishing new attributes similar to those in [RFC1997] (large
 communities, wide communities, etc.), RFC authors should state
 explicitly how the new attribute is to be handled.

6. Action Items

 Network operators are encouraged to limit their use of the "set"
 directive (within reason) to improve consistency across platforms.
 Unfortunately, it would be operationally disruptive for vendors to
 change their current implementations.
 Vendors MUST clearly document the behavior of the "set" directive in
 their implementations.
 Vendors MUST ensure that their implementations' "set" directive
 treatment of any specific community does not change if/when that
 community becomes a new well-known community through future
 standardization.  For most implementations, this means that the "set"
 directive MUST continue to remove the community; for those
 implementations where the "set" directive removes no communities,
 that behavior MUST continue.
 Given the implementation inconsistencies described in this document,
 network operators are urged never to rely on any implicit
 understanding of a neighbor ASN's BGP community handling.  That is,
 before announcing prefixes with NO_EXPORT or any other community to a
 neighbor ASN, the operator should confirm with that neighbor how the
 community will be treated.

Borkenhagen, et al. Standards Track [Page 5] RFC 8642 Policy Behavior for Well-Known BGP Communities August 2019

7. Security Considerations

 Surprising defaults and/or undocumented behaviors are not good for
 security.  This document attempts to remedy that.

8. IANA Considerations

 The IANA has listed this document as an additional reference for the
 [IANA-WKC] registry.

9. Normative References

 [IANA-WKC] IANA, "Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Well-known
            Communities", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
            bgp-well-known-communities>.
 [RFC1997]  Chandra, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP Communities
            Attribute", RFC 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC1997, August 1996,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1997>.
 [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
            Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
            DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
            <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
            2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
            May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

Acknowledgments

 The authors thank Martijn Schmidt and Qin Wu for the Huawei data
 point as well as Greg Hankins, Job Snijders, David Farmer, John
 Heasley, and Jakob Heitz.

Borkenhagen, et al. Standards Track [Page 6] RFC 8642 Policy Behavior for Well-Known BGP Communities August 2019

Authors' Addresses

 Jay Borkenhagen
 AT&T
 200 Laurel Avenue South
 Middletown, NJ  07748
 United States of America
 Email: jayb@att.com
 Randy Bush
 IIJ & Arrcus
 5147 Crystal Springs
 Bainbridge Island, WA  98110
 United States of America
 Email: randy@psg.com
 Ron Bonica
 Juniper Networks
 2251 Corporate Park Drive
 Herndon, VA  20171
 United States of America
 Email: rbonica@juniper.net
 Serpil Bayraktar
 Cisco Systems
 170 W. Tasman Drive
 San Jose, CA  95134
 United States of America
 Email: serpil@cisco.com

Borkenhagen, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]

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